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Abstract  
Confucian Terrorism: Phan Bội Châu and the Imagining of Modern Vietnam  
by  
Matthew A Berry 
Doctor of Philosophy in History  
University of California, Berkeley  
Professor Wen-hsin Yeh, Chair  
 
This study considers the life and writings of Phan Bội Châu (1867-1940), a prominent 
Vietnamese revolutionary and nationalist.  Most research on Phan Bội Châu is over forty years 
old and is contaminated by historiographical prejudices of the Vietnam War period.  I seek to re-
engage Phan Bội Châu’s writings, activities, and connections by closely analyzing and 
comparing his texts, using statistical and geographical systems techniques (GIS), and 
reconsidering previous juridical and historiographical judgments.  My dissertation explores 
nationalism, modernity, comparative religion, literature, history, and law through the life and 
work of a single individual.  The theoretical scope of this dissertation is intentionally broad for 
two reasons.  First, to improve upon work already done on Phan Bội Châu it is necessary to draw 
on a wider array of resources and insights.  Second, I hope to challenge Vietnam’s status as a 
historiographical peculiarity by rendering Phan Bội Châu’s case comparable with other regional 
and global examples. 
 
The dissertation contains five chapters.  The first is a critical analysis of Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam and Western research on Phan Bội Châu. I challenge claims that Phan Bội Châu should 
be interpreted solely as a ‘transitional figure.’   The second chapter investigates Phan Bội Châu’s 
near-obsession with martyrdom.  In it, I explore how Phan weaves together narrative and 
symbolic strands from Confucian and Catholic repertoires to justify martyrdom on behalf of the 
Vietnamese nation. The third and fourth chapters provide a detailed account of the famous trial 
of Phan Bội Châu by the Criminal Commission of Hanoi in 1925.  By evaluating the case against 
Phan Bội Châu in comparison with the research agendas presented in chapter one, I show that 
both history and law offer flawed ways of interpreting the legacy of a national hero.     The fifth 
chapter presents Phan Bội Châu’s 760-page commentary to the Book of Changes, a classical 
Confucian text that Phan Bội Châu re-interprets as a structural framework for understanding 
time, morality, and the inevitability of revolution.    
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Introduction 
Kim Liên village lies 15 kilometers due west from the center of Vinh, the capital of Nghệ 
An province, Vietnam.  The central (and really only) attraction of Kim Liên village is a lively 
mix of rustic, thatched-roof dwellings and imposing red-brick pagodas set apart by several large, 
square lotus ponds.  Hundreds, if not thousands, of Vietnamese arrive daily to pay homage to 
“Bác Hồ,” for this is the hometown of Nguyễn The Patriot, better known to the occasional 
international visitor as Hồ Chí Minh.  A military jeep, which Uncle Hồ rode back to his village 
on June 16, 1957, sits in what would otherwise be mistaken for a Buddhist temple.  The 
meticulously arranged traditionalistic decor and relentlessly earnest staff of this nationalist theme 
park leave little doubt it is a site of significance for Vietnamese visitors.   
Drive eight kilometers further west to where national route 46 meets the Cả river, and 
you will find, with a little difficulty, another anachronistic national historical site.  Here, 
overlooking the river some two hundred yards away, stands a statue of a Vietnamese mandarin 
that bears a striking resemblance to Vladimir Lenin.  At his right lies a small, clean museum with 
a rather bored staff of one.  This is the site of the “Phan Bội Châu Memorial House” and where 
Mr. Phan Văn San, later to become the namesake of the memorial house, lived from the age of 
two until the age of five (1869-1872).  Visitors, Vietnamese or otherwise, are rare.  Quite unlike 
Kim Liên village, this site is not on tour bus routes.   
Any literate Vietnamese living in or near a major city in 1925 would have been shocked 
to learn how little attention is now paid to the great patriot Phan Bội Châu.  For a brief but 
momentous period in French Indochina, Phan Bội Châu's name was on the lips of anyone able to 
read a newspaper.  If the reader was French, that name would likely have been uttered with no 
small degree of trepidation, if not anger, for Phan Bội Châu was known to be a most dangerous 
terrorist.  However, if the reader was Vietnamese, the name Phan Bội Châu conveyed a different 
meaning entirely: this was the Vietnamese revolutionary who stood up to the colonial 
administration and won.  As a symbol of dignified resistance, Phan Bội Châu had brought 
Vietnamese students, scholars, and secretaries into the streets for the first time, thus forcing the 
French governor general to grant clemency for the old patriot in the wake of a guilty verdict 
handed down by the Criminal Commission of 1925.   
A close contemporary of Sun Yatsen and Mahatma Gandhi, Phan Bội Châu had earned 
his reputation as Vietnam's foremost nationalist revolutionary by escaping French Indochina 
disguised as a Chinese merchant in 1905.  Setting up shop in Japan with the help of the famous 
Chinese journalist Liang Qichao, Phan Bội Châu quickly became a major nuisance for the 
French colonial administration by sending thousands of printed pamphlets back to Indochina 
encouraging young men to come join him abroad.  By 1908, over two hundred, including the 
cadet-branch royal Prince Cường Để, had done so in what later become known as the Đông Du 
(Eastern Travel) movement.  Thousands of other Vietnamese took part in clandestine 
organizations, such as the Duy Tân hội (Modernization Association), which provided financial 
and logistical support for those heading abroad.  Money and youth left Indochina, while Phan 
Bội Châu's pamphlets flooded in, contributing to growing domestic activism in Hanoi, Saigon, 
and the protectorate of Annam.    
While many degree-holding members of the Modernization Association encouraged a 
revitalization of Vietnamese education, other members who had fought against the French 
protectorate forces during the Cần Vương (Save the King) period (1885-1895) took a more 
aggressive stance.  A series of tax protests throughout Annam and parts of Tonkin in 1908 
encouraged members of the “militant-action group” such as Nguyễn Thành, Đặng Thái Thân, 
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and Đội Quyên to link up with the guerilla leader Để Thám in preparation for attacks on French 
military targets.  When plotters very nearly succeeded in poisoning French troops stationed at the 
citadel of Hanoi in June 1908, colonial security forces were obliged to respond with extreme 
prejudice.  The 1908 Criminal Commission of Tonkin sentenced thirteen of the Hanoi plotters to 
death, in whose possession Phan Bội Châu's pamphlets had been found.  Moreover, certain 
pamphlets, such as Việt Nam vong quốc sử (History of the Loss of Vietnam) and Hải ngoại huyết 
thư (A Letter from Overseas Written in Blood), took particular issue with the French taxation 
policies now targeted by angry protesters as far south as Bình Định province. Recognizing a 
colony-wide conspiracy at work, the security officers of the Bureau of Political Affairs identified 
Phan Bội Châu as public enemy number one, and took steps to dismantle the Modernization 
Association and arrest its membership.   
French security services did not distinguish between the “militant-action” and “peaceful 
action” wings of the Modernization Association.  For that matter, neither did their collaborators, 
the mandarins who still administered the provinces and districts of Annam and Tonkin on behalf 
of the Nguyễn court in Huế.  Degree-holders primarily interested in educational and political 
reform, such as Phan Châu Trinh, Lương Văn Cần, and Trần Quý Cáp faced arrest, 
imprisonment, and even execution.  Dynastic tribunals in Hà Tĩnh and Vinh sentenced Phan Bội 
Châu to death in absentia.  Meanwhile, diplomatic overtures to the Japanese government, 
brought an end to the Đông Du movement and to Phan Bội Châu's residency.  Many of the 
Cochinchinese students, whose parents had bankrolled the movement, were forced to testify 
upon their return.  
In disarray, the Vietnamese revolutionary movement shifted decisively toward militancy.  
While much of the older Cần Vương generation inside Indochina had been destroyed, a small 
cohort of militant northern students who remained close to Phan Bội Châu moved their 
operations to Hong Kong, Canton, and Siam.  Many in this northern cohort, including Hoàng 
Trọng Mậu, Phan Bá Ngọc and the brothers Trần Hữu Lực and Trần Hữu Công, hailed from the 
the same hardscrabble Nghệ Tĩnh region as Phan Bội Châu.  Others, such as Đặng Tử Mẫn, 
Đặng Đoàn Bằng, and Nguyễn Hải Thân, hailed from the provinces surrounding Hanoi in 
Tonkin.   Now being pursued by French intelligence services across East Asia, these young men 
learned the arts of subterfuge, bomb-making, and assassination, especially for application to real 
or suspected informers.  Phan Bội Châu did his best to offer these young men moral, and, when 
possible, financial support.   
The Xinhai Revolution of 1911 opened up a wide new range of options for Phan Bội 
Châu and his network of young revolutionaries.  Chinese contacts who Phan Bội Châu had met 
previously in Japan, Hong Kong, Canton, or Shanghai now rose to positions of political and 
military power.  Some, such as Hu Hanmin, Huang Xing, and Chen Qimei, held out the 
possibility of significant assistance for the Vietnamese revolutionary movement, which was now 
reconstituted as the Việt Nam Quang Phục hội (Vietnam Restoration Society).  Whereas Phan 
Bội Châu and his partisans had previously tolerated Prince Cường Để as their “useful idiot,” the 
depletion of most of the movement's Cochinchinese meant a political shift from monarchism to 
republicanism was in order.  Though Cường Để was “elected” president of the Quang Phục hội, 
he began to detach himself from Phan Bội Châu's increasingly radical organization, first leaving 
Canton for Saigon, then leaving Asia for Europe.   
In 1913, the conflict between Phan Bội Châu's partisans and French intelligence services 
reached a fever pitch.  Phan Bội Châu's proteges murdered several informers, complicating 
French efforts to keep tabs on the movement.  Others picked up new skills in Chinese military 
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schools.  Đặng Tử Mẫn lost three fingers in an accidental bomb explosion in Kowloon.   In April 
1913, a pair of high-profile assassinations rocked French colonial society.  Having received 
funds and grenades from Chen Qimei, the governor of Shanghai, Phan Bội Châu sent operatives 
into French Indochina with a plan to assassinate Governor General Sarraut during the triennial 
examinations in Nam Định.  The intended assassin Nguyễn Hải Thân lost his nerve, but others 
were successful at killing the tuần phủ (governor) of Thái Bình and two French military officers.  
The second attack took place in broad daylight on the terrace of the Hanoi Hotel, sending French 
living in Hanoi into a state of panic.   
French intelligence and diplomatic services redoubled their efforts to capture Phan Bội 
Châu and his lieutenants.  In January 1914, it seemed they had succeeded when Phan Bội Châu 
was placed under arrest by the incoming military governor of Canton, Long Jiguang.  However, a 
combination of intelligence failures and pressure from Beijing meant Phan Bội Châu remained in 
the custody of Long Jiguang for the next three years.  Released by his captor on Hainan island in 
1917, Phan Bội Châu reconnected with several of his compatriots, discovering that during his 
time in prison, the French had managed to dismantle the Quang Phục hội and kill a number of his 
followers.   
Phan Bội Châu entered a period of relative quiescence, moving his base of operations to 
Hangzhou, where he joined the editorial staff of the Chinese-language Military Affairs magazine 
where another of his former students Hồ Học Lãm worked.  Over the following two years, Phan 
Bội Châu took a number of long trips to Yunnan, Japan, Peking, and even Harbin.  During this 
period of reflection and reassessment, Phan Bội Châu undertook a pair of seemingly 
contradictory projects.  First, with Đặng Đoàn Bằng, he contributed to and edited Việt Nam nghĩa 
liệt sử (The History of Vietnam's Martyrs), a series of patriotic hagiographies recounting the 
lives and deaths of many of the young men who had flocked to his banner.  Second, with his dear 
companion Phan Bá Ngọc, son of the Cần Vương resistance leader Phan Đình Phùng, Phan Bội 
Châu composed a brochure entitled Pháp Việt đề huề chính kiến thư (A Proposal for a Franco-
Vietnamese Collaboration Policy).  This brochure, later published in the journal Nam Phong, 
resulted in a July 1919 visit from Sûreté officer Victor Néron, who offered Phan Bội Châu a 
pardon for his crimes and the possibility of a position and pension, provided he agree to submit 
to the French protectorate.  Although Phan Bội Châu rejected Néron's proposal, made on behalf 
of Governor General Sarraut, Phan Bội Châu, Phan Bá Ngọc, and Hồ Học Lãm continued to 
occasionally correspond with Néron.   
While living in Hangzhou, Phan Bội Châu published a number of serial novels in the 
Military Affairs magazine under Chinese pseudonyms.  These Chinese novels are decidedly Phan 
Bội Châu's most creative, thematically complex, and conceptually rich works.  Many, such as 
Ape Land, The Righteous Cat, and The Chronicle of the Pig King use animals to explore and 
critique human weaknesses.  Others grappled with the unintended effects of dehumanizing 
ideologies.  After the assassination in Hangzhou of his friend and fellow editor Phan Bá Ngọc at 
the hand of Cường Đẻ's hired gun Lê Hồng Sơn in 1922, Phan Bội Châu wrote deeply reflective 
stories questioning racism, the desire for violence, and nationalist warfare.   
The reflectiveness of this period gave way to renewed glorification of revolutionary 
terrorism in the wake of Phạm Hồng Thái's attempted assassination of Governor General Martial 
Merlin on Shameen island in Canton in 1924.  This event also renewed French interest in 
capturing Phan Bội Châu, who demonstrated his renewed commitment to revolutionary violence 
by taking a photograph with Phan Bá Ngọc's killer Lê Hồng Sơn.  In late 1924 and 1925, Phan 
Bội Châu also began communicating with Nguyễn The Patriot (later Hồ Chí Minh), whose father 
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had been Phan Bội Châu's neighbor and friend.   
French efforts to monitor, track, and capture Phan Bội Châu finally paid off on June 30, 
1925.  The capture of Phan Bội Châu, which was still rather haphazardly arranged and carried 
out, presented the French colonial administration with a number of serious legal and diplomatic 
issues.  One of these was already quite obvious: the May 30 Movement had unleashed a wave of 
Chinese indignation against foreign concessions and foreign colonial actions on Chinese 
territory.  Since Phan Bội Châu's capture had taken place on Chinese sovereign territory without 
an accompanying arrest warrant, the French consul simply placed Phan Bội Châu on a ship 
headed to Indochina.  Thus Phan Bội Châu became the problem of les grand commis Maurice 
Monguillot, Rene Robin, and Émile Jeanbrau.  A cascading series of security errors, legal 
interventions, and information leaks revealed how utterly unprepared the French administration 
was for the one thing it had sought most. 
As Phan Bội Châu sat in Hỏa Lò Central Prison in Hanoi during the hot month of July, 
the news of his capture and detention sent shockwaves throughout and beyond French Indochina.   
The colonial and foreign press coverage elicited growing support for the old revolutionary, who 
now took on the guise of an anodyne patriot.  In the face of this and the recent nomination of 
radical socialist Alexander Varenne as governor general of Indochina, the security services and 
administrators of French Indochina resolved to have justice done.  Phan Bội Châu was to go on 
trial for having inspired and ordered the 1913 attacks.  The responsibility for carrying out this 
trial was assigned to Jules-Joseph Bride, now president of the Criminal Commission of 1925.  
Bride was a uniquely appropriate adversary for Phan Bội Châu, who decided to fight the charges 
by every means he could think of.  Bride, intent on proving Phan Bội Châu's guilt well beyond a 
reasonable doubt, assembled a massive archive of documents, including testimonies, letters, 
reports, and printed works.  Bride's zealousness even got him into trouble with his superiors 
Robin and Monguillot who, while they did want Phan Bội Châu brought to justice, were also 
keenly aware that events outside of the courtroom might well play a role in the ultimate outcome.   
The trial of Phan Bội Châu, which began August 29 and culminated in a dramatic day of 
sentencing on November 23, proved to be a maddening affair.  Phan Bội Châu developed 
increasingly creative methods of denying the facts presented against him, driving Bride to 
expand his document collection, thereby extending the length of the trial.  The results of the trial 
were as conclusive as they were contradictory.  Bride's court proved Phan Bội Châu guilty, but 
Phan Bội Châu's epic defiance at the day of sentencing won him the support of the press and the 
Vietnamese public.  Meanwhile, the sheer amount of time Bride had taken to reach a verdict, 
meant that Governor General Varenne arrived in time to reverse the verdict with an order of 
clemency.  Thus it was that a revolutionary terrorist was absolved of his crimes and made into a 
national hero.   
In the 15 years that followed, Phan Bội Châu grappled with the consequences of his 
choices and the story of his life.  His years living in Huế were not easy, but they did afford him a 
steady stream of visitors, correspondence, and living companions.  Among those who came to 
share ideas and partake of the old man's wisdom were Trần Huy Liệu, Ngô Đình Diệm, Đào Duy 
Anh, and, in 1937, former Governor General Alexander Varenne.  His days were often spent 
with his friend and publisher Huỳnh Thúc Kháng.   
Phan Bội Châu managed to keep up a very active writing schedule, producing three-
quarters of his entire corpus during the final fifteen years of his life.  Much of this work involved 
writing and publishing poetry offering sly criticism of the French colonial administration.  He 
also addressed issues of social and cultural concern, thereby burnishing his reputation as a 
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scholar and dignified politician.  After writing his second autobiography, the Phan Bội Châu 
Niên Biểu, the old scholar-patriot undertook two extended reflections on the classical Chinese 
texts the Analects and the Book of Changes.  These works demonstrated that despite his age, 
Phan Bội Châu remained a brilliant thinker capable of expressing deep philosophical insights.   
Phan Bội Châu died on October 29, 1940, after constructing his own tomb of concrete in 
the courtyard of his home.  In the decades that followed, Phan Bội Châu's home in Huế would 
see solemn memorial services, the light of a postcolonial sun, and finally the terrible thunderings 
of violent conflict he had come to abhor in conflicted ways.  These decades saw Phan Bội Châu's 
reputation as Vietnam's most dangerous man eclipsed by others far more deserving of the title.  
Phan Bội Châu's revolutionary legacy was also convincingly overshadowed by that of Hồ Chí 
Minh, who represented revolutionary Marxism, an ideology Phan Bội Châu came to view with a 
certain degree of unease.   
The Contents of this Study 
In composing this study of Phan Bội Châu's life, writings, and legacy, I have sought to 
explore how competing narratives are resolved into history writ large.  Historical resolution is 
often similar to the kind of resolution that takes place in literature.  An author must make 
choices, and therefore so must an historian.  However, the historian is granted the one advantage 
of allowing conflicting viewpoints to sit uncomfortably alongside one another, without 
resolution.  That much I have attempted to do here.   
In chapter one, I review North Vietnamese and Western historical treatments of Phan Bội 
Châu, with the aim of pointing those histories back toward the conditions under which they were 
created.  The argument is simple: most historians have seen what they wish to see in Phan Bội 
Châu's life and work.  For historians such as Tôn Quang Phiệt, Trần Huy Liệu, and Chương 
Thâu, this means establishing Phan Bội Châu's character as unimpeachably good, while 
accepting that his worldview was deeply affected by his Confucian and even “feudal” 
upbringing.  These historians are thus able to explain away contradictions in Phan Bội Châu's 
actions and writing as the lasting negative effects of ideology.   
Western anti-war historians Georges Boudarel, William Duiker, and David Marr find the 
historiographical perspective of their North Vietnamese predecessors and colleagues an attractive 
means of explaining Vietnamese resilience in the face of French and American aggression.  For 
these historians, Phan Bội Châu represents a millenia-long tradition of violent resistance to 
outside rule.  The fact that Phan Bội Châu consistently drew on the Confucian repertoire 
throughout his life and neglected to ever identify “China” as a permanent existential threat to 
Vietnam in his histories is just one of the problems with this historiographical conceit.  I end this 
chapter with a critique of those historians who would see contradictions as the result of 
ideological failures.  To be understood, contradictions need to be embraced and explored, not 
resolved.  I argue that in this way, it becomes possible to conceptualize the complexity and 
nuance of thinking and acting during uncertain, dangerous, and changing times.   
The second chapter offers a deep reading of the 1917 hagiographic compendium Việt 
Nam nghĩa liệt sử (The History of Vietnam's Martyr's).  Using digital and analog techniques of 
textual analysis, this chapter explores the contradictions inherent in a work that claims to be 
nationally representative in scope, yet in practice valorizes the sacrifices of a distinct minority at 
the expense of Cochinchinese.  I also explore the manifold ways Phan Bội Châu and his fellow 
author Đặng Đoàn Bằng draw upon elements of the Confucian repertoire to establish the 
significance of deaths on behalf of the nation.  This chapter finally considers how the biographies 
and actions of individuals can be appropriated, recontextualized, or claimed by nationalist 
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histories - something that, ironically or not, happened to the author himself. 
The third and fourth chapters, intended to be read as a pair, provide a detailed narrative of 
the personally and nationally significant events of Phan Bội Châu's life from June until 
December 1925.  For these chapters, I rely on the wide variety of documents contained in the six 
dossiers pertaining to Phan Bội Châu available in the Centre nationale d'outre-mer.  In particular, 
I use telegrams, notes, reports, and press clippings to reconstruct a week-by-week account of the 
individuals responsible for capturing, prosecuting, and ultimately granting clemency to Phan Bội 
Châu.  I seek to explain how and why the trial ended up immortalizing Phan Bội Châu's 
courageous defense, despite herculean efforts to ensure Phan Bội Châu would be revealed as a 
duplicitous, manipulative, and power-hungry political operator.  These chapters also provide 
evidence showing how Vietnamese people and their allies were able to thwart the goals and 
actions of French colonial officials, and how those colonial officials worked at cross-purposes, 
despite having similar goals.  Finally, in chapter four, I consider the legacy of the trial, which did 
achieve a form of justice, only to have the verdict overturned for entirely political reasons.   
The fifth and final chapter presents a close reading of Phan Bội Châu's nearly 700-page 
exegesis on the Book of Changes, a classical Chinese cosmological divination text.  In this 
chapter, I consider the uniquely modern and revolutionary approach taken by Phan Bội Châu, 
based on his conception of ethical temporality.  By comprehending and harnessing the ethics of 
time, Phan Bội Châu valorizes the work of the individual, something quite unusual to find in a 
commentary on a Confucian text.  Because the work addresses aspects of philosophy and 
ideology, I argue that Phan Bội Châu's efforts represent his discursive resolution of his 
overlapping personal contradictions.   
1 
Chapter One  
Phan Bội Châu and National Historiography in Vietnam 
It is difficult to imagine a twentieth-century non-communist patriot who is thought of 
more fondly in a communist country than Phan Bội Châu. His name adorns major boulevards 
and important streets in the centers of nearly every Vietnamese city. Numerous articles and 
books have been written about him and his twenty-year career as an overseas revolutionary.1  In 
the roster of ardent Vietnamese patriots, his name comes second only to Hồ Chí Minh.2 Yet, 
strangely, it is commonly acknowledged that he failed in nearly every endeavor he undertook 
during his lifetime.3   Why should a traditional Confucian scholar with little to show in the way 
of success receive such acclaim, admiration, and praise from all levels of Vietnamese society? 
Furthermore, why should he prove to be such a popular subject in radical antiwar scholarship in 
the United States? 
To be sure, Phan sought and created a reputation for himself as being a fiery, outspoken 
opponent of the French colonial regime. He wrote scathing tracts and volumes exposing the 
brutality and illegitimacy of the French regime. These critical writings began prior to his initial 
escape to Japan in 1904 at the age of 37, and continued in secret even while he was under house 
arrest after his capture in 1925.  Phan’s writings circulated covertly and aroused widespread 
enthusiasm throughout Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina, the three protectorates comprising the 
“Vietnamese” portion of French Indochina.4  Word of bombing attempts and uprisings 
orchestrated by Phan further enlivened his image among his contemporaries in the colony even 
more. Nevertheless, Phan’s highly respected place in both North Vietnamese communist and 
Western antiwar historiography is only partially explained by these activities. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, parallel projects with clear political goals were proceeding in 
Hanoi, the capital of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (henceforth DRV) and on college 
 
1 A bibliography in a recent collection of essays concerning Phan Bội Châu lists no fewer than 50 
Vietnamese language volumes analyzing and interpreting Phan’s life story, activities, ideology, philosophy, and 
connections with contemporary individuals and groups. Another 92 articles are mentioned as well..  Chương Thâu, 
ed.. Nghiên Cứu Phan Bội Châu (Researching Phan Bội Châu) (Hanoi, VN: Nhà Xuất Bản Chính Trị Quốc Gia, 
2004), 759-773.  An older edited collection of essays about Phan and the Đông Du (Go East) Movement lists 22 
Western language, 161 Vietnamese language, and 33 Japanese language books and articles written about Phan and 
his activities. Vĩnh Sính, ed., Phan Bội Châu and the Đông-Du Movement (New Haven, CT: Yale Southeast Asia 
Studies, 1988), 193-213. These bibliographies are but the tip of the iceberg. I have discovered numerous additional 
independent essays, articles, books, commemorations, and poems written about Phan. 
2 William Duiker points out that, “it is significant that even communist historians today give Phan high 
marks as the greatest Vietnamese patriot for the first quarter of the present century.” Later he states, “If Ho Chi 
Minh is the paragon of all revolutionary virtues, Phan Bội Châu was his flawed but still revered predecessor.” 
William Duiker The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam 1900-1941( Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), 97, 
100. 
3 Phan himself readily admits this fact. In his second autobiography Phan writes, “Alas! My history is a 
history of countless failures without one single success.” Phan Bội Châu, The Autobiography of Phan Bội Châu. 
Trans. Vĩnh Sính and Nicholas Wickenden (HI: University of Hawai’i Press, 1999) 43. 
4 Christopher Goscha points out that the term ‘Vietnam” is relatively recent. Even up until the Geneva 
accords many communists still though in terms of “Indochina” or “Annam (Pacified South).”  Goscha points to the 
rise of the Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng (Vietnamese Nationalist Party) leading up to its violent insurrection at Yen Bay 
in 1930 as the most important event propelling the popularity of “Vietnam” as opposed to alternatives. Christopher 
Goscha, Vietnam Or Indochina?:Contesting Concepts of Space in Vietnamese Nationalism, 1887-1954 
(Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 1995), 65-66. 
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campuses in the United States, notably the University of California, Berkeley. In 1971, DRV 
“historian cadres” led by Trần Huy Liệu, a high-ranking member of the Communist Party, finally 
published the first volume of Lịch Sử Việt Nam (The History of Vietnam).5 It was the capstone of 
a long and contested effort to establish a national narrative that would both employ Marxist 
dialectics and symbolize the Vietnamese people’s deep-rooted and enduring spirit of resistance. 
At the same time, across the Pacific Ocean, David Marr published Vietnamese Anticolonialism 
1885-1925,  a history of patriotic Vietnamese resistance to foreign rule intended to dissuade the 
US government from continuing to prosecute what had become the Vietnam War.6 Marr, like 
many of his fellow antiwar scholars at the time, relied upon communist scholarship for much of 
his evidence and theories. 
In both narratives, Phan Bội Châu receives pride of place as the transitional figure 
bestriding the gap between a traditionalist, feudal, Confucian society dominated by elites, and a 
modern, socialist nation led by the Communist Party. It is my contention that the distinct 
political and ideological imperatives driving these narratives cause their authors to willfully 
overlook the complexity and subtlety of Phan’s life and thought. Rather than seriously 
considering Phan’s distinct and compelling vision of a Vietnamese nation, Vietnamese 
communists as well as the American antiwar scholars claimed him to be yet another a standard 
bearer for a primordial Vietnamese identity perpetually deployed in opposition to foreign 
aggressors. 
In this paper I will briefly describe the construction of a Vietnamese national narrative 
by the DRV during the 1950s, and show why it proved so seductive for radical US historians 
writing in the 1960s and 1970s. By then analyzing Vietnamese communist writings about Phan 
Bội Châu and comparing them to Western historiography, I seek to demonstrate why Phan came 
to function as the fulcrum between two time periods. I do not intend to downplay Phan’s 
importance as a nationalist, but rather to suggest that current articulations of his importance are 
inadequate. 
Wartime Political Ideology and the Writing of History 
Serious conflict between states is likely to produce hardline interpretations within them 
of history, culture, and the relationship with their enemies. In order to support its own  war 
effort, North Vietnam needed to produce a coherent, uncomplicated framework within which 
enemies could be clearly identified and positions clearly staked out. Kim Ninh has already 
demonstrated the chilling effect such an imperative had on the culture and intellectual stratum 
of the DRV.7  However, it proved more difficult to create a clear and consistent historical 
 
5 Trần Huy Liệu Lịch Sử Việt Nam (The History of Vietnam), vol. 1. (Hà Nội, VN: Khoa Học Xã Hội, 1971). 
The first volume, “begins with the prehistoric kingdom of Văn Lang and concludes in 1854 with the Locust Revolt 
led by Cao Bá Quát against the Nguyễn Emperor Tự Đức.”  Patricia Pelley,  Postcolonial Vietnam: New Histories of 
the National Past (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 40. Volume 2, which actually includes information 
about Phan Bội Châu, was not published until 1985.  Nevertheless, as indicated above, numerous monographs, 
articles, and books had already determined his place in the national narrative. 
6 David G. Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism 1885-1925 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1971). 
7 In A World Transformed, Ninh describes the effects of the communist party’s decision that all culture was 
in fact political. Working from Trường Chinh’s 1943 “Theses on Culture,” communist ideologues attacked the notion 
of “art for art’s sake.” Dissent against doctrinaire communist policies culminated in the Nhân Văn Giai Phẩm period 
during which intellectuals protested on behalf of intellectual freedom. By 1958, the party had subdued such dissent 
and reasserted control over cultural expression.  See especially Ninh, 121-163. 
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narrative for Vietnam. As Patricia Pelley shows in Postcolonial Vietnam, efforts to determine 
the “truth” of such important “facts” as the foundation of the nation, the mechanisms of socio-
economic progress, and the role of the communist party within history gave rise to years of 
fractious debate and infighting. The final result was a peculiar jumble of Marxist dialectics and 
descriptions of a timeless multi-ethnic national polity arranged unmistakably around a 
historical vision of a recurrent spirit of resistance against foreign invasions. 
US servicemen turned scholars likewise felt it was necessary to define and explain their 
enemy, even if only to suggest that this particular enemy should not be fought. In a concise and 
informative state of the field essay, Tuong Vu evaluates the “adolescent” period of English- 
language scholarship on Vietnam.8  Whereas earlier scholarship had doubted the strength or 
even the existence of a Vietnamese national identity and claimed that communism was an 
aberrant development, Tuong Vu finds that in the late 1960s “radicalized academia,” which had 
been influenced by social science paradigms, began to generate an entirely new perspective on 
Vietnam and its history.9 Although they had been funded or otherwise assisted by the US 
government, quite ironically, many of these new studies were “sympathetic to communist 
movements,” and sought to portray the NLF (National Liberation Front)/DRV as the inheritors 
of a “national tradition of resistance.”10 
Creating a National Narrative – Vietnamese Communist Scholarship during the 
Wars against Imperialism 
In the 1960s, the DRV faced the most powerful nation on earth in a battle for its survival. 
For North Vietnam this was total war, and total war necessitated the marshaling of all available 
forces to rally and sustain the national will, including Vietnam’s own history. As Pelley writes, 
“To dispel the fear (and the realization) that they were embroiled in a situation they did not 
control…they concocted narratives of unassailable coherence.”11  Initially, this meant producing 
substantive reactions against colonial scholarship, which had emphasized Vietnam’s inability to 
govern itself, and thus its need for a guiding hand.12  Pelley states, “Postcolonial narratives 
shifted the emphasis so that the history of Vietnam was structured not by defeat and submission 
but by resistance and opposition…Postcolonial productions stressed the strength and vitality of 
Vietnam and its history of unity.”13 
The creators of Vietnam’s new national narratives were not faceless communist 
bureaucrats. Many had previously been activists and most had been pressured out of positions 
within the party’s political leadership. The following section includes short biographies of 
those who played important roles in situating Phan Bội Châu within the history of national 
 
8 Tuong Vu, “Vietnamese Political Studies and Debates on Vietnamese Nationalism,” Journal of 
Vietnamese Studies, Vol. 2, Issue 1 (2007): 175-230. 
9 Tuong Vu in particular mentions the work of Bernard Fall, Hoàng Văn Chí, and Joseph Buttinger. For 
Fall, “the territorial basis of the modern Vietnamese nation [was] shaky,” and, “the Vietnamese also lack[ed] a 
political basis.” Hoàng Văn Chí did see“recurrent patterns of resistance to foreign invasion in Vietnamese history,” 
yet he nonetheless felt that the communists had betrayed the national cause and thus did not represent or embody a 
putative tradition of resistance. Buttinger argued that Vietnam’s identity as a nation was based not on ethnic ties but 
on communal ones. Buttinger suggested that South Vietnam best “represented the national aspirations of Vietnam,” 
and as such required and deserved US support.  ibid., 177-187. 
10 Ibid., 188-189. 
11 Pelley, 5. 
12 Ibid., 7. 
13 Ibid,, 8. 
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resistance. Trần Huy Liệu (1901-1969) was the historian par excellence of North Vietnam.14 He 
was born in the north of Nam Định province, but travelled to Saigon in 1924 to work as a 
reporter for the Vietnamese language newspaper Đông Pháp Thời Báo (The French Indochina 
Times).15  In this capacity, Trần Huy Liệu covered Phan Bội Châu’s 1925 trial in Hanoi. Later, 
while in Saigon, he compiled and published a pamphlet entitled “Việc Phan Bội Châu” (“The 
Phan Bội Châu Affair”).16  In 1926, he joined Đảng Thanh Niên (Jeune Annam), one of many 
organizations formed in impromptu fashion to demand amnesty for Phan Bội Châu after Phan 
had been sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labor.17 
Trần Huy Liệu joined the Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng (Vietnamese Nationalist Party) in 
1928 and served as the chairman of the party’s southern regional committee.18  In 1930, 
following the failed Yen Bay uprising, the French completely destroyed the organizational 
capacity of the VNQDĐ.   By this time, Trần Huy Liệu had already been arrested, having been 
sent to the Poulo Condore Penitentiary in 1929.19   He converted to communism while in prison, 
and continued to work clandestinely for the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) while officially 
employed as a journalist through the 1930s.20 During the August Revolution of 1945, Trần Huy 
Liệu made history himself by going to Huế to claim the imperial seal and imperial regalia from 
the former emperor of the Nguyễn dynasty, Bảo Đại.21  From 1953, Trần Huy Liệu served as 
chairman for the Research Committee on Literature, History, and Geography. From 1959, he 
served in top positions in the Institute of History.22 He was incredibly prodigious, writing articles 
on numerousof historical matters, organizing conferences, and playing a key role in determining 
both the national origins and the broader national narrative that would include Phan Bội Châu as 
its penultimate capstone. 
Tôn Quang Phiệt (1900-1973) was born in Phan Bội Châu’s home province of Nghệ An. 
In 1924, while studying at the Normal School in Hanoi, he was inducted into the Phục Việt 
(Vietnamese Restoration) Party during a reorganization drive.23 Previously, members of the Phục 
Việt Party had sought to forge an alliance with Phan’s Quang Phục Hội (Restoration League), but 
this effort failed in 1917 when the main leaders were arrested. Tôn Quang Phiệt himself was 
arrested in 1926, and was shuffled through ten separate prisons, finally ending up in Buon Ma 
Thuot.24 In 1930, the Phục Việt Party, and Tôn Quang Phiệt along with it, were absorbed into the 
ICP.25  In the mid 1930s, Tôn Quang Phiệt was invited to become the principal of the private 
 
14 Pelley calls him “The leading figure in the postcolonial historiographical project.”  Pelley, 21. 
15 Hue-Tam Ho Tai. Radicalism and the Origins of the Vietnamese Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1992),  122. 
16 David Marr,  Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920-1945 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1981), 16. 
17 Huynh Kim Khanh, Vietnamese Communism 1925-1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982), 
46. 
18 Ibid., 91. 
19 Peter Zinoman,   The Colonial Bastille: A History of Imprisonment in Vietnam, 1862-1940. (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 2001), 248. 
20 Ibid., 248-249. 
21 Pelley, 237. 
22 Ibid., 20-21. 
23 Tai, 84-85. 
24 Zinoman, 68. 
25 Tai, 148. Huynh Kim Khanh notes that Tôn Quang Phiệt had belonged, perhaps in addition, to the Tân 
Việt (New Vietnam) Party, which was also absorbed into the ICP in 1930. Huynh Kim Khanh furthermore cites 
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Thuan Hoa school in Huế.26 In that capacity, he pushed a leftist education platform while 
continuing to act as a clandestine ICP member.27  In 1946 he served as a representative to the 
first Vietnamese National Congress, while also holding other important party positions. 
Beginning in 1954, Tôn Quang Phiệt joined the Research Committee on Literature, History, and 
Geography and became a full-time academic. In 1954 he published, “Phan Bội Châu trong lịch 
sử chống thực dân Pháp của dân tộc Việt Nam” (Phan Bội Châu in the Vietnamese People’s 
History of Resistance to French Colonialism), a key statement on Phan’s significance in the 
Vietnamese national narrative.28 
Chương Thâu, about whom there is comparatively little available information, was born 
in 1935 and thus belongs to an entirely different generation of scholars. Chương Thâu 
nevertheless established his reputation as the foremost scholar writing on Phan Bội Châu, his 
life, his ideas, and his importance. A limited collection of Chương Thâu’s essays on Phan was 
published in 2004, and is 777 pages in length.29  In the foreword, his contemporary Vũ Ngọc 
Khánh remarks upon   Chương Thâu’s enthusiasm for his subject, depth of understanding, and 
professionalism.30  Chương Thâu’s numerous articles and books have played a significant role 
in thoroughly defining Phan’s place in Vietnamese history. 
In 1956, Trần Huy Liệu published an article on the Hùng kings, claiming that “if there had 
been no Hùng kings, then there would be no Đinh, Lê, Lý, Trần, Hồ, Lê, or Nguyễn [dynasties], 
and also no Democratic Republic of Vietnam.”31 This statement perfectly captures the North 
Vietnamese communist interest in establishing a coherent national narrative in which the Party 
itself is the end result.  Nevertheless, in order to firmly ground this supposedly historical 
tradition, Trần Huy Liệu and his colleagues first needed to prove that the Hùng kings had actually 
existed, and then to establish a logical chronology within which to situate them.  To do this, they 
relied on the DRV’s small but growing collection of archaeologists. 
In a fascinating analysis of North Vietnamese communist archaeological efforts and 
scholarship on prehistory, Haydon Cherry explains how internationally accepted theories on the 
Bronze Age in Vietnam were thoroughly conflated with the mythic tradition of the Hùng kings 
and their kingdom of Văn Lang. Communist archaeologists and historians had described  the 
Vietnamese Bronze Age as consisting of a sequence of four periods: (1) The Phùng Nguyên, (2) 
Đồng Đậu, (3) Gò Mun, and (4) Đông Sơn cultures. By doing so,they provided a material anchor 
for what was essentially a totally legendary period. As Cherry states, “The only true sources for 
this period are prehistoric relics: bronze drums, weapons, tools, ornaments, and household items, 
among others. They tell us much about the technological sophistication and economy of the early 
inhabitants of northern Vietnam. They tell us nothing about the Hùng kings and the kingdom of 
 
Nhuong Tong’s contention that Tôn Quang Phiệt provided the VNQDĐ with ideas for regulations and an action 
program.  Huynh, 92. 
26 Marr, Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 41. 
27 Ibid, 180. 
28 In 1958, Tôn Quang Phiệt expanded on his statements in a book entitled Phan Bội Châu và một giai 
đoạn lịch sử chống Pháp của nhân dân Việt Nam (Phan Bội Châu and a Period of the Vietnamese People’s History of 
Resistance to French Colonialism) ( Hanoi, VN: Nhà Xuất Bản Văn Hóa, 1958). 
29 Chương Thâu, ed. Nghiên Cứu Phan Bội Châu.  See above. 
30 Ibid., 9-13. Vũ Ngọc Khánh states, “the rays of [Chương Thâu’s] accumulated research make Phan Bội 
Châu’s image glisten more brightly every day.” 
31 Trần Huy Liệu, “Giỗ tổ Hùng Vương” (The Commemoration of Our Ancestors the Hùng Kings). Tạp san 
Nghiên cứu Văn Sử Địa (Journal of Literary, Historical, and Geographical Research) 17, 1 (May 1956): 3. 
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Văn Lang.”32 
Furthermore, dynastic histories that had previously dismissed as “feudal” were later 
readmitted into the national canon of statist histories.  This was part of a larger attempt to 
“establish a new chain of succession” that seemed to stretch ever farther back into time.33 This 
revived statist historical tradition shifted toward the Northern perspective, as opposed to the 
Southern viewpoint, which was closely associated with the former Nguyễn dynasty that had 
been based in Huế and drew support from the Mekong delta region.34 This narrative also 
sought to redefine all rebellions as essentially directed against foreigners or their internal 
collaborators.35  All rebels and resistance leaders that could be consolidated into a national 
narrative of resistance were stripped of any extraneous elements and brought into the fold. 
           Those that were either too difficult or too strange to co-opt were either labeled “feudal” 
or “reactionary” - or else ignored altogether.36  For instance, Phan Đình Phùng  was declared to 
be “patriotic,” while religious sects such as the Cao Đài and Hòa Hảo were conveniently 
whitewashed or ignored entirely. 
In 1955, Trần Huy Liệu broached the question of the date of  the origin of the Vietnamese 
nation.37 Using dynastic histories, myths, legends, Engels, and Stalin, DRV historians postulated 
various dates for Vietnam’s national origins. These  ranged from 1945 (the August Revolution, 
during which Hồ Chí Minh claimed independence from France), to 939 CE (the year the Ngô 
dynasty broke away from China), to 2879 BCE (the legendary beginning of the reign of the 
Hùng kings). Despite many carefully argued Marxist analyses that refused to extend Vietnam’s 
national origins beyond the historical era, the appeal of exceeding even the antiquity of China’s 
Xia dynasty (2070-1600s BCE) won out. 
This unjustified projecting of Vietnam’s national origins more than four millennia into the 
past reveals what was in fact a deeper historiographical issue. Pelley points out, “Historical 
materialism…is famously opaque; even though official historians were eager to innovate, they 
were often uncertain about how to read the national past according to Marxist structures and 
categories.”38 As a result, they either developed bizarre mixtures of Marxist dialectical theory 
and narratives of timeless resistance, or simply “refused to see class conflict or other forms of 
internal division as the motor of history.”39 Many national histories written by Vietnamese 
communists were thus not authentically Marxist at all. Nonetheless, the word “Marxism” carried 
 
32 Cherry, 131.  Cherry’s revelations make reading Keith Weller Taylor’s The Birth of Vietnam a real treat. 
Taylor, liberally citing Trần Quốc Vượng and other North Vietnamese archaeologists, tells the story of the Hùng 
kings and their society. Although he is careful to point out that Đông Sơn culture and the Hùng legends are distinct, 
his narrative suggests that parts of the myths originated from an actual historical polity. For instance, Taylor writes, 
“A modern Vietnamese linguist has associated Van-lang, the traditional name of the Hung kingdom, with 
phonetically similar words in the languages of minority peoples throughout the region bounded by the Yangtze and 
Mekong rivers that mean ‘people’ and, by extension, ‘nation.’”  Keith W. Taylor, The Birth of Vietnam (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1983), 3. 
33 Ibid., 29. 
34 Ibid., 31. 
35 Ibid., 38. 
36 George Dutton explains this historiographical conceit in an unpublished paper. 
37 Haydon Cherry, “Digging Up the Past: Prehistory and the Weight of the Present in Vietnam.” Journal of 
Vietnamese Studies, Vol. 4, Issue 1 (2009): 84-144. 107. 
38 Pelley, 10. 
39 Ibid. 
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with it the suggestion that a work was “scientific.”40 This made it possible, “to codify the ‘laws 
of historical development,’” and in turn appear, ‘disinterested, objective, and impartial.’41 By 
labeling works as “Marxist” or “historical materialist” that clearly were not, Pelley argues that 
Vietnamese historian cadres deprived these terms of “of any precise conceptual content.”42 
Pelley describes how DRV historian cadres engaged in long running debates about how 
to apply Stalin’s Marxism and the National Question to Vietnamese history. Interestingly, none 
of them seemed to have registered the fact that Stalin was expressly opposed to the ideas of 
nations or nationalism, and had written this text so as to better critique such concepts. Rather, 
they struggled for over a decade to determine if and when Vietnam had gone through periods of 
primitive communism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, and communism. They also considered 
and rejected the possibility of applying the concept of the Asiatic Mode of Production to 
Vietnamese history.43 Nevertheless, when the History of Vietnam was finally published in 1971, 
“the models had simply vanished.”44 In other words, once Marxist analyses had proven too 
cumbersome for the Vietnamese national narrative, they were abandoned. Faced with a choice 
of internally driven change motivated by internal tensions or an original and authentic essence 
based on demonstrable examples of courageous resistance, DRV historians usually opted for a 
qualified version of the latter.45 
Another term, “quốc túy” (national essence), received a whole new set of meanings. 
Pelley describes how Vietnamese borrowed the concept of national essence from Japan.46 DRV 
historians and cultural cadres rejected attempts made in the 1920s and 1930s to link national 
essence to language and literature, and instead aligned the notion with “the fighting spirit of the 
Vietnamese.”47  Having thus defined national essence, “official historians discerned the ‘spirit 
of resistance against foreign aggression’ all around them in the present and throughout the 
past.”48  This concept of national essence, which linked the present with the past, offered a 
powerful way to justify the suffering of the Vietnamese people during the war with the United 
States.49 Furthermore, it brushed notions of internal conflict under the rug and refocused 
attention on the underlying unity of the Vietnamese people. 
Coming to Terms with the Enemy: American Scholarship during the Vietnam War 
US scholarship on Vietnam in the late 1960s and 1970s is widely considered to have been 
of a substantially higher quality than that of previous generations. More scholars entered the 
field than ever before, and brought with them new techniques of analysis, interpretation, and 
 
40 Ibid., 43. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 44. 
43 Ibid., 54-58. 
44 Ibid., 61. 
45 As Pelley explains: “Official historians sometimes presented the Vietnamese past as transcendent and 
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46 Ibid., 141. 
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48 Ibid. 
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conceptualization.50 Where scholars had previously doubted the resilience and durability of the 
Vietnamese national polity, largely because of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN)’s increasing 
dysfunction and authoritarian tendencies, American and European academics now believed that 
“the Vietnam[ese] nation has been able to act as a political community with a distinct 
independent identity at countless times in history and has survived at great odds.”51  Legitimacy 
shifted from the ailing South Vietnamese regimes to the DRV and its tenacious, dedicated leaders 
who seemed to enjoy popular support. 
Among those leading this new charge were David Marr, William Duiker, Trương Bửu 
Lâm, and Huỳnh Kim Khánh. David Marr, currently professor emeritus at Australian National 
University, served as, “a US Marine Corps intelligence officer in Vietnam in 1962-63.’52 After 
his tour, during which he been “struck by the ability of the National Liberation Front to conduct 
complex political and military operations amidst some of the most difficult conditions 
imaginable,” Marr entered graduate school at UC Berkeley.53 As a result of his research, he 
became “convinced that the communists were going to win, largely because they were heirs to a 
strong national and anticolonial tradition.”54  He thus felt it was imperative to “convince fellow 
Americans that our actions in Southeast Asia were both disastrous and inhumane.”55 In order to 
do so, Marr examined the revolutionary career of Phan Bội Châu and other anticolonial activists, 
all the while assuming “a linear and uninterrupted relationship between history and current 
events in the idea of a unified, ultimately unstoppable force sweeping through Vietnamese 
history over two thousand years.”56  As Tuong Vu puts it, Marr’s research and arguments thus 
played a powerful role in “nationalizing Vietnamese history.”57 
Marr fought his battle on several fronts. First, in Vietnamese Anticolonialism, Marr 
introduced the concept of “anticolonialism,” as opposed to “nationalism.” This allowed him to 
evade the issue of tradition versus modernity. According to Tuong Vu, “anticolonialism,” as a 
discursive device, allowed “the Cần Vương, Đông Du and Việt Minh (the front organization for 
the Indochinese Communist Party during the war years) to be lumped together and a straight line 
be drawn from Phan Đình Phùng, a Cần Vương leader, to Hồ Chí Minh, the modern 
communist.”58  Such a line connecting the two necessarily included Phan Bội Châu. 
In addition, Marr introduced the English-speaking world to Nguyễn Khắc Viện, a 
communist intellectual with ties to France and the DRV.59  Nguyễn Khắc Viện stressed “the 
similarities between Confucianism and Marxism (e.g. a secular frame of reference and high 
moral standards).”60  According the Nihn, Nguyễn Khắc Viện’s views, , “were often quoted as 
exemplifying the uniqueness of Vietnamese Marxism’s seemingly comfortable connection with 
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51 Ibid., 189. 
52 Marr, Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, vii. 
53 Ibid. 
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55 Ibid. 
56 Tuong Vu, 190. 
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the country’s past.”61  Nguyễn Khắc Viện’s conceptual contention was reinforced by the French 
colonial scholar Paul Mus’s emphasis on the “mandate of heaven.” Mus had suggested that 
Vietnamese peasants would be more likely to accept communists because they would be seen 
simply as the next dynasty, having provided for the material needs of the people.62 
Theoretical explanations such as these that glossed over distinctions between 
Confucianism and communism in favor of an almost functional transition from one to the other 
served the interests of politically inspired scholars on both sides of the Pacific. William Duiker, 
professor emeritus at Pennsylvania State University, served as a Foreign Service officer in South 
Vietnam in the mid 1960s.63 Like his colleague Marr, Duiker was intrigued by the communists’ 
“ability to maintain their determination, sometimes in the face of great odds.”64   However, in 
contrast to Marr, Duiker saw the communists as something new, a modern force that owed as 
much to the changes wrought by French colonialism as it did to a legacy of anticolonial 
resistance.65 Nevertheless, Duiker did see a “primitive” consciousness prior to the twentieth 
century, “based on cultural and ethnic distinctiveness.”66  Drawing upon many of the same North 
Vietnamese communist sources as had Marr (including articles and books by Trần Huy Liệu, Tôn 
Quang Phiệt, and Chương Thâu), Duiker emphasized arguments more akin to “Marxist” ones 
published in the DRV, which focused upon the theoretical value of class-based analysis and the 
strategic importance of creating a cohesive, disciplined vanguard party. Duiker’s discussion of 
Phan thus targets his theoretical immaturity and inherent gullibility, yet nonetheless reinforces 
the idea of Phan as, “the hero, the apostle, and the martyr of independence, venerated by 20 
million slaves.”67 
Two Vietnamese scholars who studied and wrote in the United States, Trương Bửu Lâm, 
and Huỳnh Kim Khánh, made further contributions to the notion of a pattern or tradition of 
national resistance.68  Trương Bửu Lâm translated a great number of Vietnamese works into 
English “that appeared to assert an independent Vietnamese identity…dating back to the eleventh 
century.”69  Trương Bửu Lâm went so far as to claim that all traditional resistance movements 
were in fact “nationalist.”70 Taking perhaps a slightly more tactful approach, Huỳnh Kim Khánh 
claimed, “what has motivated the masses throughout history is patriotism, the social and 
institutional bases of which include ancestor worship and the ‘communal cult.’”71 Huỳnh Kim 
Khánh noted the effect of Chinese aggression over centuries, indicating that Vietnam had 
developed under the rather unique condition of perpetually facing an aggressive and immensely 
powerful neighbor. 
All of these scholars were responding intellectually and creatively to events on the 
ground. They were seeking to determine why the United States was losing to a small and 
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undeveloped country. With so much money, men, and weaponry being mobilized against the 
DRV, satisfying reasons for a lack of success were needed. As Ninh writes, “A number of 
influential academic works were authored by those who came to believe that the U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam could not succeed because it took into account so little of the political 
historical, and social impulses driving the Vietnamese.”72 Resolving to redress this critical 
oversight, American antiwar scholars turned to those who now seemed most knowledgeable 
about revolutionary Vietnam: Revolutionary Vietnamese. In his preface to Vietnamese 
Anticolonialism, Marr states: 
Some readers may feel that I have relied too heavily on publications from Hanoi. This 
is mainly because scholars in North Vietnam have moved far ahead of their 
contemporaries in the South in the patient collection, annotation, and publication of 
primary data on anticolonial activities…In secondary and interpretive works, 
historians in Hanoi appear to have been somewhat more attentive to modern scholastic 
practices.73 
Marr’s statements suggest that communist scholarship was indeed succeeding in its goal of 
being scientific, meticulous, and most importantly credible. This nevertheless begs the question 
of the degree to which Marr and his cohort drew on Vietnamese communist theories in addition 
to evidence. 
Communist adulation of an enduring four-millennia old national spirit corresponded 
uncannily well with the theoretical needs of US antiwar scholars.  If they could prove that an 
ethnic Vietnamese consciousness had existed throughout history and, even more importantly, 
that it had naturally culminated in the leadership of the communist party, then arguments for 
retaining a military presence in Vietnam would lose legitimacy. The  “scientific” scholarship 
of the DRV thus offered an apparently credible body of knowledge that confirmed for Marr, 
Duiker, and their colleagues all of their hypotheses regarding the strength of communism in 
Vietnam. 
Although the efforts of antiwar scholars indeed revealed a legacy of resistance to foreign 
invasion, it has subsequently been demonstrated that they overstated their case to no small 
degree. As Marr admits in a later book, one byproduct of their project, “has been to downgrade 
the historical significance of major transformations occurring during the colonial period in 
Vietnam (1859-1945).”74  Once a tradition of resistance had been isolated and defined, continuity 
took precedence over change. Great intellectual shifts and significant socioeconomic changes 
were condensed into the phrase “transitional period.” Tuong Vu furthermore blames a tendency 
toward “historical reductionism [in which] complex historical relationships were reduced to the 
‘patterns of Vietnamese resistance’ to foreign powers, and complex historical actors were 
simplified to two kinds, ‘resisters’ (or ‘patriots’) and ‘collaborators.’”75  Among the things shared 
by Vietnamese communist historians and US antiwar scholars was a desire to explain that which 
was essentially complicated in easy, clear terms. What had been gained in immediate 
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intelligibility ultimately came at the cost of subtlety, circumspection, and true comprehension. 
The Many Faces and the One Face of Phan Bội Châu 
Vietnamese communist historian cadres faced one other difficult problem. How could the 
timeless, essentialized spirit of Vietnamese patriotic resistance transcend the divide between 
traditional feudal society, where it had supposedly originated, and the modern communist party 
state, which now, it seems, embodied it? The existence of a codified lineage of national protectors 
and heroes frustrated efforts to establish a sequence of transformations informed by Marxist 
dialectics. Dedicated efforts to make theory apply even where it had no logical basis created a 
seemingly unique combination of historically productive socioeconomic revolutions alongside a 
Carlylean series of patriotic heroes stretching back into antiquity.76 
For Vietnamese communists in need of a hero capable of fulfilling the requirements of 
this bizarre schema, Phan Bội Châu offered almost everything. He embodied the best aspects of 
the Confucian tradition: Courage, loyalty, dedication, tenacity, and acuity. n addition, as an 
individual Phan was quite likeable. He made friends easily and made a significant effort to 
provide for those who followed him. At the same time, it was easy to claim Phan to be a product 
of his times and thus not responsible for various negative attributes: Gullibility, unsystematic 
thinking, political opportunism, and elite detachment. It was both possible and necessary to 
explain such unwanted elements away using selectively applied Marxist analyses. 
         In contrast, US historians could afford far more leeway with regard Phan, and  therefore 
engaged in critical analysis, interpretation, and evaluation of sources. Once they had 
demonstrated Phan’s transitional role in carrying the Vietnamese resistance movement from 
traditional royalism to modern nationalism, they could take whatever tact they wanted 
concerning his activities, connections, and intellectual development. Nevertheless, although 
antiwar scholars did take up some unorthodox issues, their reliance on North Vietnamese 
scholarship seems to have skewed their presentations of Phan toward the,“great man” style of 
analysis.  Indeed, Marr and Duiker’s accounts of Phan often seem like DRV accounts with the 
awkward Marxist frameworks removed. 
One critical question that DRV historian cadres needed to answer concerned Phan’s class 
background and ideological position. As elsewhere, opinions differed. The theoretical analyses 
produced by Tôn Quang Phiệt and Chương Thâu provide examples of the types of Marxist 
analysis employed.  In 1954, Tôn Quang Phiệt wrote an essay entitled “Phan Bội Châu Trong 
Lịch Sử Chống Thực Dân Pháp Của Dân Tộc Việt Nam” (Phan Bội Châu in the Vietnamese 
People’s History of Resistance to French Colonialism). Throughout this essay, he emphasizes the 
importance of economic and historical conditions when explaining Phan’s thoughts and actions.   
Tôn Quang Phiệt writes that Phan was, after all, “a product of his times.”77 
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Tôn Quang Phiệt claims that following the French invasion, the feudal class, to which 
Phan belonged, split into collaborationist and resistance sections.78 The French hold on the 
economy undermined the feudal class and gave rise to both a collaborationist bourgeoisie and an 
independent bourgeoisie.  Although the former had not the inclination, nor the latter the power to 
eject the French, together they produced an equally weakened proletariat class that toiled in their 
factories. Tôn Quang Phiệt argues that Phan’s family came from the very lowest echelon of the 
feudal class, which was closest to the people. As such, Phan attempted first to rally the feudal 
class to oppose the French and then to call upon the entire country to rise up.   
Phan conceived of the country as composed of ten classes.79 Tôn Quang Phiệt points out 
that Phan nevertheless failed to determine which class was the most revolutionary, or which class 
actually had the capacity to eject the French. Tôn Quang Phiệt thus argues that Phan only saw 
individuals driven to hate the French for emotional reasons and failed to conceive of classes that 
might resist the French because of their interests. In Tôn Quang Phiệt’s estimation, Phan simply 
could  neither figure out which class he represented, nor which class he should have represented. 
Chương Thâu’s treatment of Phan’s class background is far more thorough. In “Thời Đại 
và Nhà Tư Tưởng Phan Bội Châu” (The Era of the Thinker, Phan Bội Châu), written in 1967, 
Chương Thâu claims that colonialism spurred capitalism while restraining agriculture.80 Vietnam 
thus became “half colonized and half feudal,” which led to the general impoverishment of all. 
French policies and excessive taxation precipitated a social catastrophe in the countryside. 
French political, social, cultural, and economic policies created even greater divisions and 
contradictions within the Vietnamese body politic, leading to what Chương Thâu calls the, 
“revolutionization” of the people.81  By this, he means, history impressed upon the people the 
mission of national liberation. By using categories and theories of historical change drawn from 
Marxism and the National Question in such a haphazard way, Chương Thâu produces a 
productive theory of nationalism utterly at odds with Stalin’s original intent. 
Chương Thâu then evaluates the various classes to determine which would be able to 
take on this mission of national liberation. He feels that the peasantry, although imbued with 
revolutionary capability, lacked consciousness. The proletariat was of insufficient size and 
strength. The feudal class had been neutralized following the failure of the Cần Vương 
movement. Both the capitalists and the collaborators had risen under the wing of colonialism 
and had weak spirits. The petty bourgeoisie and urbanites were dependent on the colonial 
regime – and both groups were feeble and ineffective Furthermore, all of these groups lacked 
ways to represent their implicit ideologies. 
This left only the progressive patriotic scholars. According to Chương Thâu, scholar 
patriots were in essence,  using capitalist ideology borrowed from Europe via Chinese 
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reformers and revolutionaries based in Japan as a weapon. However, Phan mixed their ideas 
with his revitalized version of Confucianism. Phan rejected the old teaching methods and 
sought a Confucianism imbued with notions of “transformation.”82 Chương Thâu calls this a 
semi-bourgeois viewpoint, and claims it had been determined wholly by Phan’s economic 
position in society. 
Chương Thâu goes on to claim that Phan’s theoretical standpoint was “immature.”83 
Furthermore, his actions were “out of season.”84 This was because the bourgeois ideology that 
Phan relied upon emanated from Europe and was informed by Social Darwinism, and had 
become a weapon in the hands of the “executioners of nationalities” (i.e. colonialists and 
imperialists).85 Chương Thâu claims that all around the world , bourgeois nationalism was 
growing stale and becoming incapable of effectively opposing colonialism. Meanwhile, within 
Vietnam, contradictions were developing between socio-economic relations and the means of 
production. However, these contradictions went unnoticed and were thus invisibly generating a 
national revolutionary consciousness.  Thus, Chương Thâu asserts, Phan’s ideology was 
reflective of the  indomitable and unyielding spirit of the people at that time. Almost by 
default, Phan came to represent the national will that transcended particular interests.           
Furthermore, his revolutionary ideology represented the traditions of the people. According to 
Chương Thâu’s description, Phan was modern, traditional, bourgeois, Confucian, and patriotic 
- all at the same time. This bizarre use of Marxist theory to explain the development of a 
symbolic national will reflects the inventiveness and unorthodox character of Vietnamese 
communist historiography. 
Another example of Chương Thâu’s fanciful use of Marxist theory occurs in his essay 
written in 1962 entitled “Ảnh Hưởng của Cách Mạng Trung Quốc đối với Sự Biến Chuyển Tư 
Tưởng Phan Bội Châu” (The Influence of the Chinese Revolution on Changes in the Ideology 
of Phan Bội Châu).86  This essay explores connections between Phan and Chinese intellectuals 
such as Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, and Sun Yatsen. Chương Thâu. It begins by tracing the 
path of bourgeois revolution from the West to Meiji Japan, and from there on to Chinese 
revolutionaries and reformers in exile in Japan during the first decade of the twentieth  century. 
Their writings served to transport the ideas of the revolution to Vietnam and to Phan. 
Chương Thâu claims that a new social class arose in scattered patches at the end of the 
nineteenth century in the form of patriotic scholars who founded trading companies. He refers 
to such people as the nationalist bourgeoisie. Their ideology had just begun to develop and was 
taken directly from Japan via the writings of Kang and Liang.. Chương Thâu argues that Kang’s 
ideology “Reflected and represented the intentions and policies of the upper advanced section 
within contemporary feudal society and mainly the liberal faction of the bourgeoisie landlord 
class then rising, along with the demands and realistic political-economic interests of that 
class.”87 At the same time, along with these typical and stereotyped class labels: 
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Kang Youwei’s ideology was also the manifestation of the thousand-year old 
feudal ideological system that finally dissipated into the scholar intellectual class and 
melded with the bourgeoisie ideological line arising in that generation.  This was an 
example reflecting clearly the class nature and incomplete ideology of people in the 
‘new-old party’ during a moment when old and new were mixed together at the end of 
the Qing dynasty.88 
Through this uncritical forceful merging together of classes, traditions, and ideological 
directions, Chương Thâu is able to claim Kang, like Phan after him, to be both modern and 
traditional, bourgeois and feudal, as well as progressively idealistic and the product of socio-
economic conditions - all at the same time. In trying to make his Marxist framework cover 
everything, Chương Thâu depletes it of any theoretical value. 
It is possible to see a progression from Tôn Quang Phiệt’s staid analysis that essentially 
admits Phan had no class identity or ideological position to Chương Thâu’s creative assertion that 
Phan somehow embodied the national will. It makes much more sense if we recognize that 
Chương Thâu is in fact abandoning Marxist class analysis at the last possible moment by 
collapsing it into a patriotic populist tradition dependent on an entirely different set of 
imperatives unique to the Vietnamese circumstance.  Where Tôn Quang Phiệt is stymied by his 
own Marxist logic, Chương Thâu simply leaps beyond it. 
For Western scholars, Phan’s class background was decidedly less important. 
Unencumbered by the necessities of a Marxist framework, Marr simply notes that Phan was born 
to, “relatively poor scholar-gentry parents…[who were] careful to instill in him the Confucian 
virtues.”89  Duiker provides somewhat more information along the same lines. He notes that 
Phan’s father, “had little money, [but] he was determined to give Phan a traditional education.”90 
Duiker goes on to recite standard biographical information for Phan, including playing bình Tây 
(suppress the Westerners) with bamboo rods as a child and his organization of a “candidates 
army” in 1885 as a response to the Cần Vương edict.91  Marr and Duiker’s discussions of Phan’s 
early years follow his two autobiographies, and thus have a Confucian flavor.92 
By 1982 Chương Thâu was writing along the same lines as Marr and Duiker.  Chương 
Thâu’s “Thân Thế và Sự Nghiệp Cứu Nước của Phan Bội Châu” (The Life and Patriotic Career 
of Phan Bội Châu) covers Phan’s early life in 38 pages, yet scarcely mentions “class” or 
“ideology.”93  Rather, Chương Thâu’s focus has shifted to another important question: Phan’s 
connections. Chương Thâu begins by describing the character of the Nghệ Tĩnh region (Nghệ An 
and Hà Tĩnh provinces). Its people are “poor,” “generous,” and fiercely patriotic.94  Phan absorbs 
this character himself and in addition takes inspiration from the righteous uprisings of Phan Đình 
Phùng and the Cần Vương movement.95  Chương Thâu emphasizes Phan’s connections to former 
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Cần Vương participants and his ability organize them and obtain their support for his own 
activities at home and abroad.96 Doing so helps Chương Thâu solidify Phan’s association with the 
prior resistance tradition that was completely royalist in character. 
Another connection Chương Thâu establishes is between Phan and the common people of 
Nghệ Tĩnh. Chương Thâu writes, “Phan Bội Châu also had ‘empathetic’ friends amongst the 
ragged common people all over in poor villages and hamlets.”97  Chương Thâu furthermore 
describes Phan’s participation in local “opera singing” events during which he would sing 
patriotic songs and the common people would reciprocate.98  Chương Thâu thus not only 
reaffirms Phan’s reputation in popular culture, but also demonstrates his deep understanding and 
complex linkages with the peasantry of Vietnam. Marr picks up on this as well, noting, “Phan 
Bội Châu loved folk singing, especially the form of semi-competitive, extemporaneous rounds 
that were exchanged between groups of men and women.”99 
Even so, this is not the extent of it. Chương Thâu identifies Phan as one of the “Four 
Tigers of Nam Đàn.”100  Nam Đàn was the locality where Phan grew up, and the four tigers were 
all authors distinguished in their literary capabilities.  One of the other tigers was none other than 
Nguyễn Sinh Sắc, the father of Nguyễn Ái Quốc, better known as Hồ Chí Minh.101  Chương 
Thâu writes, “The friendship between Phan Bội Châu and Nguyễn Sinh Sắc was of the utmost 
loyalty.”102  This connection is part of a larger historiographical attempt to link Phan with 
directly with Hồ Chí Minh. Tôn Quang Phiệt claims that prior to his capture in 1925, “Phan Bội 
Châu was on his way to Guangdong to meet some revolutionaries, amongst whom was [Hồ Chí 
Minh]. Thus Phan would definitely have become a revolutionary.”103  The demonstration of a 
clear link between Phan and Hồ Chí Minh would make it much easier to claim that continuity 
existed between traditional scholar patriots and the communists. By 1982, it was this sort of 
connection, and not Phan’s class background or particular ideological motivations, that 
communist historians sought to prove. 
Westerners were also intrigued by possible connections between the two men. Marr, for 
instance, notes that “nine-year old Nguyen Ai Quoc had listened to [Phan] quoting lines of 
poetry which Nguyen never forgot.”104 Duiker, on the other hand, introduces another possible 
connection: That it was Hồ Chí Minh who betrayed Phan to the French in 1925.105  Duiker 
rejects this hypothesis, writing, “[Phan] was an ideal figure from the communist point of 
view…He would in all probability have posed little obstacle to communist control of the 
movement.”106 Antiwar scholars cared less about the necessity of a direct connection.  It was 
enough to prove that Phan served as an inspiration to communists and that he approved of their 
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activities. Nguyễn Khắc Viện, the elder communist voice speaking directly to American scholars, 
was happy to promote such an understanding. He wrote, “The great patriotic scholars Phan Bội 
Châu and Huynh Thuc Khang were attracted to the new doctrine (communism) as soon as it 
appeared in Vietnam. Unswerving enemies of the colonial regime, they felt a deep affinity with 
the new revolutionary cadres who were devoted body and soul to the national cause, as the 
scholars had been.”107 
As a final note on connections, we should consider a short article written by Trần Huy 
Liệu in 1962 entitled, “Nhớ Lại Ông Già Bến Ngự” (Remembering the Old Man of the Imperial 
Quay [indicating Phan]).108  In this oft-cited article, Trần Huy Liệu acknowledges Chương 
Thâu’s numerous scholarly contributions and offers a more off-the-cuff remembrance of Phan 
based an actual meeting Trần Huy Liệu had with him in 1935. Trần Huy Liệu compares Phan 
favorably to Phan Chu Trinh, who he also met, claiming that Phan was far more congenial and 
worthy of admiration. However, Trần Huy Liệu pointed out that Phan was far too trusting and 
easily duped. Whereas he had a sense of nationalism, his understanding of socialism was 
“utopian” and verged on “familism,” Trần Huy Liệu writes that he advised Phan not to write 
anything about socialism as he had no training in scientific Marxism, and instead to concentrate 
on writing an autobiography.109  Trần Huy Liệu concludes that Phan could not have succeeded 
because he lacked a, “scientific foundation that would allow [him] to believe that his actions 
followed historical laws.”110 
Marr specifically compares Phan with Trần Huy Liệu, claiming the difference between 
them lay in Trần Huy Liệu’s ability to, “turn vague impressions into organized knowledge.”111  
Marr thus concurs with communist assertions that Phan’s thinking lacked a certain theoretical 
undergirding necessary for success. Hue-Tam Ho Tai likewise compares Phan to Tôn Quang 
Phiệt, noting that both, “cared more about group rights than individual liberty and thought of 
liberation as a predominantly political process.”112  Tai’s observation is largely confirmed in 
Tôn Quang Phiệt’s analysis of Phan, in which again the key difference is suggested to be in the 
application of theory to practice. 
The Issue of Franco-Vietnamese Collaboration 
In 1918, Phan wrote an article addressed to the Governor General of Indochina, Albert 
Sarraut, offering the possibility of Franco-Vietnamese collaboration (đề huề).113  In it Phan 
suggested that he might cease violent activities if the French would help to develop Vietnam’s 
economy and cultural level. The article was translated from Chinese into Vietnamese and 
subsequently published in Tạp Chí Nam Phong (Southern Wind).114  Although Phan quickly 
retracted his statements, claiming that he had been duped by French agents117  and that the 
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translation of his article into Vietnamese contained serious misrepresentations of his ideas,118  
the damage had been done.115 The article understandably caused communist historians and, to 
a lesser extent, their American counterparts, no small amount of grief. How was such an 
article that so obviously contradicted Phan’s image as a die-hard revolutionary to be 
explained? 
The representative communist response is given by Chương Thâu. In an article attacking, 
“so-called ‘researchers’ and ‘theorists’ using misinterpretations of Phan Bội Châu in order to 
serve vile political goals (here indicating researchers in South Vietnam),” Chương Thâu brings 
up the collaboration article.116  In particular, Chương Thâu mocks one Phan Xuân Hòa for 
claiming both that the article was written in 1912 (instead of 1918) and that, “the Franco-
Vietnamese collaboration [article] was like a wind blowing onto a pile of revolutionary coal and 
thus lighting once again the flame.”117  In Chương Thâu’s mind, collaboration and revolution are 
absolutely incompatible.118  By suggesting that they might be in some way complementary, Phan 
Xuân Hòa was proving himself to be a “lackey of the American imperialists.”119 
Instead, Chương Thâu claims that the article was a “lamentable mistake” and a “misstep 
in the revolutionary journey of Phan Bội Châu.”120  Quoting Phan’s own retraction, Chương Thâu 
claims that Phan Bá Ngọc, the individual responsible for convincing Phan to write the article, had 
plotted from the beginning to trick Phan.  Phan Bá Ngọc and his companion Lê Dư deceived 
Phan by claiming, “The policies of Governor General Sarraut are different from the policies of 
previous Governor Generals. Sarraut is a socialist and socialism greatly contradicts the policies 
of French colonialism.”121  Furthermore, Phan Bá Ngọc intimated to Phan that a friendly French 
administration would allow the revolutionary movement to engage in espionage within the 
colony. Four or five months after having left with the article, Phan writes of Phan Bá Ngọc, “The 
beloved son of Phan Đình Phùng [Phan Bá Ngọc] brazenly came out as an obedient running dog 
of the bushy haired gang [the French].”122 
If Phan Bá Ngọc’s perfidy was not explanation enough, Chương Thâu continues. He 
reminds readers that Phan had just been released from prison in Guangdong after four years of 
captivity, and thus had little understanding of contemporary geopolitical or intra-colony events. 
As such, Chương Thâu concludes, “The event was a blemish on the glorious history of a 
courageous warrior.”123 Chương Thâu’s argument lacks any distinguishable Marxist features. 
Rather, his biting attacks on Phan Xuân Hòa for “misrepresentation” and Phan Bá Ngọc for 
treachery reveal Chương Thâu’s interest in defending a particular conception of Phan as a 
paragon of national revolution and honest patriotism. 
Marr handles the issue of Phan’s support for Franco-Vietnamese collaboration by 
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refusing to pass judgment on it. He characterizes it in a pair of short paragraphs as “something 
that has puzzled many Vietnamese ever since.”124 In his footnotes, Marr offers the communist 
and national arguments that present the episode as, “a bad mistake or else [they] explain it away 
with elaborate, rather unconvincing theoretical discussions.”125  Marr also presents a Trotskyite 
alternative.126  However, by declining to explain the implications of the article for either group, 
Marr effectively renders it a non-issue. Marr offers his own lackluster explanation that more or 
less follows Chương Thâu’s: “We may surmise that Phan Bội Châu’s deep depression, his feeling 
of having accomplished absolutely nothing in more than once decade, left him open to such 
personal entreaties.”127  Quickly returning to his narrative of anticolonial resistance, Marr then 
describes how other leaders of Phan’s Quang Phục Hội (Restoration League) grew outraged by 
Phan Bá Ngọc, and conspired to have him assassinated in 1922.128 Marr thus manages to gloss 
over the article’s importance while simultaneously reemphasizing the anticolonial movement’s 
preference for violence. 
Duiker seems more aware of the significance of the. Article.  He writes, “Not surprisingly, 
there has been considerable controversy over the meaning and implications of the entire 
incident.”129  In addition to the arguments of Trần Huy Liệu and Chương Thâu, Duiker also 
presents the “pro-French” position.130  For his own part, Duiker attempts to explain Phan’s actions 
in light of the increasingly “passive role” that Phan played in the nationalist movement.131  This 
explanation parallels that of Tôn Quang Phiệt, who also sees a shift in Phan’s attitude in his later 
years toward “civilized revolution.”132  Both Duiker and Tôn Quang Phiệt make note of two other 
works by Phan written in 1920. The first of these was  entitled “Y Hồn đơn tán dương chính sách 
bất động của Găng- đi” (A Medical Prescription for the Soul – In Praise of Gandhi’s Nonviolence 
Policy), and the second was entitled “Dư cửu niên lai sở tri chi chủ nghĩa” (My Contentions for 
the Last Nine Years). Both of these articles advocate reform as opposed to revolution.133 
Duiker blames this amelioration of political ferocity on depression, while Tôn Quang 
Phiệt claims it is necessary to investigate the historical conditions before coming to a 
conclusion. Both scholars feel that Phan somehow betrayed his true cause by demonstrating 
openness to possible peaceful solutions, and are eager to explain away any such apparent shift . 
Upon asking rhetorically whether Phan’s postwar writings indicate significant changes in his 
ideas, Duiker answers, “For the most part, they appear to reflect ideas current in China at that 
time and give little indication of any real intellectual growth. Most provocative of the new ideas 
to affect his own thought was Marxism.”134   Duiker finds Phan  to be essentially a patriotic 
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simpleton blundering from ideology to ideology until he might happen upon the correct 
one.138 
Likewise, Tôn Quang Phiệt claims Phan’s intellectual foundations to be a hodgepodge of 
Confucianism, idealism, knight-errantry, and Daoism, all of which are the product of his class 
background and times. Tôn Quang Phiệt notes that Phan shifted in his political opinions and 
ideology quite often, and asserts that emotions played a far more powerful role in Phan’s 
decision-making than did reason.135  He furthermore points out that Phan eventually saw the evil 
intentions of the French clearly and reasserted his strong patriotic will. Interestingly, Tôn Quang 
Phiệt never mentions the duplicity of Phan Bá Ngọc as a means of explaining Phan’s actions. 
Tôn Quang Phiệt writes that Phan’s “collaboration” and “civilized revolution” theories  “were 
nothing more than groping about, and Phan did not believe in them.”136  Duiker and Tôn Quang 
Phiệt thus both denigrate Phan’s intellectual ability while simultaneously emphasizing his 
patriotism. In doing so, they resolve the conundrum of the collaboration letter by dismissing it as 
a thoughtless mistake by a well-meaning and dedicated but easily misguided revolutionary 
patriot. 
Summations: Communist and Western Appraisals of Phan Bội Châu 
In his final analysis, Tôn Quang Phiệt finds Phan to be a patriot who contributed 
significantly to the national liberation movement. Tôn Quang Phiệt claims that Phan had a 
strong will to resist the enemy and, although restrained by Confucian ethics and traditional 
ritualism, he had a great and positive influence on the Vietnamese revolutionary movement. 
Tôn Quang Phiệt writes that although he failed to achieve success, “As a result of his 
enduring search Phan grasped the revolutionary path toward a promising future.”137 
According to Phiệt, Phan’s value lies in the legacy he left that encouraged people to follow the 
path of revolution, and as a leader who connected the two revolutionary periods of 
Vietnamese history. 
Nevertheless, Tôn Quang Phiệt is quick to point out Phan’s many errors. Tôn Quang 
Phiệt argues that Phan’s lack of a solid class viewpoint led him to waste effort on “ineffective 
actions” that had “little effect” and that could almost unanimously be considered “failures.”138 
Phan was furthermore too “trusting,” and when faced with stalemates and failures, easily 
gravitated toward fatalism and foolhardiness.139  Tôn Quang Phiệt suggests that Phan’s 
emphasis on emotion, rather than logic, led him to foolishly consider Franco-Vietnamese 
collaboration, but then also later led him to reject it. The implication is that Phan’s heartfelt 
devotion to the cause of resistance must be wedded to a logical, scientific understanding of 
class, economic conditions, and the laws of history in order for success to be achieved. 
Many of the themes and conclusions in Tôn Quang Phiệt’s article served as guidelines 
for later communist historiographical interpretations of Phan. An attempt to align and compare 
Phan’s actions and ideas with a putatively correct “revolutionary path” or “movement” is visible 
throughout the entire article. The supposition that such a “movement” existed apart from the 
Duy Tân Hội or Quang Phục Hội, or that there was a single “path” weaving its way through 
loosely connected narratives of various individuals or groups indicates the contemporary 
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political objectives Tôn Quang Phiệt and others hoped to fulfill. In order to make the DRV 
appear to be the “natural” product of both the scientific process of historical materialism and the 
much lauded revolutionary tradition of Vietnam, Phan needed to serve both as a link backward 
to a heroic Confucian history of resistance and forward to a modern class-based spirit of 
revolution. 
Chương Thâu, having devoted his life to studying Phan, offers a slightly more 
sentimental portrait. Chương Thâu is obviously enamored with Phan’s personal characteristics, 
and routinely comments positively on Phan’s willingness to endure hardship, his ardent tenacity 
in the face of the enemy, and even his expressions of filial piety towards his father.140  It is to 
Chương Thâu’s credit that he manages never to address the contradiction between material 
determinism and Phan’s voluntaristic patriotism. Nevertheless, it is obvious that Chương Thâu is 
attached to the former theoretically and the latter emotionally. The notion that Phan can serve as 
a national symbol who represents the collective consciousness of the people is similarly placed 
directly alongside a complex analysis of various class- consciousnesses.  We are left to assume 
that nationalism somehow transcends both class and  
Trần Huy Liệu, a well-respected intellectual and revolutionary in his own right, takes a 
broader view in his remembrance of Phan.141 Trần Huy Liệu praises Phan for his friendly 
character, his willingness to provide for those around him (while living under house arrest Phan 
took in many older revolutionaries after they were released from prison), and his cheerfully 
optimistic nature. However, these traits were to be contrasted with Phan’s uncritical, almost 
superficial attitude toward people and ideas. Trần Huy Liệu notes that Phan  did not even “see the 
evil” of the Constitutionalists, a quasi-collaborator party of capitalists and landlords based in the 
south.142 According to Trần Huy Liệu, his understanding of socialism was uninformed and highly 
idealistic.143 
As such, Trần Huy Liệu seems to thank Phan for his contributions to the resistance 
movement, yet also suggests that it is time for Phan to retire and allow more competent activists 
handle the business of real revolution. Commenting on Phan’s passing, Trần Huy Liệu quotes 
Phan himself, “The sea is not yet filled, Jingwei still carries a pebble in her mouth.”144  Phan had 
written this as an epitaph for Phan Chu Trinh; but Trần Huy Liệu finds that it applies better to 
Phan himself. Trần Huy Liệu furthermore suggests that Phan might have been better off dying in 
1926 along with Phan Chu Trinh, so that he would not have had to live out his last years in 
captivity at a time when the prospects for liberation seemed weakest. 
For Marr, Phan was truly a transitional figure. He was the last of a generation of 
Confucian scholars propelled by an enduring tradition of resistance and loyalty to one’s king and 
country. Yet he was also one of the first Vietnamese to look out across the seas in search of new 
techniques, symbols, and values with which to bolster their fight against a formidable enemy. It 
is Phan’s ability to meld these two worlds that gives him such significance in Vietnam’s history 
of resistance. Marr asserts, “Most important, [Phan and his compatriots] succeeded in creating 
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and re-creating resistance symbols and ideals for subsequent generations. Without this, who can 
say that the men who came after them would have had the sense of continuity and historical 
purpose to act as they did?”145  Nevertheless, Marr faults Phan for failing to “define himself and 
his movement.”146  Phan, according to Marr, was simply reacting rather than offering a distinct 
alternative to colonial rule. To overcome the French, the Vietnamese would have to fashion for 
themselves a new identity and a new way of defining themselves in the world. Marr’s assertion 
actually prefigures aggressive attempts by Vietnamese communists in the 1950s to refashion the 
culture, history, and national essence of Vietnam. 
Duiker’s critique of Phan copies those of communist historiographers almost point for 
point. Duiker argues that Phan’s ideas were “old-fashioned” and his actions “adventurous.”147 
Furthermore, Duiker points out, “[Phan] had little comprehension of how to go about organizing 
and building a highly disciplined revolutionary movement.”148  As such he “squandered” his 
strength and that of his compatriots on ineffective and counterproductive actions. Duiker writes, 
“Lacking the sense of certainty that the materialist dialectic provides the Marxist, the scholar-
patriots under Phan Bội Châu could not rely on historic inevitability.”149  Duiker also claims, “A 
relative weakness in Phan’s approach was his failure to utilize the potential force of the 
peasantry.”150  Though Duiker does not cite communist historians for any of these assertions, 
their influence is clear. Duiker assumes, as they do, that the preconditions for success would 
necessarily take the form of a dedicated, well organized revolutionary party with a firm grasp of 
the Marxist dialectic and deep connections with the lower classes. Duiker sums up his critique of 
Phan like this: “Phan’s gallants were more in the image of the knight-errants of old, slashing like 
Vietnamese Don Quixotes at colonial windmills, and spending more time glorying in their 
dashing image of sacrifice and revolutionary heroism than in the tough, day-to-day work of 
educating the populace and winning support at the village level.”151  In other words, Phan was 
not a member of the NLF in Southern Vietnam in 1965. 
However, like Tôn Quang Phiệt, Duiker finds much to value in Phan’s legacy. Duiker 
states that Phan“managed to grasp some important truths which served to move the Vietnamese 
resistance movement a significant step toward its final goal – a Vietnam strong and prosperous, 
its citizenry united and stubbornly determined to protect its identity as Vietnamese.”152  We have 
already noted the problems with imputing a “final goal” to a trans- historical resistance 
movement. What is most important is the incredibly close alignment of Duiker’s final appraisal 
with those of the communist historians.  Duiker states, “Phan Bội Châu and his colleagues…left 
behind a spirit of indomitability, a consciousness of the greater duty of the Vietnamese people to 
unite behind the great idea of national independence, and this image is sufficiently vital even 
today for the communists of North Vietnam to call upon the old scholar-patriot as a model for 
young Vietnamese to emulate.”153  In Duiker’s mind, Phan was nothing less than the spiritual 
godfather of Vietnamese communism. 
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Conclusion: A Symbol or a Patriot?  
US scholars who were amazed by the tenacity, organizational capability, and 
effectiveness of the NLF and DRV came not unreasonably to the conclusion that their opponents 
represented something much stronger and more durable than simply another wing of 
international communism. Drawing on the very same communists for evidence and ideas, 
antiwar academics developed a parallel narrative of enduring, even timeless, Vietnamese 
resistance.  Phan Bội Châu stood out as an exemplar of this tradition, but also an exemplar of 
Vietnam’s turn toward modernity. Conveniently, he knew Hồ Chí Minh’s father, and had written 
about socialism. It thus became easy to see him as a stepping-stone on the path to a communist 
future. 
A decade or so after the war, the idea of a primordial Vietnamese spirit of resistance 
began to receive serious re-examination. Communism no longer appeared heroic or natural, and 
many of the assumptions made by the historian cadres  no longer appeared credible.  However, 
Phan’s reputation remains largely untouched. He is still presented as the simple, emotional 
patriot and the unsystematic revolutionary. Indeed, this is how he is still presented in most 
literature published in Vietnam. Nevertheless, more separates Phan from Hồ Chí Minh than the 
ideological certainty provided by Marxist dialectical theory.  Phan inhabited a different world 
than did Trần Huy Liệu, Tôn Quang Phiệt, and Chương Thâu. Phan saw himself as part of a 
tradition of resistance, but one that had only come into existence after the French invasion. 
Phan’s vision for the Vietnamese nation also differed considerably from that of the 
communists. Rather being a simple or confused theorist, Phan’s developing concept of the nation, 
like that of Liang Qichao, was derived from a Confucian worldview within which hierarchy and 
morality played important and meaningful roles. Yet nonetheless, this vision was that of a modern 
nation.154  By carefully working through the Confucian tradition to determine what needed to be 
preserved and what should be rejected, Phan demonstrated a capacity for complex and nuanced 
thinking.155  Phan’s own ideas were easily as sophisticated as were the attempts to portray him as 
the enthusiastic predecessor of the communist party in Vietnam. 
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Chapter Two 
Phan Bội Châu’s Martyrs: Vietnamese Revolutionary Martyrdom and Nationalist 
Hagiography 
Shortly after being freed from nearly four years of imprisonment in Guangdong province 
in 1917, Phan Bội Châu rejoined some of his former proteges in Hangzhou.  Together they 
published two editions of A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs (HVM) in 1918.  Phan served as the 
overall compiler and editor of the project.  The principal author was one Đặng Đoàn Bằng.156  
Other contributors included several of Phan’s most ardent supporters: (1) His second-in-
command Nguyễn Thượng Hiền (pseudonym Đỉnh Nam); (2) a Catholic monk named Lưu Song 
Tử: and (3) a mysterious figure by the name of Trần Quốc Duy, who wrote 25 of the 100 poems 
included in the volume.   
Originally published as a short 91-page booklet in classical Chinese, HVM includes one 
preface, four introductions, fifty biographies of martyrs, and three “collective biographies” 
dedicated to all those who perished in three key events.  The fifty biographies range from terse 
one-line statements indicating the places of birth and death to elaborate stories accompanied by 
poems and remembrances.  The shortest biography is 13 characters long, and the longest is 2909 
characters long.   
In compiling A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs, Đặng Đoàn Bằng and Phan Bội Châu 
sought to present an idealized picture of the Vietnamese nation.  Borrowing from Vietnamese 
patriotic and Confucian traditions, they told the stories of unimpeachable patriots: men (and one 
woman) who had given their lives for Vietnam.  Though the scholarly elite and their children 
dominate the volume, other social groups are represented as well, including farmers, ethnic 
Chinese, and even “traitors” who converted to the cause of the revolution.  Most of the 
biographies are of Northerners, which is not a surprising since most of Phan Bội Châu’s social 
circle came from the North, but individuals from the Center and South are included as well.   
The message articulated in various forms throughout the text is clear: Vietnamese of all 
stripes can find a common purpose through self-sacrifice.  Many of the stories contained in the 
text follow similar plot lines and repeat certain formal choices.  This is because the retelling itself 
is intend to serve as a crucial means of linking those stories to a larger history of resistance.  The 
construction of an eternal Vietnamese spirit of resistance was essential to the evangelizing 
mission that lay behind the publication of A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs.  However, in order to 
determine the success of this mission, we must evaluate the content of the text in reference to its 
own claims.   
Success is not defined solely by the overarching message a text delivers, but also by the 
aggregate character of its content.  While the overall message of A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs 
is unambiguous, the structure and content of the biographies betray a much more complicated 
picture of the Vietnamese revolutionary movement from 1906 to 1918.  Rather than depicting a 
unified group with a single goal, the text resembles a patchwork quilt of different groups, each of 
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which seems to have been included for different reasons and treated in different ways.  In order 
to compare the content of the text with its ideological message, I employ digital methods to 
evaluate both data concerning the lives of the martyrs and the language used in different portions 
of the text.  This digital methodology produced results which contradicts those derived from an 
“analog” reading of the A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs, to which I now turn.  
Four Introductions: The Discursive Orientations of A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs  
The four Introductions to the text provide a solid foundation for understanding the 
political intentions and the historiographical stances of those who created A History of Vietnam’s 
Martyrs.  The two “original” introductions to the first 1918 edition were written by Đặng Đoàn 
Bằng and Trần Quốc Duy, both of whom were junior members of Phan Bội Châu’s retinue and 
principal authors of the text.  These introductions place the martyred individuals represented in 
the text firmly within a national history of resistance, make strong claims as to the objectives of 
those individuals and the political significance of each.  Two additional introductions, written for 
the second 1918 edition by the former titular head of the Vietnamese Modernization Society and 
royalist Marquis Cường Để and veteran revolutionary Nguyễn Thượng Hiền, broaden and 
reaffirm these claims.   
Đặng Đoàn Bằng’s introduction opens with a phantasmagorical depiction of ghosts 
appearing as furious natural forces.  He writes, “I can hear nothing but the chanting of spirits and 
the crying of ghosts. The shrieking wind and howling rain tears into my ears.  I see the flash of 
lightning amidst the rumbling thunder.  The running mountain and the walking sea whirl into my 
eyes.”157  These furious natural forces convey the unresolved anger of Đặng Đoàn Bằng’s fallen 
comrades.158  Furthermore, he claims these spirits have “forced” him to write A History of 
Vietnam’s Martyrs.159  Đặng Đoàn Bằng thus presents himself as the conduit for ghostly grief as 
well as a chronicler of martyred lives.  Đặng Đoàn Bằng’s introduction emphasizes the emotional 
significance of the History.  It is a text written to commemorate individuals whom the author 
knew personally and cared for intimately.   
However, this text is not simply a historical record of fallen comrades.  Đặng Đoàn 
Bằng’s introduction reveals another purpose of text: to serve as a political validation of collective 
sacrifice.  Đặng Đoàn Bằng’s ghosts do not appear as individuals in the introduction, but rather 
as a spiritual force embodying a corporate will.  He writes, “Though they had taken different 
paths, they all came together to achieve the same goal…Though the ways they died were many, 
their objective was singular.”160    Đặng Đoàn Bằng informs his readers that this objective was 
none other than “to die on behalf of the nation.”161  The image Đặng Đoàn Bằng presents is one 
of young diehard revolutionaries encouraging each other to die heroic deaths to demonstrate their 
commitment to one another and to their nation.  This image is furthermore intended to inspire 
and pressure those still living, and presumably the readers of the text, into dedicating themselves 
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to the cause of national liberation.162     
While Đặng Đoàn Bằng frames the text primarily in spiritual and emotional terms, Trần 
Quốc Duy’s introduction seeks to connect it to a larger national history of anti-foreign resistance.  
Trần Quốc Duy begins by criticizing the inability of the Vietnamese people to successfully resist 
French colonization.  He writes, “In these past few years, the war in Europe broke out and waves 
of bullets swept across the continent.  The French, finding themselves on the defense, had to take 
care of their motherland; they had no time to worry about their colonies.  Still, the five sections 
and three regions of our country heard nary a shot.  The world believes that our people are unfit 
for independence.  How terrible!”163  Trần Quốc Duy argues that this deplorable failure stood in 
sharp contrast to the historical victories of the Trần and Lê dynasties.164   
In the next section, Trần Quốc Duy complicates this contrast by introducing famous 
figures of the early anti-French resistance period.  He writes, 
In the fifteenth year of Tự Đức’s reign, the French captured the South.  Nguyễn Huân, 
Trương Định, and our brothers in the South and center fought fiercely with the enemy, 
but they were killed defending the country and many names had to be recorded as lost.  In 
the thirty-fifth year of Tự Đức’s reign, the enemy took the North.  Nguyễn Quang Bích, 
Vũ Hữu Lợi, and Nguyễn Thiện Thuật raised the army to protect the King and attacked 
the enemy across fourteen provinces.  Most glorious was General Hoàng Hoa Thám, who 
fought the enemy for close to twelve years.165   
          The figures Trần Quốc Duy mentions represent the perennial spirit of Vietnamese patriotic 
resistance to foreign occupation and the indefatigable vitality of the Vietnamese national spirit.  
However, immediately after saying this, Trần Quốc Duy reaffirms that “For around fifty years 
the French have propped up their pillow and slept soundly.  If we examine this situation, how can 
we claim the Vietnamese people are fit for independence?”166  This juxtaposition of ongoing 
resistance and demonstrated failure to thwart French colonial designs points to a seemingly 
irreconcilable contradiction: Vietnamese resistance is both inevitable and ineffectual.  It is 
obligatory yet inadequate.   
            In the final section, Trần Quốc Duy resolves this contradiction by addressing the text 
directly.  After reading A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs, he claims: 
Tears began pouring down my face.  I felt great anguish watching so many men ready for 
independence struggle hard yet achieve nothing at all.  How could this be?  Alas! The 
answer I already know.  When the heads of our valiant scholars roll uselessly onto 
hundreds of battlefields, our gallant actions provoke the enemy’s running dogs. This 
increases French oppression and brings our people closer together.167   
 
162 Đặng Đoàn Bằng indicates that the mutual obligations of the living and dead are difficult to balance.  He 
writes, “The dead have died, but what of the living? To follow the path of those who have died who be to die as well 
- how could the dead want that?  To betray the dead by living uselessly - how could the living bear to do that?.”  
Ibid. 
163 VNNLS, 26. 
164 Trần Quốc Duy writes, “Long ago our country was invaded by the Yuan dynasty; thanks to the Trần 
kings our country was twice regained in bloody battle.  Later we were invaded by the Ming dynasty; thanks to the 
Lê king’s fifteen years of waging war our country again achieved independence.” Ibid. 
165 Trần Quốc Duy continues, “In the first year of Hàm Nghi’s reign, the French invaded the capital Thuận 
Hóa and occupied the center.  Phan Đình Phùng and Nguyễn Hiệu called on the people of Nghệ An, Hà Tĩnh, Quảng 
Nam, and Quảng Ngãi to rise up, and they did for over ten years.” Ibid. 
166 VNNLS, 27. 
167 My emphasis.  Ibid. 
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Trần Quốc Duy thus reveals a dialectical process at work: revolutionary actions provoke 
repression, repression stimulates Vietnamese indignation, and the entire country moves closer to 
violent insurrection.  Trần Quốc Duy ends his introduction with the following powerful 
statement:  
I am anguished for the martyrs, but I feel hope for the future of our country.  My pain is 
endless, but my hopes will one day be realized.  From Côn Đảo up to the North, from the 
Mekong over to the East, from Lạng  Sơn down to the South, the Five-Star Flag will fly 
in the wind.  The ochre blood of our valiant scholars, our righteous warriors, and our 
gallant martyrs will coagulate and form a foundation [for our independence].168   
A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs, then, is a political testament that claims the martyred dead as the 
embodiment of total national revolution.   
The second pair of introductions follow the same discursive contours as the first pair, but 
deepen and solidify the national claims of the text as they go.  Marquis Cường Để opens with a 
brief history lesson emphasizing a thousand years of Vietnamese independence and imperial 
legacy of expansion.169  However, despite its geographical size and substantial population, 
Vietnam was unable to prevent French colonization. The thought that thehard-won territorial 
gains of his ancestors have been completely overtaken by another race distresses the Marquis, 
and forces him to consider the causes.  Regrettably, he writes, “I can only blame our poor talent, 
weak thinking, and inadequate strength.”170  Remarking sadly that many have died, Cường Để 
nevertheless points out that Vietnam’s revolutionaries have fought and died proudly and without 
complaint.  This legacy of determined, (even if unsuccessful) resistance is for Cường Để a source 
of strength and national hope.  He then echoes Trần Quốc Duy’s patriotic declaration in a more 
sanguinary tone: “[We await] a day when purple clouds float over Thăng Long, when red waves 
flow through Cần Giờ. [We await a day] when we can turn our heads toward the spirits on the 
horizon and pour the blood of our enemies onto the ground. I dream of such a day. Not for 
moment will I ever forget this ambition.”171  Cường Để thus blends Đặng Đoàn Bằng’s haunting 
appeal to the spirits of the dead with Trần Quốc Duy’s political dream of independence into a 
violent revolutionary vision of spiritually empowered anti-colonial vengeance.   
Nguyễn Thượng Hiền, who was the committed and experienced second-in-command of 
Phan Bội Châu’s, contributes the final Introduction.  It is a piece of higher literary quality and 
greater conceptual sophistication than the other three introductions, and serves as a guiding 
manifesto for the entire text.  Opening with poetic hyperbole, Nguyễn Thượng Hiền states:  
Upon the crests of waves, from seventy-thousand leagues over the sea, a great whale and 
a huge crocodile speed toward the East.  After four-thousand years of silk and satin, we 
children of the dragon have sunk to serving as buffalo and horses.  We are filled with 
 
168 Ibid. 
169 Cường Để writes, “Since the time of Đinh Tiên Hoàng, our country has consisted of the regions of 
Rinan, Jiuzhen, Xiangjun, and Jiaozhi, which combined to form Đại Cồ Việt.  It is clearly recorded that this state 
was established after breaking away from the Northern Song, which means our country has been independent for a 
long time.  After the Lý dynasty and the Trần dynasty came the Lê dynasty, which attacked Champa numerous times 
and occupied all of Lin-yi.  Our saintly forebears expanded our territory, taking Quảng Nam, Quảng Ngãi, Bình 
Định, Phú Yên, and areas further south, including the six provinces of Zhenla and some Ai-Lao territory, to reach 
the borders of our frontier today.” VNNLS, 22. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Thăng Long is another name for Hanoi.  Cần Giờ refers to the area surrounding Saigon - the area with 
the largest population of French colonists.  VNNLS, 23. 
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righteous indignation upon realizing our plight! How could we suffer knitting our brows 
and doffing our hats in order to live a single day alongside these bloodthirsty bandits?172   
Nguyễn Thượng Hiền incorporates Cường Để’s thousand years of independence and expands his 
historical scope into hoary antiquity, claiming continuity with a Vietnamese national legacy that 
predated the Chinese occupation (111 BCE-938 CE).  In doing so Nguyễn Thượng Hiền 
implicitly attributes the sacrifices of the martyred dead not just to a lengthy tradition of patriotic 
resistance, but also to a timeless national spirit embodied in all ethnic Vietnamese.   
 Nguyễn Thượng Hiền’s next move is to historiographically separate the fifty-year anti-
French resistance era into two periods.  The first of these periods dates from the fall of Saigon up 
to the complete French colonization of Vietnam.  Nguyễn Thượng Hiền likens this to, “the sun’s 
last rays fading into darkness of dusk,” and claims it brought the Vietnamese race to the brink of 
extinction.173  The second period dates from the inception of the Eastern Travel (Đông Du) 
movement in 1905, whereupon “the people’s rage has begun to seethe for revenge.”174 Nguyễn 
Thượng Hiền claims this period is like, “the light of dawn rising out of the inky blackness of 
night.”175  By associating the anti-colonial movement as a whole with the natural rhythms of time 
and space, Nguyễn Thượng Hiền imputes a sense of inevitability and naturalness to Vietnam’s 
national revolution. 
The periodization serves another purpose as well.  Whereas the first wave of resistance, 
led by such famous individuals as, “Nguyễn Tri Phương, Hoàng Diệu, Phan Đình Phùng, Tống 
Duy Tân, Võ Hữu Lợi, and Trương Định…has already been carefully recorded,” those who died 
in the second period remain largely unacknowledged.176   
Nguyễn Thượng Hiền claims it is precisely for this reason  that A History of Vietnam’s 
Martyrs was written and published.  After all, he writes, “If we do not do everything we can to 
find out and relate what happened, how will we be able to inspire future generations with the 
names and true stories of those we have lost?”177  Here, then, Nguyễn Thượng Hiền makes clear 
the practical objective of the text’s producers: To employ the life stories of martyrs as 
pedagogical tools for inspiring Vietnam’s youth to fight and die as part of a collective campaign 
seeking independence through revolution.   
Returning to grand national history, Nguyễn Thượng Hiền brings together all of the 
themes raised in the four introductions.  Evoking a spirit of resistance both timely and timeless, 
Nguyễn Thượng Hiền writes: 
For eons our predecessors have died for our country and our comrades now continue to 
rise, spear in hand.  Though they die for the country in great numbers, our patriots within 
the country and abroad continue to tread in their footsteps, ever forward.  They rise up 
throughout the countryside.  Wherever they are stamped out, they rise up once again. 
Though the French are fiendish, they truly fear the invincible spirit of our country.  Our 
country will not stay lost forever.178   
Thus, through sacrifice eventually comes salvation.   
 
172 The great whale and huge crocodile likely refer to Britain and France.  Nguyễn Thượng Hiền claims 
Vietnamese to be descendants of Lạc Long Quân, the “Dragon Lord of Lạc,” himself a descendant of dragons.  Ibid. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid. 
28 
Bringing his introduction to a resounding conclusion, Nguyễn Thượng Hiền then writes: 
 We must try hard, making use of our wits and our courage near and far to recover our 
country, to exterminate the enemy, and to purge the shame of those who died. Shall we 
only lament and shed tears on behalf of the country? Shall we only take up the pen and 
record these rays of light cast over the earth? This history of Vietnam’s martyrs that we 
write now is the history of Vietnam’s independence that will be written in the future!  
Only when this dream is fulfilled will our task be complete.  
According to this perspective, A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs is a blueprint for revolution - a 
collective guidebook for sacrifice on behalf of the nation.  It is both a commemoration of 
righteous deaths and a call to the living to emulate the spirit of patriotic martyrdom.   
It is difficult to miss a naive sense of political utopianism enfolded with the discourse of 
these four introductions.  All four authors admit that the sacrifices of the martyrs failed to yield 
any notable successes, yet they all nevertheless contend that the stories of the lives of the martyrs 
- and their deaths - are worth retelling.  None of the introductions offered an idea of when a 
reader and prospective revolutionary might expect to enjoy the fruits of their efforts and the 
sacrifices of the martyrs.  The liberation lies somewhere in the hazy future - a patriotic lodestar 
rather than a graspable reality.   
The distance found in the pages of A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs between the actuality 
of death and the illusory promise of salvation lends the text a sense of inescapable anguish.  That 
pain appears in the introductions embodied as apparitions, ghosts still wracked with shame and 
guilt for having failed to bring about revolutionary progress.  The ghosts serve as the spectral 
counterpart of the martyrs - still present -but no longer recognizable as individuals.  Instead, they 
mass together as an eidolic collectivity able to register its anger through harsh weather and 
irruptive landscapes.  In death, the martyrs come to represent the national soul, serving as an 
object of patriotic commemoration while also challenging the living to continue fighting a war 
without end.  
Biographical Narratives 
A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs is neither triumphalist, nor especially bloodthirsty.  
Rather, the martyrs are celebrated and revered for their traits and intentions.  Most of these 
biographies begin with a series of cliches which established that the martyr was intensely 
serious, loyal to a fault, and perspicacious.  The authors often recall the classic trope of the 
fledgling genius who is so intent upon reading books that he, “forgets to eat or sleep.”  Of 
course, from there, the subject of the biography has no need to grow or come to terms with 
themselves in any way.  Indeed, they do not.   
Instead, their determination and capability encounters colonial reality.  The biographies 
have plenty of unpleasant things to say about the French and their Nguyen quislings.  The French 
are devious, cruel, and relentless.  Their Vietnamese collaborators are venal, small-minded, and 
utterly untrustworthy.  Standing against such enemies, the qualities of the revolutionaries appear 
all the more praiseworthy.  A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs thus paints a dichotomous picture of 
virtue and vice, the just and the cruel.  Then, using one emotionally compelling story after 
another, the authors define the Vietnamese nation through its paragons of virtue: the martyrs. 
In order for this narrative to work, each selected individual must be pure and they must 
die.  They must appear as a series of waves, each unique in their moment, but ultimately 
indistinguishable from the tide.  A variety of deaths are acceptable: execution is a favorite, but 
starvation, exhaustion, illness, and an assortment of creative suicides work just as well.  The 
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deaths are moments of intensity in which their blood mixes with that of their spiritual fellows.  
Separated by time and space, the martyrs’ deaths are brought together textually within the 
volume.  The authors thus make the deaths and the martyrs meaningful by placing them 
alongside one another.  What would otherwise be isolated and unfortunate events become 
glittering waves in a sea of national revival.  
The many poems appended to the biographies offer another kind of national 
representation.  Each poem begins with two to four lines depicting the landscape of Vietnam, 
either geographically or topographically.  Specific mountains, rivers, or liminal boundaries are 
indicated, as if the poet sought to demarcate the body of the nation.  The remainder of the poem 
then describes how the body of the martyr was destroyed.  The parallelism is clear: in sacrificing 
one’s individual body, one reconstitutes the national body. In his introduction, Nguyễn Thượng 
Hiền explicitly draws a connection between the two: “A country is like a person; the character of 
a country cannot be destroyed just as the spirit of a person cannot.  Although both can be 
submerged in peril up to their necks, they can also hope to rise again.”179  The poems often draw 
parallels between the vibrant blood of the martyr smeared across the battlefield and the persistent 
waterways of Vietnam.  As long as both flow, the spirit of resistance can remain strong and the 
nation will live on.   
An Example Biography: Tăng Bạt Hổ 
 Tăng Bạt Hổ (1858-1906) was the sort of intrepid adventurer one might expect to 
encounter in a Joseph Conrad novel.  By the time Phan Bội Châu met him in 1904, he had 
already fought with the Cần Vương movement, travelled to Port Arthur via Guangdong, and 
joined Liu Yongfu to battle the Japanese on Taiwan.  He was knowledgeable about the world.  He 
could speak Cantonese, and had worked as a merchant seaman all over East Asia.  For these 
reasons, Tăng Bạt Hổ  was selected to guide Phan Bội Châu on his first trip abroad, which took 
him first to Hong Kong and then to Japan.180  He served as the interpreter between Phan Bội 
Châu and Liang Qichao in Yokohama.  In the summer of 1906, Cường Để arrived in Japan, so 
Phan Bội Châu sent Tặng Bát Hổ back to Vietnam to conduct party business there.  The journey 
was strenuous and, suffering from exhaustion, Tặng Bát Hổ contracted dysentery and died in 
Huế.  
 The biography on Tặng Bát Hổ provides an excellent model for understanding A History of 
Vietnam’s Martyrs as a whole: nearly every characteristic in the other biographies can be found 
in this one.  Tặng Bát Hổ’s biography nevertheless exceeds all others in the text in terms of 
character count, number of poems, and hyperbole.   
 In many ways, Tặng Bát Hổ’s biography sets the tone for the entirety of A History of 
Vietnam’s Martyrs.  The authors use powerful, vivid language to immediately convey the story of 
a great hero and evoke the larger collective will he is subsumed within.  Đặng Đoàn Bằng 
describes Tặng Bát Hổ as, “the crest of the first wave in a now growing tide, the first spark 
within a bomb now exploding outwards.”181  The choice of imagery is deliberate and 
consequential.  The “revolutionary tide” is referred to again and again throughout the text.  It is 
the ordering principle for the anti-colonial movement: enough individuals moving together can 
sweep away any manmade structures that stand in their path.  However, the movement is also a 
“bomb” insofar as it is modern, it is unstoppable, and it is potentially deadly.  As the crest of the 
 
179 VNNLS,  24. 
180 Phan Bội Châu, Overturned Chariot, 74-75. 
181 VNNLS, 29. 
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first wave, Tặng Bát Hổ literally led the movement overseas.  As the first spark within a bomb, 
he burned as a bright model for all those who come after. 
 Using the same format that nearly all of the subsequent biographies would follow, Đặng 
Đoàn Bằng next introduces Tặng Bát Hổ’s character traits.  He was, “magnanimous, thoroughly 
knowledgeable, and resolute in his sense of purpose.”  Furthermore, he was, “affable and 
easygoing to talk to.”182  Many of the same adjectives would later be used for other martyrs, but 
this kindly persona is most representative of the Annamese.  By contrast, the Nghệ Tĩnh martyrs 
are often described as fierce and indomitable.  This distinction likely draws on regional 
stereotypes even while reproducing them.  Despite his apparent kindliness, the next two things 
Đặng Đoàn Bằng describes Tặng Bát Hổ doing are rejecting marriage (he would remain a 
bachelor who was too concerned with the woes of his nation to marry), and served as a substitute 
for his older brother as a military recruit.  These actions demonstrate two key characteristics 
every martyr should have: patriotic fidelity and courageous voluntarism.  Such traits led Tặng 
Bát Hổ to quickly become a local commander of Cần Vương forces in Bình Định, and thereafter 
to leave the country in search of foreign assistance.   
 By presenting the list of each martyr’s character traits first, then describing what they did, 
Đặng Đoàn Bằng and Phan Bội Châu implicitly make the claim that heroes are born, not made.  
Almost all of the individuals are described as thinking and acting the way they do from an early 
age.  Their later lives are simply a playing out of their innate senses of righteousness and justice.  
Indeed, Phan Bội Châu’s own Autobiography follows this same format.  On this point, the 
biographies presented in A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs differ considerably from the European 
bildungsroman style of biography, in which an individual is described as slowly but surely 
becoming an autonomous adult through a series of challenging life experiences and difficult 
moral decisions. In A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs, there is no such thing as character 
development.  The individuals it describes already fully understood the moral exigencies of the 
situation from the beginning - colonialism offers little ambiguity.  Instead, the question is simply 
what could - and should - be done about it.  Relating the lives of martyrs both confirms the 
validity of a righteous moral stance and offers a measure by which to gauge one’s own patriotic 
contributions.  Just as Phan Bội Châu writes in his Autobiography, it is apparent that Đặng Đoàn 
Bằng writes for pedagogical purposes: each biography is simultaneously a testament to the 
martyrs personal moral integrity and a record of failure that the reader is expected to study so 
that they might do better. 
 In the section that follows, Đặng Đoàn Bằng narrates Tặng Bát Hổ’s return to Vietnam 
from abroad and his participation in the nascent revolutionary movement.  He travelled to Quảng 
Nam and met with Nguyễn Hàm, who introduced him to Phan Bội Châu, Đặng Thái Thân, and 
Lê Võ. Tặng Bát Hổ then met Cường Để, who is described in a long aside.  Đặng Đoàn Bằng 
thereafter describes the great meeting in November 1904, at which representatives from all over 
Vietnam selected Tặng Bát Hổ to officially serve as the “guide” responsible for taking Phan Bội 
Châu and Đặng Thái Thân’s nephew Đặng Tử Kính to Japan.  Đặng Đoàn Bằng describes how 
Tặng Bát Hổ smuggled all three men across the border at Quảng Yên by masquerading as 
Chinese merchants, and how he then took them to Hong Kong in search of the Cần Vương 
leaders Nguyễn Thiện Thuật and Tôn Thật Thuyết.  Failing to find these leaders, Đặng Đoàn 
Bằng relates how Tặng Bát Hổ escorted Phan Bội Châu to Yokohama and served as his translator 
for a momentous conversation with the Chinese reformer Liang Qichao.  
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 Tặng Bát Hổ’s death comes suddenly in the very last section of the biography.  After 
describing how Đặng Tử Kính returned to Vietnam and how Cường Để made it to Japan, Đặng 
Đoàn Bằng relates that Tặng Bát Hổ contracted dysentery upon returning to Vietnam, traveled to 
Huế, and died there.  He laments the death of Tặng Bát Hổ: 
 Alas! What a tragedy! Heavens! How terrible! After making it over so many treacherous 
peaks and through so many poisonous mists, making the jungle and mountains his home, 
making the waves and rivers his friends, he lost his life to an illness on a small boat 
floating on the Perfume River.  Has heaven no respect for his great will? Alas! In his 
youth he left home, never married, risked his life for our country for twenty years, and 
roamed East, West, North, and South. His hair went grey and his eyes became dim, but 
his great will remained as strong as ever.  Gold can go through the fire a hundred times - 
if this does not describe Tăng Bạt Hổ, then who?  He died at the age of forty-nine.183 
  The abruptness shown in this ending is repeated in almost every biography which follows.  That 
is to say, the narrative focus of the biographies is the story of each individual’s life, rather than 
their death.  Indeed, there is little actual heroism on display throughout the text (there are only 
about three notable exceptions).  Much more textual space is devoted to efforts to demonstrate 
how an individual participated in the revolutionary movement.  Indeed, to a large extent, Tặng 
Bát Hổ’s biography reads like recounting of party history.  In each biography, when it comes 
time for the martyr to die, the ending is often brief and perfunctory, with the age of death 
typically being the last statement.  This disjuncture between life and death mirrors the distance 
between the repeated performance of patriotic will and the utter failure of that performance to 
have any significant effect on the colonial state.  There is a sense, then, that A History of 
Vietnam’s Martyrs registers deaths more than it commemorates them.  What is truly 
commemorated in this text are traits and the actions taken as a result of those traits.   
 In an appended narrative section, Nguyễn Thượng Hiền repeats the biography from the 
author’s personal perspective, and describes his anguish upon discovering Tặng Bát Hổ was sick 
and possibly dying.  Desperate to save him, Nguyễn Thượng Hiền describes his efforts to procure 
cassia(a medicine) and sending it to Tặng Bát Hổ via the post, only to discover afterwards that 
Tặng Bát Hổ had rented a small boat, gotten in, and passed away while floating on the Perfume 
River.  At the end of the remembrance, Nguyễn Thượng Hiền writes, “Examining his actions and 
demeanor, I can see there was never a time that the words ‘destroy the enemy and save the 
country’ weren’t imprinted in his mind.  Sư Triệu [Tặng Bát Hổ]’s accomplishments represented 
the end of an old group of righteous warriors and the inauguration of a new one.  With these 
words I praise a man who truly deserves it.”184  Again we see a celebration of the unshakable will 
visible in Tặng Bát Hổ’s personal characteristics and mannerisms, and an attempt to embed his 
story into that of the larger revolutionary movement.  
Uncovering Mixed Messages: Digital Approaches to A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs 
Whereas the introductions, the poetry, and especially the style and tone of the biographies 
communicate a powerful and cohesive message, close examination of the content and language 
of the text reveals a rather different picture.  Contrary to the model of perennial patriotic sacrifice 
put forth in the introductions and alluded to throughout the text, while conducting a 
prosopographical analysis, I discovered that the martyrs presented in the text belong to two 
distinct and quite different generations.  While the older generation fits the patriotic martyr 
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model quite well, the younger generation diverges from it enough to call into question the usage 
of “martyrdom” itself as a term with which to understand the lives and deaths of those who 
participated as students in the Eastern Travel movement.   
   Two complementary digital techniques were used to investigate the text. First, I 
conducted a prosopographical analysis using statistical techniques in which multiple factors were 
selected from all fifty biographies and, where possible, converted to quantifiable data.  This 
allowed me to determine which factors were most commonly co-associated, thereby revealing 
blocks of individuals with similar traits. Second, I applied textual analysis software to a corpus 
composed of the fifty biographies to reveal the frequency and relative appearance of specific 
topics over the range of the text.185  This data was then cross-referenced with my 
prosopographical results to generate additional data and conclusions.186   
 
 
Table 1  Birthdates 
Older Generation 1850-1878 
Younger Generation 1880-1894 
 
 
 
185 The text analysis software I used is called Voyant. Voyant allows for word count, frequency analysis 
and comparison, and multiple modes of data export.  I intend to use text mining and topic modeling libraries in R to 
yield further results as I continue to explore this text. 
186 All prosopographical data was entered into and manipulated within an Excel spreadsheet. 
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The most significant finding was the text depicted a distinct set of two generations, each 
defined by a common set of characteristics (see Tables 1 and 2).  The older generation, composed 
of twenty individuals born between 1850 and 1878, were more likely to be degree holders 
competent in Chinese with connections to the Cần Vương movement.187  They were far less 
likely to have left Indochina, though many travelled in and amongst the three regions comprising 
Vietnam (Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina).  A far greater proportion of the older generation 
came from the central region of Annam (see Table 3), and those who did included some of the 
most famous martyrs of the revolutionary cause, such as Tăng Bạt Hổ, Trần Quý Cáp, and 
Nguyễn Hàm.188  Of the older generation, 85% were imprisoned and many died in prison or 
 
187 The dividing line between generations was, in part, arbitrarily drawn at the median age of death for all 
individuals included in A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs: 36 years old.  However. as my data will show,  there is good 
cause for treating 1879 as a watershed between the two groups. Those born after 1879 grew up almost entirely under 
colonial conditions.  They came from different areas of the country, and had different life experiences and 
revolutionary careers. 
188 Tăng Bạt Hổ, Trần Quý Cáp, and Nguyễn Hàm also figure prominently in Phan Bội Châu’s 
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exile, either of illness or by execution (see Tables 5 and 6).  Overall, the older generation was 
considerably more involved in events on the ground in Vietnam and suffered considerably more 
negative consequences as a result.  Most of them fit the classic definition of “martyrs.”   
The younger generation differed in numerous significant ways from the older.  Composed 
of 23 individuals born between 1880 and 1894, the younger generation was far more likely to 
have attended a modern educational institution, whether civil or military (see Table 8).  Nearly 
all came from the North or Nghệ Tĩnh regions, and a majority died abroad (see Table 4).  In 
contrast to the older generation, most died of illness or suicide, while only two were executed 
(see Table 6).  Overall, the younger generation was far less engaged in actual conflict with the 
French and Nguyễn dynasty authorities, but much more widely travelled than the older 
generation.  
By cross-referencing multiple factors, it is possible to sketch a more complete picture of 
the life stories contained in A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs.  First, we analyze the generational 
split in greater depth.  One difference that is immediately noticeable is the average age of death 
for members of each generation: 26.7 years of age for the younger group compared to a 46.6 
years of age for the older (see Table 2).  Simply stated, the older generation were old men when 
they died.  The younger generation, being, on average, almost twenty years younger, were youth 
and young adults.   
The individual biographies reveal the kind psychological and cultural differences that this 
age gap engendered.  For example, consider the types of suicide committed by each group (a 
meaningful comparison, for each group included five suicides).  Four out of five members of the 
older generation committed suicide under conditions of immediate imprisonment and duress.  
Two of them did so by undergoing hunger strikes, one by poisoning, and one by biting her 
tongue and bleeding to death.  In contrast, only one out of five members of the younger 
generation committed suicide while in captivity - by poisoning.  Three of the others committed 
suicide because they were ill, and the last one doing so because his father refused to send money 
to him in Japan.  Overall, the text presents the suicides of the older generation as powerful moral 
stands worthy of emulation.  By contrast, the suicides of the younger generation are simply 
referred to as “unlucky” and “unfortunate.”189 
A comparison of the two generations also reveals a significant geographical shift in 
revolutionary participation and activity.  First, the older generation included a much higher 
proportion (35%) of individuals from the central region of Annam than did the younger 
generation (4.3%).  Conversely, the younger generation was far more likely (52%) to be from the 
North than the older generation (25%).  Both generations contained a significant number of 
individuals from the two provinces of Nghệ An and Hà Tĩnh (the birthplace of Phan Bội Châu 
and later Hồ Chí Minh).  Second, as already noted, the older generation almost completely died 
 
Autobiography, and it is not surprising that they would be included in a collection surveying the lives of significant 
martyrs.  Đặng Thái Thân,from Nghệ An, is another a unsurprising addition who also appears in the Autobiography.  
Together, these four men constitute a revolutionary “old guard:” individuals with compelling personal narratives 
who could be turned into models for future generations of revolutionaries.  It is nevertheless interesting to find that 
these four men, while sharing certain traits in common, led considerably different lives and participated in “the 
revolution” in substantially different ways. 
189 VNNLS, 150. The suicide of Phan Lại Lương is described as particularly pathetic.  Having refused to 
obtain medical treatment after becoming ill while abroad a ship bound for Guangdong in 1910, Phan Lại Lương 
jumped overboard.  He was pulled out of the water, but died soon afterwards at the hospital from his injuries and the 
damage to his already weakened constitution.  Ibid.,  144. 
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within the borders of Vietnam (95%), whereas most of the younger died abroad (72%).190  Taken 
together, these proportionately significant differences indicate a transition from an older 
Annamese-led movement of active domestic resistance to a much younger Tonkinese-dominated 
expatriate community of political exiles and agitators.   
The older and younger generations underwent two very different kinds of institutional 
experiences.  The older group largely received a traditional Chinese-language education (80%), 
whereas only a few of the younger generation did so (22%).  By contrast, the younger generation 
was more likely (74%) to attend a modern institution.  Such institutions included the two schools 
serving the Eastern Travel movement - the Dobun Shoin (Đồng Văn Thư Viện, Common Culture 
Academy) and the Shimbu Gakko (Military Preparatory Academy), as well as several institutions 
in Guangdong and Beijing, including the famous Baoding Military Academy.  Five individuals 
attended some form of French educational institution. Overall, thirteen of the younger generation 
took part in the Eastern Travel movement, while ten went to school or trained in China.191  
Meanwhile, the older generation was conspicuous for having attended a quite different sort of 
institution: the colonial prison or work camp.  Seventeen of the older group were imprisoned, 
fifteen of whom died while in custody.  These clear-cut institutional distinctions reinforce the 
social and cultural differences between generations and indicate just how much of a sociological 
transition had taken place between 1905 and 1915.192   
 
 
 
190 In addition, the one older individual who died abroad, Lê Văn Tập, did so in Lông Châu, just across the 
border with China. Ibid., 108. 
191 Note that these groupings are not mutually exclusive, for six individuals attended institutions in both 
Japan and then China. 
192 1915 was the year the last member of the older generation (Nguyễn Đức Công) died.  Ibid.,126. 
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A final important distinction between the generations can be found in the very language 
used to tell their stories.  The differences in textual treatment of the generations begins simply 
with the amount of space allocated to each martyr.  Whereas the authors wrote a total of 22,366 
characters about the older generation, an average of 1,118 characters per individual, they only 
wrote 11,315 characters about the younger generation, an average of only 492 characters per 
individual, which is less than half (see Table 7, Parts One and Two).  The number of characters 
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written about each individual declined over time: on average, the later an individual died, the less 
lengthy biography they received .  Likewise, the younger an individual was, the less attention 
they received (see Tables 11 and 15).  Members of the older generation were also more likely to 
have poems appended to their biographies (an average of 2.45 poems per individual compared to 
1.52 for the younger generation, see Table 19).   No doubt this was at least partially the result of 
the older generation simply living longer lives, and thus having more biographical information 
available.  Another explanation may be that the authors simply knew less about the younger 
revolutionaries.  However, this explanation is not entirely convincing, for both Đặng Đoàn Bằng 
and Trần Quốc Duy were members of the younger generation and claimed to be close personal 
friends with many of the deceased.   
There were significant spatial differences as well. Textually speaking, the Tonkin lost out 
to the regions.  Though Northern individuals accounted for 40% of the entire collection, they 
received only 26% of the collection’s total character count.  In contrast, individuals from the 
Annam, despite accounting for only 20% of the martyrs in the collection, received 30% of the 
text’s total character count.  Annam, with only seven biographies, punched well above its weight 
in numbers.  Meanwhile, individuals from Nghệ Tĩnh took the lion’s share of authorial attention: 
on average, they received biographies nearly twice as long as individuals from the North.  Thus, 
an important distinction can be drawn between Nghệ Tĩnh and Tonkin.  This indicates that while 
Tonkin was emerging as a new source of revolutionaries, the authors were not nearly as familiar 
with them as they were with the more famous activities of the older Annamese revolutionaries 
and at least a portion of the Nghệ Tĩnh martyrs.    
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An analysis of the topics dealt with in each biography reveals even more divergence.  In 
order of frequency, the top five topics for the entire corpus were: (1) France/Puppet Government, 
(2) Martyrdom/Death, (3) Heroic Traits, (4) Party Affairs/Organization, and (5) Foreign 
Affairs/Locations.  This list overlaps with but does not correspond completely with the most 
common topics across all fifty biographies.  The most common topics for the older generation 
were France/Puppet Government (50%) and Martyrdom/Death (20%).193  In contrast, Illness 
(26%), followed by Foreign Affairs/Locations (22%) proved to be the most common topics in the 
biographies of the younger generation.194  This distinction is even more significant due to the fact 
that, throughout the corpus, the occurrences of words related to France/Puppet Government (259 
instances) and Martyrdom/Death (215 instances) far outweighed words related to Illness (71 
instances) and Foreign Affairs/Locations (144 instances).195   
That illness figures so prominently as a top-ranked topic despite its overall paucity in the 
corpus at large reveals that a large subsection of the younger generation both led significantly 
different lives and were treated textually in significantly different ways.  Indeed, many of the 
biographies of the younger generations contained little else besides a description of their foreign 
travels and their death from illness.  In contrast, the biographies of the older generation included 
many topics, and were often much richer in literary and emotional content as well.  Two charts 
comparing the raw frequency of the term “France” and the term “Illness” over the range of the 
corpus further demonstrate this divergence (see Table 13).   
 
 
 
193 Only three of the biographies of younger individuals ranked France/Puppet Government first.  None 
ranked Martyrdom/Death first. 
194 Only two biographies of older individuals ranked Foreign Affairs/Locations first.  None ranked Illness 
first. 
195 The high number of characters/words pertaining to France/Puppet Government is noteworthy, and I will 
address this issue separately below. 
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The next factor I considered is age at death.  While the following results largely reinforce 
my previous argument concerning the existence of two distinct generations, they do not take the 
date of birth into consideration as a primary metric.  Nevertheless, since all of those born before 
1879 died at an age of 36 years old or more and all those born after 1879 died at an age of 32 
years old or less, this metric implicitly reproduces an identical generational split.  The purpose of 
using it is to evaluate other metrics without considering generation per se (see Table 14).  One of 
the results is that this reveals certain patterns of overlap between generations as well as other 
important distinctions between martyred individuals. 
Several useful alternative metrics also affirm the existence of two generations.  First, 
comparing the average age of death to birthplace reveals Annam to be the source of considerably 
older martyrs (47.4 years old) than both the Tonkin and Nghệ Tĩnh regions (32.8 and 32.9 years 
old respectively, see Table 17).  The four martyrs from Cochinchina display a slightly higher 
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average age of death: 38.3 years.  This confirms the conclusion drawn previously about Annam 
having been a primary source of the older generation.  It also reveals that despite producing a 
number of members of the older generation, Nghệ Tĩnh, was still quite youthful in character.  
Judging exclusively from this data, one would predict that Nghệ Tĩnh and Tonkin would be the 
source of the next generation of revolutionaries.   
Second, an analysis of the average age of death by location of death confirms that those 
dying within the country tended to be much older (see Table 18).  Interestingly, the average age 
of those dying in a different region from where they were born (domestic distant) was quite high 
(46.6 years old), while the average age of those dying in their home region (domestic local, 39.3 
years old) was closer to the median of 36 years old.  I interpret this to be an indication that the 
older an individual was, the greater was the probability of them participating in national as 
opposed to purely regional resistance activities.  By comparison, the average age of those dying 
in Japan (23.5 years old), Siam (27.3 years old), and China (28.6 years old) was considerably 
younger.  This metric confirms the generational argument. 
A Complication: Time or Space? 
I will now consider several metrics that complicate the concept of two distinct 
generations – at least to some degree.  First, an analysis of age of death by date of death presents 
a muddled picture (see Table 14).  The younger generation began dying early (two in 1908), 
whereas the older generation continue to live for some time (the last died in 1915).  This means 
that no clear dividing line can be drawn according to when individuals died.  Rather, it seems  
that the most useful means for making a social distinction between networks or groups is not a 
temporal analysis, but a spatial analysis.  In other words, even though the generations overlapped 
temporally, this does not necessarily mean that they had significant communication or 
intercourse with each other.   
Second, while analysis of character count and number of appended poems by age of 
death confirms the contention that older individuals received significantly more authorial 
attention, it also reveals some interesting outliers within the younger generation.  Another chart 
detailing character count by date of death also suggests an overall trend which nevertheless 
contains several exceptions and outliers (see Table 19).  Certain younger individuals did receive 
longer biographies and a greater number of poems.  This complicates the picture for the younger 
generation, and demands an explanation: what was distinctive about the particular members of 
the younger generation who received longer biographies? 
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In order to answer this question, we will turn to the final metric to be considered: the 
manner of death.  A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs presents five categories of death: (a) Illness 
(19), (b) suicide (9), (c) execution (9), (d) battle (5), and (e) exhaustion (2).  For ease of 
reference, I have combined illness with exhaustion (natural causes), and combined execution 
with battle (execution/battle).  Examining this metric by birthplace reveals Tonkin and Nghệ 
Tĩnh to be the primary sources of those killed by the French and their allies (executions/battle, 
see).  Conversely, those who died of natural causes were split almost evenly between regions 
(see Table 20).  Suicide displayed similar spatial diversification, though none of the four 
Cochinchinese committed suicide.  Initially, this finding struck me as quite strange, for I had 
come to assume that the Annamese were primarily responsible for actually fighting with the 
French.  In fact, only two of the ten Annamese were executed, while five died of natural causes.  
Does this indicate the generational argument is flawed? 
In a word, no. Contrasting the manner of death with the average age of death confirms.  
The average age of death from illness was 31.1, consistent with earlier findings about the 
younger generation.  In contrast, the average age of death by execution and suicide was 40.6 and 
40.8, respectively (see Table 23).  This indicates the generational argument was accurate, 
although it points to a greater willingness on the part of the older generation to take their own 
lives.  The reader will remember that four out of five older suicides were committed while in 
prison or in custody.  An analysis of the manner of death by location of death further reinforces 
the generational argument (see Table 22).  Most deaths from illness (74%) took place abroad, 
whereas nearly all (94%) deaths resulting from execution or combat happened within Vietnam.  
If the older Annamese did not account for more than two of these deaths, then who was dying at 
the hands of the enemy? 
It turns out the answer is different for executions and deaths in battle (see Table 24).  , 
Excluding the problematic Annamese, those executed were most likely to be from the older 
generation, and hailed from either Nghệ Tĩnh or Tonkin (78%).  However, those who died in 
battle, while also split between Nghệ Tĩnh or Tonkin, were almost all younger (80%).  This small 
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group of four young men was responsible for skewing the scatter plots and frustrating the 
previously outlined “sick student” model.  However, the most interesting metric of all concerns 
the relative proportion of text dedicated to them.   
The four younger martyrs who died in battle, along with the two who were executed, 
receive considerably more attention than their peers who died of illness or suicide.  The 
individuals who suffered “violent deaths” averaged 984 characters per biography, compared to 
only 318 for their contemporaries.  A quick check of the older generation reveals no such gap: 
the average character count for deaths in battle or by execution was 1029, in contrast to 1178 
characters per biography for those dying of natural causes or taking their own lives (see Table 
21).  This indicates that for the younger generation “violent deaths” came at an editorial premium 
– such a violent death was almost a sufficient qualification for those six individuals to achieve 
parity with their elders.  They constitute an important subgroup within the younger generation - 
one I will examine in greater detail below.  Of course, It is also highly significant that their peers 
hardly merited attention at all.  Indeed, the next question is why were they included in a 
compendium of “martyrs” in the first place? 
Conclusion 
This statistically informed prosopographical analysis reveals that the individuals included 
in A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs can be usefully divided along several important metrics.  
Drawing together the results of these metrics, we find the text contains four distinct subgroups.  
First came an older generation of Annamese scholar-patriots with considerable name recognition.  
This group travelled significantly within the country and nearly all spent time in colonial prisons.  
They were classically educated and had many personal connections to the Cần Vương 
movement.  For the most part, they are described as dedicated yet reserved individuals.  The 
authors of the text hold them in high regard and use their stories to create archetypes for model 
patriots.   
The second group consisted of older patriots from Tonkin and Nghệ Tĩnh.  This group 
enjoyed slightly less fame than the Annam group, but was far more likely to have been captured 
and killed or executed by the French.  They were classically educated and many had close 
connections with Phan Bội Châu.  The life stories of this group are the most interesting of the 
entire text, and their stories often suggest these individuals were strong-willed loners driven to 
revolutionary activity by their conscience and sense of righteous indignation.  Where the 
Annamese are presented as purposeful and prudent patriotic models, this older generation of 
northerners are depicted as ardent revolutionaries - angry men willing to die in defense of their 
principles.   
The third group is that of the “sick students.”  This group was mostly from Tonkin and 
Nghệ Tĩnh.  They spent considerable time abroad, and many of them were trained at modern 
educational or military institutions.  Many participated in the Eastern Travel movement, and 
several of them served in a junior capacity in Phan Bội Châu’s various political organizations.  
The principal authors of the text, Đặng Đoàn Bằng and Trần Quốc Duy, belonged to this third 
group.   yet strangely, these authors have far less to contribute about this group than they do 
about the other groups.  For this group, their editorial comments are  often wistful, complaining 
about wasted talent and a general unluckiness.  Most of this group died of illness or suicide while 
abroad.   
This group of “sick students” presents a challenge to the very concept of martyrdom.  In 
both the Catholic and Confucian traditions, martyrdom is specifically associated with violent 
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death at the hand of an enemy.  The Confucian tradition admits suicide in particular cases, 
especially if an individual is under duress or captured and commits suicide strategically to deny 
an advantage to the enemy.  However, in cases in which suicide was unprovoked, the application 
of the term “martyr” seems doubtful.  Its use for cases of death by illness stretches the meaning 
of the term considerably.  This may be a function of translation.   For such cases, perhaps it is 
more appropriate to employ the phrase “righteous dead,” which lacks the sanguinary 
connotations of “martyr” but still maintains the (fictive) notion that the individual died on behalf 
of a cause.    
The fourth group consists of those members of the younger generation who died a 
“violent death.”  These individuals received comparatively more of the authors’ attention than 
their peers. They were less likely to have travelled abroad.  Only three of six participated in the 
Eastern Travel movement.  However, they represented, the nucleus of a new generation of 
radicalized martyrs.  It was this group - and not the “sick students” - who could and were 
legitimately presented as the inheritors of a violent anti-colonial legacy perpetuated by the 
second group. 
A final group to consider, mostly for its relative absence throughout the text, are the 
Cochinchinese.  Despite the fact, noted in the text itself, that two-thirds of participants in the 
Eastern Travel movement came from the south, only four southerners are included in this 
compilation.  Of those who are, two belong to the older generation and two to the younger.  Their 
biographies are comparatively short compared to those of the other three regions as well.  
Overall the treatment of Cochinchinese fails to substantiate the text’s claim to national 
representativeness.  However, what this absence does point to is a social disconnect between 
northern and southern revolutionaries.  Either the overweighted proportion of southern Eastern 
Travel movement participants simply did not become martyrs to the same degree that the 
northerners did (unlikely), or the authors and editors of the text failed to develop many 
meaningful relationships with southern activists, and likewise failed to maintain the relationships 
they did cultivate.   
Having evaluated A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs as an aggregated collection of 
biographies and as a corpus of texts, I will now reconsider the overall message and discursive 
function of the text.  The text purports to present recent significant moments in national history.  
The four Introductions claim the text to be both a commemoration of the dead and a political 
testament to the perennial potency of Vietnamese patriotic resistance.  The text bears these 
claims out, but only to a certain extent.  The authors provide moving accounts of selected 
individuals which certainly qualify as commemorations of the dead.  However, they fail to 
successfully integrate these accounts into a larger national narrative.  Instead, the accounts fall 
haphazardly into four groups defined by their common attributes.  
The text is regionally fragmented and historiographically discontinuous.  Instead of a 
national history, we have here several loose historical narrative clusters which correspond to 
generationally and regionally defined groups.  Some of these biographical clusters are much 
closer to the language and intent of the introductions, specifically those of individuals of both 
generations from Tonkin and Nghệ Tĩnh who died “violent deaths.”  The Tonkinese and Nghệ 
Tĩnh fighters exhibit the characteristics of patriotic martyrs alluded to in the introductions: 
determination, selflessness, and righteous anger.   
In contrast, the “sick students” are conspicuous for their lack of these traits.  This large 
group, comprising almost half of the individuals contained in A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs, 
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confusingly muddles the message the text hopes to deliver.  It is not clear whether many of these 
individuals were in fact acting on behalf of the national cause while they trained in educational 
and military institutions abroad.  The biographies of these individuals fail to adequately explain 
their motivations or how their deaths fit into a larger national narrative.   
Meanwhile, the Annamese appear as important agents of national communication and 
integration.  More than those of the Tonkinese, their efforts served to bring the northern region 
into dialogue with the south.  They were instrumental in developing the first nationwide 
organizational infrastructure, and suffered considerably as a result.  Meanwhile, in terms of 
national integration, it seems their efforts were only partially successful.  Cochinchinese barely 
appear in this volume, and the younger generation contains only one individual from Annam.   
Overall, A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs presents a series of snapshots of a national 
movement still in its formative stages.  Although its language might differ from its content, it is 
decidedly nationalist in intent and scope.  The text positions its authors, martyrs, and readers 
against the French colonial state, and uses “the loss of the country” as a foil for constituting 
exactly that country.  Through sacrifice the nation is realized.  This utilitarian approach to death 
may partly explain the inclusion of so many “sick students.”  If every death reinforces the life of 
the nation, then the manner, location, and specific circumstances of each death do not matter.  
What does matter is that each deceased individual can be claimed on behalf of the nation.  To at 
least a certain extent, quantity eclipses quality.   
At a certain point, the calculus between commemoration of the dead and the creation of a 
model for patriotic emulation would shift in favor of the latter.  The greater the quantity of 
deaths, the more likely this shift was to take place.  Whether he intended to or not, Phan Bội 
Châu had produced an especially somber and bloody national legacy.  By commemorating deaths 
on behalf of the nation, no matter their provenance, he set a dangerous precedent.  Of course, it 
was exactly this precedent that would later be invoked by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
when it encouraged hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of young Vietnamese to go to their 
deaths in 33 years of war against France, the United States, Cambodia, and China.   
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Chapter Three  
Security, Legality, and Secrets:  
The Capture, Transport, and Incarceration of Phan Bội Châu, June-August, 1925 
The morning train from Hangzhou pulled into Shanghai’s North Railway Station at noon 
on June 30, 1925. Phan Bội Châu exited the train and caught a tram that would take him to the 
center of the International Concession.  Once there, Phan Bội Châu intended to mail four 
hundred yuan and a letter to Trần Hữu Công in Germany.  After their exhausting journey together 
through the Chinese interior to Yunnan and back in 1918, Trần Hữu Công had wearied of the 
revolutionary cause. After winning a scholarship from the Peking government in 1922, he left to 
study medicine in Berlin. Phan Bội Châu dutifully collected the award when it arrived each 
month and, after depositing a portion of it into a savings account, sent the balance on to the 
young man.  Once this was done, Phan Bội Châu planned to board a ship bound for Canton, 
where Nguyễn Ai Quốc and the grave of Phạm Hồng Thái awaited him. 
Although Phan Bội Châu did not know it, a woman by the name of Zao-Wang-Ze had 
followed him on the train from Hangzhou.  Her husband, Zao-Zeng-Gning, worked in Shanghai 
at the Grand Monde casino, but he was also an informer in the payroll of Brigadier-Detective 
Sou-Zah-Seu of the French Police’s Bureau of Political Affairs.  The informer Zao-Zeng-Gning 
was originally from Hangzhou and still had family living there.  Brigadier-Detective Sou-Zah-
Seu was determined to succeed where many French agents had failed, and thus had organized a 
sophisticated surveillance operation to keep track of Phan Bội Châu’s movements and 
activities.196   
This surveillance team consisted of eight individuals. In Hangzhou, Zao-Zeng-Gning’s 
wife Zao-Wang-Ze obtained messages from an unnamed “boy” living with Phan Bội Châu.  She 
then communicated the information she obtained from him to her husband’s two brothers Zao-
Ching-Tching and Zao-Keng-Ling.  Zao-Ching-Tching transmitted information to Sergeant Wou 
and an agent named Wang, who were both employed at the Shanghai South Railway Station 
police, who then passed it on to Zao-Zeng-Gning in the French Concession.  A final police agent 
named Zao-Ki-Ziang, likely another family member, worked at the Songjiang station between 
Hangzhou and Shanghai.197   
As a result of the coordinated efforts of this team, by nine o’clock on the morning of June 
30, Brigadier-Detective Sou-Zah-Seu and Sergeant J. Giamarchi knew Phan Bội Châu was 
coming to Shanghai’s North Railway Station.  Accompanied by Brigadier-Detectives Emilianoff 
and Dulinatz of the French Police and Inspector Conduit of the International Concession Police 
Force, Sou-Zah-Seu and Giamarchi arrived by automobile at the North Railway Station at 
approximately 11:30 AM.  Sou-Zah Seu and Giamarchi entered the station and waited until the 
train from Hangzhou arrived and its passengers had disembarked.  As Phan Bội Châu now 
moved through the station, Zao-Wang-Ze followed and signaled his identity to the two officers, 
who then moved in on their target.  Just as Phan Bội Châu was about to get on to a tram, 
Giamarchi approached Phan Bội Châu and asked him to follow.  The stunned old man attempt to 
escape, but Giamarchi motioned him toward the waiting vehicle and pushed him inside.  The 
ensemble departed immediately for the Jules Ferry, which was waiting at the wharf.198 
The Security State Takes Action 
 
196 SPCE 355, Le Sergent Giamarchi à M. le Chef de la Garde, 19 juillet 1925. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Ibid. 
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Tensions had been building throughout the entire month of June, following the shooting 
of a Chinese demonstrator by Japanese police in Shanghai on May 30, 1925.  This incident 
triggered protests across Shanghai and Canton.  On June 23, 1925 the tiny French concession 
located on Shameen Island in Canton came under fire, leading to the death of a French citizen 
and an atmosphere thick with fear that more attacks were imminent.  The consulate manager, 
Madame Leurquin, indicated that the attacks, “oblige us to use all the means of repression at our 
disposal.”199  Shameen Island was under siege and cut off from cable service.   Acting Governor 
General Monguillot later indicated the attack was carried out by Whampoa cadets, led by 
Russian officers.200   
Several Vietnamese revolutionaries were known to be cadets at Whampoa, including Lê 
Hồng Phong, Lê Quang Đạt, and Lê Hồng Sơn (aka Lê Tản Anh, aka Lê Văn Phan). Phan Bội 
Châu and the veteran revolutionary operative Nguyễn Hải Thần had arranged for their admission 
to Whampoa during his stay in Canton the previous year (August-October 1924).201  Since 
returning to Hangzhou in December 1924, Phan Bội Châu continued to correspond with his 
contacts in Canton, especially Hồ Tùng Mậu.202  Thanks to their network of spies, the 
Indochinese security services of the Sûreté Générale were privy to much of Phan Bội Châu’s 
correspondence. As of April 22, 1925, Georges Nadaud, head of the third bureau of the Sûreté 
Générale, knew Phan Bội Châu planned to return to Canton for the anniversary of Phạm Hồng 
Thái’s June 19, 1924 assassination attempt on Governor General Martial Merlin on Shameen 
Island, Canton.203  The Sûreté intelligence services had an even better source, however, namely 
the “boy” living with Phan Bội Châu in Hangzhou, who would be able to specify the precise date 
Phan Bội Châu would be travelling.204  Nadaud coordinated with Captain Fiori of the French 
 
199 Mdm. Leurquin - “Are you informed yesterday by Admirality of serious incidents in which Mr. Eugene 
Pasquier was found died.  It is absolutely proved that the fire was opened by Chinese troops and an ensemble of 
irrefutable facts establish that this attack on Shameen was premeditated.  Machine guns were used, but not cannons.  
The Chinese were students.  While claiming the English, Portuguese, and French were responsible for this 
“buchery,” the civil governor called on the American consul to negotiate.  I tell you, repeating myself, that 
yesterday’s attacks oblige us to use all the means of repression at our disposal.  The French concession is defended 
by marines, volunteers, Annamese police, and the guard of the Portuguese consulate general (composed of Russians) 
and all valiantly did their duty.  The majority of women have evacuated to HK.”  - Leurquin.  SPCE 355, 
Telegramme Officiel, Altair (Leurquin, Hong Kong) to GGI Hanoi (Monguillot), No. 12, 24 juin 1925. 
200 Monguillot reported by cable to the Minister of Colonies, André Hesse: “June 28, Shameen completely 
isolated.  Consul Canton confirmed that responsibility for the serious incident, wherein Eugene Pasquier was found 
dead, lies with the Cantonese alone.  Attack on Shameen by Whampoa cadets led by Russian officers.”  SPCE 355, 
GGI à Colonies, 30 juin 1925. 
201 Phan Bội Châu.  Overturned Chariot, translated by Vinh Sinh and Nicholas Wickenden (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 1999), 259. 
202 Agent Emile indicates Phan Bội Châu returned to Hangzhou on December 4, 1924.  SPCE 355, Agent 
Emile, Lettre adressée problablement de Canton, peut-être par Ho Tung Mau, à Phan Bội Châu, à Hangtchéou, 26 
décembre 1925 [?]. 
203 This information was provided by Agent Pinot (aka Lâm Đức Thụ, aka Nguyễn Công Viễn, aka Hoàng 
Chấn Đông).  SPCE 355, Note Noel No. 154 du 23 Mai 1925 (Annexe No. 1), Traduction d’un rapport de Pinot à 
Noel du 22 avril 1925. 
204 Yves Le Jariel presents evidence that the traitor who provided the Sûreté with Phan Bội Châu’s travel 
information was Lưu Trọng Quế (aka Lưu Yên Đơn, aka Lý Trọng Bá), a Catholic student from Hà Tĩnh who had 
participated in the Đông Du movement and who Agent Pinot confirmed was living with Phan Bội Châu in 
Hangzhou in June 1925.  Based on archival documents, Le Jariel suggests Lưu Yên Đơn was in fact Agent Emile.  
Le Jariel argues that Nguyễn Thượng Huyền, who Phan Bội Châu later suspected to be the traitor, and who was 
suspected for the rest of his life as a result, was very likely innocent. Le Jariel’s claim that Lưu Trọng Quế was a 
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concession police in Shanghai, linking up the Sûreté’s spy in Hangzhou with Brigadier-Detective 
Sou-Zah-Seu and Sergeant J. Giamarchi’s team.205  With their pieces in place, Nadaud and Fiori 
had only to wait for Phan Bội Châu to make his move. 
On June 24, the French Consul Meyrier at Shanghai anxiously cabled the governor 
general’s office in Hanoi to share a rumor obtained by local intelligence: Annamese 
revolutionaries in Hangzhou intended to commit attacks against the French concession in 
Canton, in order to support the revolutionary movement in Indochina.206  Maurice Monguillot, 
recognizing that the French in Canton were isolated, reached out to French Consul Yves du 
Courthial in Hong Kong, to alert him to the possibility of another attack.207  The next day, June 
25, Etienne Fiori, captain of police for the French concession at Shanghai sent a coded telegram 
to Nadaud at Hong Kong suggesting Phan Bội Châu himself, on the orders of the “Revolutionary 
Committee of Hangzhou,” planned to “attack all French subjects in Canton and to prepare a 
movement against Indochina.”208   
Alarmed, Consul Courthial at Hong Kong cabled Louis Paul Jeanbrau, the head of the 
Sûreté Générale.  Courthial indicated that, while he was unable to decipher the telegram from 
Shanghai (namely, Fiori’s telegram from earlier that day), he assumed it pertained to the arrest of 
Phan Bội Châu in Shanghai.  Courthial therefore asked Jeanbrau to contact Consul Meyrier in 
Shanghai with (1) an arrest warrant for Phan Bội Châu, (2) a warning to be careful and identify 
any people arrested with Phan Bội Châu, and (3) confirmation that 5,000 piastres would be paid 
for the arrest of Phan Bội Châu.209  Jeanbrau responded the next day (June 26), indicating 
Courthial’s assumption was unlikely.210  He further advised Courthial to contact Meyrier directly, 
should the telegram actually pertain to the arrest of Phan Bội Châu.  This strongly suggests that 
Jeanbrau was not entirely up to date on Nadaud’s intelligence mission. Monguillot, it appears, 
knew even less, because he sent a cable of his own to Shanghai in which he asked if Nadaud had 
returned Japan yet.211   
 
spy, like his claim that Nguyễn Thượng Huyền was innocent are both supportable by available evidence.  However, 
as I indicate below, I believe the source of Phan Bội Châu’s travel information was neither of these individuals.  Le 
Jariel, Yves.  Phan Bội Châu (1867-1940): Le Nationalisme Vietnamien Avant Ho Chi Minh (Paris: L’Harmattan, 
2008), 264-269, 308, 313. 
205 SPCE 355, Chang Hai (Fiori) à Fransulat [sic] (Hong Kong, Nadaud), 30 juin 1925. 
206 SPCE 355, Consul francaise Shanghai Meyrier à GGI Monguillot 24 juin 1925.  Meyrier followed up 
his report on Phan Bội Châu’s intentions on the morning of June 30, indicating that “Phan Bội Châu came to 
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GGI Monguillot 30 juin 1925. 
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rapidly as possible.”  SPCE 355, Hanoi (Monguillot) à Francsulat Hong Kong (Courthial), 25 juin 1925. 
208 SPCE 355, Fiori à Nadaud 25 juin, 1925.  Fiori cabled, “Spy indicates Annamese, probably Phan Bội 
Châu, [will depart] July 7 with instructions received from revolutionary committee of Hangzhou to commit attacks 
on French subjects in Canton to prepare movement against Indochina - redouble surveillance after verifying 
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in.  SPCE 355, Telegramme Officiel, Francsulat (Courthial, Hong Kong) à Gougal, Hanoi, Pour Directeur Sûreté 
Generale, No. 84, 25 juin 1925. 
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On June 29, Consul Meyrier cabled Monguillot with far more precise details concerning 
what was taking place in Hangzhou.  According to Meyrier, the information concerning Phan Bội 
Châu’s plan to attack French in Canton came from a Chinese domestic working for Phan Bội 
Châu.  The informer had listened to Phan Bội Châu’s conversations and had read his letters 
addressed to Canton.  Meyrier further indicated that Phan Bội Châu intended to return to Canton 
on July 5, passing through Shanghai on his way.  Though Nadaud had asked Meyrier to arrest 
Phan Bội Châu as he passed through, Nadaud never sent the arrest warrant as he had promised.  
Thus, Meyrier asked Monguillot to confirm the arrest by sending a warrant by cable.212   
It was too late for that.  Phan Bội Châu was not returning to Canton on July 5; he was 
leaving the very next day!  At 5:20 AM on June 30, Meyrier frantically cabled Monguillot to 
relay the news.  Not only would Phan Bội Châu be coming to Shanghai that very morning, he 
apparently planned to (1) attend the Chinese May 30th protests and attempt to direct them against 
the French concession, (2) spread propaganda amongst the Vietnamese guards policing the 
French concession.  In the light of the ongoing unrest in Shanghai, Meyrier considered Phan Bội 
Châu’s presence “a grave danger to the concession.”  Thus, he planned to arrest him in secret, put 
him on board the Jules Ferry, and put him on the Angkor under a false name on July 4, bound for 
Saigon.213   
The foregoing telegrams indicate that the top administrative and security officials of 
French Indochina had little idea Phan Bội Châu was about to be arrested.  Jeanbrau seemed 
generally unaware of Nadaud’s mission, or his coordination with Fiori in Shanghai.  Monguillot 
did not even know where Nadaud was.  In any case, Monguillot’s attention was centered on 
Canton, where another attack by Whampoa cadets on Shameen Island appeared imminent.214  
Neither Nadaud nor Fiori were themselves in Shanghai at the time.215  The decision to arrest 
Phan Bội Châu thus fell to Consul Meyrier, who, lacking an arrest warrant, elected to have Phan 
Bội Châu “secretly arrested” due to security concerns.  Since there was little chance Phan Bội 
Châu would enter the French concession, it fell to Sergeant Giamarchi and Brigadier-Detective 
Sou-Zah-Seu to stage what looked an awful lot like a kidnapping of a Vietnamese resident of 
China in broad daylight within Chinese sovereign territory. 
The news of the arrest of Phan Bội Châu in Shanghai spread quickly within the French 
Far East cable network.  It quickly became apparent that there was no clear plan about what to do 
with Phan Bội Châu now that he had been captured.  In fact, even as the French security forces 
 
212 Meyrier also indicated that the assassin of Phan Bá Ngọc was now a cadet at Whampoa.  This was 
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215 Le Jariel, Phan Bội Châu, 262. 
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congratulated one another, their diplomatic and administrative counterparts pointed out the 
distinct dangers presented by the capture.  Anxious to avoid public recriminations, Meyrier had 
Phan Bội Châu taken directly from the North Railway Station to the waiting warship the Jules 
Ferry.  There he would wait for the next ship, the Angkor, which was due to depart for Saigon on 
July 4.  Meanwhile, top officials sought to make the arrest at least appear legal.  On June 30, 
Meyrier signed a Consular Ordinance citing Articles 16 and 17 of the Law of July 8, 1852, along 
with Articles 82 and 83 of the Edict of June 1778.216  The ordinance simply stated that Phan Bội 
Châu was arrested and sent to Saigon, and that the Municipal Guard was charged with carrying 
out the arrest.  This was the best that could be done on such short notice.  On July 1, Acting 
Governor General Monguillot, hoping to offer a shinier veneer of legality should Phan Bội 
Châu’s presence aboard the Jules Ferry become known to the Chinese authorities, offered to 
send Meyrier a copy by post of the original 1913 Criminal Commission’s verdict of death in 
absentia.217    
As Phan Bội Châu lay chained in the Jules Ferry, the magnitude of the arrest began to 
dawn on French security officials.  On July 3, the Sûreté Chief Louis Paul Jeanbrau and Agent 
Georges Nadaud first emphasized the need for secrecy.218  A day later (July 4), Jeanbrau sent 
multiple cables to the Sûreté offices in Huế and Saigon requesting agents there “keep this matter 
secret as long as possible.”219  Jeanbrau’s caution bordered on paranoia.  Concerns about the 
diplomatic implications of the arrest seemed to have play a large role.  In a letter to the consulate 
in Hong Kong, where the Angkor was to dock later that day, Jeanbrau warned of the possibility 
the British authorities there might not consent to guard Phan Bội Châu.220  The same day, Martel, 
the plenipotentiary minister of France in Peking, signaled his awareness of the matter and 
demanded the news of Phan Bội Châu’s capture not be publicly announced “to avoid provoking 
the Chinese.”221   
It soon became clear that Meyrier’s off-the-cuff plan to send Phan Bội Châu to Saigon 
was not going to work.222  Deciding that Saigon, the eventual destination of the Angkor was too 
dangerous, on July 4, Jeanbrau had Gilles, the head of the Sûreté in Tonkin, instead dispatch two 
Sûreté inspectors and two additional Annamese agents aboard the Amakusa Maru.  Their orders 
were to take hold of Phan Bội Châu in Hong Kong and return him directly to Hanoi.223  The next 
day, July 5, Jeanbrau explained to the French consul in Hong Kong that he preferred Phan Bội 
Châu be transferred directly to Hanoi “to avoid probable Cochinchinese indiscretions.”224  
Jeanbrau briefly floated the idea of having Phan Bội Châu first tried in Huế, but Sogny, the head 
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of the Sûreté in Annam, flatly dismissed the idea on July 7.    
While security officials worked out a plan, French diplomats and administrators curiously 
occupied themselves with determining whether to pay (and if so how) Nadaud and Fiori’s 
informer the $5,000 Indochinese piastres promised for the capture of Phan Bội Châu.  Meyrier, 
Monguillot, and Courthial, the French consul at Hong Kong, discussed this issue over several 
cables beginning on June 25, five days before the capture.225  Apparently not content with just 
one arrest, Courthial raised the possibility of paying an informant in Canton 10,000 piastres, 
presumably for the capture of Lý Thụy (aka Nguyễn Ái Quốc) or possibly Lê Hồng Sơn.  
Paradoxically, the Governor General and French consular officials focused on playing 
intelligence officers, while French security officials made choices about to do with their famous 
prisoner - choices that had real diplomatic and political significance.   
Phan Bội Châu, Prisoner of the French 
Phan Bội Châu had exited his train from Hangzhou expecting to send a letter along with 
funds to his dear friend and former traveling companion Trần Hữu Công (aka Nguyễn Thức 
Canh, aka Trần Trọng Khắc), who was studying in Berlin.226  Instead, Phan Bội Châu found 
himself brusquely thrust into a coach, which sped off to the Shanghai docks where the Jules 
Ferry waited.  According to Phan Bội Châu’s later account, the police of the French concession 
in Shanghai placed him in irons and hid him in the lowest deck of the ship.  The concession 
police took an inventory of Phan Bội Châu’s belongings.  Phan Bội Châu’s suitcase contained 
brochures, letters, enveloppes, receipts, a daily planner covering the first half of 1925, and much 
else besides.  In his carrying tote were enough clothes for a trip to Canton.227   
At 4:00 PM the following day (July 1), Phan Bội Châu was interrogated by three 
individuals from the French concession: Pierre Crépin, chief interpreter for the Consulate 
Général of France in Shanghai, Barthélémy Tchang, Chinese-language interpreter, and J. 
Yvonnou, clerk.228  Phan Bội Châu told them that his name was P’an Che Han (潘是漢), aka 
[Phan] Boi Chau (潘佩珠), and he was 59 years of age, originally from [Nghệ An], Indochina.  
He stated further that he was a journalist, he lived in Hangzhou in the hotel Si-Ou on Tchai-
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by Meyrier.  SPCE 355, Mission Noel, Envoi 230, Annexe No. 7, 3 septembre 1925. 
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Francaise, Bordereau des pièces adressées à M. le Consul Général de France à Shanghai, 3 juillet 1925. 
228 SPCE 355, Correspondance relative a son arrestation et documents saisis sur lui, “L’an mil neuf cent 
vingt cinq et le premier Juillet à seize heures.” 
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Kouan Hang (?官巷) street, and he worked at the bureau of the Military Affairs magazine (軍事
雜誌).  Phan Bội Châu explained that he had come to Shanghai to send $400 to his friend Tch’en 
Tchong-Ko (陳仲克) [aka Trần Trọng Khắc], who was studying medicine in Germany.  He had 
intended to go to Canton on the invitation of his friend Lin Te-Chou 林德樹 (Lâm Đức Thụ), but 
after failing to hear from his friend, he’d given up on this idea.  Phan Bội Châu stated that he 
knew Prince Cường Để very well.  In his suitcase they could find brochures he intended to send 
to a friend in Guangxi named Teng Tzeu-Min 鄧子敏 (aka Đặng Tử Mẫn), who is missing a 
hand.  Phan Bội Châu then signed the deposition form.229  This deposition is remarkable as in it 
Phan Bội Châu freely admits to many facts he would later vehemently deny.   
This was not the only revealing act Phan Bội Châu took. On the same day (July 1), Phan 
Bội Châu wrote a letter addressed to the government of Tonkin.230  In this letter, seven pages 
long in translation, Phan Bội Châu admitted to having written revolutionary works, but claimed 
to have switched to “peaceful revolution” beginning in 1915.  After this point, he claimed to have 
supported Franco-Vietnamese collaboration in cooperation with Governor General Albert Sarraut 
and his bureau chief Mr. Néron, who came to Hangzhou.  Unfortunately, Phan Bội Châu 
explains, Mr. Phan Bá Ngọc died and it was no longer possible to engage in the politics of 
cooperation.  
In a striking passage, Phan Bội Châu then addressed how the “fad of Russian 
communism” has quickly taken over the Vietnamese nationalist movement.231   He continued: 
Examining the intellectual level of the Vietnamese people and their way of life, I finally 
understand that if we use the murderous cannons of such a revolution to bombard 
Vietnam, we would only destroy the harmony and the order which reign, without 
bringing about the political reform desired. I speak here sincerely and seriously, without 
having any idea of deception.  The greatest trouble is, that by living abroad, my 
supporters and I must necessarily rely on strangers. Among the foreigners on whom we 
can rely, there are only the Chinese and Soviet communist parties. By sheltering behind 
them to live, we cannot help but associate ourselves with their policies and allow them to 
employ us as their avant-garde soldiers. 
In an incredibly fatalistic turn, Phan Bội Châu then explained that his shame at having 
allowed communism to “poison my county” led him to “return to my country to seek death there, 
in order to atone for my faults and deliver myself at the same time from a parasitic life that 
always obliges me to lean on others for survival.”232  By seeking death, Phan Bội Châu argued, 
 
229 The copy was certified on July 3 1925.  SPCE 355, Correspondance relative a son arrestation et 
documents saisis sur lui, “L’an mil neuf cent vingt cinq et le premier Juillet à seize heures.” 
230 SPCE 355, Traduction (Traduction des caractères souscrits sur l’enveloppe: “Lettre adressée au 
Gouvernement du Tonkin - écrite par Phan Bội Châu, lors du premier jour de son arrestation - le 1er Juillet!!). 
231 Phan Bội Châu writes, “For four to five years, the wave of communism in Russia has spread very 
quickly. The young ardent Annamites associated themselves with the Chinese students, who allowed themselves to 
be swept away by the current of communism in Russia.”  Ibid. 
232 Phan Bội Châu continued: “As I said earlier, I no longer want to rely on the communists to live. By 
ceasing to rely on them, the work of revolution will necessarily stop and will no longer be able to advance; because 
all the strength of our party lies entirely in their hands, Now, wanting to deliver me from their support, I will 
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he could demonstrate his sincerity and pay back the debt he owed to his comrades who had died 
before him.233  Therefore, he wrote: “By coming to seek death. I find it now. I therefore ask the 
French Government to do me a courtesy: carry out [my death] to the last. I will not complain.”234   
Phan Bội Châu’s fatalistic attitude lasted for several days, causing Jeanbrau to suggest 
special surveillance to ensure against a possible suicide.235  On July 4, Phan Bội Châu was 
moved from the Jules Ferry to the Angkor, which would stop at Hong Kong so that Phan Bội 
Châu could be handed over to the two agents coming from Tonkin.  On this trip, Phan attempted 
to pass a note to his assigned guard, Agent Bardy, who promptly turned the note over to the 
Sûreté agents when they arrived in Hong Kong on July 7.  At Hong Kong, Phan Bội Châu was 
transferred to the Altaïr and placed in the custody of Agent François, who had also arrived from 
Indochina on July 7 with his partner Christiani and two Vietnamese agents.  Phan remained 
sequestered aboard the Altaïr for two days, cursing loudly at anyone who attempted to interact 
with him.  On July 9, Phan Bội Châu was transferred to the Tonkin under the name Nguyen Ngoc 
Dong.  The Tonkin departed at 2:00 PM, heading for Haiphong.  Agents François and Christiani 
stayed in the same cabin with Phan Bội Châu.  Agent Bardy from Shanghai and Agent Le Roy 
from Shameen were also aboard.236   
Phan Bội Châu seems to have warmed to Inspector François (aka Trần Tứ Quí), who was 
a naturalized French citizen, but ethnically Vietnamese.237  According to Inspector François’s 
report, Phan Bội Châu revealed a considerable amount of incriminating information in a single 
extended conversation,  although in an incoherent, rambling manner.  Phan Bội Châu began by 
explaining to Inspector François that he had left Nghệ An in 1903 and travelled to Moncay, 
whereupon he took a boat to Hong Kong.  Upon arriving, he discovered fifty Vietnamese 
building “anarchistic devices” to be used in Indochina to create a Republic.  One of these bombs 
blew up, mutilating his friend Đặng Tử Mẫn’s hand, whereupon everyone split up, going either 
to Canton, Shanghai, Japan, England, or America.  Phan Bội Châu continued mixing up events 
and meetings with individuals, jumping back and forth in time in a narrative that depended more 
on his stream of consciousness than on anything resembling an accurate chronology.  Finally, the 
stream of consciousness led Phan Bội Châu up to his very conversation with Inspector François.  
Phan Bội Châu then told François, “I tell you, I have been mistreated.  I haven’t eaten for six 
days.  I await my death.  I will be avenged by my friends…”   
François, perhaps realizing that his prisoner was badly malnourished and mentally ill, 
 
necessarily have to strive to find the means to provide for my individual life, by ceasing to continue the work of the 
revolution. By doing this, my conscience no longer allows me to live quietly. Why that ? Because I have nothing to 
pay my debt to my colleagues who died.” Ibid. 
233 Phan Bội Châu then described the arc of his revolutionary career: “I was, in Vietnam, the first person 
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old days needlessly, renouncing the labors of the revolution, I will be ashamed before those who died, having 
nothing to discharge my debt to them.” Ibid. 
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236 SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur François de la Sûreté à M. le Commissaire Spécial Chef de Service à 
Haiphong, 13 juillet 1925. 
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removed Phan Bội Châu’s manacles and convinced him to eat, drink, and sleep.238  François gave 
Phan Bội Châu Cinchona and red wine for his colic.  Even after this, Phan Bội Châu continued 
rambling, relating additional incriminating information to François.  For example, Phan Bội 
Châu claimed:  
If I am sentenced to death, my friends, namely Cường Để…he’s an officer in Japan… 
Nguyễn Thượng Hiền can be found in “An Se.” The third is Tú Đại Từ [Nguyễn Hải 
Thân] can be found in Canton…he was the organizer of the Shameen Affair.  Sadly, it 
failed.  The fourth, I forgot his name… Another group of my friends can be found in 
Canton, in a society called Công Hóa, under a Russian president.  They are ready to 
march against the French and massacre them…239   
Though Phan Bội Châu had been in a furious mood while held aboard the Altaïr, François 
claimed that he calmed down considerably on the Tonkin. Though Phan Bội Châu continued to 
curse the French, by the end of the trip he agreed to sign the fans of Agents François and Le Roy.  
For Le Roy, he wrote, “French and Vietnamese, are of the same house.”  And for François, “Two 
family names form the same heart.”240  François ended his report by noting that as the ship sailed 
from Hòn Dáu island along the coast to Haiphong, he had pointed a number of economic 
improvements to Phan Bội Châu, including the zinc factory at Quảng Yên, a cup workshop 
managed by a Vietnamese, and the maritime production facilities of Bạch Thái Bưởi.  François 
also told Phan Bội Châu that many professional schools now existed in Haiphong for boys and 
girls.  Phan Bội Châu responded that none of this had existed when he left.241  The Tonkin arrived 
in Haiphong on July 11, whereupon Phan was transported to Hanoi by automobile and placed in 
the European section of the Central Prison of Hanoi.   
Having resolved how to get Phan Bội Châu to Hanoi, the attention of security officials 
now turned to legal questions.  On July 8, Paul-Louis Arnoux, the head of the Sûreté in Saigon, 
shared with Jeanbrau the details of his meeting with an unnamed prosecutor general (probably 
Jean Colonna) concerning the proper juridical procedure for dealing with Phan Bội Châu, who he 
referred to as “Revolutionary X.”242  Arnoux advised that, in order to ensure the incarceration 
was legal, a prosecutor of the republic would need to interrogate Phan Bội Châu within forty-
eight hours of the prisoner’s arrival. In other words, once he entered the jurisdiction of 
Indochina, Phan Bội Châu could not legally be held longer than forty-eight hours unless a crime 
had been specified.  However, depending on the result of the interrogation, the prosecutor of the 
republic could produce a new order legitimizing the incarceration.  This meant “we would 
therefore be obliged to make known the nature of the offense or attributable crime.”243  Arnoux 
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relayed the prosecutor general’s recommendation: Phan Bội Châu should be arrested upon 
disembarking in Haiphong and the nature of the crime should be specified at that time so that the 
prosecutor of the republic would know how to complete the new order.   
There were two rather serious problems with the prosecutor general’s advice.  First, 
Gustave-Frédéric-Charles Toussaint, the prosecutor general attached to the Court of Appeals in 
Hanoi, a member of the Protectorate Council of Tonkin, and a legal authority upon whom the 
Sûreté could rely, was out of town.244  His immediate subordinate, Louis-Emile Bourayne, was , 
for unknown reasons, also unavailable.  Some temporary legal expedient would thus need to be 
devised to justify holding Phan Bội Châu in detention.  The solution ended being expedient 
indeed: Dupuy, the resident-mayor of Hanoi, would be tasked with signing Phan Bội Châu’s 
incarceration order using a false name for the new inmate. 
The second serious problem was the nature of the charge itself.  Surely Phan Bội Châu 
was guilty.  But of what?  Phan Bội Châu certainly opposed the French colonial government, but 
he was also technically a subject of the Annamese emperor.  Allowing the Nguyễn court to try 
Phan Bội Châu for treason might seem an easy solution.  However, the Nguyễn dynastic 
administration, which the French colonial state continued to tolerate because it retained some 
symbolic authority, was, in eyes of the French, a fickle instrument.  There was no guarantee a 
dynastic court would produce the right verdict in a manner that the swiftly modernizing 
Vietnamese intellectual class would accept.  Moreover, the Nguyễn courts still relied in some 
cases on the outdated Gia Long Emperor’s legal code, which had been largely borrowed from the 
Qing legal code.  A Nguyễn court might well be viewed internationally as a “kangaroo court” 
created to produce a forgone conclusion on the basis of little or no evidence.  Phan Bội Châu 
had, after all, already been convicted by two different Nguyễn courts for different offenses, both 
in absentia.  First came Phan Bội Châu’s trial held on May 27, 1908,  in Hà Tĩnh under the 
authority of the Nguyễn court.  Nguyễn officials, including the lieutenant governor of Hà Tĩnh, 
found Phan Bội Châu and a number of his close friends guilty of violating Article 204 of the Gia 
Long Code for “having consorted with foreigners or hid out on the border in order to cause 
trouble.”245  Second came the trial held on February 7, 1910, in Vinh, the capital of Nghệ An 
province.  At this trial, led by the governor of Nghệ An and Hà Tĩnh, Phan Bội Châu and several 
others were found guilty under an 1813 Nguyễn law (Article 224), which prohibited “conspiracy 
to commit sedition.”246  In both cases, Phan Bội Châu was sentenced to death in absentia.   
Phan Bội Châu’s third guilty sentence came following the trials on September 5, 1913, of 
the terrorist bombers Phạm Văn Tráng and Nguyễn Văn Túy.  Unlike the previous two trials, this 
trial was conducted by a colonial Criminal Commission set up in Hanoi expressly for the purpose 
of trying the 84 individuals captured following Phạm Văn Tráng and Nguyễn Văn Túy’s attacks 
in April of 1913.  In addition to the 84 suspects who were tried and received sentences ranging 
from one year imprisonment to death, 13 other individuals, including Phan Bội Châu, were tried, 
found guilty, and sentenced to death or life imprisonment in absentia.  All were convicted based 
on the Criminal Commission’s belief they had participated in planning or carrying out the April 
 
244 On April 8th, 1925, Toussaint had been temporarily appointed Director of the Administration of Justice 
in Indochina, replacing M. Habert.  It is not clear whether or not Toussaint’s absence was related to this temporary 
appointment.  “Principaux changements pendant la impression.”  Annuaire général de l'Indo-Chine française 1925.  
Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrême-Orient, 1925. P. IV-V. 
245 Chuong Thâu, Ed.  Hồ sơ vụ án Phan Bội Châu (Documents Related to the Trials of Phan Bội Châu) 
(Hanoi: Nhà xuất bản Văn hóa - Thông tín, 2002), 25. 
246 Ibid, 27. 
62 
1913 bombings.  To prove the various charges, the 1913 Criminal Commission relied on a 
staggering number of documents, primarily testimonies given by prisoners on trial themselves.  
Testimonies of one suspect were used to incriminate other suspects, and were often used to 
advance intelligence operations domestically and abroad.  If the French colonial state hoped to 
convict Phan Bội Châu yet again in 1925, surely this was most easily accomplished by relying on 
the sentence and body of evidence already produced in 1913.  Or would it?   
A “Governor General’s Note,” dated July 9, 1925, offers a window into what Monguillot 
and Robin were thinking, both regarding how to handle Phan Bội Châu’s legal situation and 
about how to convey their decision to the Ministry of Colonies.247  This note is significant for 
several reasons.  First, it indicates that the Ministry of Colonies may not yet have known of the 
capture.  Monguillot and Robin simply had not conveyed this crucial information to the 
metropole.  Since the departure of Governor General Martial Merlin in April 1925, Monguillot 
and Robin had effectively overseen the administration of French Indochina independent of Paris.  
The Cartel of the Left, a parliamentary alliance of radical socialists and republicans, had come 
into power in June 1924.  The Cartel was now on its second cabinet, the first having fallen in 
April 1925 as a result of a fiscal crisis.  No new governor general had yet been appointed (this 
would come only at the end of July 1925), so Monguillot and Robin would important handle 
matters themselves, such as what to do about Phan Bội Châu. Second, the note suggests its 
authors had agreed upon a legal strategy through discussions with Toussaint, the absent 
prosecutor general. Finally, the note weighs the pros and cons of several “solutions” before 
selecting one, providing a rare window into French considerations of Phan Bội Châu’s legal fate. 
Of the note’s three potential solutions, “A” would be to void the 1913 sentence of death 
in absentia, then retry Phan Bội Châu for the same crimes.  Monguillot and Robin worried this 
path would lead to a great deal of publicity and internal and external agitation, even if the 
proceedings were “conducted behind closed doors.”248  Solution “B” would be to commute a 
sentence of death (whether old or new), and send Phan Bội Châu to prison on Poulo Condore.   
Monguillot and Robin worried this solution would “appear weak to some and frightening to 
others.”249  Either of these solutions, they added, could lead to retaliatory violence from 
Annamese revolutionaries abroad.  Solution “C,” which the authors preferred, would be to 
abandon the 1913 case entirely and instead try Phan Bội Châu only for acts committed since that 
time.  Monguillot and Robin tempered this proposal by recognizing that it could invite polemic 
attacks in the press, “for arresting someone who was convicted in absentia, but not then trying 
them [for those same crimes].”250  Ironically, these two disliked solutions proved better guides 
for Phan Bội Châu’s trial, and these led to precisely the reactions Monguillot and Robin had 
feared.   
Monguillot’s direct subordinate, Rene Robin, was a career civil service agent with 
considerable experience in intelligence and security work, and since 1920 had served as the 
 
247 SPCE 355, Note de GGI, 9 juillet 1925.  This document contains no clear indication of its author, which 
was likely either Monguillot or Robin.  Monguillot’s final signed telegram appears on July 3rd, 1925.  It is rather a 
mystery why Monguillot did not participate in inter-government communication after this date.  Robin decisively 
stepped in on July 16th, 1925 and remained the final authority over the Trial of Phan Bội Châu until the arrival of 
Governor General Alexander Varenne on November 24, 1925.  For the sake of narrative cohesion, I take the note to 
be the result of acting Governor General Monguillot’s conversations with his secretary general, Robin. 
248 SPCE 355, Note de GGI, 9 juillet 1925. 
249 SPCE 355, Note de GGI, 9 juillet 1925. 
250 SPCE 355, Note de GGI, 9 juillet 1925. 
63 
secretary general of Indochina in the capacity of a Resident Superior (of Tonkin).  Robin was a 
formidable administrator whose interests in the matter of Phan Bội Châu aligned with those of 
Sûreté Chief Jeanbrau.  Robin understood that if the dangerous terrorist Phan Bội Châu was to be 
prosecuted, it needed to take place quickly, quietly, and in a manner that demonstrated the 
juridical efficacy of the French colonial state.   
Colonial Clumsiness: Indiscrete Agents and the Roche Incident  
Despite the best efforts of Jeanbrau and Robin, the incarceration of Phan Bội Châu was a 
difficult matter to keep secret.  On July 11, the Tonkin arrived at Haiphong.  Inspectors François 
and Cristiani, who had closely guarded Phan Bội Châu from Hong Kong, now took him to Hanoi 
by automobile.  With them was Agent Bardy from Shanghai who, thanks to Nadaud’s extreme 
caution, was instructed to continue on from Hong Kong to Hanoi as well as for extra security.  
This may well have been a mistake on Nadaud’s part.  After depositing Phan Bội Châu at the 
central prison in Hanoi (in the section reserved for Europeans), Bardy, Cristiani, and a man 
named Versini decided to blow off steam at a restaurant called the Golden Cock.  According to a 
report filed July 17 by Edgard Gilles, the head of the Sûreté in Tonkin, the agents became drunk 
and began boasting to other patrons that they had just brought Phan Bội Châu back from abroad, 
and that he was now in the central prison of Hanoi.   
As it turns out, drunken agents were the least of Jeanbrau and Robin’s problems.   
Seeking to accomplish the twin goals of keeping Phan Bội Châu’s identity secret and meeting the 
forty-eight hour deadline identified by Arnoux, on July 12 Robin sent Resident-Mayor of Hanoi 
Dupuy to the prison to ensure the prisoner was properly registered under the name “Ngoc,”251 
and to notify the prisoner of the standing September 5, 1913 verdict against him, thereby legally 
confirming the arrest and incarceration.  Dupuy’s efforts apparently did more harm than good, 
because on July 13 the prison clerk, perplexed by Dupuy’s registration attempt, brought the 
prisoner from his cell to the registration desk and asked his name.  Phan Bội Châu announced 
that he was known by two names, neither of which was “Ngoc,” as Dupuy had claimed.  Phan 
then signed using his Chinese pseudonym “Truong Van Duc,” but verbally provided his other 
name: “Phan Bội Châu.”  This was overheard by the Vietnamese secretary of the prison clerk, a 
man named Hung.252  Later that evening, secretary Hung met a Vietnamese Sûreté agent named 
Nha at a party and told him, “Phan Bội Châu has been arrested; he is now at the prison.”  If we 
counting Agent François, Secretary Hung, and Agent Nha, this means at least three Vietnamese 
working for the French colonial state were now aware that the Sûreté’s secret prisoner was Phan 
Bội Châu.   
Agent Nha, Robin later surmised, and must have informed the acting prosecutor general 
Albert Roche that the mysterious Vietnamese individual being held at the central prison in Hanoi 
under the name of “Ngoc” was none other than Phan Bội Châu.  Roche was standing in for 
Prosecutor General Toussaint, who was in Saigon on business.  It is unclear whether Roche was 
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simply uninformed about Robin and Jeanbrau’s plans or had decided to make the most of his 
temporary authority by thwarting what he saw as a perversion of justice.  In either case, Roche 
angered the security officials by sending Agent Nha to extricate Phan Bội Châu from prison on 
the morning of July 14.  In a rather astonishing breach of security, Agent Nha alone walked Phan 
Bội Châu down the street to Roche’s office, arriving at 9:30 AM.  Roche then questioned Phan 
Bội Châu for forty-five-minutes with the help of a Vietnamese translator, and in the presence of 
even more Vietnamese clerks.  At 10:15 AM, Roche instructed Agent Nha to walk Phan Bội 
Châu back to the Central Prison and re-incarcerate him.    
Alarmed by what Phan Bội Châu related to him, Roche spun into action.  By 10:30 AM, 
Roche sent for the chief warden of Central Prison, Mr. Bareteau, before telephoning Resident-
Mayor Dupuy to demand an explanation for why “a Mr. Ngoc, arrested in Shanghai for a plot 
against state security was imprisoned in a central prison by an order delivered by the Resident-
Mayor of Hanoi when there is already here a French Justice and the prison lies under the control 
of the Prosecutor of the Republic.”  Dupuy attempted to forestall Roche by claiming 
arrangements were underway, that the detention was of a political nature, and had in any case 
been ordered in agreement with the Prosecutor General.  Roche was not to be deterred.  At 10:50 
AM, Roche telephoned the office of Gilles, the head of the Sûreté in Tonkin, and berated his 
secretary, Mr. Levilain, with the same questions Roche had asked Dupuy twenty minutes 
previously.  This time, Roche upped the ante by asserting that Phan Bội Châu’s detention was 
arbitrary and demanding a response by noon, lest he be forced to “pose the question in writing.”  
Apparently, the fear of documentation was enough to send Mr. Levilain immediately over to 
Sûreté Chief Gilles’s home in person.    
Meanwhile, Chief Warden Bareteau, responding immediately to Roche’s summons, found 
himself berated by Roche for allowing the irregular incarceration of a political detainee on July 
12 by the order of the resident-mayor (Dupuy).  Bareteau defended himself by claiming Phan Bội 
Châu had been appropriately detained by the orders of the 1913 Criminal Commission, and that 
the prosecutor general was first to be informed.  Roche pushed back, telling Bareteau that he 
should not have received the prisoner without an expressed order from the Prosecutor of the 
Republic, who, as a member of the Criminal Commission, had sole authority to deliver such an 
order.  Roche then informed Bareteau that his actions were irregular, the arrest was arbitrary, and 
the detention of Phan Bội Châu was therefore illegal.   
Bareteau realized he had no choice but to invoke the authority of the Governor General, 
under whose authority, he claimed, both he and the Criminal Commission had acted.  Even this 
did nothing to dissuade Roche, who now saw the issue as one not only of jurisdiction, but of the 
upholding the law of the French Republic by thwarting what he saw as an extralegal rendition of 
a political prisoner.  Roche demanded Bareteau hand over two documents.  These documents 
were the order of confidentiality, which had been written up by Dupuy, and the provisional 
incarceration request, which had been verified by the Prosecutor General.  Finally, Roche 
advised Bareteau that it was his responsibility to release Phan Bội Châu without delay. 
Bareteau hurried back to the Central Prison, where he discovered to his horror that Roche 
had extracted Phan Bội Châu for questioning earlier that morning.  Meanwhile, Gilles, the head 
of the Sûreté in Tonkin, received his flustered secretary Levilain at his home.  Levilain conveyed 
Roche’s demand that Gilles respond by noon that day with an explanation for the “arbitrary 
detention.” Gilles quickly realized the incredible danger Roche posed not only to the secrecy of 
Phan Bội Châu’s incarceration, but also to the very ability of the security services to keep him 
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incarcerated at all.   
In his confidential report sent two days later (July 16) to Jeanbrau, head of the Sûreté 
General of Indochina,  Gilles wrote, “I thought it useless to answer the summons of Mr. Roche, 
and reserved for myself [the option of] immediately making the Prosecutor General aware of the 
incident which violated his instructions [to keep the affair secret].”   However, Gilles did not go 
to the office of the Prosecutor General on July 14.  Instead, he contacted Dupuy, thereby learning 
that Roche had contacted him as well.  Dupuy too had clearly been flummoxed by Roche’s 
sudden intervention, and conveyed to Gilles, “his great surprise at the intrusion of Mr. Roche and 
the tone with which his observations were formulated.”  Gilles and Dupuy, representing, 
respectively, the security forces and Hanoi’s civic administration, realized they had a meddling 
Young Turk on their hands.  Left unchecked, Roche might well undermine the authority of the 
Governor General and the whole colonial edifice.  
Alarmed by this possibility, Gilles resolved to shore up the juridical justification for Phan 
Bội Châu’s incarceration.  Apparently unable to contact Roche’s superiors, Toussaint and 
Bourayne, Gilles may an effort locate the administrative director of the Sûreté General (it is 
unclear who Gilles is referring to).  Together, they went immediately to meet with the Governor 
General’s Chief of Staff (likely Le Fol) to “discover whether the order designating a new 
president of the Criminal Commission had yet been signed, which would have allowed us to 
replace the existing detention order with one bearing the signature of the new president.”  
Gilles’s plan was straightforward: if a new Criminal Commission could be quickly created, then 
the newly appointed president of that Criminal Commission could sign a fresh, unquestionably 
legal order, thereby replacing Dupuy’s order and ending the threat from Roche for good.   
The next morning, at 8:00 AM on July 15, Chief Warden Bareteau showed up at Gilles’s 
office to relate the story of his encounter with Roche the previous day.  In no uncertain terms, 
Bareteau complained to Gilles about, “the [terrible] manner in which [he] had been treated by 
Mr. Roche.”  Not only had the upstart Roche reproached Bareteau, he had done so in the 
presence of his Indian clerk, who Roche had allowed to attend the entire interview.  For Gilles, 
Roche’s shameful treatment of Bareteau was the final straw.  Gilles immediately went to see 
Prosecutor General Bourayne, who returned to Hanoi that afternoon, and explained to him the 
legal mess Bourayne’s subordinate Roche had caused in his absence.  Horrified, Bourayne called 
Roche into his office and dressed him down in front of Gilles.  Bourayne demanded Roche return 
the copy of the incarceration order he had taken from Chief Warden Bareteau.  By the end of the 
day, a new Criminal Commission would be authorized by the office of the governer general, 
thereby legalizing Phan Bội Châu’s detention.  Roche’s impromptu uprising was over.  
The “Roche Incident,” as Gilles referred to it, reveals just how unprepared the French 
colonial security services were to handle the aftermath of Phan Bội Châu’s capture.  No one had 
bothered to sort out the seemingly simple decision about where Phan Bội Châu could be held, so    
the heads of the Sûreté ended up playing a game of hot potato while their prisoner was enroute to 
Indochina.  Arnoux feared Phan Bội Châu’s presence in Saigon would upset anti-colonial 
elements there.  Sogny, surely uninterested in acting as referee between the Governor General, 
the Vietnamese court, and Phan Bội Châu’s supporters, flatly refused to allow Phan Bội Châu to 
pass through Huế.  Thus it came to be that Phan Bội Châu was placed on a ship bound for 
Haiphong, brought in the middle of the night by hired automobile to Hanoi, and held under a 
secret identity in the European section of the Central Prison.   
Gilles, the head of the Sûreté Tonkin, who played almost no role in the correspondence 
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concerning the arrest and transport of Phan Bội Châu until he was unexpectedly dragged into the 
affair by Roche, had made little effort to prevent security breaches.  This is clearly demonstrated 
by the sequence of events that took place after Phan Bội Châu’s incarceration.  The indiscretions 
of agents Cristiani, Versini, and Bardy on the night of July 11, in which the identity and details 
concerning the capture of Phan Bội Châu were drunkenly revealed to patrons of the Golden 
Cock, could perhaps be excused as an aberrant breach of secrecy.  More likely, the agents were 
never given specific instructions that the identity of their prisoner needed to remain secret for 
security reasons.  Gilles’s report on their misadventure would almost certainly have noted if the 
three men had violated orders, yet it does not.253    
The Sûreté’s poor planning is further demonstrated by the events precipitating the Roche 
Incident.  Though Gilles and Dupuy had the foresight to place Phan Bội Châu in the European 
section, they failed to consider the presence of Vietnamese staff there, such as Secretary Hung.  
Hung, whether under orders to keep quiet or not, saw fit to share the information about Phan Bội 
Châu’s incarceration with Agent Nha.  It is not difficult to read between the lines of Gilles’s 
reports on the matter to figure out that Agent Nha was likely the person who informed Roche, 
then moonlighting as prosecutor of the republic, that a travesty of justice was taking place.  The 
most astonishing evidence of Sûreté incompetence lies in the fact that Agent Nha, under Roche’s 
orders, was able to, extract Phan Bội Châu by himself, and walk him two blocks to the Palace of 
Justice.  Had strict secrecy and control procedures been in place, this surely could not have 
happened.  Even more embarrassing for Gilles was the fact that Nha was one of his own Sûreté 
agents, a fact he admitted in passing.  The confidential reports Gilles sent to Jeanbrau on July 16 
and 17 reveal a colonial security administrator scrambling to keep up with events and desperate 
to retain a semblance of his own authority. 
However, Roche’s mini-revolt in the name of justice had done more than damage Gilles’s 
reputation.  By directing Agent Nha to extract Phan Bội Châu from prison and march him to the 
Palace of Justice, Roche had compromised the secrecy and security of the colonial state.  As 
Gilles put it, “this incident is especially regrettable, in my opinion, because it has considerably 
reduced our efforts and plans to keep the arrest as secret as possible.”  Soon, Gilles feared, the 
native elites would know Phan Bội Châu was being held prisoner.254   Gilles did not feel the need 
to explain the potential consequences of Phan Bội Châu’s arrest and detention becoming 
common knowledge, and thus becoming a potential rallying point for disaffected Vietnamese in 
Hanoi and beyond.  The state needed to take action.  Bringing his report to Jeanbrau to a close, 
Gilles made it clear what he thought the state needed to do and why: “It is very necessary for the 
Criminal Commission to meet and render its definitive sentence with the briefest possible delay.  
Under the present circumstances, any interruption, any delay will only make the personality of 
Phan Bội Châu become the cause of unnecessary and dangerous agitation.”  Were the news of 
Phan Bội Châu’s detention to get out - and this was less a question of “if” than “when” - a new 
Criminal Commission would be needed to legitimize French juridical authority.  It was not long 
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in coming.   
The Criminal Commission of 1925 
At this point, Rene Robin, the resident superior of Tonkin and secretary general of the 
government general of Indochina, stepped in to decisively take charge. On July 16, Robin cabled 
the Ministry of Colonies, finally relaying the news of Phan Bội Châu’s capture and detention.  
Robin went on to state that Phan Bội Châu had been imprisoned in Hanoi since 13 of July, and 
now awaited, “his next appearance before the new criminal commission.”255  As far as charges 
went, Robin stated only that Phan Bội Châu had been arrested for “the intention of orienting 
Chinese xenophobia against our concession [in Shanghai] and spreading revolutionary 
propaganda amongst the Annamese guards in the concession’s police force.”256  The minister of 
colonies might be forgiven for assuming that the new Criminal Commission would investigate 
and charge Phan Bội Châu for these recent activities.  However. Robin almost certainly knew 
that little proof existed for these charges, and that the new Criminal Commission would perforce 
reprise the work of the previous 1913 Criminal Commission.  Robin finished his short telegram 
by indicating that he would keep the Ministry of Colonies apprised by cable of any new 
developments and, if applicable, any news regarding indigenous public opinion concerning the 
arrest, “which has not yet been revealed within the colony.”257  The tone of Robin’s telegram was 
clear: he was not going to ask the Ministry of Colonies for permission to do anything.   
Robin indeed seems to have been pulling wool over the eyes of the Ministry of Colonies.   
Immediately after Robin sent his telegram to Paris, Jeanbrau cabled Sogny in Huế.  In his “very 
urgent,” coded telegram, Jeanbrau provided Sogny with the full text of Robin’s telegram to Paris.  
Jeanbrau followed this with two rather telling sentences:  
As a result of successive blunders due to the somewhat inopportune zeal of Mr Roche, 
who substituted by visiting the prison in the absence of the prosecutor of the republic, the 
incarceration of PBC is now known in Hanoi. Given the procedure for creating a 
Criminal Commission, however, there does not seem to be much disadvantage in 
Indochina knowing of the arrest.258 
Jeanbrau’s cable reveals three important things.  First, Robin and Jeanbrau were working 
together closely, and Sogny was clearly considered part of the “in-crowd.”  The French 
Indochinese administration was effectively being run by “les grand commis.”259  Second, 
Jeanbrau blamed Roche for revealing Phan Bội Châu’s arrest and detention.  This directly 
contradicted Robin’s claim to the Ministry of Colonies that the news of the arrest had not yet 
leaked.  The Sûreté’s leaders had no interest in sharing such pertinent information with Paris.  
Third, Jeanbrau, and probably Robin as well, saw the new Criminal Commission as a means of 
neutralizing any public relations problems that might come from further leaks about the arrest. 
If a new Criminal Commission had the power to forestall unrest, its assistance could not 
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come soon enough, because the news of Phan Bội Châu’s arrest, transportation, and incarceration 
in the Central Prison of Hanoi had indeed begun to spread.  Interestingly, the big news break 
came not in Hanoi, but from the port city of Haiphong.  On July 16, the same day Gilles 
submitted his first report and Robin sent his telegram, the Courrier d’Haiphong carried an article 
announcing a “Sensational Arrest!”  This article was followed by several reports sent to Gilles by 
Special Commissar Xavier Leandri of the Sûreté Tonkin, based in Haiphong.  On the basis of 
information provided to him by “trustworthy informers,” Leandri offers several clues as to how 
the press in Haiphong beat Hanoi to the punch.  First, rumors began circulating among the 
Chinese community in Haiphong to the effect that an Annamese man disguised as a Chinese man 
had been brought by the Sûreté aboard the “Tonkin” on the night of July 11.260   Second, one of 
two drivers hired by the Sûreté to convey their agents and prisoner from Haiphong to Hanoi,  
upon reflection, realized that the prisoner in their car was an Annamese revolutionary who had 
lived in China for many years.  Third, a man named Mai Huu Van claimed to have known about 
the arrest of Phan Bội Châu prior to the publication of this news in the Courrier d’Haiphong.  
Leandri’s reports also describe the reaction of several Vietnamese and Chinese residents of 
Haiphong to the July 16 article.   
Gilles would not have found these reports encouraging.  One of Leandri’s informers 
reported a conversation he had with a tailor on Paul Bert Street in Haiphong in which the tailor 
had asked the informer to read to him the article in the Courrier d’Haiphong.  Upon learning the 
news of Phan Bội Châu’s capture, the tailor exclaimed, “It’s the end for him! He will be killed!  
But he will not have died without first having accomplished some things in China.”  When the 
informer read the final sentence of the article indicating that “the arrest would be to the 
satisfaction of the majority of Annamese,” the tailor simply retorted, “That’s a joke.”  Others 
praised Phan Bội Châu as a “great hero,” and despaired of his certain death.  The streetside 
reactions of a public schoolteacher and a bank secretary were even more sobering: 
He may be shot, but not publicly, no doubt, because, you know, the punishment executed 
in public, such a man will not fail to provoke a painful sensation in our compatriots. But 
in any case, we will not let our old man go free. His death is certain. To hope that it will 
not be tortured before killing by any means whatsoever. Its end is a dungeon for our 
country. The more he is tortured, the more he will die a martyr. Let's wait and see the 
decision of the meeting that will decide on him... 
Such reports underscored the problems that Phan Bội Châu’s arrest and detention posed 
for the French colonial administration.  Not only were the security forces clearly unable to keep 
the matter secret, the French administration now faced an uphill battle to convince the 
Indochinese public that Phan Bội Châu was indeed a dangerous criminal.  
Assembling an Archive: The Inquiries of President Bride 
The man chosen to lead the new Criminal Commission was another career civil servant 
who had previously worked in the Sûreté’s Directorate of Political Affairs: Jules-Joseph Bride.261  
To build the Criminal Commission’s case against Phan Bội Châu, Bride soon began to marshal 
the archival resources at the Sûreté’s disposal.  Beginning on July 22, Bride initiated a search for 
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and collection of documents that lasted well into the trial period itself.  Bride’s first letter is to 
the governor general requesting 64 of a total of 297 documents related to the Hoang Trong Mau 
affair of 1916.262  Marked “very urgent,” the missive offers a vivid picture of the eventual scope 
and refinement of Bride’s archival effort.  Rather than request the entire dossier, Bride took care 
to enumerate and list individual files he needed.  Bride’s language offers a glimpse of his 
officious personality: “As this file is to be submitted to the discussions of the Criminal 
Commission, to be communicated to the defense, it is indispensable to complete it.”263  With the 
attitude of a punctilious librarian, Bride intended to track down exactly what he needed to prove 
beyond any doubt that Phan Bội Châu was guilty.   
A week into the project, Bride seemed quite taken with his new powers of documentary 
request.  Writing to Monguillot on July 29, who was concurrently serving as acting governor 
general and as the resident superior of Tonkin, Bride pointedly emphasized that the archives of 
the 1913 Criminal Commission, which he had sent to Sûreté, were incomplete.264  This, Bride 
made quite clear, simply would not do:  
After having first conducted the job of reclassifying the documents, I realized that many 
pieces of form, information and information have been removed since 1914. The absence 
of slips and inventories of certain files does not allow to give details of documents which 
have been removed but annotations leave no doubt on this point. As a result of the 
research carried out, the information files of PBC and CD were removed from the 
archives and handed over to the Secretary General in 1914.  I will be very grateful to you 
for making the two files available to me.265 
Apparently unafraid of offending anyone, Bride soon had the heads of each Sûreté branch 
and bureau scrambling to fulfill his document requests.  Gilles, Nadaud, and especially Néron 
went to work throughout August 1925 tracking down letters, testimonies, photos, subscription 
lists, original writings, translations, and various other documentary proofs, all to “satisfy the 
demands of the President of the Criminal Commission.”266  Bride’s punctilious pursuit of a 
perfectly ordered archive seemed to be infectious.  On July 30, Jean-Félix Krautheimer, the 
acting resident superior of Tonkin, warned the office of the governor general:  
The President of the Criminal Commission has indicated the dossiers you sent are 
incomplete…It is of paramount importance that all of the aforementioned dossiers 
concerning the affairs of Phan Bội Châu and his collaborators be delivered fully intact 
and in their originals…Please kindly provide useful instructions to this effect so that the 
Criminal Commission can continue its work with all the documents necessary to bring 
forth the truth.  I ask furthermore that the translations of documents written in [Chinese] 
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characters or quoc-ngu…be attached to avoid lengthy work which would unhelpfully 
delay the process of justice.267    
Krautheimer’s letter illustrates the diligence and determination guiding Bride and those 
assisting him. It also indicates two of the most serious challenges they faced: bureaucratic 
inefficiency and an extremely compressed timetable.   The sheer number of documents required 
meant hours of searching for, collating, notating, copying, transcribing, translating, and 
transporting files.  Misplaced or damaged files only further complicated this effort, as did the 
requirement that all files appear in French translation as well as their originals.  It was a tall 
order. 
Despite these challenges, Bride valiantly pressed ahead. On August 12, a busy day,  Bride 
simultaneously reached out to the Resident Superior of Tonkin for files pertaining to the events 
of 1908,268 to the French Consul at Longzhou for any documents related to Phan Bội Châu from 
1906 through 1913,269 and finally to Saigon for the dossiers on Gilbert Chieu and a number of 
other individuals.270  By August 14, Bride was able to report that his inventory of the 1913 
Criminal Commission’s archives, containing 5333 files, was complete.  In the same message, 
however, Bride made it quite clear that he refused to be limited in his purview to what the 
previous commission’s archive contained.271    By the end of the day, Bride had sent out at least 
seven additional requests.272 
Unfortunately, the demands of the President of the Criminal Commission were often 
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difficult to satisfy.  A letter sent on August 18 from Bride to Monguillot could not have pleased 
its recipient:  
You have kindly sent me, thanks to the head of the Sûreté, the documents which are the 
subject of request I680-SG of August 14, 1925. These documents are, for the most part, 
copies or extracts of letters, but they are not certified (identical) copies. You will certainly 
agree with me that they can not be added as they are on the Criminal Commission's file 
and that their authenticity must be affirmed by the signature of the Director of Political 
Affairs and General Security. It seems that this official could not delegate his signature 
for that purpose. In the event that this formality does not appear to him as necessary for 
him to do, I should be grateful if you would ask the opinion of the Director of the Judicial 
Administration. It is important to prevent the work of the Criminal Commission from 
being vitiated by vices that could lead to their invalidity.273 
While this letter is an amusing indication of Bride’s overzealousness, it also demonstrates 
the intense seriousness with which the leaders of the French Indochinese security state had 
committed themselves to preparing for Phan Bội Châu’s trial.   
However, this seriousness did have its limits.  When Bride’s obsessive drive to marshal 
the resources of the French Indochinese security state began to infringe on the state’s ability to 
safeguard its day-to-day operations, Bride’s colleagues finally stood up to him.  Néron, who had 
worked harder than any other Sûreté official to fulfill Bride’s documentary requests, left a 
handwritten note on an August 3 transmission indicating, “In the absence of any indication of the 
nature of documents pertaining to PBC…the Central Information Service will extract from 
individual dossiers only the pieces which would interest the Criminal Commission.”274  Bride, 
furious that anyone might try to arbitrarily reduce the scope of his requests, retorted:  
Allow me to point out that Mr. Néron, whom I recognize for his professional valor and 
competence with regard to all questions within his purview, may very well consider to be 
uninteresting documents which are, on the contrary, of a great importance that the 
President of the Criminal Commission is alone in a position to appreciate.275 
Néron knew that two could play at this game.  In an undated note to Robin, Néron 
complained that while “the Central Information Service and the Sûreté General will send to this 
Commission everything that might be useful for the administration of Justice,” Bride’s never-
ending demands were nevertheless taxing the security state and causing “huge 
inconveniences.”276  Néron pointed out that Bride was requesting files that could not possibly 
interest the Criminal Commission and that, if circulated, could present a real danger to “certain 
individuals under surveillance” - undoubtedly a reference to Vietnamese informers working for 
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the Sûreté.  Néron therefore demanded that Robin curtail Bride’s document requests for dossiers 
examined during the 1913 Criminal Commission.  If, during the trial of Phan Bội Châu, Bride 
began delving into files dated after 1914, Néron was concerned the safety of ongoing intelligence 
and security operations might well be compromised. 
Rene Robin was beginning to get anxious.  On one hand, he was reading Néron’s 
concerns about Bride’s overzealousness compromising state security.  On the other, Robin was 
all too aware that the window of opportunity to successfully prosecute Phan Bội Châu quickly 
closing.   On August 28, Robin himself intervened to ensure Néron’s request to limit the Criminal 
Commission’s purview was in fact carried out.  In this letter, Robin’s parallels that of Néron’s 
undated note, demonstrating a similar annoyance with Bride’s administrative overreach:   
It would be improper to submit for examination reports and other documents from the 
files of the PBC and his accomplices produced after 1913.  In addition, releasing certain 
documents from the archives of SCR & SG would be a reckless act that could have 
serious consequences.277 
Robin’s letter accepted the logic of Néron’s request, thereby officially limiting the 1925 
Criminal Commission to documents related to the 1913 Criminal Commission.  In practice, the 
1925 Criminal Commission could look at anything prior to 1913, but hardly anything after that 
date.  Néron and Robin were worried Bride’s legalistic officiousness would threaten the day-to-
day functioning of the Sûreté’s intelligence gathering and security enforcement operations.  The 
imperatives of running the security state thus placed a hard limit on the ability of the state to 
pursue a legal case, even against its number one enemy.   
Despite the curbs placed on his requests, by the start of the trial on August 29, Bride’s 
efforts resulted in a truly massive collection of documents.  As of August 22, shortly before the 
trial began, Bride had sent a total of 57 official letters of request, each detailing the need for 
multiple dossiers, files, and telegrams.278  In addition to the 5,333 files associated with the 
Criminal Commission of 1913, Bride had called up individual dossiers on hundreds of 
individuals and events, the originals and translations of all of Phan Bội Châu’s writings then 
available, and numerous diplomatic telegrams sent by French consular officials from posts 
throughout East Asia.279   Bride continued to request documents throughout the trial.  By the time 
the trial ended on November 23, Bride had sent out over 125 letters of request, bringing in 5476 
files related to the 1913 Criminal Commission, 1898 files related to the 1915-1916 Council of 
War, and an additional 6201 files unique to the 1925 Criminal Commission, for a staggering total 
of 13,575 files arranged into 53 distinct dossiers.280   
For Bride, who had not been a member of the 1913 Criminal Commission, making use of 
this documentary haul must have been a monumental undertaking.  Bride’s fellow commission 
 
277 SPCE 355, Robin à Commandeur de la Légion d’Honneur, Monsieur le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, 
28 août 1925. 
278 SPCE 355, Le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin à Monsieur le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine, No. 
358 CCB, 24 août 1925. 
279 For Bride’s consular document requests, see SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affairs politiques et 
administratives, President de la Commission Criminelle à Monsieur le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, No. 54, 55, 22 
août 1925. 
280 SPCE 355, RST, Commission Crimnelle de 1925, Bordereau des pièces adressées le 26 novembre 1925 
à M. le Gouverneur General de l’Indochine, Dossier de Phan Bội Châu. 
73 
members included Dupuy, the resident-mayor of Hanoi, Bellier, a captain of the colonial infantry, 
and Boyer, a prosecutor of the republic for the Court of First Instance in Hanoi.  Arnoux served 
as the commission’s clerk and Gombaud Saintonge as its interpreter.  Saintonge was the only 
individual who had previously served the 1913 Criminal Commission.  Just how much these 
individuals assisted Bride in preparing for the trial is not clear.281  However, regardless of how 
much time would be needed to properly review and prepare such a large amount of documentary 
evidence, by the end of August 1925, Bride knew that the clock was ticking.  Events outside the 
courtroom were looking increasingly problematic.  Each passing day tipped the scales farther 
from the need for completeness and closer to an expedient start for the trial. 
The View from Outside the Courtroom 
Before the month of August even began, three important shifts started to take place 
relative to Indochina’s political climate.  First, the news of Phan Bội Châu’s arrest spread 
domestically, awakening a new political consciousness amongst the urban Vietnamese 
population.  Second, the same news quickly spread internationally, making the French colonial 
state the unwelcome target of critical foreign journalists and revolutionary Vietnamese groups 
based abroad.  Third, and perhaps most worrisome, the appointment of the radical socialist 
politician Alexander Varenne as governor general of Indochina threw the future of the security 
state into question.  The combination of these three shifts hastened the need to prosecute Phan 
Bội Châu in as expedient (but also juridically defensible) manner as possible.   
The news of the arrest and detention of Phan Bội Châu spread through the urban spaces 
of Indochina at an incredible pace.  An account by a Mr. “N.V.H.” entitled “Tôi vào tận trong 
Hỏa Lò Hà Nội dò xem Trần Văn Đức là ai? (I entered Hỏa Lò [Prison] in Hanoi to see who Trần 
Văn Đức was),” published in the literary journal Cải Tạo in 1950, demonstrates the lengths to 
which some Vietnamese went to acquire information about Phan Bội Châu’s situation.282  Mr. 
N.V.H. tells a lively tale of derry-do involving the bribing of guards and secretaries and a very 
near-miss with none other than Bride himself.  The story of Mr. N.V.H. begins on a Saturday at 
the house of Quang Minh on Hàng Bông street in Hanoi, where the author was informed of a 
rumor that none other than Phan Bội Châu was being held in Hỏa Lò Central Prison in Hanoi.  
Quang Minh was a member of the Phục Viẹt party and had many connections to revolutionaries 
throughout Hanoi.  On Quang Minh’s introduction, Mr. N.V.H. received a mission from “the 
manager of Trung Bắc tân văn” to infiltrate the prison and determine whether the rumor was 
true.283  Once inside the prison, Mr. N.V.H. was assisted by two secretaries, Mr. X and Old B., 
both who allowed him to see the register containing Phan Bội Châu’s actual information.  Rather 
amusingly, Mr. X recounted to Mr. N.V.H. the moment Phan Bội Châu stated clearly for all to 
hear exactly who he was.   
The sudden and unexpected arrival of Bride marks a moment of genuine terror for the 
author, who writes, “I confess to you, my body was like a sack without rice, unsteady and ready 
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to collapse!”284  The author identifies Bride as one of the “Four Red Hairs,” the others being 
Darles, Eckert, and Delamarre.  Holding back an urge to sneeze, an act that would surely draw 
the wrong kind of attention, Mr. N.V.H. finally escaped the presence of Bride, to hide in the 
rafters with Mr. X.  There, he overheard Bride angrily admonish another clerk, stating, “We must 
keep this information confidential, so no one will know!”285  Mr. N.V.H. also learned that Old B, 
who hailed from Reunion Island, took pity on Phan Bội Châu and brought him eyeglasses.  After 
making it out of the prison, Mr. N.V.H. returned to the house of Quang Minh to make his report: 
Phan Bội Châu was in Hỏa Lò Central Prison and the French wanted to keep the information 
secret.  According to Mr. N.V.H., the revolutionaries began to spread this information around 
right away via secret transmissions throughout Hanoi, to Haiphong, Hải Dương, and Nam Định.  
However, Mr. N.V.H. stated, bringing his story to a close, “because the telegram was accidentally 
sent in black envelopes, it went to clerical workers throughout the southern part of Indochina.”286 
Though the story as a whole reads like an tale of adventure, several aspects align well 
with other available evidence.  Phan Bội Châu’s declaration of his own identity matches Gilles’s 
report, as does the fact that prison secretaries played a major role in revealing Phan Bội Châu’s 
incarceration.  Mr. N.V.H.’S description of Bride as a fearsome, self-assured individual matches 
the tone of Bride’s communications with other French officials.  The utter inability of French 
security officials to keep Phan Bội Châu’s identity and presence from quickly leaking out rings 
true.  One interesting discrepancy concerns the fake name attributed to Phan Bội Châu: "Trần 
Văn Đức," which appears to be a misreading of the Chinese name Phan Bội Châu had entered 
into the register: "Truong Van Duc."  The false name Resident-Mayor Dupuy had incarcerated 
Phan Bội Châu under was entirely different ("Ngoc," possibly an abbreviation of "Nguyen Ngoc 
Dong").  Taken altogether, however, Mr. N.V.H's story fits well with archival evidence, as we 
shall we. Finally, the presence in the story of a newspaper manager is quite telling. 
The press of French Indochina played a crucial role in disseminating the news of Phan 
Bội Châu’s capture, transportation, and incarceration.  The French-language trade journal 
Courrier d’Haiphong first broke the news on July 16, to the dismay of security officials.287  The 
news was by no means restricted to readers of French, however.  On July 18, Special Commissar 
Léandri reported that the Chinese and Vietnamese communities of Haiphong were already aware 
a Vietnamese revolutionary of repute had landed the night of July 10.288  On July 24, Léandri 
shared his informer’s report stating that Dương Tử Nguyên, brother of the former revolutionary 
Dương Bá Trạc, had read the Courrier d’Haiphong article, which had been translated into quốc 
ngữ (romanized Vietnamese script), and republished in both the Trung Bắc tân văn and the Đồng 
Pháp Bảo.289 According to the informer, Dương Tử Nguyên regretted the incident had taken 
place.  Now that the news had been translated into vernacular Vietnamese, it was only a matter of 
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time before new of the detention of Phan Bội Châu would become common knowledge 
throughout Indochina.  Dương Tử Nguyên’s reaction to the news was possibly even more 
alarming.  His brother, Dương Bá Trạc (and the editor of Trung Bắc tân văn!), had come over to 
join collaborationist intellectuals such as Phạm Quỳnh in supporting the French government, and 
the family was seen as being reliably moderate.  If an anodyne member of the elite such as 
Dương Tử Nguyên took issue with Phan Bội Châu’s imprisonment, the Sûreté could expect far 
worse from a rabble-rousing radical such as Nguyễn An Ninh, editor of La Cloche Fêlée, or A. 
Clementi, editor of L’Argus Indochinois. 
The next day, July 25, Léandri telephoned Gilles with even more disturbing news: around 
8:00 PM the previous evening (July 24), a Vietnamese man had been spotted distributing poly-
copied tracts on the streets of Haiphong.  These tracts, printed in quốc ngữ, extolled the virtues 
of Phan Bội Châu and deplored his current situation.  Even more alarming, that morning the 
director of financial control brought a $0.04 cent envelope to Léandri, which had been sent from 
Haiphong, and addressed to “Mr. Indigenous Personnel of the Financial Control, Hanoi.”  The 
envelope contained five tracts, which Léandri assumed to be of the same origin.290  Each tract, 
printed on a half sheet of cheap brown paper in purple ink, began by addressing its reader as 
“Fellow Countryman!”  It went on to relate that Phan Bội Châu, the great hero, had been 
captured by the French government and thrown into the Hỏa-lồ Prison in Hanoi.  This, the tract 
announced, “was a great hardship for Mr. Phan Bội Châu, who had left twenty years previous in 
order to find a way to retake the country.”291  The tract suggested that since Phan Bội Châu had 
fought so hard for the country, “we countrymen owe him a great deal.”  Gilles and Léandri 
immediately began parallel investigations in Hanoi and Haiphong to determine the source of 
these tracts.   
Meanwhile, around 4:20 PM on the same day (July 25), Sogny, the head of the Sûreté in 
Annam, telegrammed with disturbing news of his own.  One of his spies, a former political 
prisoner on a mission in Vinh, the capital of Nghệ An province, informed the French Resident 
that an armed band led by Ngo Quang and “Cam” had been spotted in the mountainous Hương 
Sơn region of Hà Tĩnh province.   The spy warned that the band were in possession of four 
bombs sent to them from Siam by the Phan Bội Châu’s partisan [Đặng] Tú Hứa (aka Tú Ngọ, aka 
Đặng Thúc Hứa).  The band had heard of Phan Bội Châu’s arrest and wanted to send someone to 
Haiphong to demand the latest news from China concerning the arrest.292  Three days later, on 
July 28, Joseph Alberti, the governor general’s chief of staff, relayed Sogny’s message to Saigon, 
further advising that all services exercise high alertness in light of the information.293  If the 
report were true, security officials had good cause to fear potential reprisals for Phan Bội Châu’s 
arrest and ongoing detention.   
On July 29, Gilles reported on the progress of his search for the origins of the poly-
copied tracts in Hanoi.294  His informers suggested that the source might be located in Hanoi, 
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though the word on the street was that the Sûreté police themselves were responsible.  Some of 
the individuals his informers had spoken to felt the tracts were an underhanded police strategy 
intended to gauge public support for Phan Bội Châu.  This rumor was not the only one going 
around.  The same day, Gilles also reported that a persistent rumor was now circulating among 
Vietnamese nationalists that the individual being held in the Central Prison was not Phan Bội 
Châu at all, but rather an impostor pretending to be Phan Bội Châu as part of a government plot 
to make trouble amongst the nationalists.295  It seemed that Hanoi was a cauldron of gossip. 
However, something altogether different was taking place in Haiphong. On August 3, 
Léandri reported that one of his agents, named Vu Dinh Mau, had discovered a 16-year-old 
domestic servant in possession of a Phan Bội Châu tract.  Vu Dinh Mau took the teenager to the 
Sûreté office for interrogation, whereupon it was revealed that a slightly older teenager who 
looked to be from outside the city of Haiphong had handed him the tract while he was standing 
in front of the home of his employer.296  Léandri sent another report on August 21 indicating two 
additional distribution operations pertaining to the same poly-copied tracts advocating on behalf 
of Phan Bội Châu.297  On this occasion,, Vietnamese employees of the Treasury in Haiphong had 
 
295 Gilles further suggested that some nationalists would continue to reject the identity of the prisoner as 
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296 Léandri’s report continues in full: “That day, around 11 AM, Agent Vu-Dinh-Mau, passing Bd 
Chavassieux, and seeing a young native who seemed suspicious and who put a paper in the pocket, went and 
searched him. The agent found a bag in which, among other papers, was a pamphlet concerning Phan-Boi-Chau.  
The agent brought him to the Sûreté office where he was questioned and made the following statements: 
“I am Le VAN MON, 16 years old.  I’ve worked as a domestic for about four years, at the home of M. Tran-Van-
Tu, an entrepreneur, located at 103 Bd Chavassieux.  I am originally from the village of Hoanh-Nha, Hai-Hau 
district, (Nam-Dinh province). 
"About ten days ago, without my being able to specify, at nightfall, I was on the pavement, in front of my boss's 
house, when a native came to pass who had many papers in his hand, and who gave me one, I folded it and put it in 
one of the pockets of my cai-ao, returned to the house, and knowing how to read the quoc-ngu, I became acquainted 
with it, having never heard of the person mentioned in this paper, I did not pay attention to this reading and put the 
paper back in my pocket, where I always kept it and where it was with other papers, when your agent stopped and 
searched me.” 
Upon questioning: "I did not show anyone the paper in question, just as I did not give it to anyone". 
Upon questioning: "The person who gave me this paper appeared to be between 16 and 18 years old, he is of 
medium height, wore canvas clothes (his cai - ao was very short), he was wearing a hat made of latanier leaf, like 
those worn by the young people of the countryside and not used by the inhabitants of the city, which makes me think 
that the distributor is a stranger to Haiphong. I cannot report any more about him as he passed quickly, I could not 
stare, and it was around dusk.   
Mr. Tran-Van-Tu, Le-Van-Mon's employer, told me that he did not know about the existence of this leaflet and that 
he was satisfied with the conduct of his servant, who surely did not understand the contents of the incriminating 
tract, because of his young age, first, and the inadequacy of his education, second. 
[Léandri]: I thought it necessary to carry out my investigations further and, with the consent of Tran Van Tu and his 
servant, I went with Mr. PHUONG, in the capacity of an interpreter, to their home, at No. 103 Boulevard 
Chavassieux, where we did not find anything suspicious. 
I will add that the tract seized is absolutely the same as those we already know and that the other papers which the 
young MON was a carrying were of no consequences and have been returned to him.  
SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle 183-S, Commissaire Spécial Léandri à Le Procureur de la Republique et Chef de la 
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297 Léandri’s report read: “Continuing my investigations concerning the distribution of leaflets relating to 
Phan-Boi-Châu, I was led to question:  
1.  The two cashiers, one of whom also provides postal services, and the 5 secretaries of the treasury, each 
of whom had received by mail an envelope bearing the following address: "Mr. Indigenous Treasury Personnel of 
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been targeted by mail.  In addition, two youth were discovered handing out tracts downtown on 
Strasbourg Street.  Both claimed to have been paid 10 cents to distribute packets of thirty tracts 
apiece.  Clearly a relatively large-scale and well-organized publicizing effort was taking place on 
the streets of Indochinese cities.  The Sûreté could not help taking notice.   
As concern over the tracts was reaching a fever-pitch, Gilles broke the news that the 
perpetrator had been uncovered.  On August 20, Gilles sent a report to Néron indicating that 
information obtained in Hanoi had revealed the tracts had in fact been produced in Haiphong by 
a courrier who had previously worked for the Resident of Nam Dinh, but had since moved to 
Haiphong.  The courrier, named Ca-Tieu, had hired a sampan and had printed the tracts out on 
the river.  When he was finished, Ca-Tieu had thrown the gelatin paste used during the 
polycopying process into the river.298  If this information is accurate, Ca-Tieu was able to make a 
dramatic impact, at the very least on the Sûreté, with a very modest investment in basic copying 
tools.  The fact that Ca-Tieu was a former employee of the French government and he or his 
associates were targeting secretaries and clerks then working in government offices suggests that 
the Sûreté now had good reason to suspect the loyalties of the very class of Vietnamese on whom 
French relied on a daily basis.  If the Phan Bội Châu affair provoked the ire of government 
clerical staff, then French Indochina might quickly become ungovernable.   
While unrest inside Indochina was rattling the nerves of Gilles and his colleagues, their 
counterparts abroad had their own share of concerns.  Nguyễn Thế Truyền, head of the 
Vietnamese section of the l’Union Intercoloniale, received a petition dated July 23, 1925, from a 
group calling itself Jeune Annam (Young Annam).  This petition, which Nguyễn Thế Truyền later 
published on September 4 and distributed widely thereafter, accused the colonial administration 
and the Sûreté specifically of an attempt to carry out a “scandalous death sentence!”299  The 
 
Haiphong.” [The envelopes] contained several copies of said leaflet. Nothing of interest has been collected from 
their statements; both groups confined themselves to saying that they had taken note of the libel, to which they had 
attached no importance, and that they had destroyed these papers, with the exception of the named Nguyen-Van-
Ngan, a 62-year-old cashier. This cashier, who had set aside the envelope with two of the leaflets it contained, and, 
on the 18th of this month, on hearing that the native Treasury employees were summoned to the local Sûreté 
[office], had been taken with fear and handed them over to his boss. 
Mr. Bayeur has indeed given me this envelope and the two leaflets, which are exactly similar to those 
distributed on public roads and which we have already seen. 
2- Two young natives who were reported to me as having distributed flyers on public roads. 
Respectively 15 and 17 years old, they told me that they were on Strasbourg street one evening around 8 
o'clock (they could not remember the date) when an Annamese appearing to be about thirty years, wearing a white 
cloth shirt with a "Danton" collar and cut in the European style and no hat (who they only saw this one time), gave 
them ‘each to 10 cents and a small packet of papers (about thirty in each package).  He told them to distribute the 
papers to passers-by, adding that these papers were leaflets. The two youth immediately separated to make their 
distribution. They later met in front of the booth installed in the vacant lot along the Boulevard Amiral Courbet, 
where one of them passed the remainder of his papers to the other. The latter was admonished by another Annamese 
who, having read the leaflet’s contents, suggested the lad go to the Canal Bonnal to throw away the remaining 
copies.   
It has not been possible to learn anything more about these two young natives, whose good faith can be 
assumed because of their age and lack of education. 
SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle No. 197-S, Commissaire Spécial Léandri à M.M. le Procureur de la 
République à Haiphong et le Chef de la Sûreté au Tonkin à Hanoi, 21 août 1925. 
298 SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle 5029, Chef de la Sûreté à le Chef du S.C.R. et de S.G. Hanoi, 20 août 
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299 SPCE 355, Union Intercoloniale, Association des originaires de toutes les colonies, Nguyen The Truyen 
à le Directeur de “France Indochine,” 4 septembre 1925.  The dossier contains many copies of this letter and the 
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“Criminal Commission,” the petition continued, would base its judgments solely on police 
reports.  This is exactly what people in Indochina could expect from “French justice,” backed by 
those “creatures of the French administration,” namely the mandarins of the Court in Huế.  The 
petition ended by appealing to the solidarity of French and Indochinese people to “save Phan Bội 
Châu.”300  Though Nguyễn Thế Truyền’s propaganda campaign in support of Phan Bội Châu 
would take longer to reach Indochina, when it did in October 1925, the heads of all five Sûreté 
branches in French Indochina began to report copies of the letter and its attached petition.   
Meanwhile, journalists and activists closer to Indochina began to take action.  By July 27, 
Courthial, the French Consul in Hong Kong, telegrammed on behalf of Nadaud to complain that 
the Hongkong Telegraph, a journal affiliated with the government of Canton, had reproduced the 
Courrier d’Haiphong article.  By divulging precise details of the Indochinese political service’s 
yearlong investigation, as well as information about Phan Bội Châu’s arrest and transportation to 
Indochina, Nadaud griped,“this useless publicity has drawn unwanted attention to me in Hong 
Kong and has disturbed those who aid me or who might have aided me in Canton.”  Nadaud 
demanded measures be taken to ensure no further news leak, lest it “definitively compromise the 
success of my mission.”301  The news of Phan Bội Châu’s capture was not only deeply 
embarrassing for the Sûreté, it also negatively affected ongoing intelligence operations and put 
the lives of agents and informers at greater risk.   
The news from China would only worsen.  On July 31, the Canton-based bulletin 
Gongren zhi lu (The Worker’s Path, 工人之路) forcefully protested Phan Bội Châu’s arrest by 
publishing a telegram sent the previous day by the League of Oppressed People and an article 
excoriating French actions. Gongren zhi lu was started in June 1925 by the Strike Commission of 
the General Union of Workers, anti-imperialist labor movement closely affiliated with the 
Chinese Communist Party.302 The League of Oppressed People (in Vietnamese: Bị áp bức dân 
tộc Liên hiệp Hội, in Chinese: 被壓迫民族聯合會) had also been founded one month prior, on 
June 30, 1925, as a pan-Asian anti-colonial organization. Led by Canton’s governor Liao 
Zhongkai, the League included Vietnamese, Korean, and Indian activists, notably Nguyễn Ái 
Quốc (aka Lý Thủy, aka Hồ Chí Mính).303   The League’s telegram explained the conditions of 
Phan Bội Châu’s arrest, suggesting that the French must have obtained the tacit approval of 
Zhang Zuolin prior to the capture.  The telegram took particular issue with French violations of 
Chinese territorial sovereignty, as the North Railway Station was decidedly outside of the French 
Concession.  The League called on Chinese and other Asians to unite against French 
imperialism.304  An accompanying article provided further details on Phan Bội Châu’s capture, 
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including the names of the ships on which he had been transported.  The most shocking part, 
however, was a poem the Gongren zhi Lu claimed Phan Bội Châu had composed aboard the 
Angkor and thrown onto an adjacent boat, whereupon it was successfully retrieved by a Chinese 
student.  The Gongren zhi Lu raised the issue again in another article the following day (August 
1).305 
An informer’s report arriving August 3 confirmed the Vietnamese revolutionaries in 
Canton had played a key role in supplying the Congress of Oppressed Peoples with information 
and documents.  The agent, code-named “Pinot” (aka Lâm Đức Thụ), reported that since his 
previous report on July 15, the revolutionaries based in Canton had learned of Phan Bội Châu’s 
capture and were actively searching for the “traitor” who had made the arrest possible.  Agent 
Pinot explained that thanks to “an intermediary,” Phan Bội Châu had managed to write letters to 
Hồ Tùng Mậu in Canton and Hồ Học Lãm in Hangzhou.306  This was likely a reference to the 
poems Phan Bội Châu managed to throw off of the Angkor to an adjacent boat.  The next day, on 
August 4, Martel, the French Minister in Peking, wrote to alert the governor general’s office that 
the account published in the Courrier d’Haiphong was now being republished in the Chinese and 
foreign press there.  Martel expressed his deep regret at the publicity the Phan Bội Châu affair 
was causing, and the difficulties it created for him in his dealings with the Chinese 
government.307   
As the news stirred up anger in China, it also began to spread elsewhere.  In Bangkok, on 
August 10, at a meeting at the Pagoda of Que Duong, the Buddhist monk Thien Hoi read a letter 
written in Chinese from [Đặng] Tú Ngọ (aka Đặng Thúc Hứa) and Co Khon announcing the 
arrest of Phan Bội Châu.  The letter called on all Vietnamese compatriots to contribute 50 Tx 
each, to be given to Cu Nhon (another name for Thien Hoi), who was the representative of Tú 
Ngọ and Co Khon in Bangkok.  Other attendees suggested that subscription lists be drawn up 
and that collectors be sent to other Vietnamese colonies in Siam.308   
The news continued to roil stakeholders in China.  On August 12, a report from agent 
“Pipo” warned that Vietnamese rebels located in Guangxi and affiliated with the Black Flags 
were enraged at the news of Phan Bội Châu’s capture and now claimed to be planning 
simultaneous attacks on Dong-Trieu and Langson with 10,000 men.  They also claimed to have 
drawn in subscriptions worth two million [yuan?] and that Germany stood by to assist their 
attacks.  Though Pipo stressed that this news was quite exaggerated, it contributed to a sense that 
French Indochina was under siege, with more attacks possible at any time.309  On August 13, the 
Gongren zhi lu published yet another letter from the League of Oppressed Peoples addressing the 
arrest of Mr. Phan Thi Han (aka Phan Bội Châu).  The letter claimed that though “the mission of 
Mr. Phan is over,” “the republican partisans of Annam must carry out the struggle without being 
discouraged by the death of Mr. Phan.”  Raising the spectre of a global anti-imperialist backlash, 
the letter pointedly noted that “3 million Moroccans had managed to defeat the Spanish and 
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would soon defeat the French as well.  Would 20 million Vietnamese remain ever fearful as the 
eternal slaves of the French?”310  While the communists and anti-imperialists in Canton 
presented a serious threat, at least they were a known quantity.  Concerns about Phan Bội Châu’s 
capture, however, came from farther to the right in the Chinese political spectrum.   An August 
29 letter to Commander Lemoigne from Captain Sabatier, the commander of Tonkinese Riflemen 
in Shanghai, reported that none other than “the Chinese Christian general Feng Hong Siang [Sic: 
Feng Yuxiang]…is in Shanghai to inquire about the conditions under which the Annamese 
reformer Phan was arrested.”311  The involvement of top-ranking Chinese officials on the eve of 
Phan Bội Châu’s trial demonstrated that the actions of the Criminal Commission could easily 
pose geopolitical and well as internal political challenges.   
While domestic unrest and foreign agitation were certainly on the minds of Robin and 
Monguillot, these issues may well have taken a back seat to an even more pressing issue: the 
arrival of newly appointed Governor General Alexander Varenne.  The selection of Varenne had 
elicited praise from the radical left and a storm of indignation from the conservatives on the 
right.  The rightist periodicals La Victoire, Le Figaro, and L’Éclair voiced their strident 
opposition to the choice.312  Conservative publications in Indochina, such as France Indochine 
agreed, while expressing their regret that Monguillot, a dedicated career civil servant, had not 
been given the post.313  By contrast, radical papers such as Malraux and Monin’s L’Indochine 
enchaînée, expressed their “real pleasure” at the decision.314  However, the truth was that no one 
really knew what Varenne would do once he arrived in Saigon come November 1925.  As the 
weeks passed, both sides of the Indochinese political spectrum notice aspects of Varenne that 
unnerved them.  The left discovered that Varenne was perhaps less of a socialist and more of a 
rehabilitated conservative.315  Conservatives saw not another conservative, but a progressive 
reformer in the mold of Albert Sarraut, whose legacy in French Indochina was mixed at best.  
Varenne himself recapitulated Sarraut’s reform agenda.  At a dinner in on October 14, prior to 
leaving France for Indochina, Varenne declared that fixing the problems between the French and 
the Vietnamese required the development of “public education, hygiene, public assistance, 
learning the ‘native’s’ belief, respecting his habits, and building up his milieu.”316  What this 
meant for the outcome of Phan Bội Châu’s trial was anyone’s guess, but Robin and Monguillot 
had good reason to be concerned.  It was therefore imperative that the trial begin soon, and that 
the result be juridically unimpeachable.   
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Chapter Four:  
Competing Legitimacies and Courtroom Drama:  
The Trial of Phan Bội Châu in Hanoi, August-December, 1925 
Over a six-month period from the end of June through the end of December 1925, Phan 
Bội Châu was hurtled from a life of relative obscurity as the editor of the Military Affairs Review 
in Hangzhou to the center of attention for all of Indochina.  Between his arrest at the hands of 
French Concession police in Shanghai on June 30 and the pardon granted by incoming Governor 
General Alexander Varenne on December 24, Phan Bội Châu found himself confronted by the 
full force of the French colonial security apparatus, whose leaders were determined to 
demonstrate the power of French security and legal institutions by proving him guilty of murder, 
incitement to violence, and sedition.  The interrogation and trial of Phan Bội Châu, which began 
on August 29 and ended in a dramatic and very public courtroom showdown on November 23 
ironically demonstrated that in French Indochina, politics counted for more than facts.   
This chapter will show how the leaders of the French colonial security state instigated 
Herculean efforts to quickly build an airtight criminal case against Phan Bội Châu in the face of 
metropolitan disquiet, foreign protest, and domestic political agitation.  It will further argue that 
the Criminal Commission of 1925, the juridical body responsible for prosecuting Phan Bội Châu, 
despite the defiant intransigence of the accused and an astounding self-imposed clerical burden, 
was ultimately successful in proving the charges inherited from its predecessor.  The 
Commission’s legal victory, a testament to the power of the colonial archive, soon turned sour as 
Phan Bội Châu recognized and took advantage of something new and even stronger that had 
risen suddenly in the wake of press reports concerning his capture and trial: Indochinese public 
opinion.317   
The Trial Begins 
The Criminal Commission of 1925 began its proceedings on Saturday, August 29, 1925.  
The Commission was headed by President Bride, a first-class civil service administrator and 
inspector for the Tonkin Bureau of Political and Administrative Affairs.  The Commission also 
included the resident-mayor of Hanoi (Paul Justin Hippolyte) Dupuy, Captain of the First 
Regiment of Tonkinese Riflemen Bellier, and the Attorney General of the Republic at the Court 
of First Instance of Hanoi Boyer.  Also present were (Edouard Auguste) Arnoux, the Criminal 
Commission’s clerk,318 and Gombaud Saintonge, its interpreter.  An additional Vietnamese 
interpreter named Bùi Bằng Đoàn was brought in later to assist. 
Between the beginning of the Commission’s inquiry on August 29 and its completion on 
November 9, Phan Bội Châu faced off against Commission members in sixty-four interrogation 
sessions held on thirty-six separate days.  Only the testimony from one additional witness 
appears in the Interrogatoires: that of Inspector François (aka Trần Tứ Quí) of the Sûreté, who 
had guarded Phan Bội Châu on the Altaïr in Hong Kong and aboard the Tonkin during the trip to 
Haiphong.  A handful of times, the Commission also called on the interpreters Gombaud 
Saintonge and Bùi Bằng Đoàn to repeat testimony.  Bùi Bằng Đoàn was also called upon twice 
called to verify the authenticity of Phan Bội Châu’s handwriting.   
 
317 For this chapter, I have drawn primarily on files, intelligence and press surveillance reports, and internal 
security and administrative communications found in ANOM, SPCE 351-355.  The transcript of the trial’s lengthy 
interrogation sessions, on which my discussion of the trial’s internal workings is based, may be found here: SPCE 
352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu Interrogatoires. 
318 Note - This is not the same individual as Paul Louis Marius Arnoux, head of the Sûreté in Cochinchina. 
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Aside from these brief, infrequent interruptions, the 440-page Interrogatoires constitutes 
a two-month dialogue between Commission members and Phan Bội Châu that was often 
combative.  Over the course of the inquiry, Criminal Commission members, who are not 
identified by name, asked 1,896 questions, nearly all of which Phan Bội Châu answered.  For the 
vast majority of their questions, the Commission members cited documents, typically testimonies 
and texts attributed to Phan Bội Châu.  They then challenged Phan Bội Châu to account for the 
contents of those documents.  Lacking any legal representation or any documents of his own to 
present, Phan Bội Châu had no choice but to devise strategies to counter the Criminal 
Commission’s unrelenting deluge of documents.  In a very real sense, the trial of Phan Bội Châu 
was a trial by archive.   
Despite a sincere desire to conduct the trial in the most rapid possible manner, the 
Criminal Commission members found themselves flummoxed by Phan Bội Châu’s initial 
defense strategy: deny or mislead whenever possible.  This strategy began immediately, even 
before the first question was asked.   
Day One (8/29/1925): Testing Strategies 
Presenting himself before the court on the morning of August 29, Phan Bội Châu stated 
simply: “I forget the name of my second wife.  I had one child by each of my wives.”319  The 
first part of this comment, ridiculous on its face, served two purposes.  First, it allowed Phan Bội 
Châu to protect the identity of his second wife Nguyen Thi Em.  Second, it revealed Phan Bội 
Châu’s central defense strategy of claiming complete ignorance of any potentially incriminating 
facts.  The latter part of comment, also blatantly untrue, was probably intended to protect the 
identity of Phan Bội Châu’s daughter Phan Thi Cuong.  To the members of the Criminal 
Commission, the message was clear: Phan Bội Châu was ready to play games with the truth. 
 Asking for Phan Bội Châu to be handed a copy of his sentencing by the 1913 Criminal 
Commission, the prosecutor fired his opening salvo: “Do you have any comments on this order?”  
Undeterred, Phan Bội Châu responded, “I have been aware, while abroad, that a judgment was 
rendered against me, but I do not know what grievances I am reproached for.  I am very happy 
that the investigation has resumed and I will answer frankly and clearly all the questions that will 
be asked.”   
The first day was largely spent arguing over dates.  Members of the Criminal 
Commission were hoping to confirm certain biographical details pertaining to the period before 
Phan Bội Châu first left Indochina (1905), and found Phan Bội Châu quite willing to supply 
dates.  Unfortunately for them, many of the dates Phan Bội Châu provided did not match their 
files.  In many cases, neither did Phan’s dates correspond to each other!  Asked when he had 
passed the triennial regional examination in Nghệ An, Phan Bội Châu claimed it was the 
thirteenth year of Thành-Thai, in other words, “1901, I believe.”320  This intentional inaccuracy 
marked a crucial component in Phan Bội Châu’s evolving defense strategy: a deliberate 
 
319 Although the Interrogatory does not specify who spoke first, the content suggests it could only have 
been Phan Bội Châu.  The declaratory statements about his wives both begin with the first person pronoun.  In 
addition, whereas in Phan Bội Châu’s administrative files, his profession is always indicated to be “professor of 
[Chinese] characters,” in the Interrogatory Phan Bội Châu’s profession is declared to be “student.” This claim 
corresponds to Phan Bội Châu’s initial defense strategy of minimizing responsibility by claiming to lack significant 
authority. 
320 61. Phan Bội Châu actually passed the Nghe An regional examination in the twelfth year of Thanh Thai, 
1900.  Phan Bội Châu provides the correct date in his Autobiography, and, in any event, could hardly have forgotten 
the year he had achieved first rank, thereby receiving accolades within his district and from friends in the capital. 
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confusion of dates.  Asked at which examination he had been banned for life, Phan continued to 
obfuscate, claiming “It was in the year 1900 (the tenth year of Thành-Thai).”  Not only had Phan  
actually been banned in 1897, the eighth year of Thành-Thai, but the year 1900 was the year 
Phan Bội Châu had famously taken first place in the regional exams.  Phan himself stated this 
fact only two months previous upon his arrest.   Moreover, with this response, Phan Bội Châu 
had just effectively made two consecutive years by the Western calendar (1900 and 1901) the 
equivalent of three full years apart by the Vietnamese regnal calendar (the tenth and thirteenth 
years of Thành-Thai, which would actually correspond to 1899 and 1902).  Asked again to state 
the year he had passed the triennial regional exams, Phan Bội Châu again confirmed, “I received 
my ban in the tenth year of Thành-Thai and my cử-nhân degree in the thirteenth year.”   
The chronological confusion had only just begun.  Later that same morning, the 
prosecutor asked Phan Bội Châu when Mr. Trần Đình Phát had served as tổng đốc (provincial 
governor) of Nghệ An.  Phan Bội Châu demurred, “I cannot answer you because Trần Đình Phát 
was not nominated tổng đốc until after I left the country.”   The prosecutor then asked Phan to 
confirm when he had left Nghệ An. He replied, “1905.”  The prosecutor, apparently having 
caught Phan lying, challenged him, “In 1903, Mr. Trần Đình Phát was the tổng đốc of Nghệ An.”  
Phan Bội Châu pushed right back, insisting instead that Tôn Thất Hân had been the tổng đốc in 
1903.  However, he continued, “I prefer not to specify because I no longer remember.”  
Appearing to move on to another topic, the prosecutor then asked Phan Bội Châu when he had 
published Lamentations sur Formose (Letter from the Ryukyus Written in Tears of Blood)321.  
When Phan Bội Châu replied “1903,” the prosecutor sprang his trap: “In 1903, were you not 
summoned before a tổng đốc who agreed to ’forget’ about you because your actions had become 
known to the [French] Resident?” The prosecutor then launched into a long series of accusations, 
alleging that the Resident of Nghệ-an, whose name was Trần Đình Phát, had covered up Phan 
Bội Châu’s partisan activities and asked him to leave the province in 1903, whereupon Phan Bội 
Châu then travelled to Huế, composed Lamentations sur Formose, and was inducted as a rebel 
alongside his former students, such as Võ Bá Hợp, who was sentenced in 1908 by the Criminal 
Commission.322   
Phan Bội Châu heatedly denied all of this.  Directly addressing the prosecutor’s claims, 
Phan Bội Châu objected: 
That’s a completely erroneous account! I never knew Mr. Trần Đình Phát as the tổng đốc 
of Nghê-An, because I was no longer in the province [when he assumed the position]. I 
never met this mandarin, so he could not have summoned me. It is also wrong that this 
mandarin told me to leave the country. The only fact that is correct concerns the pamphlet 
I wrote entitled Lamentations sur Formose.  I distributed it amongst the ministers of the 
court, knowing full well that they would inform the Resident Superior. But this work was 
not a revolutionary writing!  As for me being inducted as a rebel, it may have happened, 
but without my knowledge. As for Bá Hợp, he was my student, but he was never 
sentenced. There is an error in his name. I affirm that I have never been summoned by 
 
321 In Vietnamese: Lưu Cầu Huyết Lệ Tân Thư.  In Chinese: 琉球血淚新書. 
322 Presumably the “Criminal Commission” the prosecutor refers to here is actually one of the Nguyễn 
court tribunals held in 1908.  The first French Criminal Commission to address the actions of Phan Bội Châu’s 
partisans  was the 1913 Criminal Commission in Hanoi. 
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any native authority to receive observations on anti-French conduct.323 
So ended the first interrogatory session on the morning of August 29.  If Bride had any 
illusions that Phan Bội Châu would bend easily to the apparently well-substantiated charges put 
forward by the Criminal Commission, the first day’s combative confrontation surely dispelled 
them.   
The second session began later in the evening of the same day, August 29, with both sides 
seeming to have calmed down.  The prosecutor continued to ask Phan Bội Châu about his 
activities prior to going abroad for the first time in 1905.  Phan Bội Châu continued to exercise 
selective memory of events.   Phan Bội Châu was forthcoming with many details about his 
journey to Tonkin, which he claimed coincided with the opening in 1903 of the Paul Doumer 
Bridge in Hanoi.  He also freely reported having briefly met the collaborationist official Hoàng 
Trọng Phu (the son of Phan Đình Phùng’s nemesis Hoàng Cao Khải).  However, Phan Bội Châu 
claimed to have forgotten the names of the “twenty or thirty people” who travelled with him on 
this trip.   
After describing his trip, Phan Bội Châu suddenly offered a rather surprising admission: 
in 1898, he had sold a fraudulent composition to a student taking the examinations in Nam Dinh. 
The prosecutor asked if this was the only time.  It was not.  Phan Bội Châu stated that he had 
sold fraudulent exam compositions many times in Annam and Huế, earning twenty or thirty 
piastres for each.  However, because the students buying these exams were unable to understand 
the themes Phan Bội Châu wrote about, so they did not pass.  The prosecutor immediately took 
advantage of this unexpected opening: “Do you have some special conception of the honesty 
required during the examinations?”  Phan Bội Châu blithely replied that the payoffs that 
routinely took place during the examinations were even worse. “All the examiners,” he quipped, 
“touch the money.”  Still sizing his adversary up, Phan Bội Châu was freely offering what he 
thought to be useless information.   
Taking advantage of Phan Bội Châu’s willingness to talk, the prosecutor began to 
question Phan Bội Châu about his connections with the bandit leader Để Thám, the rebellious 
mandarin Nguyễn Thượng Hiền.  Phan Bội Châu denied having had any relations with Để Thám, 
while he admitted having met Nguyễn Thượng Hiền “completely by accident.”  As the 
prosecutor continued to press ahead, clearly hoping to catch him in a lie, Phan Bội Châu began to 
dissimulate and dodge.  Asked about the peripatetic warrior Tăng Bạt Hổ, Phan Bội Châu 
claimed only to know him as an Cantonese-speaking medical practitioner, but not by name.  
However, Phan Boi Châu at first flatly denied knowing Nam Thịnh and Sơn Tẩu (aka Đỗ Tuyển), 
both prominent resistance leaders from Quảng Nam.  The prosecutor, incredulous, asked again, 
 
323 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 5.  Interestingly, French records for 1903 list 
neither Trần Đình Phát nor Tôn Thất Hân as tổng đốc of Nghê-An.  Rather, French administrative records and Phan 
Bội Châu Niên Biểu (NB) both indicate the tổng đốc of Nghê-An at the time was Đào Tấn.  In NB, Phan Bội Châu 
indeed claims Đào Tấn helped to protect him.  Trần Đình Phát does appear in French administrative records, but 
only in 1911 and 1912 as the minister of finances for the court in Huế.  Tôn Thất Hân, on the other hand, is listed as 
the tổng đốc of Faifoo in 1903, but he did indeed become the tổng đốc of Nghê-An in 1904.  Based on French 
administrative records, therefore, Phan Bội Châu’s statement was closer to the truth than that of the prosecutor, 
though Phan Bội Châu wisely did not volunteer the name of his actual protector, Đào Tấn.  Phan Bội Châu,  
Overturned Chariot: The Autobiography of Phan Bội Châu (Honolulu: SHAPS Library of Translations, University 
of Hawai’i Press, 1999), 61.  See also Annuaire général de l'Indo-Chine française 1903, 1904, 1911, 1912 (Hanoi: 
Imprimerie Typo-Lithographique F.H. Schneider, 1903, 1904, 1911, 1912). 
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this time indicating that Nam Thịnh was also called Nguyễn Hàm (aka Tiểu La) and that Sơn Tẩu 
(aka Đỗ Tuyển) had held the position of chủ sự (secretary).  Backtracking, Phan Bội Châu 
admitted to knowing Nguyễn Hàm and to knowing a chủ sự by the name of Trình Hiền (another 
of Đỗ Tuyển’s names).   However, Phan Bội Châu claimed Nam Thịnh was a lieutenant of the 
arch-collaborationist Nguyễn Thân, while Trình Hiền was little more than “a former mandarin 
who retired to his home to work the fields.”   
At this statement, the prosecutor pounced: “The information given to the Criminal 
Commission does not agree with what you just said to us.”  The prosecutor went on to specify 
that Nam Thịnh had worked under the resistance leader Nguyễn Hiệu as early as 1885, while Sơn 
Tẩu, aka Đỗ Tuyển, had also followed Nguyễn Hiệu and remained a virulently anti-French 
partisan.  Both men had hid in the mountains waiting for their chance to revolt, but were both 
captured. Nam Thịnh had died on Poulo Condore island and Sơn Tẩu had died at Lao Bảo prison.  
Recognizing that the prosecutor clearly knew the stories of both men, Phan Bội Châu simply 
responded that he had known nothing of either man’s fate after having met them in Huế and, as 
far as he knew, Nam Thịnh had submitted to Nguyễn Thân and obeyed him thereafter.  In an 
effort to distance himself from such an incriminating figure, Phan Bội Châu claimed that he had 
known Nam Thịnh only because of the examinations.  But, he hastened to add, that because Nam 
Thịnh had often needed his help to study for the examinations, the two of them could have been 
found together quite often during that period.  Such a remarkably quick series of self-corrections 
revealed just how badly the prosecutor had rattled Phan Bội Châu.   
This testy exchange brought the first day of interrogatories to an end.  Each side had 
played their hand and revealed their primary strategies for trial.  Bride would rely on his 
voluminous records to challenge Phan Bội Châu’s claims. In response, the accused would feign 
ignorance, deliberately confuse facts, and outright deny anything incriminating, all the while 
providing information he considered to be inconsequential.  Each side also got the measure of 
their adversary.  Bride saw in Phan Bội Châu yet more proof of the French stereotype that all 
Annamese were inveterate liars.  With a vast archive of messages, reports, and translations at 
hand, Bride felt sure he could not just prove Phan Bội Châu lied, but also force him to admit it.  
Phan Bội Châu, meanwhile, realized that Bride meant serious business.  If he wanted to survive 
the trial, Phan Bội Châu needed to take much more care with his words.  Henceforth, every 
answer would require tactical consideration and verbal talent.  It would be a duel of wits and 
words between the bureaucratic and the revolutionary. 
Day Two (8/31/1925): Establishing Positions 
When they met again two days later, on the morning of August 31, Phan Bội Châu came 
ready to make the first move.   Before any questions had been aksed, he declared spontaneously: 
During my last interrogation, it is possible I was inaccurate in my designation of the 
years.  I was counting them according to the Chinese calendar, which is possibly different 
by one year from the Annamese calendar.  I received my cử-nhân degree in the Chinese 
year Ti [Tí, 子, the Year of the Rat, 1900]. I went to the exposition in Hanoi in the 
Chinese year Dân [Dần, 寅, the Year of the Tiger, 1902]. I went to Saigon in the year 
Mao [Mão, 卯, the Year of the Cat, 1903], and I left Indochina in the year Ti [Tị, 巳, the 
Year of the Snake, 1905]. 
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If I did not respond to you immediately when, at the end of my last interrogation, you 
mentioned the names of Nam Thịnh and Sơn Tẩu, it was because these two individuals 
took those names after I departed Indochina.  While I was in Annam, I know those 
individuals by the names Âm Hàm and Ông Chủ Ô Gia (Sơn Tẩ). 
In this prepared statement, Phan Bội Châu managed not only to explain his chronological 
discrepancies and apparent ignorance of his good friends’ names, but he also introduced 
preliminary justifications for any future obfuscations.  If the prosecutor wanted to catch him 
providing the wrong dates for events, Phan Bội Châu could simply he was using one of four 
different chronological systems: the Chinese calendar, the Vietnamese calendar,  the Western 
calendar, or the Vietnamese regnal year.  If the prosecutor wanted to catch him lying about his 
relations with a particular person, Phan Bội Châu could simply claim to know that person by a 
different name or pseudonym.   
The second full day of interrogation witnessed Phan Bội Châu energized, confident, and 
ready to parry any of Bride’s thrusts.  The prosecutor jabbed at Phan Bội Châu with questions 
about Nam Thịnh and Sơn Tẩu; Phan Bội Châu blocked these by maintaining that his 
relationship with both men was purely academic.  The prosecutor lobbed other names at Phan 
Bội Châu, who skillfully dodged each one, refusing to incriminate himself.  Phan Bội Châu 
denied knowing or ever meeting the one-time revolutionary Tôn Thất Toại.324   More improbably, 
he claimed to have made friends with Prince Cường Để solely because, “I was curious about the 
items his ancestor Đông Cung [Prince Nguyễn Phúc Cảnh] had brought back from France and 
Cường Để kept at his house.”325  Phan Bội Châu even described his May 1904 encounter with 
Auvergne, the Resident Superior of Annam, in such a way that made the French official seem an 
easy mark: “I told him I went to Cochinchina to see the Statue of Monseigneur Adran and the 
Botanical Garden.  The Resident Superior told me ‘that’s all fine.’  But he never asked me 
anything about anti-French activities.”326  Phan Bội Châu was effectively telling Bride that his 
fellow countryman Auvergne was incompetent, while at the same time refusing to incriminate 
himself by admitting that he was in fact participating in anti-French activities.   
Unable to pin Phan Bội Châu down on any of his domestic activities, the prosecutor 
turned to the one event not in question: Phan Bội Châu’s first trip abroad in February 1905.  Here 
again, Phan Bội Châu carried on with his verbal trickery.   First, he described returning to his 
hometown of Đan Nhiễm to “arrange my family affairs.”  Phan Bội Châu revealed that he had 
entrusted his domestic duties to an adopted son named Am and also that he had a daughter by his 
second wife.  He had not mentioned his daughter previously because, he explained, “according to 
Vietnamese custom, girls are not entitled to property.”  The only people in the entire village who 
knew of his plan to leave the country, Phan Bội Châu explained, were his first wife Nguyễn Thị 
Huyên and his adopted son, Am.  While Phan Bội Châu’s daughter certainly existed, “Am” may 
well have been an on-the-spot invention to deflect any further interest on the part of French 
intelligence in his actual family members or fellow villagers.   
Phan Bội Châu then related the story of his secret departure from Đan Nhiễm village 
northward to Nam Định province.  With him, he claimed, were just two individuals: his guide 
 
324 In NB, Phan Bội Châu indicates that Tiểu La introduced him to Tôn Thất Toại in 1903, though Phan Bội 
Châu was unimpressed by the man.  Overturned Chariot, 63. 
325 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 13. 
326 Ibid. 
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Tăng Bạt Hổ and his temporary porter Nguyễn Điển.  By mentioning Nguyễn Điển’s name, Phan 
Bội Châu attempted to pull off two dazzling tricks at the same time.  The first was to capture the 
attention of Bride, who certainly would have known Nguyễn Điềm as the earliest informer the 
French had within Phan Bội Châu’s revolutionary organization.  Nguyễn Điềm came from Xuân 
Liễu village, very close to Đan Nhiễm, and had in fact passed fifth in the very same examination 
Phan Bội Châu came in first, in 1900.  Nguyễn Điềm, who may have turned informant as earlier 
as 1902, was later murdered by Phan Bội Châu’s close collaborators Trần Hữu Lực and Hoàng 
Trọng Mẫu in Canton in December 1912.  Perhaps anticipating that Bride would eventually ask 
about the murder, Phan Bội Châu teased the Criminal Commission, stating: “Nguyễn Điềm was 
very dedicated and he proved that dedication to the French government.  It was he who arrived in 
Canton alongside French functionaries in an attempt to get Cường Để to give himself up.  I 
believe that Cường Để had Nguyễn Điềm assassinated in Canton.  I did not have a chance to see 
him in China because Cường Để, I think, had him killed shortly after his arrival.”327  Not only 
was Phan Bội Châu mocking the French security services for the death of their agent, he had 
done so quite out of context and conveniently pinned the blame for the murder on Cường Để.  As 
galling to Bride as this statement likely was, it was doubly false.  Not only had he 
enthusiastically endorsed the assassination of his former student Nguyễn Điềm in 1912, Nguyễn 
Điềm also had not served as Phan Bội Châu’s porter in 1905.  Rather, this was Phan Bội Châu’s 
second trick: a lie designed to obscure the identity of his actual travel companions Đặng Tử Kính 
and Trần Bỉnh.328    Bride’s reaction is not indicated in the transcript.  The members of the 
Criminal Commission seemed willing to allow Phan Bội Châu to talk unchallenged, perhaps 
hoping he would contradict himself, or one of their many documents.  In any case, the morning 
interrogatory session ended after Phan Bội Châu finished his story.329 
For the evening session of August 31, the prosecutor asked Phan Bội Châu why he had 
left Indochina, then allowed him to address the topic at length.  Phan Bội Châu took the 
opportunity to recast his early motives as reformist, and even potentially collaborationist.  Phan 
Bội Châu explained that he had planned to become a tri huyện (district magistrate) after 
 
327 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 15, 96.  The name “Nguyễn Điềm is the source of 
no small amount of confusion because it is very similar to three other named individuals: Nguyễn Điển of Hà Đông, 
Nguyễn Điển of Cao Điền, a village in Thanh Chương district, adjacent to Nam Đàn district, where Nguyễn Điềm’s 
home village of Xuân Liễu lies, and finally Nguyễn Huy Điển (aka Bat Bieu), who also served as a spy for the 
French..  In a footnote to NB, Chương Thâu incorrectly identifies the Nguyễn Điềm  (阮 恬) as Nguyễn Điển (阮典) 
of Cao Điền. Chương Thâu, ed., “Phan Bội Châu Niên Biểu,” Phan Bội Châu Toàn Tập, Vol. 6, 268-269.  See also 
Le Jariel, Yves, Phan Bội Châu, 42, 115, 258, 302, 318.  Vinh Sinh confuses Nguyễn Điềm with Nguyễn Huy Điển, 
who were definitely two different individuals, and who were both spies killed by Trần Hữu Lực, the former inside 
Indochina in 1908, the latter in Canton in 1912.  This is the only way to resolve an apparent contradiction: in NB, 
Phan Bội Châu claims Trần Hữu Lực “stabbed the cử nhân Nguyễn Điềm…after he killed Nguyễn Điềm, Ngư Hải 
was concerned for his future and therefore pressed him to go abroad.”  Ngư Hải (aka Đặng Thái Thân) died in 1910, 
therefore he could not have given instruction to Trần Hữu Lực to flee Indochina for a murder committed in Canton 
in 1912.  It is possible that Nguyễn Điển of Cao Điền is the same person as Nguyễn Huy Điển (aka Bat Bieu).  See 
Phan Bội Châu, Overturned Chariot, 60, 93, 96, 108, 138, 144, 153 (for reference to murder of Nguyễn Điềm), 180 
(for reference to murder of Nguyễn Huy Điển). 
328 These are, at least, the two companions Phan Bội Châu identifies in NB.   Phan Bội Châu claims Tăng 
Bạt Hổ went to Tonkin earlier and met them there.  Overturned Chariot, 78.   In NTT, Phan Bội Châu mentions only 
Tăng Bạt Hổ and Đặng Tử Kính.  Phan Bội Châu, “Prison Notes,” Reflections from Captivity, translated by 
Christopher Jenkins, Tran Khanh Tuyet, and Huynh Sanh Thong (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1978), 26. 
329 While there is no clear way to determine if a particular session ended early, it can be inferred from the 
number of pages 
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receiving his cử nhân degree in 1900, but became increasingly aware of “an incommensurable 
difference between the intellectual levels of French and Vietnamese.”330   This awareness, Phan 
Bội Châu claimed, propelled him to compose the short work Lưu Cầu Huyết Lệ Tân Thư (Letter 
from the Ryukyus Written in Tears of Blood) in which he “specifically called for the abolition of 
the traditional education and examination systems…and the creation of modern schools along 
Western lines.”331  However, Phan Bội Châu continued, the mandarins to whom he showed his 
work dissuaded him from approaching French authorities.  Furthermore, Phan Bội Châu learned 
that a Frenchman observing successful candidates had counted them off: “un cochon, deux 
cochon…neuf cochons (one piggy, two piggies…nine piggies).”  Deciding there was no point 
trying to work with the French if that was their attitude, Phan Bội Châu stated, “I therefore came 
up with the idea of leaving the country.”332  Whether he intended to or not, Phan Bội Châu had 
just played a sour note. 
At this point, the tone of the encounter shifted toward acrimony.  Perhaps recognizing he 
had offended the members of the Criminal Commission, Phan Bội Châu quickly added, “Had I 
ever seen with my own eyes examples of Frenchmen such as those who make up this Criminal 
Commission, I would never have left.”333  The prosecutor was neither mollified, nor amused by 
this naked flattery.  He angrily challenged Phan Bội Châu, “We cannot accept that you left your 
native country, your wife, your children, the grave of your father, and those of your ancestors 
because you learned of a Frenchman counting pigs while watching Annamese!  Tell us the real 
reason you left!”334  Phan Bội Châu responded that the ‘piggy story’ was just an example; the 
real reason he had left was the obvious contempt French held for Vietnamese.  Becoming angry 
himself, Phan Bội Châu continued, “The Vietnamese people are like an abandoned child adopted 
by benevolent strangers.  But after twenty years, the French seemed to have abandoned their 
adopted child to pursue their own interests.”335  Clearly riled by Phan Bội Châu’s words, the 
prosecutor interjected, “We hear that the Vietnamese say mean or injurious things about 
Frenchmen every day, but we do not think that because of this all Vietnamese hate the French!”  
Phan Bội Châu snapped back, “I did not think all French hated the Vietnamese either!  I was 
exasperated by the terrible situation in my country and saw the French government doing nothing  
whatsoever to fix it.  The ‘piggy story’ was simply the drop of water that made the vase 
overflow.”336  Still rankled by Phan Bội Châu’s suggestion that the French were bigots, the 
prosecutor pointed out, “We have seen in a poem authored by a Vietnamese the phrase ‘the 
fattened pig must be slaughtered.’  Though this phrase targets us French, we hold no hatred for 
the author, nor do we hate all Vietnamese because of something one of them wrote.”337   
The argument was highly revealing: both sides abandoned their strategies and resorted to 
yelling as the racial animosities engendered by colonialism were laid bare.  For Bride and his 
fellow commission members, there could be no questioning French motives.  As far as Bride was 
concerned, the French colonial administration represented the epitome of justice, humaneness, 
and reason. If any French did denigrate the Vietnamese, they were outliers.  For Phan Bội Châu, 
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who had written exhaustively to analyze and critique the exploitative actions of the colonial 
administration and degrading way French treated Vietnamese, the ‘piggy story’ was simply a fact 
of life.  This argument, which set a divisive tone for the rest of the trial, revealed something very 
important to Phan Bội Châu about the mindset of his adversaries: although French colonial 
officials were perfectly willing to use their administrative and military power to oppress the 
Vietnamese, appearances mattered.  The Criminal Commission could embody the republican 
principles of justice, equality, and bureaucratic rationality, but never racial prejudice.  The 
prosecutor’s evident sensitivity about this topic had provided Phan Bội Châu another arrow for 
his quiver.   
The day’s session sped to a close as the prosecutor delivered a long, chastising rant.  
Calling Phan Bội Châu’s purported reasons for leaving Indochina “puerile and futile,” the 
prosecutor went on to establish Phan Bội Châu’s true motives: the exploitation of nationalist 
sentiments, the establishment of an insurrectionary movement to overthrow French domination, 
and the realization of political independence for Vietnam.  All of these were just means to an 
even great end, however.  According to the prosecutor, Phan Bội Châu’s true personal goal was 
to become the premier of Vietnam.  Everything Phan Bội Châu had done, from rallying former 
Cần Vương partisans, to placing Cường Để at the head of the movement, and finally to obtaining 
Japanese military and financial support, were steps in his secret master plan to achieve political 
power for himself.   
 Phan Bội Châu vigorously protested against the prosecutor’s claims.  Not only was the 
suggestion that he personally wanted power untrue, it was ridiculous!  He had never sought to 
profit personally; he sought only to better his country.  “The real reason I left,” Phan Bội Châu 
affirmed, “is the one I already exposed to you, namely to contribute to the intellectual 
development of my country by writing.  But there is one point on which you are absolute correct: 
I wanted independence for my country.”338   As for inciting an insurrection, Phan Bội Châu 
continued, this was quite impossible because once abroad he had had no further contact with his 
countrymen.  The prosecutor’s information about Cường Để was also incorrect. There had been 
no coordination; Cường Để came abroad on his own, a year after Phan Bội Châu himself.    
Moreover, Cường Để was the one who sought Japan’s support to retake the throne of Vietnam.  
Finally, Phan Bội Châu concluded emphatically, “I never thought about appealing [to Japan] for 
military assistance to fight France; as at that time I felt France was unbeatable.”339    
The competing speeches brought the second day of interrogation to a close.  The 
discursive positions of each side were now clear.  Bride intended to prove Phan Bội Châu was a 
manipulative, scheming, and unscrupulous politician, happy to dupe, use, or even sacrifice his 
countrymen for personal gain.  Phan Bội Châu sought to present himself as a nothing more than 
an earnest, patriotic writer, uninterested in political power or military affairs.  Interestingly, at no 
point during the entire two days had either side addressed the specific charges Phan Bội Châu 
was being tried, or rather re-tried, for: the 1913 assassinations of Nguyễn Duy Hàn, Montgrand, 
and Chapuis.  Having worked hard to collect and organize his documents, Bride intended to 
proceed methodically and chronologically.  Phan Bội Châu saw no reason to hurry the process. 
Day Three (September 3) and Day Four (September 4): Into the Weeds 
Three days passed before Phan Bội Châu met the Criminal Commission again.  Bride had 
ceased the interrogatory sessions temporarily while he awaited four additional cases of 
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documents he had requested that finally arrived from Huế on September 2.340  This fresh archival 
collection, 1307 new files contained in 88 dossiers, had been sent by the managing director of 
justice attached to the Nguyễn Court in Huế.  It offered Bride far greater access to information 
pertaining to the administration of Annam, including names, dates, and tribunal outcomes.  Most 
of these files covered events from 1913 or earlier.   This shot in the arm increased Bride’s ability 
to challenge Phan Bội Châu’s accounts of events from that period. 
Beginning September 3, the prosecutor started using a new tactic: citing testimonies and 
depositions from other individuals in order to challenge Phan Bội Châu.  For the first question of 
the morning, the prosecutor addressed Phan Bội Châu’s August 31 claim that the 1,300 piastres 
he had carried with him abroad came entirely from selling fraudulent exams: 
You told us that the 1,300 piastres you took with you came from fraudulent exams [sales] 
and lessons given to students. However, according to the declaration of a Mr. Lê-Văn-Hà, 
originating from Cam-Trang in the district of Duc-Tho (Hà Tĩnh province), who was the 
object of Judgment No. 11, dated January 11, 1911, which was rendered by the Hà Tĩnh 
provincial authorities and which we will read to you now, this money came from thefts 
and piracy. What do you have to say about Lê-Văn-Hà’s statement?341 
Phan Bội Châu, obviously startled by this new line of questioning, struck back 
immediately, declaring the statement to be “absolutely false!”  Phan Bội Châu then said he knew 
Lê Văn Hà by his reputation as a pirate.  Finally, he announced to the prosecutor, “I am not afraid 
to confront him if he appears before the Criminal Commission!”342  Bride, of course, had no 
intention of bringing any other Vietnamese to testify before the Criminal Commission.  Why 
should he risk state and personal security by paying to have individuals, many of them criminals, 
brought to the Central Prison in Hanoi when he already had their testimony on file?  A trial by 
archive was much safer, cheaper, and more efficient. 
The prosecutor busied himself for the remainder of the morning clarifying Phan Bội 
Châu’s statements.  He demanded Phan Bội Châu provide accurate dates and locations and asked 
him many times if he knew particular individuals.  Phan Bội Châu, clearly put off by the 
prosecutor’s newfound cockiness, grew increasingly frustrated.  After the prosecutor accused him 
of always using the same “fraudulent, concealed, crafty, [and] cunning” tricks and maneuvers, 
Phan Bội Châu shot back, “I don’t understand the deductions you’ve drawn from my 
declarations!”343  Nevertheless, when the prosecutor demanded he provide complete details of 
his entire first voyage abroad, Phan Bội Châu did his best to offer a comprehensive (though not 
entirely accurate) account, including his now famous meeting with the Chinese reformer and 
journalist Liang Qichao.   
In the evening session of September 3, Phan Bội Châu struck on a new strategy of his 
own: making other people responsible for anything the prosecutor hoped to accuse him of.  Phan 
 
340 Sent by the managing director of justice in Huế, the set of 88 dossiers comprised 1307 separate files.  
SPCE 355, Le Résident Supérieur au Tonkin à M le Président de la Commission Criminelle, Bordereau No. 600, 2 
septembre 1925. 
341 I am unable to confirm at this time that this testimony was contained in the four cases delivered to Bride 
the previous day, but this seems likely given it took place during a Nguyễn provincial tribunal.  SPCE 352, Affaire 
Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 20. 
342 Ibid. 
343 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 22. 
91 
Bội Châu began by claiming that the work attributed to him Việt Nam Vong Quốc Sử (The 
History of the Loss of Vietnam) was in reality the work of Liang Qichao.  “I gave [Liang Qichao] 
the theme of the work, and he developed it with his own personal ideas,” Phan Bội Châu told the 
prosecutor.  Not content to stop there, Phan Bội Châu continued, “the advice Liang Qichao 
claims to have given me in his preface is really exaggerated.  I cannot specify which points are 
exaggerated, but I was left with the impression that it was really exaggerated.”    Phan Bội Châu 
did suggest one part of the preface that was simply untrue: “Liang Qichao represents us as 
overwhelmed by afflictions with our faces bathed in tears, while actually we were cheerful and 
smiling.”344  The prosecutor, apparently dumbfounded by this new strategy, did not challenge 
Phan Bội Châu.  Instead, the prosecutor then asked when Phan Bội Châu had published his 
biography of Tăng Bạt Hổ.  This work too, Phan Bội Châu claimed, was not his, but that of 
Nguyễn Thượng Hiền.  Yes, he had written a work called Hải Ngoại Huyết Thư (Letter From 
Abroad Written in Blood), but it was “very short, only two or three pages long.”345  Phan Bội 
Châu’s strategy was clear: if he did write whatever portion of the works attributed to him that the 
French found objectionable, then he could not be held responsible.   
By this point, Phan Bội Châu had realized just how powerful the strategy of denial could 
be, especially for events for which the French administration had few reliable files.  In short 
order, Phan Bội Châu denied having ever met Count Okuma Shigenobu, denied ever living in 
Tokyo (he “always stayed in Yokohama”), and denied ever leaving Japan from 1905 through 
1909.346  It was a stunning series of blatant lies, but ones that Phan Bội Châu clearly felt it would 
be possible to pull off.   
The strategy of denial hit its first snag before the day was out.  After Phan Bội Châu 
declared having met the former resistance leader [Nguyễn] Tận Thuật in Canton for the first time 
in 1918, the prosecutor produced a photograph.  He asked Phan Bội Châu to identify the 
individuals in the photograph, which included [Nguyễn] Tận Thuật and Phan Bội Châu himself, 
then asked Phan Bội Châu what year the photograph had been taken.  According to the transcript, 
which contains the equivalent of stage directions, this did not go well: 
Phan Bội Châu: “It was long ago, either in the year Thi (1917) or in the year Ngo (1918) 
in Canton. [He pauses then says]: It was perhaps before 1915. [Another pause, then he 
resumes]: It was at the end of 1913, or the beginning of 1914 that this photograph was 
taken.”347 
The prosecutor immediately pounced, “We catch you once again in the flagrant act of 
lying!”   To this, Phan Bội Châu lamely responded, “I did not want to lie either time…I 
responded without thinking precisely about the date.”  Claiming that his memory was no longer 
good enough to answer such questions, Phan Bội Châu asked for relief from the requirement of 
specifying dates with precision.  Perhaps realizing he was not ready to commit to senility, Phan 
Bội Châu quickly offered a possible aid for his “poor” memory: while abroad he had recorded 
his meetings in a small notebook, which he no longer had.  This small notebook, he explained, 
“which contains notes of all my comings and goings since 1905…is in the magazine office in 
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Hangzhou.”348   
It had been quite the day for new strategies and dramatic reversals.  Bride upped the ante 
by introducing documented testimony and a photograph.  Phan Bội Châu responded by doubling 
down on his initial strategy of obfuscation, turning it into a strategy of outright denial and lying.  
This is also the moment the transcript itself reveals itself as a highly biased text.  Specifically, the 
“stage directions” that indicate when Phan Bội Châu paused appear in this transcript only when 
he is caught lying.  These rare notes constitute a metatext - they demonstrate the slow yet 
inevitable process of a liar coming to justice.   
Despite having been “caught” lying the evening prior, Phan Bội Châu continued to rely 
on his strategy of denial for the fourth day of interrogation.  If anything, he took it even farther.  
Cường Để had gone to Tokyo, while he had remained in Yokohama.  As such, Cường Để had 
been entirely responsible for the students of the Đông Du movement, while Phan Bội Châu 
simply worked as a freelance writer for Liang Qichao.349  Phan Bội Châu admitted some 
knowledge of Cường Để meetings with Japanese authorities and to having met some of the 
students, but essentially described himself as a loosely associated figure who a handful of 
students came to visit in Yokohama on occasion.  After struggling to combat Phan Bội Châu’s 
new account of his time in Japan, Bride ended the interrogatory sessions on the morning of 
September 4.  They would not resume again until September 16. 
A Hiatus (September 4-September 15): Reassessing and Rearming  
For nearly two weeks, both sides attempted to consolidate their positions.  On September 
7, Phan Bội Châu wrote a pair of letters in Chinese, which were duly translated.  In the first 
letter, sent to the president of the Criminal Commission, Phan Bội Châu formally requested 
Bride write to the French Consul in Shanghai so that he might obtain and return Phan Bội Châu’s 
small notebook, which remained at the bureau of the Military Affairs journal.350  In the second 
letter, addressed to Hồ Học Lãm who still worked at the journal, Phan Bội Châu asked that he 
assist the Shanghai Consulate by finding and conveying the small notebook.351  I was unable to 
find any further reference to this small notebook, though a daily planner found on Phan Bội 
Châu’s person at the time of his arrest suggests he did indeed keep a journal of his activities.352 
Bride, meanwhile, was busy requesting yet more documents to bolster his case against 
Phan Bội Châu.  He now focused on two categories of documents: intelligence files and Phan 
Bội Châu’s writings.  First, to refute Phan Bội Châu’s falsified account of events from 1903 
through 1907, on September 7 Bride requested of the resident superior of Tonkin documents 
allowing him to resolve a list of nineteen questions, all of which pertained to topics covered 
during the first set of interrogatory sessions.353  As a later response from Sogny reveals, Bride’s 
questions were handed off to the Sûreté of Annam, the Resident of Vinh, and the Nguyễn 
provincial authorities in Nghệ An.354   The same day, Bride separately requested an report 
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entitled “L’agitation antifrancaise dans les Pays Annamites de 1905 à 1918,” which Louis Marty 
had produced for Governor General Albert Sarraut.355  On September 8, Bride requested copies 
of several works attributed to Phan Bội Châu in various reports and legal judgments.356  Perhaps 
feeling the need to justify his fresh round of document requests, Bride explained to Robin: 
 
I have the opportunity to report how difficult the task of the Criminal Commission has 
been made by the attitude of the accused who, to each charge raised against him, 
systematically opposes a formal denial, unless evidence is provided to him. Furthermore, 
he pretends to ignore the names of the most exiles and important members of his party 
until the [Chinese] characters of the names are put before his eyes. Often, he even 
quibbles with Annamese pronunciations of surnames and only recognizes them when 
given the Chinese translation.  
Concerning his works, [the accused] claims that they were only a means of earning a 
living. He claims to have had no thought of putting revolutionary propaganda into them 
and he refuses to admit ever having called for murders, banditry, or revolts. It cannot 
escape you what importance I attach to being able to present him with the aforementioned 
works. He will deny their existence if they do not appear in the file, and I will be very 
grateful to you for agreeing to order the research been done so that they can be sent to 
me.357 
Bride’s plaintive request to Robin is triply revealing.  First, it was not enough to know 
Phan Bội Châu was lying; Bride needed him to admit to facts.  This demonstrates the seriousness 
with which Bride and the Criminal Commission approached the administration of justice.  
Second, Bride was aware of Robin’s impatience and no doubt understood that his superior 
needed the trial completed quickly, just as much as he needed it completed lawfully.  Third, Phan 
Bội Châu’s strategies of obfuscation and denial were indeed highly successful at delaying the 
trial, thus forcing the Criminal Commission’s dual imperatives of justice and efficiency into 
mutual competition. 
For a week, surprisingly little happened.  Robin did not respond to Bride’s request, Bride 
neglected to restart the interrogation sessions, and Phan Bội Châu sat in his cell.  Outside the 
Central Prison, however, the case was beginning to draw more and more attention. On August 
29, the same day the trial began, the Hanoi anti-colonial magazine L’Argus Indochinois managed 
by Amédée Clementi published an article titled “Une grave question: L’arrestation de Phan Bội 
Châu et sa mise en jugement.”358  Clementi, who wrote the article himself, called into question 
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the French colonial government’s actions and warned that should Phan Bội Châu die in prison, 
the entirety of north-central Vietnam could see a firestorm of bloodletting.  Clementi also noted 
that Phan Bội Châu had been illegally captured on Chinese territory, provided the fake name 
Tran Van Duc, under which Dupuy and Jeanbrau had registered Phan Bội Châu in the Central 
Prison, and lambasted the authorities for attempting to conceal Phan Bội Châu’s identity.  
Finally, Clementi pointed out the hypocrisy of a such measures being taken by a state that 
professed to represent the ideals of the French Revolution.  It was a damning critique that soon 
found a receptive native audience. On September 5, the progressive Vietnamese journalist 
Nguyễn Phan Long re-printed a portion of the L’Argus Indochinois article359 in L’Écho 
Annamite, a French-language daily he managed in Saigon with a circulation of 3,500.   This 
marked the beginning of active Saigonese interest in Phan Bội Châu’s fate.   
Meanwhile, in Paris, the anti-colonial bimonthly magazine le Paria made the subject into 
the front-page headline for its September-October 1925 edition: “Vive Pham-Boï-Chau!”360  The 
metropole had come alive to Phan Bội Châu’s arrest and fate.  On September 4, the Paris-based 
journalist and activist Nguyễn Thế Truyền penned a letter to accompany the July 23 petition sent 
to him by Jeune Annam.  He then carefully formatted both documents, added the Union 
Intercoloniale letterhead, and printed massive numbers of both.  Within weeks, this aesthetically 
stunning document, often accompanied by copies of le Paria, would begin to appear by post 
throughout Indochina and other French colonies.361  If the French colonial authorities wanted to 
bring Phan Bội Châu to justice, their time was running out. 
What was holding up the trial?  Bride and Robin had reached an impasse. Bride wanted 
to adequately prepare for his next encounter with the slippery Phan Bội Châu. This meant Bride 
needed more documents, and time to review those he already had.  His superior Réne Robin, 
however, was furious with Bride’s delays and decided to put a lid on Bride’s endless document 
requests.  On September 18, Robin categorically denied Bride’s request for Louis Marty’s report 
“L’agitation antifrancaise dans les Pays Annamites de 1905 à 1918.”  According to Robin, the 
report had been prepared for security officials’ eyes only and contained nothing of judicial 
value.362  The fact that Bride was a first-class inspector of political and administrative affairs 
himself did not matter as he had requested the document in his capacity as an officer of the court.  
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Concerned that Bride was spending more time requesting documents than using them, Robin 
used the only lever available to him: exercising administrative privilege to force Bride back to 
work. 
The Trial, Phase 2: (September 16-September 26) 
When Phan Bội Châu and the Criminal Commission met again on September 16, both 
sides immediately reprised their strategies.  The prosecutor began by challenging Phan Bội Châu 
on his date of departure from Nghệ An by citing his wife Nguyen Thi Thuyet’s testimony from 
the Tribunal of Vinh held in February 1910.363  Phan Bội Châu admitted he had committed an 
error regarding the date of departure.  Not long passed, however, before Phan Bội Châu claimed 
that Liang Qichao had written nine-tenths of Việt Nam vong quốc sử.364  Bride questioned Phan 
Bội Châu on his employment history and how much money he had received from Cường Để.  
Phan Bội Châu provided perfunctory answers, but generally remained noncommittal until 
offering the utterly implausible claim that he had worked for a journal in Shanghai from 1909 
uninterrupted through to 1913.  “It is exactly correct,” Phan Bội Châu affirmed, “that I was 
nothing more than a journalist and that my only source of income came from my work as a 
journalist.”365 
Unable to make headway concerning Phan Bội Châu’s source of funds, in the evening the 
prosecutor questioned him about reputation he had acquired as a fiery writer.  To this, Phan Bội 
Châu suggested that Liang Qichao had manufactured a reputation for by publishing Việt Nam 
vong quốc sử in his name.  After this, readers may simply have assumed writings were by him, 
but that did not mean he was the true author.  When the prosecutor returned to the Đông Du 
movement, Phan Bội Châu again made every effort to portray himself as a distant, barely 
connected literary figure.  He lived in Yokohama, while the Đông Văn Thư Viện school was 
located in Tokyo.  He visited it, Phan Bội Châu claimed, just two times during his five years in 
Japan.366   
On September 17, Phan Bội Châu softened his position slightly.  He was now willing to 
admit to knowing some of the Đông Du students, especially those from Annam.  He would admit 
to knowing specific names, but entirely reject others.  The same applied to pseudonyms 
attributed to him.  The flabbergasted prosecutor finally addressed Phan Bội Châu’s system of 
responses:  
How is it that after nearly twenty years away you can give us precise names of the 
students from Annam and Tonkin, who you saw only five or six times during your stay in 
Japan, and [also] those of Cochinchinese students who [you claim] never came to see 
you? Your memory on these points is very faithful, while on the others it is uncertain and 
your answers almost always contradictory?367 
Yet Phan Bội Châu had an answer for this: he only remembered the names of students for 
which he had seen the Chinese characters.  The prosecutor, feeling lucky, pointed out that the 
Cochinchinese did not know Chinese and thus could not have written their names.  Phan Bội 
Châu would not be outdone: “When the students from Annam came to visit me, they gave me the 
 
363 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 33. 
364 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 35. 
365 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 38. 
366 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 41. 
367 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 44. 
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names of Cochinchinese and Tonkinese for whom they knew the characters.”368 
The prosecutor decided to switch back to the technique that had garnered the best results 
so far: citing testimony.  In quick succession, the prosecutor cited testimony from Nguyễn Cẩm 
Giang, Am-Voa, and Ngô Văn Chanh.  This time, Phan Bội Châu was ready.  To each man’s 
testimony Phan Bội Châu now replied “I do not know this person…that is a lie.”369  This was, 
essentially, an way of adapting of his strategy of denial to apply to the prosecutor’s strategy of 
citing testimony.  For the entire evening session, the prosecutor tried in vain to rattle Phan Bội 
Châu using testimonies.  However, Phan Bội Châu now seemed harder to hit than before.  To 
ensure the consistency of his story about being a simple journalist, Phan Bội Châu flatly denied 
the testimonies of anyone and everyone who stated otherwise.  Even a photograph of him and 
Cường Để together failed to constitute evidence of their collaboration. “That proves nothing at 
all,” stated Phan Bội Châu, “when fellow countrymen meet one another abroad, they take a 
photograph!”  By the end of the day on September 17, it began to look as though Bride’s massive 
archive of documents amounted to little more than a heap of paper.   
Alternative Realities: Proofs and Denials 
The back-and-forth game of cat and mouse continued for weeks on end as both sides 
settled into their routines.  When the prosecutor caught Phan Bội Châu inadvertently admitting to 
having left Japan for Shanghai,370 Phan Bội Châu nonchalantly dodged: “I thought you meant 
long trips!  My trip to Shanghai was only for a couple of days.”371  Flustered, the prosecutor 
snapped, “Our questions are very precise and contain no ambiguity whatsoever…It is useless to 
continue this comedy!”372  A similar exchange took place when the prosecutor attempted to work 
out how many times and in which years Phan Bội Châu had met Phan Châu Trinh.373  Frequently, 
the exasperated prosecutor incredulously blurted out something on the order of, “How can you, 
before such categorical affirmations, always continue to deny [the truth]?”374  Deny he could and 
 
368 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 45. 
369 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 46-47. 
370 To emphasize the prosecutor’s achievement, the transcript includes stage directions: “(thinking for a 
long time, looking embarrassed, then declaring).” ⁠  SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 45. 
371 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 46. 
372 Ibid. 
373 Example: Prosecutor: “Which letter did your interview with PCT cover?” 
Phan Bội Châu: “It was concerning my brochure Lamentations for Formosa Under Japanese Rule and not my letter 
"Advice for Young Men to go Study Abroad.” 
Prosecutor: “It is you who are now creating the confusion! Our question concerned the letter written by you from 
Japan to your compatriots to engage them to go to school. You replied that you had an interview in Hue with Phan 
Chau Trinh regarding this letter. As you have always claimed that you did not return to Annam subsequent to your 
departure for Japan, you locate this interview in 1903 and you now say that it was on your pamphlet Lamentations 
for Formosa. You are looking for an escape. We understood you very well and your answer concerned only the 
teaching, but you immediately realized that it was possible to deduce from this interview with Phan Chau Trinh in 
Hue regarding a letter you wrote in Japan and handed over to Tang Bat Ho when he returned from Japan to Annam 
in the middle of 1905, that you returned to Annam and especially to Hue in the course of 1905 after having left at 
the beginning of the first month of 1905. 
Phan Bội Châu: “I maintain that this was my work Lamentation for Formosa that occasioned my interview with 
PCT. The confusion that has arisen is due to the fact that I did not sufficiently elaborate on this book that I wanted to 
discuss in my previous answer.”   SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 79. 
374 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 81.  Later on, the prosecutor even attempted to list 
Phan Bội Châu’s standard reactions:  “You have been kept informed, while abroad, of the declarations and 
confessions of individuals arrested and brought before the courts, if not completely, at least sufficiently to prepare 
your defense. And when the questions embarrass you, you answer: ‘That's false.’ ‘This information is pure 
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deny he did.  When the prosecutor pointedly noted that all of the statements Phan Bội Châu had 
denied corresponded with one another, despite having been made before different courts on 
different dates, Phan Bội Châu flippantly retorted, “These are all hearsay.  One could well say 
that I was the Emperor of China.”375 
Phan Bội Châu was quick to point out any inconsistencies or errors in the testimonies 
cited by the prosecutor.  After the prosecutor cited one Dang Trung Ngo’s 1915 declaration 
before a judge in Phú Thọ that a person named “Dan” had reported receiving orders from “[Li] 
Yuanhong and Phan Bội Châu,” Phan Bội Châu immediately fired back, “This declaration is 
ridiculous! Li Yuanhong is a great leader of the Chinese Republic. It would be very difficult for 
me to approach him. This statement proves that the people playing games with me simply built 
stories upon words they heard from here.”376  Having put with the prosecutor repeatedly accusing 
him of contradictions, Phan Bội Châu began to do the same back.   When the prosecutor cited Le 
Duc Nhuan (aka Le Ba Chiet)’s statement that Hoàng Trọng Mậu had served as Phan Bội Châu’s 
secretary, Phan Bội Châu gleefully pointed out, “Previously someone had said that I had Phan Bá 
Ngọc as a secretary. Now they just said it was Hoàng Trọng Mậu. This is a contradiction.”377  
The prosecutor’s attempt to explain that a person could have more than one secretary only 
underscored the danger of the trial becoming a farce.   
Because Bride’s case was largely dependent upon testimonies, the prosecutor introduced 
several names repeatedly over the course of the trial.  If only Phan Bội Châu’s relentless denials 
could be somehow dealt with, the testimony of these individuals would be damning.  One 
individual the prosecutor cited frequently was the Ấm Võ (aka Lê Võ), a native of Hà Tĩnh born 
1871 who played a major role in the domestic operations of Phan Bội Châu’s Modernization 
Association.  Ấm Võ was arrested January 16, 1912 in Hanoi and subsequently revealed a 
considerable amount of information about the organization’s infrastructure and personnel.378  The 
prosecutor used Ấm Võ’s testimony to assert, for example, that Phan Bội Châu and Cường Để 
had collaborated to construct an elaborate system of correspondence and subscription-based 
funding for the Đông Du movement.379  The prosecutor also drew on Ấm Võ’s words as evidence 
for Phan Bội Châu’s secretive dealings with the Chinese leaders Sun Yatsen and Zhang 
Binglin.380 Ấm Võ’s statements often elicited furious denunciations from Phan Bội Châu, who 
 
invention.’ ‘It's a pure lie.’ ‘It's a statement to harm me.’ ‘I do not know where such has taken such inventions.’ 
‘This information is incorrect.’ ‘It's revenge.’ ‘CD said that to my accuser.’ ‘This deposition is meant to cover for 
CD.’   SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 88.  Still later, the prosecutor argued, “We cannot catch 
you on the important points because you only offer denials, but on the whole your lies prove that you do not tell the 
truth.”  SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 234. 
375 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 84. 
376 Li Yuanhong  (黎元洪) served as vice-president of the Republic of China 1912-1916 and as president of 
the Republic of China 1916-1917 and 1922-1923.  Phan Bội Châu may have received some support from Li 
Yuanhong, but there is nothing to support Dan’s claim that Li Yuanhong was directing rebel activities inside French 
Indochina. 
 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 85. 
377 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 84. 
378 Despite how forthcoming he had been, Ấm Võ was sentenced to life imprisonment and served 15 years 
on Poulo Condore island.  Morlat, Patrice, Les Affaires politiques de l’Indochine (1895-1923): Les grands commis: 
du savoir au pouvoir (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995), 135. 
379 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 54. 
380 Example: “This is what Am Vo said on the 11th of the 3rd month of the 6th year of Duy Tan during his 
interrogation (Piece 31, Dossier 1925 B): ‘During my stay in HK, I met PBC at commercial house Ich Sanh. [Phan 
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called them “completely false,” “a pure invention on his part,” and “something he made up in his 
own defense.”381   
Other figures whose testimonies appear frequently throughout the trial transcript include 
Nguyễn Bá Trác, Nguyễn Cẩm Giang, and Phan Bá Ngọc.  Nguyễn Bá Trác was arrested in 
1914382 and gave testimony in November of that year.  He went on to become a collaborator of 
the French regime known for his work Louis Marty and Phạm Quỳnh on the conservative journal 
Nam Phong.383  Nguyễn Cẩm Giang (aka Nguyễn Hải Thần, aka Võ Hải Thu) made statements to 
the French resident of Hà Đông in September 1908, but apparently avoided detention and who 
went on to become a key figure in the nationalist movement.384  Phan Bá Ngọc, the son of Phan 
Đình Phùng and Phan Bội Châu’s close confidante during much of his time in Japan and China, 
offered information to the Sûreté of Tonkin after his arrest in April 1918.385  Phan Bá Ngọc was 
murdered in 1922 by Lê Hồng Sơn, at the order of Cường Để.386  Several Cochinchinese 
partisans affiliated with Cường Để make numerous appearances, including Bùi Chí Nhuận 
(interrogated May 1913)387 and Đặng Bỉnh Thành (interrogated December 1915).388   
As Phan Bội Châu continued to deny most of the testimonies produced by the prosecutor, 
he nevertheless found it necessary to elaborate an alternative explanation for the preponderance 
of evidence.  This meant laying the blame at the feet of Cường Để, who Phan Bội Châu 
increasingly began to depict as a strategic mastermind.  During the evening session of September 
18, Phan Bội Châu claimed “Since the majority of the money that Cường Để received in Japan 
came from Cochinchina, he had to say to the students from that country who were returning 
 
Bội Châu] told me that he had just made a trip with Sun Yatsen from the Siamese capital to Hong Kong on an 
American boat.’ ‘Do you know,’ Sun Yatsen told him while passing by Haiphong and pointing at it, ‘that this place 
will later become the subject of the argument?’ ‘Would you also [consider taking],” [Phan Bội Châu] asked Sun 
Yatsen, laughing, ‘Tonkin, where there are many fertile plains and a lot of resources?’ ‘No,’ replied SYS, ‘I do not 
want the land interests, rather [I want] the maritime interests. Haiphong is a port of the French Protectorate but it is 
the throat of the provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi. To have troops ready to embark later on, it will be necessary 
to station them in Haiphong and Guangzhouwan.   A base will be established in Guangzhouwan, the warships will 
be stationed in Haiphong, then even the European torpedoers will not be able to pass. Haiphong is a place that will 
be needed to form up armies.”SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 86-87.  This is the only reference 
I have found to such a journey and conversation.  This may have been an invention of Phan Bội Châu, or of Ấm Võ 
himself.  For additional testimony from Ấm Võ regarding Phan Bội Châu’s interactions with Sun Yatsen and Zhang 
Binglin, see Ibid, 55-56. 
381 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 55, 77.  Ấm Võ’s testimony suggests he played a 
much larger role in the Modernization Association than Phan Bội Châu was later willing to admit in his 
Autobiography.  Ấm Võ’s name appears only twice in NB, though three times in NTT.  Phan Bội Châu, Overturned 
Chariot, 71, 78.   Phan Bội Châu, “Prison Notes,” Reflections from Captivity, 16, 43, 48. 
382 In 1917, Nguyễn Bá Trác worked with Louis Marty and Phạm Quỳnh on the conservative journal Nam 
Phong. 
383 Le Jariel, Yves, Phan Bội Châu, 188-189. After Phan Bội Châu was granted amnesty and the ability to 
live in Huế, he was initially placed in Nguyễn Bá Trác’s residence.  Disgusted by Nguyễn Bá Trác and unhappy 
with these living arrangements, Phan Bội Châu and supporters moved quickly to buy a separate property to move 
into in 1926. 
384 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 57, 60. 
385 On September 26, for example, the prosecutor cited a statement made by Phan Bá Ngọc over 1000 
words long covering his activities in Japan during the Đông Du movement.   SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: 
Interrogatoires, 91-93. 
386 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 51, 57.  See Phan Bội Châu, Overturned Chariot, 
251.  Phan Bội Châu uses an alternative name for Lê Hồng Sơn: Lê Tản Anh. 
387 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 48, 78. 
388 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 49. 
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home that, ‘If ever you are asked about what I do in Japan, you put it all on Phan Bội Châu.’ 
Voila!  This is the origin of all the accusations against me.”389   Phan Bội Châu further alleged 
that students had left Indochina for Japan with the intention of joining Cường Để to obtain 
positions in the government the prince would create when he became emperor.390  Phan Bội Châu 
also made Cường Để responsible for claiming Phan Bội Châu as his secretary, for using Phan 
Bội Châu’s name to publish incendiary literature, and for orchestrating the myriad testimonies 
which he was now being called upon to account for.391  As the interrogations proceeded, it 
became clear that Phan Bội Châu was either the target of an absolutely colossal conspiracy 
organized by Cường Để, or simply lying through his teeth. 
It is not hard to see why Phan Bội Châu wanted to deny the mounting testimonies.  The 
story woven by the prosecutor out of many threads of testimony was decidedly unfavorable to 
Phan Bội Châu.  The prosecutor cited testimony from former students who claimed Phan Bội 
Châu had taken from them their parents’ money, supposedly to pay for living and educational 
expenses, but later refused to give it back when the director of the Đông Văn school expelled 
them for failure to pay tuition.392   After taking the students’ money, the prosecutor affirmed, “All 
declare that you [Phan Bội Châu] then completely lost interest in them.”393  Many former 
students testified they either never met Cường Để, or encountered him only once or twice.394  In 
contrast, many former students emphasized the role of Võ Mẫn Kiến, who facilitated the 
movement of students, money, and pamphlets through a boarding house he managed in Hong 
Kong.395  Cochinchinese also pointed to Gilbert Chieu’s efforts to send them abroad.396  The 
 
389 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 62. 
390 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 66. 
391 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 85. 
392 Examples include the testimonies of Phạm Dat Tam, Trần Tiên Dong, Nguyễn Vân Nghiên, Nguyễn 
Văn Tai, and Nguyễn Thanh Liêm.  The transcript indicates all of these testimonies were found in the Gilbert Chieu 
dossier (Nos. 1288-1296) . SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 64-65.  After numerous testimonies 
of this sort, the prosecutor recapped: “From this statement and those preceding, we know that young people who 
wanted to go to Japan stole their parent's money, but they were then driven away from school in Tokyo because their 
tuition was not paid.  Pham Van Yen (File 1283), Luu Quan Bac (File 1282), Nguyen Van De (File 1281), Truong 
Van Chi (File 1281) made identical declarations before the Investigating Judge of Mytho (File MPc / Gilbert Chieu). 
They were taken to the Dong Van School in Tokyo. PBC took their money from them: 250 piastres for Pham Van 
Yen, 70 piastres for [Luu Quan] Bac, 150 piastres for [Nguyen Van] De, which his parents gave him, 200 piastres 
for [Truong Van] Chi, which he stole from his father.”  Ibid, 71. 
393 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 71. 
394 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 61-62, 72. 
395 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 64.  Phan Bội Châu alludes to Võ Mẫn Kiến’s role 
as a “local agent” in NB, but provides no indication of just how significant he was for the Modernization 
Association and Đông Du movement.   Phan Bội Châu, Overturned Chariot, 116. 
396 Example: “In his interrogation of October 29, 1908 (Cote 1314, File MPc / Gilbert Chieu) one named 
Chau Van Qui declared the following concerning the house in HK where the emigres gathered. ‘Arriving at HK, I 
handed this letter to a Tonkinese by the name Vo Man Kien.  This Tonkinese runs a kind of halfway house in HK 
(Kowloon) under the sign of the nine dragons. It is to the home of this Tonkinese fellow that the Annamites come to 
change their clothes and hairstyles for their journey to Japan.  To get there you have to show a letter signed by 
Chieu, and when you go to Japan the proprietor also stamps your letter.  If I had not done so, they'd have kicked me 
out. Moreover, Vo Man Kien received formal orders from Chieu. He must confiscate money and the letters of those 
who would turn back without going to Japan.  It would indeed be too easy to ask Chieu for money for the restoration 
of the throne of Annam and to take advantage of it to simply pay for a leisure trip to HK with funds for the 
education and recruitment of Annamites of good will.  It was to avoid this that Chieu had this measure taken. 
 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 68. 
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leader of the Đông Du movement, the students all agreed, was Phan Bội Châu.   
Not only had Phan Bội Châu been responsible for the Đông Du movement, the prosecutor 
alleged, he had been a poor leader in every sense.   On September 21, the prosecutor addressed 
Phan Bội Châu’s failure to act morally responsible as a leader:  
You would receive the money and leave the students who had been attracted by the 
beautiful promises made to them before they left. All those who came to Japan in 1908 
are unanimous in saying that they knew only you who received them, took them to 
school, and took and kept their money. At that time you were 40 to 42 years old. These 
young people were on average 20 years of age, one of them, Nguyen Van Truyen, was 
even a child. They were abandoned on the Tokyo pavement. It even happened that some 
who immediately expressed the intention of returning to Indochina were prevented from 
doing so by all sorts of means, including threats.397 
The prosecutor went on to cite testimony from students claiming to have been threatened 
with death should they attempt to leave Japan or extorted for more money before being allowed 
to return.398  Phan Bội Châu responded by alleging that all of the former students’ testimonies 
had been coerced, prepared, or inspired by Cường Để.399   
When it came to Phan Bội Châu’s ulterior motives for pursuing the Đông Du movement, 
the prosecutor’s picture of Phan Bội Châu darkened even more.  The educational goals of the 
Đông Du movement were nothing but a smokescreen, the prosecutor alleged.  Phan Bội Châu’s 
real intention was to train up an army of Vietnamese youth, indoctrinate them with violent, racist, 
and revolutionary rhetoric, and send them back to massacre all of the French in Indochina.400  To 
 
397 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 71. 
398 Example 1: “Ngo Van Phai, in his declaration of October 13, 1908 (File 1521.18 of the Dossier MPc / 
Gilbert Chieu), a statement which you will be able to read and which we will quote you entirely, describes his 
travels in Japan. We extract only the following passage : ‘When we arrived, we were asked to hand over all the 
money we had in our possession before we started our studies, to prove that we were planning to stay in. I did not 
want to consent to being treated that way and I refused to hand over my money. Neither Huynh nor But received 
theirs back.  Two or three days later I saw the young royal prince of Annam who told me that he intended to replace 
the child who had been placed on Annam's throne and was going to reconquer Indochina.   Frightened, I consulted 
with Huynh and But leaving as soon as possible.  When they learned about it, they threatened to assassinate us.  
Huynh said we were too old to still be students. Huynh and But left with young Tan, but without me. I was forced to 
give them a hundred piastres to let me go. The prince gave me his photograph with a dedication. This photograph is 
still at home in a hiding place. I could give it to you.’”    
Example 2: “To Van Huynh, November 8, 1908 (File 1114, MPc / Gilbert Chieu) declared, ’12 days later, having 
shown the intention to go back to Saigon, my comrades did everything they could to prevent me and to keep me in 
Tokyo.  They even went so far as to lock my luggage in a room in the Hotel we lived in and which served as a store.   
They charged two of them with watching and following me wherever I went, etc. On the 14th day after my arrival in 
Tokyo, I succeeded in taking the first train to Kobe.’ 
The same To Van Huynh, in the same declaration: "At that time I was convinced that I had been dealing in Japan 
with members of a secret society and I was convinced that one day or another, we would would try to kill me.’” 
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 71-72. 
399 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 72. 
400 Example 1: “The truth is that to succeed in your projects you needed a name sufficiently well-known in 
Indochina to entice both the Annamese of North and South. You alone would have been unable to draw in the 
money you needed. That's why you put forth Cuong De, who, in your mind, would only be an instrument in your 
hands to attract young people to you. The [ostensible] goal was to have study them in Japan. However, the secret 
design, unveiled only to the most diehard, was to inspire in them a hatred of the Protectorate and the Royal 
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support this allegation, the prosecutor cited the testimony of Bùi Chí Nhuận, Lê Văn Hà, and Ấm 
Võ, all of whom claimed to have heard Phan Bội Châu explain this secret plan firsthand.401  Phan 
Bội Châu denied having taken part in such conversations. 
The prosecutor next turned to the Modernization Association’s activities inside Indochina 
to further substantiate his representation of Phan Bội Châu as an “unscrupulous 
megalomaniac.”402  As he had done for the Đông Du movement, the prosecutor now sought to 
prove Phan Bội Châu was the real leader of the Modernization Association.  He cited the 
testimonies of individuals who claimed Phan Bội Châu, and not Cường Để or any other person, 
had called the shots.403  The prosecutor used testimony to connect Phan Bội Châu to both the 
Đông Kinh Nghĩa Thục (Dong Kinh Free School) in Hanoi and Gilbert Chieu’s Hotel Minh Tân 
in Mỹ Tho.404 To bolster his revolutionary movement, the prosecutor argued, Phan Bội Châu had 
also connected with existing secret societies, or else ordered that ones be created.405  Drawing on 
testimonies obtained in the aftermath of the 1908 tax protests, the prosecutor alleged Phan Bội 
Châu had sought to obtain funding from Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina by any means 
necessary.  This included encouraging his subordinates and followers to create subscription lists, 
 
Government in Hue by promising them a privileged appointment in the future government once the French were 
expelled from Indochina and a new dynasty established on the throne of Annam.” 
Example 2: “We have plenty of evidence that the instruction of the emigres focused in particular on their military 
training. We have already given you a lot of evidence. We will add the statements of Nguyen Van Chung of 
November 16, 1908 before the Investigating Judge of Mytho (Piece 1388, File MPc / Gilbert Chieu). We will quote 
that of Duong Minh Thanh of November 17, 1908 before the Investigating Judge of Mytho (Piece 1391, File MPc / 
Gilbert Chieu). [Duong Minh Thanh] declares that Bui Chi Nhuan said to him: "This is the instruction that we will 
give to the young Annamese in Japan.  Sao Nam Tu is there. He is a very capable man and, thanks to him, when the 
Annamites have been sufficiently educated, they will come back to Cochinchina to drive out the French." On the 
occasion of this interrogation, the Judge in Mytho learned that the word ‘work’ is a conventional term which means 
"studies of military art.” 
 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 66, 77. 
401 Example: “Am-Vo declared in March 1912 to the Resident of Hatinh (Piece 26, File B 1925) that the 
revolutionary program involved the work of the present, the future and the ‘given moment.’ The task for the present 
is to send young people to Japan to learn the military arts, the diplomatic arts, and administration, as well as ‘all the 
necessary trades, and finally the language of England.’ The work of the future will be the success of the efforts that 
stimulate the present labor.  The work of the ‘given moment’ is the publication of books and their distribution in 
Annam. Thanks to the Chinese newspapers, this is the reasoning most clearly visible to readers. It is the alliance 
with Japan and friendly relations with big and powerful nations. It is the formal notice of the regency council to ask 
the Protectorate for the independence of the country. This is why, adds Am-Vo, that PBC wrote to his classmates, 
Dang Thai Than, Pham Tinh (aka Cu Tinh), Tu Ngon, Tu Kien, and others, inviting them to form 
societies/companies.”  
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 77.  See also Ibid, 58-59. 
402 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 76. 
403 Example 1: “Nguyen Quang Hao, on July 5, 1913 in front of the CC of 1913, Cote 345, File F, said: 
‘The leader of the revolutionary party is indisputably PBC, who has the upper hand over everything.   It is he who 
gives instructions to the different groups in China. Then comes CD, etc.’” 
Example 2: “You were the real acting leader, with lieutenants to execute your orders. We see this from the 
declaration of Nguyen Khac Can made on May 17, 1913 before the CC (Cote 29, Dossier D).   He said: ‘The one 
who pushed me to act is PBC, who is the leader.  Having arrived in Canton, I was not in direct contact with PBC, 
but rather with one of his lieutenants whom I do not know.’” 
 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 81-82. 
404 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 100-102 (DKNT), 109-111 (Gilbert Chieu). 
405 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 99. 
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commit theft, and even engage in outright banditry and extortion.406  To maintain secrecy, the 
prosecutor explained, Phan Bội Châu enforced a code of silence for all members of the 
Modernization Association.407  Anyone who violated the code of silence or acted without having 
first received orders from Phan Bội Châu, would be marked for death.408  The secret societies, 
under Phan Bội Châu’s orders, had disseminated propaganda, created fake businesses to obtain 
money, and murdered anyone who resisted or was suspected of spying on the movement.409  As 
usual, Phan Bội Châu denied all of this.   
Though Phan Bội Châu’s strategy of denying everything was clearly frustrating Bride to 
no end, by the end of September 1925 the Criminal Commission was finally beginning to find 
ways to rattle the old patriot.  First, by citing so many testimonies from former friends and 
compatriots, the prosecutor revealed to Phan Bội Châu the information-gathering capacity of the 
French colonial security state.  For every denial, there was yet another testimony.  Second, Phan 
Bội Châu was very likely unnerved by just how much information his former students, 
companions, and operatives had given up to the French.  The most alarming revelation in this 
regard were the long, detailed statements made by Phan Bá Ngọc in 1918, which demonstrated to 
Phan Bội Châu that his former protege had indeed been working closely with the Sûreté, as 
Cường Để had suspected.  Though it was taking far longer than Bride expected, the sheer 
quantity of documents would eventually begin to weigh on Phan Bội Châu’s mind. 
Third, in addition to the quantity of documents, Bride could not have helped but notice 
that Phan Bội Châu’s reactions depended significantly on the quality of information.  Certain 
types of information provoked sincere responses from Phan Bội Châu.  In particular, Phan Bội 
Châu reacted with horrified repulsion to testimony directly tying him to violence.  Phan Bội 
Châu’s first reaction of this kind came in response to the prosecutor citing the testimony of 
Nguyễn Khắc Cần, one of the bombers responsible for the 1913 attacks for which Phan Bội Châu 
 
406 Example: “In his interrogation of January 18, 1910 conducted by the Resident of Hatinh (Piece No. 68, 
File H 1925) the one named Que said that Cu Luong declares that while they were in Japan, CD and PBC often sent 
letters to the rebels (of Hatinh). To this day, all the inhabitants of Nghe An send Tu Ngon the money which he then 
hands over to Duoc No in HK, who hands it over to PBC. Just recently, PBC sent a letter complaining that so far he 
has not received much of the money sent and he announces that many of the students who have finished their studies 
can not go home [due to] lack of funds. Que adds that PBC demanded 40,000 piastres to meet the expenses of 
weapons manufacture and that he heard from Am-Vo and Long Son that the moneybags in Nghe An have already 
offered a lot of money and that it is necessary to open subscriptions in Hatinh.”  SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: 
Interrogatoires, 75. 
407 Example: “This code of silence must have been followed by the party members. When Nguyen Dao 
Nam and Tuong Long met in the Hanoi prison in June 1913 to be heard by the Criminal Commission, the latter 
[Tuong Long] made a gesture to his comrade and indicated to him that he had just written in the gravel with his foot. 
Nam approached and saw the characters that in quoc ngu translate as ‘nhat tu bat ngon’ [ 一字不言], meaning ‘say 
absolutely nothing, or we die’ (letter of June 23, 1913 Nguyen Dao Nam - Piece No. 81 and 82, File J 1913 ).”  
SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 77. 
408 Example: “Nguyen Van Thong (aka Nguyen Van Dao) in his interrogation of November 19, 1915 
before the Investigating Judge of Phu Tho (Exhibit 78 of the Phutho file) declared “Following the orders of Phan 
Bội Châu, we formed a secret society called ‘Dong Bao’ (Blood Brothers) [with the goal of] helping each other to 
reconquer the Annam empire and drive out the French. Anyone who independently attacks a place, a [district], or a 
province before being ordered to do so by Phan Bội Châu will be punished with death by the spirits of Heaven and 
Earth. Anyone who does not obey the chiefs and betray his oaths will also be punished with the same penalty and 
will not have posterity. We will be supported by China and we will receive guns when necessary."  SPCE 352, 
Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 98. 
409 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 99-100. 
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was now on trial.  Phan Bội Châu emphatically denied knowing the name Nguyễn Khắc Cần and 
stated: 
I have told you many times that I never wanted to revolt against the Protectorate 
government. If that had been my intention, I would have acted frankly without resorting 
to these criminal means employed in part by this individual…I would say that [Nguyễn 
Khắc Cần] obeys a group of evildoers who can be found inside the country, who want to 
stir up trouble for personal reasons…By criminal means, I mean the savage methods 
unworthy of a civilized man, which result in striking blindly. To these means I oppose 
those of sound reason, which consist of a combination of efforts both on the Annamese 
side and on the French side for the development of the country.410 
Phan Bội Châu’s distinction between savage and civilized methods was both unprompted 
and highly revealing.  This statement amounted to a categorical rejection of the revolutionary 
terrorism Phan Bội Châu had enthusiastically endorsed in his preface to Việt Nam nghĩa liệt sử 
(A History of Vietnam’s Martyrs), in favor of the Franco-Vietnamese collaborationism he had 
proposed in Pháp Việt đề huề (A Proposal for a Franco-Vietnamese Collaboration Policy).411  
Not only did Phan Bội Châu now claim to disapprove of “savage methods,” he even appeared 
willing to support a harsh government response. When the prosecutor described murders carried 
out by the “Dong Bao” secret society in Binh Dinh, Phan Bội Châu protested, “If it was up to 
me, all the members of these societies would be put to death.”412  For Bride, Phan Bội Châu’s 
responses indicated that the revolutionary leader was happy to inspire or even order others to 
undertake violence acts, but could not stomach the results when forced to confront them.413     
Finally, Bride had one more trick up his sleeve.  On September 26, he revealed for the 
first time a new type of document: one of Phan Bội Châu’s own handwritten letters.  Rejecting 
the testimony of absent individuals was one thing, denying one’s own writing would require 
another level of chutzpah entirely.  According to the prosecutor, the letter in question, dated 
November 1909, was written to Đội Quyên (battalion commander Quyên), and discussed 
correspondence and money, Japan’s military strength, and “public vengeance.”414  The letter was 
 
410 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 82. 
411 Việt Nam nghĩa liệt sử included hagiographic accounts of two of the 1913 assassins Nguyễn Khắc Cần 
and Nguyễn Thế Trung (aka Nguyễn Duy Hàn).  See Chapter Two.  Việt Nam nghĩa liệt sử and Pháp Việt đề huề 
chính kiến thư are available in Phan Bội Châu Toàn Tập, Vol. 5 (Hue: Nhà xuất bản Thuận Hóa, 1999), 11-196, 
197-206. 
412 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 100. Phan Bội Châu: “I absolutely deny connection 
to acts of murder and pillage.”  SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 256. 
413 In subsequent sessions, the prosecutor continued to provide evidence of terrible violence committed by 
some 200 secret society members based in Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai, describing the burning of houses and 
pagodas, forced hair-cutting, and murders, all with the intention of causing fear to encourage donations to the 
revolutionary cause.  SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 102-108, 254 The prosecutor: “The 
Commission has determined it necessary for you to hear these facts and includes them in your interrogatory because 
it is necessary for you to know why the native tribunals sentenced you.”  SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: 
Interrogatoires, 258. 
414 Example: “From all these statements, whatever you may say, it turns out that you were actively engaged 
in creating and organizing the rebel party and that you were directing it with passion. Letters from you have been 
seized, here is one. We read: ‘25th day of the 10th month of the year Ky Dau (November 1909) (Piece 67, File H 
1925): "Dear friend Mr. Dai Dan [aka Đội Quyên] and my dear collaborators.   For more than two months, I left the 
East to arrange a very important affair.   It is with great joy that I have received letters from inside the country 
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signed with a personal stamp of the characters “Sào Nam Châu (巢南珠),” a combination of 
“Phan Bội Châu (潘佩珠)” and his frequent pseudonym “Sào Nam Tử (巢南子).”  Phan Bội 
Châu nevertheless denied the letter was his, claiming that he never had a personal stamp and that 
someone else must have made a personal stamp with his name.415  If Bride was going to force 
Phan Bội Châu to admit to organizing a revolution, he still needed to provide better evidence.   
Trial Phase 3: October 2-October 19 
The Criminal Commission paused again briefly between the sessions on September 26 
and October 2.  If Bride wanted more time, he was due for disappointment.  Security officials 
privy to intelligence and press reports could see that the Criminal Commission was racing 
against a clock. On September 29, The Saigonese journalist Nguyễn Phan Long began to address 
Phan Bội Châu’s captivity in his own editorials published in L’Écho Annamite.416  On October 8, 
Nguyễn Phan Long followed this up by publishing the Jeune Annam petition which Nguyễn Thế 
Truyền had mailed to the offices of periodicals throughout French Indochina, including L’Écho 
Annamite.417  On October 12, correspondence began pouring in from all five Indochinese Sûreté 
offices indicating that Nguyễn Thế Truyền’s letter had arrived at multiple locations.418  The Jeune 
Annam petition had come full circle from Indochina to the metropole and now back again.419   
Nguyễn Thế Truyền himself, meanwhile, had been very busy in Paris organizing a 
meeting of the l’Union Intercoloniale to discuss the situation in Indochina and China.  This 
meeting, which took place on October 9, brought together 200 anti-colonial activists, including 
150 Vietnamese, along with French, Chinese, and North Africans.  Nguyễn Thế Truyền had even 
invited Governor-General elect Varenne, who did not respond.  Phan Bội Châu was named 
honorary president of the Union, which voted to send two telegrams. One went to the Chinese 
Nationalist Party in Canton addressing Phan Bội Châu’s arrest on sovereign Chinese territory and 
calling on the Chinese and Indochinese peoples to unite against imperialism.  The other was to be 
 
informing me that you are all loyal, devoted, and striving together to raise money. It is also a pleasure to learn that 
your courage is growing in vigor. Thanks to the strength of the war hawks, Japan is very powerful and, as I am 
energetic, I asked our "boss" to send you letters of compliments. I beg you to kindly gather more courageous people 
to increase our strength, all counsels must be cautious, courage must be constant, and the heart must always be just 
and persevering. This is for public vengeance. Our country can be equal to Japan. All yours - signed Sao Nam Chau 
(with the personal stamp).”’ SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 89-90.  At the trial, Phan Bội Châu 
claimed not to know Đội Quyên.  Phan Bội Châu mentions Đội Quyên twice in NB, though does not indicate the 
large role this individual apparently played in domestic military affairs.  Phan Bội Châu, Overturned Chariot, 56, 
78. 
415 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 90. 
416 SPCE 354BIS, Extrait, L’Écho Annamite, No. 391, “Du Communisme au Maboulisme,” 29 septembre 
1925. 
417 SPCE 354BIS, L’Écho Annamite, No. 492, “En Faveur de M. Phan-Boi-Chau,” 8 octobre 1925. 
418 The editor of France-Indochine in Hanoi reported receiving a copy on October 12, along with another 
copy addressed to Báo Đông Pháp.  SPCE 355, Hand-written note addressed to Director of Cabinet M.Alberti, on 
France-Indochine letterhead, 12 octobre 1925.  See also SPCE 355, Chef Sûreté Tonkin a Chefs Sûreté Hue, Saigon, 
Phnom-Penh, Vientiane, communication Sûreté Haiphong, No. 6432, 12 octobre 1925. 
419 A secret cable from the Ministry of Colonies dated December 21, 1925 indicates that colonial security 
officials were still trying to figure out the origins of the “Jeune Annam” petition, which purported to come from a 
group of that name based in Hanoi. Monguillot had proposed that the petition was actual produced and sent by the 
League of Oppressed Peoples, based in Canton.   SPCE 355, Le Ministre des Colonies à M. le Gouverneur General 
de l’Indochina Hanoi, “Envoi en Indochine par l’Union Intercoloniale d’une petition en faveur de Pham-Boi-
Chau,” 21 décembre 1925. 
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sent to Phan Bội Châu himself at his current address (Central Prison, Hanoi), declaring: “A large 
number of your compatriots, together with their brothers from China, France, and different 
colonies, having suffered the crimes of colonialism, send you the expression of their sympathy 
and promise to do their utmost to tear you away from torture and death. Sino-Indochinese 
Meeting, Paris.”420 The spectre of international and especially Chinese interest in Phan Bội 
Châu’s detention cast a pall over the trial’s proceedings.  Bride had to get moving, and fast. 
Bride unfortunately was of precisely the wrong temperament and would not be rushed.  
Bride was determined to prosecute the trial the right way: by forcing Phan Bội Châu to confess.  
To do this, Bride knew he needed to prove Phan Bội Châu had written letters to known violent 
offenders, making him ultimately responsible for their actions.  Thus Bride continued to send out 
document requests, though the nature of these changed: now he wanted original copies of Phan 
Bội Châu’s works, both handwritten and in print.  On September 26, Bride reminded Robin and 
Monguillot of his request for three letters   While Bride had received two, the third, written by 
Phan Bội Châu for Néron on August 4 while in detention, was missing.421  Bride had originally 
conveyed this letter to Néron, but he now wanted it back so the handwriting could be compared 
with other letters purportedly written by Phan Bội Châu.  Here again, the security services fought 
against Bride’s request in an undated Sûreté note that claimed the letter was of a personal nature 
and now constituted a restricted police document.422   
Demonstrating the level of official anxiety over the trial’s management, on October 2 
Interim Governor General Monguillot himself intervened to quash the rivalry between the 
judiciary, represented by Bride, and the security services, represented by Robin, Jeanbrau, Gilles, 
and Néron.423  Bride could have the letter, but he was not to include any of its contents in the trial 
transcript, and he was required to return it to the archives of the Sûreté immediately after he was 
finished with it.  The subtext of Monguillot’s letter to Bride was clear: concentrate on the charges 
related to 1913 attacks and prosecute the case!  Though Bride agreed to return the letter, he 
pointedly emphasized the importance of the letters for confirming Phan Bội Châu’s 
handwriting.424   Not even Monguillot would be able to rush Bride, who was far from finished 
with his requests.   
The same day (October 5), Bride sent Monguillot an bigger demand: he needed another 
interpreter.  The interrogation of Phan Bội Châu, Bride explained, “has been rendered 
particularly because of the continual denials which oblige the Commission to read and translate 
numerous depositions, documents, and exhibits written in [Chinese] characters.”425 The court’s 
 
420 SPCE 354BIS, Bordereau No. 177-SG du 21 janvier 1926 du S.C.R. & S.G. Hanoi, Note sur la 
propagande revolutionnaire Interessant les pays d’outre-mer, “Les milieux coloniaux communistes de Paris.  
L’Union Intercoloniale et le Paria.” 
421 SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affaires politiques et administratives, Président de la Commission 
Criminelle à M. le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine, No. 121, A.s.de 3 lettres de P.B.C. communiquées 
confidentiellement & à titre personnel à M. le Gouverneur Général & à M. le Secrétaire Général, 26 septembre 
1925. 
422 SPCE 355, Service Central de Renseignements et de Sûreté Générale, Note, “Le Président de la 
Commission Criminelle…,” undated. 
423 SPCE 355, Le GGI de l’IC, Commandeur de la Légion d’Honneur, à M. le Président de la Commission 
Criminelle, No. 2573-SG, 2 octobre 1925. 
424 SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affaires politiques et administratives, Président de la Commission 
Criminelle à M. le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine, No. 124, 5 octobre 1925. 
425 SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affaires politiques et administratives, Président de la Commission 
Criminelle à M. le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine (Sous le couvert de M. le Résident Superieur au Tonkin), No. 
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interpreter Gombaud Saintonge simply could not keep up with the workload, so Bride asked for 
an Vietnamese interpreter.  He already knew who he wanted as well: District Magistrate Bùi 
Bằng Đoàn, known for his probity and discretion.426  Willing at this point to do anything that 
would move the trial forward, Monguillot agreed and appointed Bùi Bằng Đoàn as the court’s 
second interpreter on October 9.427   
The request to hire Bùi Bằng Đoàn demonstrated the lengths Bride was willing to go to in 
his pursuit of justice.  It was also a strong indicator of the clerical problems facing the Criminal 
Commission as it struggled to prosecute a case dependent on evidence in at least three different 
languages.  In addition to another interpreter, Bride needed additional institutional support.  On 
October 7, Bride requested original copies of Việt Nam vong quốc sử (History of the Loss of 
Vietnam) and Hải ngoại huyết thư (A Letter from Overseas Written in Blood), as well as certified 
copies of translations by Mr. Maybon of the l’Ecole Française d’Extrême-Orient (EFEO).  To 
ensure there was no confusion, Bride cited long portions of each work in his eight-page 
request.428  This request too, was granted.   
As the trial entered October 1925, Bride’s strategy of relentlessly throwing documents 
and testimonies in Phan Bội Châu’s face began to produce at least one result: Phan Bội Châu 
now talked less than before.  The prosecutor, meanwhile, began to cite longer and longer 
documents, often reading aloud several pages at a time.  Phan Bội Châu continued to deny the 
prosecutor’s accusations, but his denials now grew more bitter and, increasingly, more legally 
adroit.  For example, at the end of a very long day on October 2, Phan Bội Châu stated: 
You accuse me of lacking courage because I blame Cường Để.  I accept this reproach, but 
wouldn’t I be more courageous in lying to the Commission?   I will tell you things as I 
know them. If, after my arrest, the Government had used its authority to execute me 
according to the judgment delivered by the Criminal Commission of 1913, I would have 
suffered my sentence without protesting.  Since you give me the means to defend myself, 
I will use them.429 
Having recognized that Bride needed to conduct the trial according to rules of evidence 
and testimony, Phan Bội Châu began to adapt his arguments into something approximating a 
legal defense.  This complicated Bride’s approach considerably.  Just as the prosecutor was now 
getting to the most damning evidence, Phan Bội Châu was refining his defense and becoming 
much more careful with his answers. Since Phan Bội Châu refused to simply admit to inciting 
revolution or violence, Bride had little choice but to prove his case to the Criminal Commission 
itself by citing his way through the archive he had amassed.     
The prosecutor began the month with an incredibly long interrogation session on October 
 
125, 5 octobre 1925. 
426 According to his son, Bùi Tín, Bùi Bằng Đoàn had previously served as a judge in Ninh Bình and as 
governor of Cao Bằng and Bắc Ninh.  In 1933, he became Minister of Justice for Emperor Bảo Đại and helped draft 
the Criminal and Civil codes of law for Annam.  Bùi Tín, Following Ho Chi Minh: Memoirs of a North Vietnamese 
Colonel (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1995), 7. 
427 SPCE 355, Le Gouverneur General P.I. de L’Indochine, Commandeur de la Légion d’Honneur 
(Monguillot), Arrete, No. 3797, 9 octobre 1925. 
428 SPCE 355, L’Inspecteur des Affaires politiques et administratives, Président de la Commission 
Criminelle à M. le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine (Service Central des Renseignements et de la Sûreté 
Générale au Gouvernement Général), Object: demandes communication des brochures de P.B.C., 7 octobre 1925. 
429 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 120. 
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2.430  Wrapping up the events of 1908 inside Indochina, the prosecutor addressed the violence 
associated with tax revolts in Annam, the 1908 Hanoi Poison plot, and a variety of other 
conspiracies.431  On October 3, the prosecutor moved on to address the activities of the Việt Nam 
Quang Phục Hội (Vietnam Restoration Society) and several supposedly affiliated organizations 
in 1912-1913.432  After this, the prosecutor doubled back to address how and why Phan Bội Châu 
had been deported from Japan in 1909.433   
After October 5, however, the prosecutor shifted his focus to Phan Bội Châu’s works 
written and published during the period he was in Japan (1905-1909.434  These included Khuyến 
quốc dân tư trợ du học văn (An Appeal to My Fellow Countrymen to Provide Financial Support 
for Overseas Studies),435 Hải ngọai huyết thư (A Letter from Overseas Written in Blood),436 Việt 
Nam vong quốc sử (History of the Loss of Vietnam),437 Tân Việt Nam (The New Vietnam),438 Kỷ 
niệm lực (A Record of Memories),439 Việt Nam quốc sử khảo (A Study of Vietnamese History),440 
Sùng bái giai nhân (A Tribute to Shining Lives)441, Ai cáo Nam Kỳ phụ lão văn (A Sorrowful 
Appeal to the Elders of Cochinchina),442 Trần Đông Phong truyện (The Life of Trần Đông 
 
430 The majority of sessions produced between five and eight pages of transcript.  The session on October 2 
produced twenty-three pages.  SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 100-122. 
431 These included secret support provided by seditious mandarins, propaganda encouraging domestic 
workers to kill their (French) employers, and a a planned massacre of all Europeans in Hanoi.  According to the 
prosecutor, the organizations involved were the Đông Kinh Nghĩa Thục, the Đông Tân Hưng, the Đông Lợi Tế, and 
the Đông Thành Xương.  SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 114-115. 
432 These included the Tam Thánh (Three Saints [Society]) and the Thiên Địa Hội (Heaven and Earth 
Society).  SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 123-127. 
433 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 132-138. 
434 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 138-243. 
435 In NB, Phan Bội Châu indicates that he gave several thousand copies of this letter to Tăng Bạt Hổ for 
distribution inside Indochina.  Phan Bội Châu, Overturned Chariot, 96.  A French translation entitled Conseil aux 
jeunes gens d’aller s’instruire à l’étranger is included in the Interrogatoires.  SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: 
Interrogatoires, 134-138.  For the Vietnamese version, see Phan Bội Châu “Khuyến quốc dân tư trợ du học văn,” 
Phan Bội Châu ⁠ Toàn Tập,Vol 2 (Hue: Nhà xuất bản Thuận hóa, 1999), 253-258. 
436 In French Lettre d’outre mer écrite avec du sang.  SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 
145-151, 194, 199-206 (partial French translation).  For the Vietnamese version, see Phan Bội Châu “Hải ngọai 
huyết thư,” Phan Bội Châu⁠ Toàn Tập,Vol 2 (Hue: Nhà xuất bản Thuận hóa, 1999), 95-168. 
437 Already introduced in this chapter.  In French Asservisement de l’Annam.  SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội 
Châu: Interrogatoires, 153-154, 158-163 (French translation of Liang Qichao’s preface).  For the Vietnamese 
version, see Phan Bội Châu “Việt Nam vong quốc sử,” Phan Bội Châu⁠ Toàn Tập,Vol 2 (Hue: Nhà xuất bản Thuận 
hóa, 1999), 11-92.. 
438 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 167-170, 171-180 (French translation). For the 
Vietnamese version, see Phan Bội Châu “Tân Việt Nam,” Phan Bội Châu⁠ Toàn Tập,Vol 2 (Hue: Nhà xuất bản 
Thuận hóa, 1999), 171-195. 
439 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 183, 186, 188. 
440 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 183, 212-221 (French translation). 
441 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 186, 188, 195-199, 206-212 (partial French 
translation).  For the Vietnamese version, see Phan Bội Châu “Sùng bái giai nhân,” Phan Bội Châu⁠ Toàn Tập,Vol 2 
(Hue: Nhà xuất bản Thuận hóa, 1999), 199-237. 
442 In French Aux habitants de la Cochinchine. SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 222-
223 (French translation). In NB, Phan Bội Châu indicates that he wrote this work at the request of Cường Để.  Phan 
Bội Châu, Overturned Chariot, 126. 
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Phong),443 and Hà thành liệt sĩ truyện (The History of the Martyrs of Hanoi).444  The prosecutor 
included another work that appears not to be written by Phan Bội Châu entitled Sào Nam Tử 
khuyến chư tăng thư (Letter from Sao Nam Tu to the bonzes).445  For several of these works, the 
prosecutor included in the transcript partial or complete French translations.   
For the next week’s worth of sessions (including October 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, and part of 
October 13), the prosecutor and Phan Bội Châu repeatedly clashed over the question of 
authorship.446  This debate had started on October 2 when the prosecutor sought to explain Phan 
Bội Châu’s responsibility for the events of 1908. Lacking sufficient hard evidence to prove that 
Phan Bội Châu had indeed ordered many of the violent acts described in cited testimonies, the 
prosecutor argued instead that the rebels and bandits had been inspired by Phan Bội Châu’s 
propaganda.  Phan Bội Châu vehemently rejected the suggestion, drawing a line between his 
supposedly lofty discourse and the crude propaganda attributed to him.447  Phan Bội Châu’s 
comments foreshadowed the most refined and most unbelievable iteration of his strategy of 
denial.  The stakes were clear: if Phan Bội Châu could successfully deny authorship of the 
propaganda the former rebels claimed to be inspired by, then he could claim innocence of the 
acts the French were charging him with.  As the prosecutor began to introduce Phan Bội Châu’s 
writings one after the other, the old patriot manufactured an incredible defense strategy: he 
simply was not the author.   
Phan Bội Châu continued to develop his “scapegoat” theory in subsequent sessions into a 
remarkably flexible defense mechanism.  For works he had already admitted authorship of Phan 
Bội Châu would claim that portions had been added or replaced by other people.  On October 3, 
Phan Bội Châu claimed that three-tenths of the version of Khuyến quốc dân tư trợ du học văn 
brought before him by the prosecutor had been "added by other people."448  He added, "I remind 
the Criminal Commision that I gave my letter to Tăng Bạt Hổ in the tenth month, whereas this 
piece is dated the eleventh month."449   Obviously, following Phan Bội Châu's logic, someone 
had taken his version, added several sections (which conveniently contained the language the 
Criminal Commission found offensive), and published that copy one month later.   
The same logic applied to Việt Nam vong quốc sử.  According to Phan Bội Châu, "the 
Chinese printers" had added sections on "public education, public works, the native army" and 
the phrase "the French are dogs."450  The printers in Japan had also been responsible for printing 
a second edition of Khuyến quốc dân tư trợ du học văn at the end of 1908.  Phan Bội Châu, 
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however, had "left the country in November 1908" and thus never saw the edition.451  Another 
anonymous malfeasant was "the amplifier," who Phan Bội Châu held responsible for adding 
disagreeable or inconvenient phrases or sections to his work.452 Some common themes added by 
"Chinese printers" and "the amplifier" were: the French desire to annihilate the Vietnamese, the 
concept of racial extinction, Catholicism, and Nguyễn collaborators.453   
When the prosecutor moved on to address Hải ngọai huyết thư, Phan Bội Châu came up 
with a procedural version of this same explanation.  While he was working at Liang Qichao's 
journal, Phan Bội Châu claimed, he would place his works on a manuscript table alongside the 
newspapers.454  In 1906, he claimed, he had placed Khuyến quốc dân tư trợ du học văn, Hải 
ngọai huyết thư, and Việt Nam vong quốc sử on this manuscript table.  Since these works were all 
lying out in public, Phan Bội Châu suggested, anybody could copy them and do whatever they 
wished with them, including adding material and printing them.   
At times, the patience of the prosecutor was incredible. 
Prosecutor: "Who could have printed the copies you put out [on the table]?" 
Phan Bội Châu: "A student or someone working for Cường Để." 
Prosecutor: "How did copies end up in Annam at the beginning of 1906?" 
Phan Bội Châu: "I don't know." 
Prosecutor: "By depositing a writing of this importance on the manuscript table of the  
 journal, did you not take responsibility for the work even if it was printed with   
 modifications? 
Phan Bội Châu: "What I write is not my responsibility, provided that it is not 
subversive."455 
The logic of Phan Bội Châu's comment was, strictly speaking, unassailable.  Phan Bội 
Châu was sketching an image of himself as a writer who cared absolutely nothing for what 
people did with, or because of, his own writings.   
Another option, of course, was to deny the entirety of a work.456  After the prosecutor 
entered ten pages of Tân Việt Nam into the trial record, Phan Bội Châu simply responded, "There 
is nothing of mine in there."457   The same was true for Sùng bái giai nhân.  All Phan Bội Châu 
had to say of the work was, "I've never written a work with that title and I've never heard of it 
either."458      Why did both Sùng bái giai nhân and Kỷ niệm lực (which he also denied authorship 
of) bear Phan Bội Châu's name?  Phan Bội Châu has his old standby ready: "It's clearly all 
Cường Để's doing." In fact, he was ready to push it farther, "The fact that my name was on them 
imputes the blame to Cường Để."459  With this, Phan Bội Châu took the logic of his scapegoat 
theory into the realm of conspiracy theory: any appearance of Phan Bội Châu's name simply 
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confirmed that Cường Để, not Phan Bội Châu, was responsible.460   
With the prosecutor seemingly willing to follow Phan Bội Châu down any logical path he 
wished to tread, the two sides often drifted into pettifoggery.  Phan Bội Châu and the prosecutor 
had a semantic argument parsing the differences between "a writing (un écrit)," "a work (un 
ouvrage)," and "a book (une livre)."461  After this, they had a debate about printing errors.462   
Then it was on to the subtle differences in national copyright laws.463  Phan Bội Châu even 
devised a way to explain handwritten copies of works that were later printed.  Challenged by the 
prosecutor with a handwritten copy of Khuyến quốc dân tư trợ du học văn that included all of the 
sections Phan Bội Châu claimed other people had added, Phan Bội Châu explained that Tăng Bạt 
Hổ had not printed enough copies, so he handcopied more.464 
The debate over handwriting samples took Phan Bội Châu's battle with the Criminal 
Commission to hilarious new levels.465  After presenting Phan Bội Châu with three letters, all 
signed "Phan Bội Châu," the prosecutor asked if Phan Bội Châu had written them.  This went 
about as well as could be expected. 
Phan Bội Châu: "I did not write that. Someone was imitating my handwriting."   
Prosecutor: "Who would know your handwriting well enough to imitate you?" 
Phan Bội Châu: "I taught my writing style to many students."466   
 The prosecutor, hoping to make some headway, brought in a "scholar with the rank of cử 
nhân" to serve as a handwriting analysis expert.467  The expert confirmed that lettres No. 155, 
157, and 158 were written using the same brush by the same individual, which the Criminal 
Commission deemed to be Phan Bội Châu.  Phan Bội Châu promptly challenging the credibility 
of the handwriting expert.  
Phan Bội Châu: "The opinion of this cử nhân is not as good as mine. I tell you that is was 
 not me who wrote those letters.  It was not me." 
Prosecutor: "On what basis can you affirm that the handwriting in these three letters is an 
 imitation of your own?" 
Phan Bội Châu: "I examined each character singularly.  The characters are different than 
 mine, but all together they resemble my handwriting."468 
 
460 The prosecutor: "Why would Cường Để undertake such a giant conspiracy?"   
Phan Bội Châu: "That's easy to explain.  The Vietnamese students were obligated to Cường Để for their studies."⁠ 
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A major component of Phan Bội Châu's scapegoat theory concerned the supposed misuse 
of his reputation.  After all, Phan Bội Châu needed to explain why a veritable army of 
anonymous copyists would want to use his name.  Phan tried several novel explanations.  First, 
like the “old legendary Vietnamese humorist called ‘Trạng Quỳnh,’” whose name posthumously 
served to designate all humorists in the country, Phan Bội Châu declared that “Phan Bội Châu” 
had become the name used by all overseas Vietnamese individuals publishing works abroad.469  
Later, Phan Bội Châu argued that Liang Qichao had been responsible for making him 
"universally famous."470   
Phan Bội Châu identifed Liang Qichao's preface to Việt Nam vong quốc sủ as a 
particularly egregious source of unwanted reputational inflation.471  Liang Qichao had written it 
for Chinese, especially for the reigning Manchus, Phan Bội Châu argued, "he was using a 
Vietnamese voice to attract the attention of his readers."472  The dastardly Liang Qichao had 
added many details that never took place. Phan Bội Châu had never compared Emperor Thành 
Thái to a marionette.  Phan Bội Châu had never claimed one-tenth of the population were 
"running dogs."  Phan Bội Châu had never told Liang Qichao about an internal passport system.  
All of these were, of course, Liang Qichao's additions.  Finally (just in case), Phan Bội Châu 
stated, "Tăng Bạt Hổ spoke Cantonese, so I don't know what was actually said to Liang 
Qichao."473 
Who was responsible for editing and printing Phan Bội Châu's works, thus continuing to 
inflate his reputation as a racist revolutionary?  In addition to Liang Qichao, Phan Bội Châu 
came up with a hit list of possible suspects.  Cường Để stood at the top of the list, of course.  
However, Bùi Chí Nhuận, Đặng Bỉnh Thành, Phan Bá Ngọc, Lê Cầu Tinh, Đinh Doãn Tế, and 
even Trần Hữu Công were on the suspect list too.474  Later, Phan Bội Châu added Nguyễn 
Thượng Hiền to the list as well.475 If none of these worked, Phan Bội Châu was happy to blame 
"Chinese students," who seemed to be lurking every eager to grab, pervert, and print anything he 
wrote.476   
Flabbergasted after six sessions spent on publications, the prosecutor assessed Phan Bội 
Châu's defense strategy:  
Your system is always the same: you create a scheme where you expose only general 
ideas of a philosophical scope; you put it on a newspaper table; it is copied and the 
person attaches to your part something different for each of your works; they denature 
your manuscript, amplify it, and have it printed without your knowledge by signing it 
annoyingly with your name or one of your pseudonyms? 
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Phan Bội Châu: "That is exactly right! The parts which I indicate as not being mine, I do 
not choose them; I just notice that they are not mine.477 
In the battle over his writings, Phan Bội Châu had effectively fought the prosecutor to a 
draw.  However, because the prosecutor had been unable to land a solid hit on Phan Bội Châu, 
despite having expended over a week of the court's time, it was a win for Phan Bội Châu.  On 
October 13, the prosecutor finally finished his review of Phan Bội Châu’s works.  He managed to 
make one significant point before finishing up this portion of the trial, however.  It was this: 
Phan Bội Châu's greatest strength was his masterful ability to adapt his writing to different 
audiences.478  Despite Phan Bội Châu's unwillingness to admit to having written the works 
covered by the Criminal Commission, the works themselves had received their day in court.   
Bride Strikes Back: A Return to Testimonials 
Beginning on October 13, the prosecutor shifted from Phan Bội Châu's writings back to 
an examination of their concrete effects.479 The prosecutor returned to his previous practice of 
citing individual testimonies. This was a more successful strategy insofar as the prosecutor no 
longer needed to weight his word against Phan Bội Châu's.  Many of the the testimonies 
introduced offer fascinating glimpses into how the Modernization Association and later the 
Restoration Society actually worked.480   Using document after document, the prosecutor linked 
Phan Bội Châu to a variety of events and individuals.481  These included Phan Châu Trinh, Để 
Thám,482 Trần Quý Cáp, Cường Để, Đội Quyên,483 Lương Tam Kỳ, Jules Tiet, and Trần Hữu 
Công. More than before, the tone often grew dark.  The prosecutor delivered testimonies 
pertaining to violent attacks on villages and assassinations of informers and even loyal society 
members who fell under suspicion.   
Then, on October 16, Bride played a winning card: Inspector François's report written 
after François had travelled with Phan Bội Châu from Hong Kong to Haiphong.  This testimony 
Phan Bội Châu was not ready for.  Inspector François report not only contradicted many of Phan 
Bội Châu's denials, it made Phan Bội Châu sound delerious, if not unhinged.  Phan Bội Châu 
tried to explain: "I never thought I would stand before a commission.  I thought I would be 
executed.  I was not cheerful."484   The prosecutor pressed: "In this state of depression, could you 
not but tell the truth?"485   For the first time in the trial, it seemed as though Phan Bội Châu was 
genuinely unsure of how to proceed.   
The prosecutor offered his estimation of Phan Bội Châu's though process: "You declared 
declared to the president of the Criminal Commission that you at first intended not to answer 
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questions, but having realized you could escape the death penalty, you prepared your defense."  
Phan Bội Châu agreed with this statement, but he was still looking for a way out.  All of the 
testimonies he had previously denied had taken place elsewhere.  The only real difference with 
this one was that Francois had shown Phan Bội Châu kindness in a moment of true despair.  To 
find Francois was indeed every bit the Sûreté officer any of his French colleagues were, must 
have been a bitter blow for Phan Bội Châu.  Francois had abused the trust Phan Bội Châu had 
granted him in his weakest moment.   Phan Bội Châu became quite sullen, stating simply, 
"Francois is a man skilled at disguising the truth."486  Then: "He satisfied all my desires.  That is 
why I talked to him."  Phan Bội Châu went on to claim that Francois had asked him questions, 
but Phan Bội Châu was so tired and hungry at the time that he offered only onamatopeic and 
monosyllabic responses.  Francois, Phan Bội Châu claimed, had reconstructed these into the 
claims contained in his report.  Here, then, was the answer: Francois, not Phan Bội Châu, was the 
truly dishonest one! 
On October 17, the prosecutor called his first and only witness: Mr. François (aka Trần 
Tứ Quí), inspector of the Sûreté.  Inspector François delivered aloud the contents of his report, 
then answered the prosecutor's questions.  Did Francois speak Vietnamese well?  "Very well."  
Did Phan Bội Châu offer his statements spontaneously?  "Yes."  Had Francois been assigned a 
mission to interrogate Phan Bội Châu?  "No."  Was Phan Bội Châu being truthful?  Francois was 
unequivocal: "In my job I often deal with prisoners.  I am persuaded that he spoke the truth based 
on his attitude and tone."487  The prosecutor could not have asked for a more perfect witness. 
Given the opportunity to cross-examine the witness, Phan Bội Châu threw together what 
defense he could: "I never asked Mr. Francois for wine!  He interrogated me while I only spoke 
in monosyllables!"488  Perhaps realizing that denying the testimony of an individual in person 
was quite different than denying the testimony written on paper, Phan Bội Châu backed off a bit.  
Phan Bội Châu thanked Francois for showing him kindness, for removing his fetters, and for 
helping him to eat.  Perhaps Phan Bội Châu could muddle through Francois's testimony with a 
few tactful words.   
The prosecutor quickly ended any such notions: "It is sad for you that the facts reported 
by Inspector Francois are confirmed by many witnesses."489   Recognizing tact was getting him 
nowhere, Phan Bội Châu reverted to his scapegoat strategy: "[Francois's] declaration's are the 
result of his having knowledge of these declarations prior to testifying!"  The prosecutor was 
incredulous: "Inspector Francois flipped through all of the files in the prosecutor's office in 
Saigon and Hanoi, and those of the military tribunals, and the archives of the residences superior 
of Annam and Tonkin and of the Court of Hue all before coming to testify at your 
interrogatory??"490  Phan Bội Châu mustered a few more perfunctory challenges, but Inspector 
Francois's testimony had taken the wind out of the old patriot's sails.   
In the following days, Phan Bội Châu's denials grew shorter and less emphatic.  The 
prosecutor, meanwhile, was emboldened.  Phan Bội Châu was now faced with questions such as 
the following:  
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We find a correspondence from the French ambassador to Tokyo n. 20 of November 7, 
1909 (Exhibit 227 file I-1925), in another of June 7, 1909 (Exhibit 189 in file A-1925), in 
another of July 12, 1909, from the governor general to the minister of colonies (Exhibit 
203 file I-1925), in a letter of November 7, 1909 from the ambassador in Tokyo to the 
Governor General (Exhibit 56 file H-1925), in letter n. 7 of the resident superior of 
Annam of January 28, 1910 (Exhibit 90 file C-1925), in letter n. 25, the ambassador from 
France to Tokio to the governor general of November 26, 1909.  Does this information 
does prevent us from having faith in your statement?491 
Phan Bội Châu's response was decidedly muted, compared with the previous month of 
interrogations.  Bride's archive was finally paying dividends.   
At 8:00 AM on the morning of October 19, in following a "very urgent" notice from 
President Bride, Victor Néron presented testimony to the Criminal Commission.492  Unlike that 
of Inspector Francois, Néron's testimony is not included in the Interrogatoires.  However, an 
accompanying handwritten note to Jeanbrau from Néron dated the same day indicates that Bride 
requested the exterior testimony of Phan Châu Trinh.  However, before establishing a Rogatory 
Commission for that purpose, Bride wanted first to be sure the governor general (Monguillot) 
could look into the "the political drawbacks of this procedure."493  Bride asked Néron to orally 
convey this request.   
This note indicates that Bride recognized the limits to his requisitional authority, but 
sought to expand those limits regardless.  Phan Châu Trinh, who had himself returned to 
Indochina in June 1925, was staying at a guesthouse on Pellerin street in Saigon.494  Bringing 
Phan Châu Trinh before a Rogatory Commission would indeed have posed serious political 
problems for Monguillot and Phan Châu Trinh was busy advocating for Phan Bội Châu's release, 
despite suffering from worsening tuberculosis.  Phan Châu Trinh died March 24, 1926, unable to 
reconnect with his old friend and debating partner before the end as he had hoped to do.495 
Beginning that same day (October 19), the prosecutor also began to cite a new set of 
testimonies from an individual whose statements would henceforth make common appearances 
during interrogation sessions: Trần Văn Tuân (aka Hồng Lục, aka Tu Dich).  Trần Văn Tuân had 
testified before the head of the Sûreté in 1918.  The sheer amount of precise information 
provided by this individual strongly suggests he was an informer.  Trần Văn Tuân seemed to 
know information about nearly every aspect of the Restoration society's activities in China, 
Siam, and Indochina.  Even worse, he knew where Phan Bội Châu had been and when.  To Trần 
Văn Tuân's testimony, the prosecutor added that of Néron, to whom Phan Bội Châu had sent a 
letter on August 4.  The cornerstone to the prosecutor's case, however, was letters, hundreds of 
letters to and from Phan Bội Châu.  It seemed there would be no escaping the trial by archive.   
Admission and Acceptance (October 20) 
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By October 20, Phan Bội Châu’s ability to continue denying his involvement, his 
knowledge, and his own handwriting was waning.  The old patriot nevertheless made a final 
attempt to deny it all.  Admittedly, this was clever, if not entirely surprising: Phan Bội Châu had 
a double. Desperate to find a logical explanation for the Criminal Commission's endless parade 
of testimonies and signed letters, Phan Bội Châu claimed that there had been another Phan Bội 
Châu, who went by the name Phan Thị Hán (Phan Bội Châu's pen name).   
The prosecutor had good reason for focusing on the name Phan Thị Hán in particular.  In 
a letter from Cường Để to Ta Anh Ba [Xie Yingbo 謝英伯], written January 22, 1913, stated that 
he [Cường Để] was leaving for Europe aboard a ship that very day.  Furthermore, Cường Để 
wrote, "In my absence, Mr. Phan Thị Hán will be in charge."496   Xie Yingbo was one of several 
Chinese individuals Phan Bội Châu and Cường Để had been working with to obtain funds and 
weapons for the Việt Nam Quang Phục hội (Vietnam Restoration Society).497   It was all well and 
good for Phan Bội Châu to claim that Cường Để had abused his name for the sake of publishing 
incendiary texts.  But it made no sense for Cường Để to put Phan Thị Hán in charge of anything 
important, unless there actually was a Phan Thị Hán.  Therefore logic required Phan Bội Châu 
either give up, or invent another Phan Thị Hán.   
Who was the other Phan Thị Hán?  One of Cường Để's secretaries, obviously.498  Phan 
Bội Châu claimed that when meeting with Chinese or Japanese who did not know what he [Phan 
Bội Châu] looked like, Cường Để would one of his secretaries pretend to be Phan Bội Châu.499  
Phan Bội Châu tried to explain:  
Cường-Để must have had the following conversation with Ta-Anh-Ba [aka Xie Yingbo]: 
'During a trip I made in Indochina, I heard that a certain Phan-Boi-Chau had left his 
country. Who was this man, do you know him, can you inform me about his character and 
his ideas?' Cường-Để pointed to his the secretary Phan-Thị-Hán, who had accompanied 
him, and said, 'Here he is! his name is Phan Bội Châu!'500 
For a trial already full of tall tales, obfuscations, and denials, this explanation took first 
prize.  Nevertheless, the prosecutor spent an incredible six pages worth of testimony addressing 
Phan Bội Châu's "double," while winking occasionally at how utterly preposterous the 
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proposition was.501  
Finally, the prosecutor stopped considering the matter of the "double" and barrelled 
forward, introducing a letter written to Mr. Chuong-Chu [Nguyễn Thành Hiến] on April 7, 
1912.502  The author indicated he had travelled to Nanjing in February 1912 to discuss plans with 
"the Chinese revolutionary chiefs" who offered "a good opportunity" for the Vietnamese 
revolutionary movement.  The author stated that weapons were ready at hand, though funds 
remained lacking.  A postscript warned Chuong-Chu to show the letter only to trusted 
individuals.  The letter was signed by by "Phan Bội Châu."503   
The prosecutor noted the similarities between this letter and a previously introduced letter 
(letter no. 5, dossier E, also sent to "Chuong-Chu," aka Nguyễn Thành Hiến) signed "Châu." He 
asked Phan Bội Châu to account for this, which he did in his customary fashion, "Châu could 
have been anyone named 'Châu.'  This letter, signed 'Bội Châu,' I can now confirm is false."   
Phan Bội Châu agreed that both letters, along with a third, had all been written by the same 
person. However, Phan Bội Châu denied that person had been him.  Clearly, the "double" had 
been busy.   
The prosecutor, however, had more letters.  He introduced a copy of a July 21, 1912 letter 
from "Mê Diên" mentioning the transfer of monies, various commercial matters, communication 
difficulties, and the location of various agents.504 Was "Mê Diên" a pseudonym for Phan Bội 
Châu?  Phan Bội Châu confidently replied that he couldn't be sure, because he did not recognize 
the copy; he would need the original.  The prosecutor had anticipated this: "here is the original."  
Now Phan Bội Châu denied the letter entirely.  The prosecutor introduced two more letters sent 
to Mr. Hoàng Triêu Ha, signed by "Mê Diên."  Then another sent to Mr. Chuc Dinh, also signed 
by "Mê Diên."  The prosecutor asked again, was "Mê Diên" a pseudonym for Phan Bội Châu?  
Phan Bội Châu replied that he had never signed a letter "Mê Diên," but confirmed that the name 
was indeed one given to him by his students.  It meant "the rice paddy which allows the rice to 
grow [米田]."505 
The prosecutor continued, presenting letters No. 1, 5, 16, and 32 from dossier E, and Nos. 
155bis, 156bis, 157bis, and 158bis from dossier C.  All eight had been written by the same 
person.  Finally, he added No. 37 from dossier E.  Bride's puzzle pieces were falling into place. 
Prosecutor: "Is it not the same individual who, in these nine letters, has signed "Châu," 
"Sào Tu," "Phan Bội Châu," "Sào Nam," "Bội Châu," and "Mê Diên?" 
Phan Bội Châu: "Yes, I recognize this." 
Prosecutor: "Let us continue to play the comedy.  Do you recognize that it is you who 
wrote all of these letters?" 
Phan Bội Châu: "It is my name that is written on these letters. It was not me who wrote 
these letters, but I recognize that the letters have been signed using my names." 
[After a long reflection] 
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Phan Bội Châu: "Since you tell me that all these letters are signed with my name, I accept 
them as being from me." 
[After a pause, the accused thinks] 
Phan Bội Châu: "You tell me the letters are signed by me.  Truly, it was not me who 
wrote them, moreover I do not know the names of the commercial houses to which they were 
sent, but since you are certain they are mine, I recognize them as mine." 
[The accused thinks once again] 
Phan Bội Châu: "I accept all the names as mine." 
............... 
[After the accused reflects for a long time and examines all of the letters] 
Phan Bội Châu: "Yes, it was indeed me you wrote these letters...[thinks]...I recognize all 
of the names on the letters." 
............... 
[After the accused reflects for a long time over the various letters presented] 
Phan Bội Châu: "BECAUSE YOU ARE CONVINCED THAT THESE LETTERS ARE 
MINE, I RECOGNIZE THEM AS MINE.  IF I AM HESITANT TO RECOGNIZE HAVING 
WRITTEN THEM, IT IS BECAUSE THEY ARE VERY COMPROMISING."506 
The prosecutor then presented a long series of additional letters, asking if Phan Bội Châu 
recognized each one.  He replied no to all of them, save one. 
Finally, the prosecutor asked, "Will you declare to us that it was indeed you who wrote all 
of these letters?" 
[The accused reflects for a long time, before examining one by one the members of the 
Criminal Commission.  He then also examines the various letters presented to him.  The accused 
hesitates, begins phrases that he does not complete, then hangs his head and says] 
Phan Bội Châu: "Yes, I admit having written the first letter.  If I now admit having written 
the others, then I cannot admit to having written even that one, because the other letters are all 
very compromising.  I recognize having written the letters while I was overseas to people abroad.  
I never wrote to people in Indochina." 
Prosecutor: "We give the accused the deposition dated this day, by the testimony of Bùi 
Bằng Đoàn." 
Phan Bội Châu: "You are certain that all of the letters were written by me.  I have nothing 
more to say on the subject and I remit myself to your kindness for the rest."507 
Thereupon, the day's session ended with Phan Bội Châu dramatically abandoning the line 
of defense he had clung to with astonishing resilience for over a month.  The trial transcript had 
captured in minute detail each moment of Phan Bội Châu's acceptance of responsibility for his 
own writing and, thereby, for his own actions.  Phan Bội Châu's confession came in the face of 
the overwhelming documentary evidence presented by the prosecutor.  These documents had 
been painstakingly assembled, certified, organized, translated, interpreted, and made available as 
evidence by President Bride.  The trial by archive had been successful. 
Trial Phase 4: (October 23-November 9) 
Despite the fact that Phan Bội Châu had admitted to writing the letters presented to him 
by the Criminal Commission, the interrogatory portion of the trial continued for an additional 
 
506 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 324-325.  The interpellated notes and capitalization 
has been retained as they appear in the original. 
507 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu: Interrogatoires, 326. 
118 
two and a half weeks.  After all, Phan Bội Châu had only admitted to writing letters.  He had not 
admitted to planning or aiding the 1913 attacks, for which he was being prosecuted.  This meant 
the Criminal Commission still had plenty of work ahead of it.  It also meant Phan Bội Châu had 
time and opportunity to reconsider his entire approach to the trial.  As the final phase of the trial 
got underway, Phan Bội Châu did exactly that, fashioning new lines of defense that exchanged 
outright denials for a more subtle distinction between patriotic rhetoric, which he now proudly 
admitted having written, and acts of violence, which he continued to deny having been involved 
in. 
Outside the courtroom, security officials began to realize the scope of Nguyễn Thế 
Truyền's mailing campaign.  On October 19, Acting Governor General Monguillot wrote to the 
Ministry of Colonies to address the Union Intercoloniale packets, including the Jeune Annam 
petition, which he traced back to Nguyễn Ái Quốc and the revolutionaries based in Canton.  The 
security services had seized a great many envelopes by interdicting the mail, though multiple 
reports of journal editors and citizens having turned over Union<<!KMB_CMMT_AUTHOR::AGL>> 
Intercoloniale packets to the Sûreté suggests the interdiction was only partially successful.  
From508 such information as was available, Monguillot was able to report, “a few dispatches, 
with the petition inserted, were journals in the colony, however the majority of petitions were 
addressed to Vietnamese, many of whom are known for their hostility toward the French 
administration.”509    
Toward the end of October, some disturbing reports surfaced.  On October 21, a special 
commissar in Nam Định reported several rumors pertaining to the arrest of Phan Bội Châu.  
Residents in the Hanh Thien district believed the person arrested in Shanghai was not Phan Bội 
Châu, but rather a Chinese individual.  According to this local rumor, the Chinese government 
was seeking the repatriation of their citizen.  Another source reported the Chinese of Nam Định 
were under the impression a long-time resident who had become a naturalized Chinese citizen 
had been arrested in error.  This rumor held that the Chinese authorities were seeking redress for 
the arrest and had demanded the French government rectify its mistake.  Thus, a person by the 
name of Phan Bội Châu had been sent from Haiphong to Hongkong and the French government 
had paid the Chinese government 100,000 piastres in compensation.510  These wildly inaccurate 
rumors demonstrate two important features of news communications in French Indochina during 
this period.  First, outside of the major cities, the likelihood of receiving accurate news declined 
considerably.  Second, residents of peripheral districts nevertheless shared information related to 
matters of significance for the colony at large.  Whether rural residents believed Phan Bội Châu 
was actually being held or not, the report does indicate that his name and reputation were known 
and drew interest beyond urban areas.   
Since Vietnamese revolutionaries had already attempted to assassinate two governor 
generals of Indochina, Néron's report on October 29 would have definitely raised alarm bells.  
Néron conveyed to Sûreté offices throughout Indochina a cable from the Ministry of Colonies 
suggesting a Vietnamese by the name of Le Trinh Vuong planned to return to Indochina to take 
the life of the new governor general should he fail to release Phan Bội Châu.511  Le Trinh Vuong 
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claimed to be a long-time Hanoi resident born in Guangzhouwan who had participated in an 
assassination in Canton.  He had shared his story and intentions with an informer in Paris.  Most 
concerning, the Sûreté lacked any information on Le Trinh Vuong, which made it far more 
difficult to prevent an attack.512 after another brief 
After another brief pause, the Criminal Commission marched on.  They followed up on 
Phan Bội Châu's riveting confession on October 23.  Having had several days to reflect, Phan 
Bội Châu provided the Commission members with an explanation for his previous 
dissimulations: "I thought it was a matter of rhetoric and a parody of justice.  I thought I would 
be executed regardless, so I exaggerated my lies."513  The French administration had been 
responsible for executing enough of Phan Bội Châu's comrades that this claim was certainly 
plausible.  However, tt does not explain why Phan Bội Châu freely admitted to incriminating 
facts and made compromising statements immediately after his arrest.  Presumably, if Phan Bội 
Châu believed he would be killed regardless, he would have withheld information so as to 
protect his compatriots.  In fact, the one thing Phan Bội Châu had done consistently since his 
arrest was to incriminate his former comrades (especially Cường Để). 
Now that Phan Bội Châu was willing to be more honest, the prosecutor addressed Phan 
Bội Châu's activities and movements between 1908 and 1913.  The prosecutor addressed various 
issues related to how Phan Bội Châu had funded his numerous operations.514  Phan Bội Châu 
admitted to receiving some 2,000 piastres from Đặng Thái Thân through emigrating students, but 
claimed he did not know the money's provenance.515  He admitted that it was possible Đặng Thái 
Thân had relied on violent actors such as Đội Quyên's "band."516  Phan Bội Châu admitted to 
taking approximately 20% of the money Đông Du students brought to Japan, but claimed he had 
done so to subsidize poorer students.517  Phan Bội Châu maintained that he had played no direct 
role in the violent events of 1908, and had not ordered anyone to pillage or extort money.518  The 
prosecutor addressed Phan Bội Châu's writings once again.  He admitted that most of the works 
previously discussed were indeed his.  However, he still insisted that Hà Thành liệt sĩ truyền had 
been written by Nguyễn Thành Hiến, and that he did not know who was responsible for Sùng bài 
giai nhân.519    
In the evening, Phan Bội Châu admitted to the truth of his relationships with Japanese 
and Chinese people such as Inukai Tsuyoshi, Okuma Shigenobu, and Liang Qichao.520  Phan Bội 
Châu admitted to meeting Để Thám and to working with Cường Để.  However, Phan Bội Châu 
offered his opinion of Cường Để, which remained unflattering: "I found him of ordinary 
intelligence and too inferior to have any influence on me.  I directed everything; he only wanted 
to be king.  He would never have revolted against the Protectorate if he had been given the 
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throne."521   Phan Bội Châu essentially confirmed that he had seen Cường Để as little more than 
a temporarily convenient figurehead.  He ended his first day of "honesty" by stating "If the 
Vietnamese people were clear-eyed about the French, I would pass on Cường Để's support and 
act on my own accord."522  Phan Bội Châu was suggesting that, more than any other Vietnamese 
leader, he was the most intelligent and therefore the best to work directly with the French 
Protectorate administration.  It was an unsubtle shift back toward the possibility of Franco-
Vietnamese collaboration. 
The next day (October 24), the newfound friendliness between Phan Bội Châu and the 
Criminal Commission began to fray.  Phan Bội Châu claimed that he had only developed the idea 
of opposing the French government in 1909-1910, after the French had targeted his movement.523  
The prosecutor's attempt to remind Phan Bội Châu of some of the very unpleasant things he had 
written about Frenchmen did not have the intended effect.  Phan Bội Châu claimed that his 
compatriots had simply misinterpreted his writings.  When the prosecutor reprised the accusation 
that Phan Bội Châu had written "passionate, violent, and vulgar diatribes against the French," 
Phan Bội Châu again claimed that Cường Để was the one responsible: "Cường Để wrote his own 
compositions, but he signed my name."524  Why on earth did he let Cường Để do this?  Phan Bội 
Châu claimed he had allowed it to happen so that money would continue to flow from 
Cochinchina to support the Đông Du students.525  Phan Bội Châu's wilyness, temporarily 
eclipsed by his contrition, now reappeared. 
On October 26, Phan Bội Châu refined his new line of defense.  Every answer seemed 
honest, but always involved a large measure of plausible deniability.  Yes, he had opposed the 
government, "but I never arrived at taking action."526  When violent actions such as the murder 
of Nguyễn Huy Điển in Canton in July 1912 had taken place, Phan Bội Châu was conveniently 
out of town.527   Had a "batallion of death" existed?  Phan Bội Châu had heard that Nguyễn Hải 
Thân and Nguyễn Thành Hiến had created such an organization, but he was not sure whether it 
actually existed.528  Phan Bội Châu admitted to being "responsible for the education of [students] 
in Japan," but he refused to take any responsibility for the actions of those students.529  Even if 
he had written unpleasant things about the French government, Phan Bội Châu's only "weapon" 
was his brush.530  Most importantly, Phan Bội Châu stressed, "I was not responsible for the 1912-
1913 terrorist campaign."531 
The prosecutor was clearly frustrated.  The accused had displayed a moment of honesty, 
but that had now passed.  Phan Bội Châu was ready to play games again and this time around he 
had a much better idea of the rules.  Yes, he had accepted money, but it was used to pay for 
education, not weapons and munitions.532  The Quang Phục hội had existed, but only briefly.  
Chinese revolutionaries had hoped their Vietnamese counterparts would strike at the French 
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Protectorate, but a lack of funds prevented anyone from doing anything.533  Other Vietnamese 
may have purchased or built bombs, but Phan Bội Châu had never done so.534  Phan Bội Châu 
claimed never to have personally known any of the bombers.535  Anyone, such as Ấm Võ, 
Nguyễn Văn Tuân, or Lương Ngọc Quyên, who testified that Phan Bội Châu had played a 
material role in planning or carrying out terrorist acts was lying.536 
Sometimes Phan Bội Châu botched his own defense by making claims the prosecutor 
could all too easily disprove.  Phan Bội Châu initially claimed he had been arrested by warlord 
Long Jiguang "at the end of 1912," which would have absolved him of responsibility for the 
1913 attacks.537  There were far too many witnesses and documents for this to work.538  He then 
attempted to claim that he had changed his opinion of the French administration in 1913 in 
response to Governor General Sarraut's educational reforms.539  This line of defense included a 
bold line, "Once I was overseas, I realized many whites had enlightened ideas and that my ideas 
were wrong."540   
On October 28, the prosecutor returned to using a previously successful strategy: 
describing the violence Phan Bội Châu had provoked with his writings.  This time, the 
prosecutor presented detailed testimonies describing murders and assassinations carried out 
against real and suspected informers.541  Đỗ Hữu Tiên had been stabbed and his body was 
dumped on the side of the road.542  Thiên Nhi was chopped in the ribs and neck with a machete, 
and his body was thrown into the water and disappeared.543  Nguyễn Huy Điển was murdered in 
1912 for spying on Phan Bội Châu, Âm Tran was murdered in 1913 for failing to carry out an 
attack on Pac Hin Bom.544  In Siam, Ma Kheng had informed Đặng Tử Kính and Đặng Tử Hứa 
that Co Bac was a spy, so they had her trapped and murdered in Korat forest.545  In 1911, Đặng 
Tử Kính had taken Ba-Ben to a spinnery and threw a brick at him, causing severe injury.546  
Đặng Tử Kính was also responsible for the death of a Tonkinese named Quan and Ba-Nho.547  In 
1912, Hoàng Trọng Mậu, Âm Giên, and Trần Hữu Lực had stabbed a spy in their house in 
Canton.  They chopped up the body, rolled the parts up in a carpet, and dumped it in the river.548  
Trần Thị Chuyên testified that her husband was paid to bring back severed ears.549  Phan Bội 
Châu denounced these grisly events and denied all knowledge and responsibility.  Regarding the 
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murder of Bat-Biên (aka Nguyễn Huy Điển), which Hoàng Trọng Mậu had testified took place 
on Phan Bội Châu's orders, Phan Bội Châu protested, "I deplore the assassination of Nguyễn Huy 
Điển.  He was one of my most loyal servants.  He was assassinated in my absence!"550   
Recognizing he had hit a nerve, the prosecutor then portrayed Phan Bội Châu as a corrupt 
beneficiary of all this bloodshed.  He claimed that the first assassinations "were meant to inspire 
confidence in the Chinese officials so you could obtain 300,000 piastres which they offered 
you."551  The prosecutor argued that because Phan Bội Châu had admitted to being the one to 
meet with the Chinese officials who were making these offers, such as Chen Qimei, he was 
ultimately responsible for triggering the wave of bloodshed that took place 1912-1913.  The 
prosecutor excoriated Phan Bội Châu, "In 1913, you were a vulgar crook who promised things 
you knew where impossible, yet you asked anyway.  You lived off the money that you duped and 
threatened your countrymen to obtain."552   Phan Bội Châu's need for money, the prosecutor 
continued, was what prompted the printing and sale in 1912 of "200,000 piastres" in worthless 
banknotes carrying Phan Bội Châu's name and signature.553  Bombs were used to threaten 
villagers in Indochina to hand over money to the Vietnamese revolutionaries, which Phan Bội 
Châu then used to support his lifestyle in Canton.554  According to Hoàng Trọng Mậu's 
testimony, "you organized, through intermediaries, a veritable enterprise based on pillaging 
entire regions...to support your wasteful appetites."555 
This series of moral condemnations and ad hominem attacks again put Phan Bội Châu on 
the defensive.  Yes, he had printed banknotes, but so had Cường Để, and Cường Để's print-run 
was larger.556  Yes, he'd been in charge, but he allowed both Cường Để and Hoàng Trọng Mậu to 
do what they wanted.557  The claims he was profiting off of violence were absolutely untrue, 
Phan Bội Châu protested, "I had no influence.  I had no money."558 
On October 30, the prosecutor ratcheted up his accusations.  Phan Bội Châu was planning 
massive attacks on Tonkin to obtain the 100,000 piastres promised by Germany.559  Phan Bội 
Châu played both the Germans and the Chinese for funds, while personally coordinating the 
attacks that would have released more funding from his benefactors.560  Cường Để had left Phan 
Bội Châu in charge and fled to Europe after Phan Bội Châu's partisans threatened him in 
Canton.561  Accoring to Nguyễn Bá Trác, "Phan Bội Châu is the most fervent of the violent 
terrorists.  Phan Bội Châu is determined, perseverant, and fanatical.  He is trapped by his own 
promises to the Chinese."562  The prosecutor's accusations were reaching a fever pitch.     
Building on his relentless charges, on October 31, the prosecutor introduced testimony 
and documentation demonstrating Phan Bội Châu's involvement in bomb-making.  Bùi Ngọc 
Nhuận was arrested in Bangkok in 1913 with pieces of an encoded letter to Phan Bội Châu that 
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intelligence services were able to reconstruct and decode.  The letter testified to the fabrication 
and tranportation of bombs to Saigon and Hà Tiên.563   Another letter from Lý Định used code to 
discuss bombs and bombing.564  The prosecutor went on to introduce four more similar letters.  
Then eight more.  Then testimony from individuals on bomb-making.  Nguyễn Huy Nhuận 
testified, "The bombs can kill 1,000 people.  The small ones cost 100 piastres.  The big ones cost 
600 piastres."565  Đặng Kiên called the bombs "egg-shaped people killers."566  And Vũ Văn Thụy 
declared, "the revolutionaries started to talk about bombs as an easy way of provoking a 
revolution."567 
Certain students, such as Đặng Tử Mẫn, became Phan Bội Châu's expert bomb-makers, 
capable of creating a variety of deadly explosive devices.568  One type, called a "goose egg" was 
equipped with a striker and packed with 500 grams of iron pellets.  This was the kind used to 
eviscerate the tuần phủ of Thái Bình.569  Another kind was the "pig tail grenades" that used a 
wick.  Yet another were the "money grenades" that included two internal chambers.570  A bomb 
expert examined some of the bombs created by Phan Bội Châu's revolutionaries in China, and 
declared them to be of professional quality, made using machines obtained in Japan.571 
Rapidly, the prosecutor strung together a long list of documents that, he claimed, 
illustrated Phan Bội Châu's vast terrorist network in action.572  The notebook seized from Cường 
Để's belongings indicated that Phan Bội Châu was sending money to workshop sites provided by 
Kang Youwei where Phan Bội Châu's young men produced the explosives.573  After the 
accidental explosion in Kowloon that resulted in the loss of several of Đặng Tử Mẫn's fingers, 
the bomb-makers split up.  Some went to Longzhou, others to Yunnan, and still others to Siam.574   
In Yunnan, Vietnamese revolutionaries were supported by the Chinese warlord Lu Rongting.  
Nguyễn Hải Thân (aka Nguyễn Cẩm Giàng) led the Vietnamese in Yunnan.575  Another 
contingent made bombs in Nanning in a tailor shop.576   
In 1914, the executive committee of the Quang Phục hội moved to demonstrate the 
group's potential to Chinese officals.  According to the testimony of Nguyễn Quang Hào, bomb-
makers were assigned to each province to carry out attacks.577  The Chinese revolutionary-
turned-official Huang Xing was treated to a banquet where Vietnamese promised to "show the 
Chinese their bomb-throwing prowess."578  Nguyễn Hải Thân then undertook a mission to kill 
Governor General Albert Sarraut in Nam Định.  He returned claiming success, greatly pleasing 
the Chinese, until the Chinese learned that this was a lie.  Nguyễn Văn Tuân testified that the 
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Executive Committee of the Quang Phục hội then replaced Nguyễn Hải Thân with Nguyễn 
Trọng Thượng.  It was on Nguyễn Trọng Thượng's orders that Tài Xế (aka Nguyễn Văn Thụy) 
carried out his attack on the terrace of the Hanoi Hotel on April 26, 1913. 
The prosecutor began to tie together his case.  Nguyễn Hải Thân, Nguyễn Trọng Thượng, 
and the others were all following Phan Bội Châu's direct orders.  The prosecutor rattled off 
testimonies to build his case.  Nguyễn Đạo Nam had declared to the 1913 Criminal Commission, 
which had originally sentenced Phan Bội Châu to death, "The revolution is coming.  We will 
trouble the country and blow up the loyal officials of the French.  We intend to frighten the 
officials associated with the administration."579  Phạm Hoàng Triêt testified, "The exact date of 
the attacks was fixed in advance by Phan Bội Châu himself."  Nguyễn Đại testified, "Phan Bội 
Châu...recruited partisans from northern Tonkin because they get along with the Chinese pirates." 
Phan Bội Châu could offer only weak excuses to wave after wave of evidence.  He 
claimed, "The only order I gave was to study.  If you are claiming my ideas are the cause of the 
1913 terrorist campaign, I cannot protest, but they did not act on my orders."580  Continuing, 
Phan Bội Châu offered a highly revealing statement: "In my writings, I said bad things about the 
French.  I exhorted my compatriots to unite against the French.  But I never thought they would 
actually do it."581  Other statements represented desperate half-measures that only hurt his case 
further.  Phan Bội Châu disavowed Nguyễn Hải Thân, but then admitted he had been in charge of 
bomb production in Longzhou.582  Phan Bội Châu offered desperate, evasive explanations: 
"Đặng Tử Mẫn only made powder...Đặng Bỉnh Thành had bought bombs on Cường Để's 
orders...I only gave 5 piastres to contribute to the opening of that tailor shop."583  Even worse, 
Phan Bội Châu's statements increasingly compromised his own defense: "Our party was against 
the French government, not the [native] functionaries...Nguyễn Trọng Thượng was part of my 
group, but he did not follow my orders."584  November 4 culminated in descriptions of the April 
1913 assassinations.585   
Finally, the prosecutor read off multiple pages of Phan Bội Châu's previous incriminating 
statements, asking the old man if he stood by his own words.586  The prosecutor then pointed out 
contradictions between Phan Bội Châu's statements.  Losing ground with each passing day, Phan 
Bội Châu grew quieter and less combative.  There would be no victory against such well-
substantiated prosecution.  Phan Bội Châu weakly clung to the last remaining defense he could 
muster: it was all Cường Để's doing.  In the evening of November 6, the prosecutor unleashed his 
final salvo: a hitherto unmentioned letter written by Phan Bội Châu to Cường Để that proved 
Phan Bội Châu had been the sole authority leading the Quang Phục hội at the time the April 1913 
attacks were carried out.587   
The letter was found in Cường Để’s possession upon his capture in Hong Kong on July 8, 
1913.  In this letter, dated March 26, 1913, Phan Bội Châu is clearly shown to have given 
instructions to Cường Để, not the other way around.  Phan Bội Châu indicated that he had 
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received a letter from Nguyễn Trọng Thượng in Indochina assuring him the population was ready 
to support him and the Quang Phục hội.  The prosecutor explained that the letter proved Phan 
Bội Châu was marshaling his forces for an imminent campaign of terrorism against the French 
Protectorate.  Nguyễn Trọng Thượng, son of Nguyễn Tận Thuạt was to lead the attack in Tonkin.  
Phan Bội Châu needed Cường Để to return so he could exercise his influence over the 
Cochinchinese.  Cường Để’s sudden departure in March 1913, apparently for Europe thought 
actually for the Mekong Delta, had thrown Phan Bội Châu’s plans for a violent takeover into 
disarray by threatening to fragment the movement.  Thus Phan Bội Châu demanded Cường Để 
return to assist with the “great enterprise,” including the “organization of a provisional 
government.”  Phan Bội Châu was clearly the one in charge. 
Realizing that everything now rested on this letter, which he was clearly shocked to see, 
Phan Bội Châu resurrected his old defense strategy:  
Phan Bội Châu: "Someone imitated my signature."   
Prosecutor: "Are you recommencing the comedy of October 20?  If the letter is bogus, 
why would Cường Để keep it?  He knew your writing well.  He would not have interrupted his 
voyage on your orders unless it was really you."   
Phan Bội Châu: "The person who wrote this letter is very good at imitating my 
signature."   
Prosecutor: "You continue to mock the Criminal Commission.  Why not ask for an expert 
as you did for the copy?" 
Phan Bội Châu: "It is such a good imitation that an expert would be fooled.   
[The letter is presented to interpreter Bùi Bằng Đoàn, who confirms it] 
Phan Bội Châu: "The interpreter is wrong." 
Prosecutor: "This is proof you organized the 1913 terrorist campaign. You were indeed 
the leader because your order made Cường Để interrupt his voyage."588 
The interrogatory sessions were over.  For the Criminal Commission, there was 
absolutely no question: Phan Bội Châu had led the Quang Phục hội at the time that organization's 
operatives carried out bombing attacks on government targets inside French Indochina.  Phan 
Bội Châu was the insidious master of puppets, who used violent rhetoric, ruthless tactics, 
sophisticated explosives, and radicalized young men to bring to fruition his plan to eradicate the 
French colonial administration, terrify the Indochinese population into submission, and become 
the president and ruler of Vietnam. 
On November 9, the Criminal Commission met solely to read the charges.  Phan Bội 
Châu said only that he had nothing to add and that he protested his innocence.  The prosecutor 
gave Phan Bội Châu three days in which to prepare his defense and asked if he wanted to choose 
an attorney.  Phan Bội Châu asked that the Commission designate him one.  Bride, as president 
of the Criminal Commission, then designated Raymond Bona, defense advocate for the Court of 
Appeals in Hanoi, and ended the meeting at 4:00 PM.   
The Approaching Storm (November 10-November 22) 
After 36 days of interrogation, Phan Bội Châu and his designated attorney Raymond 
Bona were to be given just three days to prepare a defense.  Fortunately for Phan Bội Châu, and 
quite unfortunately for administration officials who were anxious have the verdict rendered in 
advance of Governor General Varenne's imminent arrival to the colony, the gears of colonial 
bureaucray simply could not grind that quickly.  On November 15, Jean-Félix Krautheimer, 
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acting resident superior of Tonkin, wrote Monguillot to report that the preparation of Phan Bội 
Châu's defense has been delayed due to difficulties with the designation of Phan Bội Châu's 
attorney.589  It had taken until that day (November 15) to hold the new meeting required to allow 
a proper designation. Krautheimer estimated that the day of judgment would take place on 
November 21.     
As it turned out, Phan Bội Châu received not one defense attorney, but two: Raymond 
Bona and Joseph Larre, of Haiphong.  On November 17, Larre and Bona asked Bride for a 
supplementary delay on account of the number of files it was necessary for them to review.590  
President Bride granted this, although the extension was still not to exceed three days.591   
On November 16, Bride had provided the office of the resident superior of Tonkin a press 
release he hoped to have distributed. In the press release, Bride declared the day of judgment 
would take place in the hall of the First Chamber of the Court of Appeals, located in the Palace 
of Justice, and that it was scheduled for 8:00 AM, Monday November 23.592  Bride followed this 
with a self-congratulatory statement: 
On this occasion, I would like to recall that the investigation of Phan Bội Châu, during 
which nearly 1950 questions were put to the accused, was particularly long because of 
the numerous documents it was necessary to gather, sometimes from Cochinchina and 
Annam, analyze, translate, classify and inventory. The Criminal Commission with its 
auxiliaries, under the direction of its President, has done considerable work which 
required two long sessions each day, which were often extended very late in the evening. 
This being the circumstance, I wish to pay tribute to the zeal everyone has thrown into 
this case so that all the necessary clarifications might be made in the interest of justice.593 
Bride requested the press release be sent out on November 21.  Robin was not 
interested.594  Neither was the Sûreté, which responded in a one-line cable on November 19: "No 
press release should be made to the press."595  The security state had thwarted Bride's desire to 
pursue his version of French colonial justice a final time.  Bride had been so single-mindedly 
focused on proving Phan Bội Châu's guilt that he had little conception of how such a verdict 
would be received by Vietnamese in the colony.  Robin and Jeanbrau, who had been watching a 
stream of ever more worrisome cables, recognized that Phan Bội Châu's arrest and trial had 
excited public opinion in unprecented and dangerous ways.  Bride needed to bring the trial of 
Phan Bội Châu to a close with the less fanfare, the better. 
A Titannic Duel: The Day of Sentencing (November 23) 
 
589 SPCE 355, Le Résident Supérieur p.i. au Tonkin à M. le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine (Cabinet), 
No. 501.CCB, 15 novembre 1925. 
590 SPCE 355, Telegramme Officiel, Gougal (Alberti, Hanoi) à Gougal Saigon, No. 2976, 17 novembre 
1925. 
591 SPCE 355, Telegramme Officiel, Gougal à Gougal Saigon, November (date missing) 1925. 
592 SPCE 355, Le Résident Supérieur p.i. au Tonkin à M. le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine (Cabinet), 
No. 503.CCB, 16 novembre 1925. 
593 SPCE 355, Le Résident Supérieur p.i. au Tonkin à M. le Gouverneur Général de l’Indochine (Cabinet), 
No. 504.CCB, 16 novembre 1925. 
594 According to Alberti, Robin had called Bride’s press release, “not very useful.”  SPCE 355, Telegramme 
Officiel, Gougal (Alberti, Hanoi) à Gougal Saigon, No. 2976, 17 novembre 1925. 
595 SPCE 355, Telegramme Officiel, Gougal (Saigon) à Gougal Hanoi, No. 16-S, 19 Novembre 1925. 
127 
By 7:00 AM, it was standing room only outside the gates the Palace of Justice.596  Despite 
the lack of a press release, the colonial press turned out in force.  The major Vietnamese 
language newspapers covering the trial were Thực nghiệp dân báo, Trung Bắc tân văn, both 
based in Hanoi, and Đông Pháp thời báo, based in Saigon.597  French-language coverage 
appeared in L'Argus Indochinois, Indochine Républicain, and L'Écho Annamite.   
Stern-looking guards holding bayonets watched as the crowd continued to grow.598  After 
filling the walk-in rooms on the ground floor, the crowd filled out the first floor as well, then 
proceeded to fill the corridors as well.  It was a scene quite unlike any that had taken place in the 
colony.  This was the first time a Criminal Commission had been open to the public.  The 
reporter for Trung Bắc tân văn later mused if this was Bride's idea of "equality."599  The Sûreté 
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commented that the trial had provoked considerable curiosity, "which resulted in an influx of a 
very mixed indigenous public."600  Altogether, including a fair number of Europeans, the crowd 
had reached around 2,000 people.   
At 7:45 AM, Phan Bội Châu exited Hỏa Lò Central Prison between two French soldiers.  
He wore a five-paneled aristocratic gown that extended to his heels.   His bald forehead lay under 
a tangle of hair.  The guards sat him in a chair and, as he waited for the court to open, Phan Bội 
Châu stroked his beard, looking very deliberate in each action.  The journalist from Thực nghiệp 
dân báo commented that the old patriot looked like a Chinese gentleman.601   
At 8:25 AM, President Bride convened the final meeting of the Criminal Commission, 
with members Resident-Mayor Dupuy, Prosecutor General Boyer, and Captain Bellier present.  
Alongside, there was the court's clerk Patrick Arnoux and the court's two intepreters Gombaud 
Saintonge and Bùi Bằng Đoàn.  Saintonge would translate the statements of the Commission into 
Vietnamese, while Bùi Bằng Đoàn would translate Phan Bội Châu's words into French.  Finally, 
appearing before the court were Raymond Bona, Joseph Larre, and Phan Boi Châu.  
Bride began by asking Phan Bội Châu to state his name, place of birth, profession, and 
parentage.  In a loud and nimble voice, Phan Bội Châu answered, stating he was from Đan 
Nhiễm village, Nam Đàn district in the province of Nghệ An and that he was formerly a teacher.  
Bride then read the eight charges against Phan Bội Châu: 
1.  To have, in Siamese or Chinese territory at an unspecified time, by donations, 
promises, threats, abuse of authority or power, machinations or guilty artifices, been 
complicit in the crime of murder with premeditation committed by the convicted Phạm 
Văn Tráng (known as Cháng) on April 12, 1913 in Thái Bình, Tonkin on the person of 
tuần phủ Nguyễn Duy Hàn.  To have provoked this crime and provided instructions for 
how to commit it. 
2. To have been, in the same circumstances of time and place, made complicit in the 
crime of murder with premeditation committed by the convicted Phạm Văn Tráng 
(known as Cháng), on April 12, 1913 in Thái Bình, Tonkin on the person of tuần phủ 
Nguyễn Duy Hàn, by procuring instruments, in this case bombs, which served for the 
action, knowing well what they would do.    
3. To have, in the same circumstances of time and place, by donations, promises, threats, 
abuse of authority or power, machinations or guilty artifices, been complicit in the crime 
of murder with premeditation committed by Nguyễn Văn Tuý (known as Tài Xế) and the 
convicted Nguyễn Khắc Cần on April 26, 1913 on the terrace of the Hanoi Hotel in 
Hanoi, Tonkin on the persons of Captains Montgrand and Chapuis.   To have provoked 
this crime and provided instructions for how to commit it. 
4.  To have, in the same circumstances of time and place, been complicit in the crime of 
murder with premeditation committed by Nguyễn Văn Tuý (known as Tài Xế) and the 
 
600 SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle, No. 7468, Chef de la Sûreté du Tonkin (Gilles) à M. le Résident 
Supérieur, le DirAffPol et de la S.G., le Procureur Général, 24 novembre 1925. 
601 Another version appeared as Đồng Hải, Những tin tức và dư luận vể Ông Phan Bội Châu trong hai 
tháng Novembre và Decembre 1925 (Hanoi: Thực Nghiệp, 1926).  Yet another appeared as  Finally, Chương Thâu a 
copy was printed in chữ nôm in 1925 the day after the trial. 
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convicted Nguyễn Khắc Cần on April 26, 1913 on the terrace of the Hanoi Hotel in 
Hanoi, Tonkin on the persons of Captains Montgrand and Chapuis, by procuring 
instruments, in this case bombs, which served for the action, knowing well what they 
would do.    
5.  To have, in the same circumstances of time and place, taken part in a conspiracy to 
either destroy the Government or to excite citizens or inhabitants to arm themselves 
against the authorities within the territories of Annam and Tonkin, with the aggravating 
circumstance that said conspiracy was followed by its execution or preparation thereof. 
6.  To have, in the same circumstances of time and place, taken part in a conspiracy to 
either destroy the Government or to encourage citizens or inhabitants to arm themselves 
against the authorities within the territories of Annam and Tonkin. 
7.  To have, in the same circumstances of time and place, taken actions likely to 
compromise public security or to cause serious political disturbances. 
8.  To have, in the same circumstances of time and place, taken part in an association 
formed for the purpose of preparing or committing crimes against persons or property.602   
Having read the charges, Bride ceded the floor to Phan Bội Châu.  It is difficult to guess 
exactly what Bride and the other members of the Criminal Commission expected to happen next.   
However, little in the previous two months of interrogatory sessions could have prepared them 
for what did happen next.  In a strong yet genuine voice,603 Phan Bội Châu addressed President 
Bride and packed audience of thousands:   
Vietnam is a nation, but in days past it fell under harsh rule.  The people have long 
suffered.  The kings kept themselves far from the people and heaped on restrictions, so 
the people had no way to move forward.  Because the Protectorate also represents a 
civilized nation that speaks of progress, I had believed that after thousands of years it was 
time for the people of Giao Chỉ [Vietnam] to open their eyes.  Little could I have known 
that twenty years ago the government would simply stop reforms and not change so much 
as a single policy.   
Bride's observation that Phan Bội Châu's greatest weapon was his ability to adapt his 
message perfectly to his audience must have come back to haunt him at this moment.604  This 
was simply not the same Phan Bội Châu Bride had worked so hard to bring to justice.  Phan Bội 
Châu was ready to deliver a speech and Bride in his desire to demonstrate the grandeur of French 
justice had unwittingly given him the perfect audience.   
Bride occassionally interrupted Phan Bội Châu to allow Gombaud Saintonge to translate 
 
602 The various Vietnamese accounts provide rough approximations of each charge.  For a complete version 
in French, see SPCE 354, Affaire Phan Bội Châu, Rapport du Président de la Commission Criminelle, 31-32. 
603 Even Sûreté Chief Gilles describes Phan Bội Châu’s voice as “un voix forte mais sans jactance.”  SPCE 
355, Note Confidentielle, No. 7468, Chef de la Sûreté du Tonkin (Gilles) à M. le Résident Supérieur, le DirAffPol et 
de la S.G., le Procureur Général, 24 novembre 1925. 
604 SPCE 352, Affaire Phan Bội Châu, Interrogatoires, 227. 
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on his behalf, but Phan Bội Châu did not need a translator for the audience that mattered.  He 
was now a teacher once again and he had been preparing this lesson his whole life: 
Since 1904, Annam and Tonkin have had only two colleges: the University of Hanoi and 
the University of Thuận Hóa, but they only teach translation.  The people are not allowed 
to study abroad.  The examination system has remained in place.  Penals laws have not 
been adapted to match the laws of France.  The mandarins are corrupt.  You can bribe 
them in public.     
I am from Vietnam.  I love the nation of Vietnam.  I want to wake up the people of 
Vietnam.  Seeing what was happening, I came up with a plan to oppose the government.  
If I had at hand a 10,000 man navy and many tens of thousands of troops, guns, and 
bullets, along with warships and airplanes, then I would declare war and take down this 
government piece by piece.  
But I am just a scholar. I have not a single coin in my pocket.  Without iron in my hand, I 
have no way to acquire weapons to fight back.  Thus I use only my words.  I use my 
voice to encourage the people and to demand the government reform its politics.  But the 
government was suspicious of me and attacked, so I had to flee overseas to work toward 
my goals.  I called out to my comrades to give money and send people abroad.  I wrote 
books and sent them back to stir the people up.  What I have done is use my tongue and 
my brush.  My goal was only to reform the government.  What I wanted was only to love 
the people and my country.  My actions truly were principled. 
If I have committed crimes, they are these:  First, the government was given over to the 
Protectorate.  Nobody opposed this except me, because I wanted independence for 
Vietnam.  Second, before when Vietnam was truly an autocracy, I wanted the country to 
become a nation. Third, the state would not allow travel abroad, but I escaped and 
encouraged others to follow.  Fourth, I wrote and gave speeches to wake up the people, to 
demand government reform, and to bring about civilization.605 
Phan Bội Châu's speech lasted for over an hour.  He had clearly taken careful 
observations of the Criminal Commission during the long interrogatory sessions, because his 
speech anticipated the main arguments in Bride's report.  One by one, Phan Bội Châu employed 
refined versions of the counter arguments he had practiced the previous two and a half months.  
He was a scholar, not a warrior.  He was guilty only of writing to inspire patriotism.  He had not 
thrown any bombs personally.  If Phan Bội Châu had wanted to be a thug, he could have stayed 
and joined Để Thám or a group of bandits.  He had never killed any Westerners.  In fact, his 
books encouraged Westerners and Vietnamese to love each other like brothers, like family.606  
The crimes he was being charged with were savage and uncivilized.  If Vietnam were to achieve 
independence, Phan Bội Châu stated as he brought his speech to a conclusion, "The first thing I 
would do would be to sentence to death those murderers, because murdering people like those 
officials is not a humane act.  People who have lost their country are like children who lose their 
 
605 This version of Phan Bội Châu’s speech relies on Tập án Phan Bội Châu, which draws on the reporting 
of Thực Nghiệp dân báo. 
606 Many of these statements appear in the three main Vietnamese accounts, though in different order. 
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parents.  If children can’t follow their parents, who will they follow?"607 
Having finished this speech, Phan Bội Châu said no more.   Bride asked if he anything 
more to say.  Phan Bội Châu told Bride he would answer any questions the Commission had, 
whereupon Bride replied, "The Council has no more questions, because we asked them all during 
the inquiry.  This time is only for the accused to say what they will."608  Phan Bội Châu sat down.  
It was clear to everyone in the room that something momentous had taken place.  Gilles, the 
chief of the Sûreté in Tonkin, wrote the next day, "It must be recognized that...the impression this 
produced on the native audience, who observed listening with a religious silence, seemed 
entirely in his favor."609  Phan Bội Châu had won the room.    
At 10:15 AM, Larre and Bona requested a break until 3:00 PM.610  Satisfied with this, 
Bride ended the meeting immediately.  Phan Bội Châu stayed in the Palace of Justice as Gilles 
cleared the corridor and held back the throng of desperately curious Vietnamese hoping to get 
another look at the old patriot.611  Guards brought Phan Bội Châu back to Hỏa Lò Central Prison 
without incident.  The streets were silent.   
Vietnamese agents of the Sûreté mixed in with the crowd reported people saying that the 
"great patriot Phan Bội Châu" would almost certainly be sentenced to life imprisonment or 
deportation by the Criminal Commission.612  In the afternoon, the crowd returned in even greater 
numbers than the morning.  The corridor needed to be slightly cleared so that Phan Bội Châu, his 
attorneys, and the Criminal Commission could get back into the courtroom.  The Criminal 
Commission then reconvened at 3:00 PM sharp. 
President Bride attempted to steal back Phan Bội Châu's thunder.  He opened by stating, 
"This morning Mr. Phan Bội Châu failed to answer several questions correctly, so the 
Commission will give an account of the things Mr. Phan Bội Châu did during the period 1904-
1913 so they can be included in the court’s record."613  Bride proceeded to present a concise and 
relatively straightforward account of Phan Bội Châu's life as a revolutionary.  However, nothing 
he had to say was particularly incriminating.   Without the benefit of his vast archive of 
documents ready for citation, Bride indictment of Phan Bội Châu had lost a great deal of its 
punch. 
Bride did attempt to reprise some of his greatest hits from the interrogatory sessions.  To 
show how dishonest Phan Bội Châu had been, Bride cited Phan Bội Châu's own statements. 
Taken out of context, however, the statements Bride cited were hardly incriminating. Bride 
noted, for example, that "Phan Bội Châu claimed Liang Qichao’s introduction was incorrect.  But 
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611 SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle, No. 7468, Chef de la Sûreté du Tonkin (Gilles) à M. le Résident 
Supérieur, le DirAffPol et de la S.G., le Procureur Général, 24 novembre 1925. 
612 SPCE 355, Note Confidentielle, No. 7468, Chef de la Sûreté du Tonkin (Gilles) à M. le Résident 
Supérieur, le DirAffPol et de la S.G., le Procureur Général, 24 novembre 1925. 
613 Việc Phan Bội Châu tại Hồng đồng đề hình phiên ngày 23 Novembre 1925 (Hanoi: Trung Bắc tân văn, 
1925). 
132 
Liang Qichao had no reason to make anything up."614  Just what the Vietnamese in the room 
were supposed to make of this was unclear.  But Bride did not explain.  He moved on to another 
example.  Bride pointed out Phan Bội Châu's fiery rhetoric.  He compared Phan Châu Trinh's 
writings favorably with Phan Bội Châu's: "The words you've let loose include insults for 
Frenchmen.  Mr. Phan Châu Trinh opposes us but does not insult anyone."615  No doubt some of 
the Vietnamese in the audience felt the French, and probably Bride himself, could stand to put up 
with a few insults.   
The overall impression of Bride's statement was mixed at best.  Gilles claimed that Bride 
had left a "deep impression on the audience."  Gilles noted in his report, for example, how when 
Bride cited Phan Bội Châu's claim that "All the Annamites are liars," "Phan Bội Châu could not 
but bow his head without answering."616  None of the Vietnamese accounts mention this 
interaction.  In fact, Bride appears either as a bit player, in the case of Thực Nghiệp dân báo's 
reporting, or as a foil for Phan Bội Châu to debate, in the case of Trung Bắc tân văn's reporting.  
And debate Phan Bội Châu did, countering Bride's claims with every bit of confidence he had 
shown in the early interrogatory sessions.  The only difference was instead of simply denying 
claims, Phan Bội Châu was now also supplying a counternarrative: he was a patriot and not a 
criminal.  Phan Bội Châu had even picked up some new arguments during the interrogation 
sessions, to amusing effect: "You all claim I was the leader who ordered the bombing, but who 
caught me handing a bomb to anyone?  Or took a picture of me giving one to anyone?"617   
Indeed, Bride did not have a picture of Phan Bội Châu handing someone a bomb.  Bride 
did have reams of letters and testimonies, of course, but those could not be revealed in open 
court.  The strategy of trial by archive, which the Criminal Commission had been able to use 
with such success during the interrogatory sessions, worked against Bride now. He could only 
make claims; he could not show the evidence necessary to convince the audience those claims 
were true.  Even Bride's attempt to address the bombing incidents failed to leave an impression 
on the journalists in the room.  The story they were interested in was not a pair of bombings that 
someone other than the accused had commited twelve years prior.  There was a far better story to 
cover: a Vietnamese patriot who perfectly willing to tell a French official he was wrong.   
At 7:00 PM, Bride stopped.  It was Larre and Bona's turn to make strong statements on 
Phan Bội Châu's behalf.  Larre stressed that Phan Bội Châu was "simply an ardent patriot, a 
philosopher, a jewel amongst jewels."618  Bona, meanwhile, questioned Bride's evidence as a 
whole:  
The charges are based on wastepaper and the words of complete criminals.  Those papers 
are the papers of consuls and emissaries, but everything in them is from the mouths of 
spies.  What kind of people are spies?  Spies are people who are paid to find stuff.  If they 
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can’t find stuff they make accusations anyway, so very often there is no story, yet there 
are reports. As for the depositions of criminals, these are all accusations that put 
everything on PBC while he is not there to refute them."619 
Phan Bội Châu was a good man, Bona stressed.  Bride had simply misunderstood him.  
Bona then turned the tables by citing from a number of Phan Bội Châu's more recent writings.  
According to the reporter from Trung Bắc tân van, the audience seemed to be very moved.620  
Bona finished his statements at 8:00 PM.  After a brief pause, Bride gave Phan Bội Châu the 
opportunity to make a final statement.  Phan Bội Châu simply said: 
I have nothing more to complain about.  I believe I have said everything.  My resistance 
is like that of times past, like ancient times [he pointed his hand into the past], but it is no 
longer on my shoulders.  Where can I stand now to present everything?  Thus I beg to say 
one more thing: “If the state will take up the sword and gun to civilize the Vietnamese 
people, then I ask to be killed.  If the state will take up culture and morals to civilize the 
Vietnamese people, then I am without any guilt.621   
Bride then called on the Criminal Commission to review the charges and determine their 
verdict.  Bride read each charge, and to each the Criminal Commission replied in the affirmative.  
Phan Bội Châu was guilty of all of the charges.  Bride then asked a ninth question: "do there 
exist attentuating circumstances in favor of Phan Bội Châu?"  To this the majority agreed again.   
The Criminal Commission then adjourned briefly to deliberate.  Upon return, Bride stated for the 
court: "Phan Bội Châu is found culpable of the facts specified.  He is sentenced to the 
punishment of Forced Labor for Life."622   Phan Bội Châu sat back slightly, but the color of his 
face did not seem to change.   Bride asked whether Phan Bội Châu wished to appeal the 
sentence.  He did.  At 8:30 PM, the trial of Phan Bội Châu ended. 
Colonial Firestorm: Indochina Reacts to the Verdict (November 24-December 9) 
The news of Phan Bội Châu’s dramatic day of sentencing quickly exploded throughout 
the colony’s major cities. The Sûreté could barely keep up.  One of the larger newspaper 
operations reporting on the trial, Thực nghiệp dân báo came out with five days of back-to-back 
coverage on November 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27.623    Recognizing the incredible demand for its 
coverage, the newspaper later republished selections from November 25, 26, and 27 in the form 
of a news pamphlet entitled Tập án Phan Bội Châu (The Trial of Phan Bội Châu), which sold for 
10 cents.624  This rather conveniently left out most of Bride’s statements, which had appeared on 
November 23 and 24, concentrating instead on Phan Bội Châu, Larre, and Bona’s statements.   
The news triggered quick responses aboard and at home.  At 11:05 AM on November 25, 
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an individual named Nguyễn Pho claiming to represent “Groupe de Jeune Annam” sent a 
telegram to the Chamber of Deputies in Paris demanding the French Parliament intervene to 
either affirm French sovereignty in Indochina by confirming Phan Bội Châu’s death sentence, or 
else give up France’s unique claims [to Indochina], thereby providing Vietnamese an example of 
France’s moral grandeur.625  This set off further alarm bells as Nguyễn Pho was known to be a 
dangerous operative with many contacts and bomb-making expertise.626 
Léandri cabled from Haiphong on November 26 to provide three sample reactions, all of 
which expressed unease with the sentence.  Better, one respondent stated, that Phan Bội Châu be 
given either “liberty or death.”627  Two days later, Léandri cabled again to report that all of the 
journals, including Trung Bắc tân văn, Thực nghiệp dân báo, and Khai-hóa had sold out between 
10:30 AM and 2:00 PM that day.628  Léandri’s informer had then gone around to different groups 
of to discover the same thing taking place all over: the articles were being read aloud all over 
Haiphong. At each location, Vietnamese listened with rapt attention to the journalistic 
descriptions of “the person of interest, his good looks, and his courageous attitude.”629   The 
informer noted that while Vietnamese intellectuals seemed unhappy with the sentence, they were 
not provoked to protest, but rather either “awaited the arrival of a new governor general who 
they hoped would grant clemency,” or believed that in light of the “Phan Bội Châu’s energetic 
defense and his attorneys’ clever arguments, the Superior Council [the Protectorate Council] 
would change the nature of the sentence.”630  
Hanoi quickly grew restive as well.  On November 26 at 8:20 AM, Governor General 
Varenne, now in Saigon, received a private telegram from “Vietnamese Students” in Hanoi 
expressing their “stupifying sadness” at the verdict against Phan Bội Châu.631  Alarmed by the 
possibility that Vietnamese could directly express their feelings electronically to Varenne, the 
Sûreté scrambled to find out who was responsible.632  The offending party, a third-year student at 
the School of Agriculture by the name of Trần Tiên Ngữ from Nha Trang, claimed he had acted 
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alone and apologized for abusing the telegram privileges he enjoyed as a student.633  The Sûreté 
soon found out that many more Vietnamese knew how to “abuse” the colonial communication 
services.  A letter written in French, dated November 27, and signed by “a group of students at 
the University of Hanoi affiliated with Jeune Annam” arrived addressed to Jeanbrau, the director 
of political affairs and head of the Sûreté Générale.  The letter called Phan Bội Châu a “national 
hero” and warned that the Vietnamese people were indignant at the “abominable” verdict 
delivered by a “despotic” and “tyrannical” government.634   
The news from Saigon was offered no comfort for security officials.  On November 27, 
Arnoux, the head of the Sûreté in Saigon, advised by telegram that the journal La Cloche Fêlée 
(The Broken Bell) had reappeared under the leadership of veteran radical journalists Phan Văn 
Trường, Eugene De La Batie, and Nguyễn An Ninh.  La Cloche Fêlée put out a manifesto calling 
on citizens to protest against the conviction of Phan Bội Châu by refraining from joining Nguyễn 
Phan Long’s one-hundred strong Vietnamese delegation to meet with Governor General Varenne.  
Arnoux further advised that Phan Châu Trinh was taking advantage of the delegation’s presence 
to hold a talk entitled “The Republic and the Monarchy.”635  Not only were parallel 
manifestations taking shape in both Hanoi and Saigon, there was considerable evidence that 
these manifestations were inextricably linked. That same day, a cable from Saigon to Hanoi was 
intercepted: an individual named Nguyen Hao Dang messaged Cao Van Hai of the School of 
Commerce in Hanoi to let him know La Cloche Fêlée had reappeared and published a 
manifesto.636  Arnoux reported again on December 1 that a group of Tonkinese living in Saigon 
had planned to meet that day met to discuss the sentence against Phan Bội Châu.637  Other parts 
of the country began to take action as well.  On December 5, Sogny, head of the Sûreté in 
Annam, advised that a number of residents of Annam had sent an appeal to Hanoi on December 
3 drafted in quốc ngữ demanding amnesty for Phan Bội Châu.638   
Soon Hanoi was abuzz with fervent interest in Phan Bội Châu’s fate.  Special Commissar 
Bertrand of the Sûreté in Tonkin reported on November 28 that while the Vietnamese masses of 
Hanoi had absolutely no interest in Phan Bội Châu, amongst the politicians and intellectuals, 
“Phan Bội Châu was the subject of every conversation.”  Furthermore, “in the theaters, in the 
restaurants, on the trams, and in the street, the interpreters, secretaries, students, and scholars 
talked incessantly about the great revolutionary.  They all found the sentence too severe.”639  
Evidence began to surface suggesting well-organized groups were taking advantage of the trial’s 
outcome to drum up support for national independence.  On December 3, another round of poly-
copied tracts similar to the purple-inked ones that had circulated in July began to arrive for 
Vietnamese clerical workers.640  Signed by the “Phục Việt hội (Society for the Independence of 
Vietnam,” the tone of this new set of tracts was considerably more alarmed, and therefore 
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alarming for security officials.641   
More than any other source, newspapers and magazines were responsible for spurring 
interest in the case and driving Vietnamese to take action.  Amedée Clementi, owner of L’Argus 
Indochinois, led the charge in this regard, publishing numerous articles offering sharp criticism 
of the colonial administration, and the security services in particular.642  Clementi understood 
that Phan Bội Châu’s best hope was convincing Governor General Varenne that the peace and 
security of French Indochina depended upon a clemency order.643  Clearly aware of the colonial 
political situation, Clementi argued in L’Argus Indochinois that the Sûreté services wanted to 
stop demonstrations by Vietnamese in favor of Governor General Varenne for exactly this 
reason.  As such, Clementi worked with students affiliated with Jeune Annam to stage a large 
public protest to greet Varenne’s arrival on December 7.  According to Special Commissar 
Bertrand’s report: 
The young people who had prepared their flags and banners stood in front of the Hommel 
house, Boulevard Gia-Long, as prescribed in the leaflets of Ngac Van Don, having been 
dislodged by the music that settled in the same place. Mr. Clementi then took the 
demonstrators to the corner of Boulevards Carreau and Gia-Long where he had them set 
up again. Because there were Security Service officials around them, some expressed the 
desire to leave so as not to be subjected to violence by the police, but Mr. Clementi, who 
was accompanied by Mr. Martin, dissuaded them.  A few days later, Mr. Clementi wrote 
in L'Argus [Indochinois] that he had stood near the demonstrators to protect them against 
a police intervention, and that he was carrying photographic equipment and had intended 
to take pictures of scenes that might taken place between the police and the 
demonstrators.644 
Clementi’s plan to shield demonstrators with his camera demonstrates the newfound 
power of the colonial press to expose human rights violations.  Like Roche, Clementi represented  
a member of the colonial elite willing to put his career on the line to defend his values.  Bertrand 
went on to indicate Clementi had organized protests in Haiphong as well and had collected large 
sums of money by calling for donations for Phan Bội Châu’s defense.645  The actions of Clementi 
and Jeune Annam in Tonkin, Nguyễn Phan Long and the Cloche Fêlée group in Cochinchina, and 
Nguyễn Thế Truyền and L’Union Intercoloniale in France were signs of a rising tide. If Varenne 
was unable or unwilling to somehow overturn Phan Bội Châu’s verdict, French Indochina might 
well be flooded with urban unrest.  
Governor General Varenne vs. the Colonial Deep State  
Varenne did not need to be convinced to consider clemency.  It was on his mind as soon 
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as he heard the verdict.  On November 24, the day after sentencing, Varenne cabled from Phnom 
Penh to his subordinates in Saigon and Hanoi, “I intend to consider the possibility of clemency 
for the purpose of political conciliation.”646  This much Robin, Jeanbrau, and Bride already 
assumed and feared.  The real question was whether Varenne would even be given the 
opportunity to grant clemency. 
Varenne had good reason to send his morning-after cable: his subordinates had tried to 
pre-empt him.  Earlier that morning, Alberti, the director of cabinet for the office of the governor 
general, had already begun sending out telegrams announcing the verdict.  One went to Varenne 
in Phnom Penh, one went to Rene Robin in Tourane, and one went to the Ministry of Colonies.647   
The cable sent to the Ministry of Colonies indicated it was from “Varenne,” but it bore Alberti’s 
signature “P.O. (Par ordre, meaning by order).”  Before Varenne’s arrival, Robin, Alberti, and 
other officials regularly signed telegrams on behalf of one another, so this in itself was not 
surprising.  The problem was Varenne had not ordered Alberti to send the telegram.   
Alberti’s telegram stated simply, “Verdict rendered November 23 by Criminal 
Commission Hanoi sentencing Phan Bội Châu [to] forced labor for life. Large calm crowd 
regularly followed audience. No demonstration or incident.”648  Alberti’s cable to Varenne was 
nearly identical, except he added, “Department advised.”649  Varenne immediately recognized 
Alberti was attempting to present him with a fait accompli.  He was not going to play allow this.  
Varenne cabled Alberti: 
ABSOLUTE PRIORITY. In response to your [cable No.] 3051 - Desiring to write myself 
cable to Department concerning PBC conviction. Ignoring the number you sent on this 
subject. Have prescribed Postal Service to stop all transmissions. Cables priority number 
and text sent to allow cable pass all other transmissions.650 
Varenne then cabled Saigon, Hue, and Hanoi again for good measure, letting them all 
know in no uncertain terms that he was to be the first one informed of any developments related 
to Phan Bội Châu and that they were not to take any further actions until he arrived in Hanoi.651  
Finally, Varenne replaced Alberti’s cable No. 1545 with two of his own cable No. 1545s.652  The 
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first, which Varenne also sent to his subordinates within Indochina, stated that he “regretted not 
arriving in Tonkin in time to participate in the debate, that he reserved the right to approve the 
Criminal Commission’s decision after personally reviewing all of the dossier’s files,” and, 
finally, that he was considering granting clemency.653  The second version of cable No. 1545 
went out the following day, letting the Ministry of Colonies know that Phan Bội Châu’s appeal 
would be heard by the Protectorate Council of Tonkin, which would serve as a Court of 
Cassation in accordance with the Order of September 15, 1896.654  On December 4, Minister of 
Colonies Léon Perrier responded, informing Varenne, “it is up to you, after advice from the 
Protectorate Council, to rule by decree on a PBC appeal.”655  By his flurry of telegraphic activity, 
Varenne had preserved his ability to act in concerning Phan Bội Châu’s case.  Varenne had also 
put the deep state of French Indochina on notice that this governor general knew how to play 
their games. 
The deep state was far from finished, however.  Secretary-General and Acting Resident 
Superior of Tonkin Rene Robin recognized that Varenne could quite possibly cause the Sûreté’s 
hard work, not to mention that of the Criminal Commission, to evaporate into thin air.  Robin 
determined this should not happen.  But how could he thwart Varenne if the new governor 
general was intent to granting clemency to a state terrorist?  For this, Robin had an unexpected 
ally: Bride.  Varenne had stated in his cable that he “reserved the right to approve the Criminal 
Commission’s decision after personally reviewing all of the dossier’s files.”  Aside from the fact 
that Varenne obviously had no idea what that meant, Robin now realized that Bride’s meticulous 
diligence might be the verdict’s saving grace.   
Fortunately for Robin, on November 26 Bride delivered a distillation of the Criminal 
Commission’s laborious efforts in Rapport du Président de la Commission Criminelle.656  In his 
letter accompanying the report, Bride offered a compelling justification for the length of the trial 
and complexity of the report:  
I have the honor to submit to you in this envelope the report on the operations of the 
Crime Commission of 1925. Phan Bội Châu had been condemned to death by the decree 
of September 5, 1913. The 1925 Commission had to collect all the files kept concerning 
the authors of the various anti-French movements or of plots against the safety of the 
Protectorate since 1905, to study all the documents one by one and to collect all useful 
extracts that would allow its members to render a judgment with full knowledge of the 
facts; their conscience would indeed have refused to pronounce any verdict which had 
not been motivated by certain and irrefutable evidence. On the other hand, there is no 
doubt that this case went beyond the usual framework; it must have had repercussions in 
the Annamese community, which cannot leave unmoved any Frenchman concerned with 
preserving the justice of his country, his reputation for impartiality, for independence, and 
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above all for safeguarding the interests of the accused.   
In order to protect the rights of the defense, the Commission considered it necessary also 
to allow the accused to present his defense by refuting point by point all the charges 
raised against him and [therefore the Commission] decided that a proceeding should be 
carried out to allow for additional information. Thus it can be affirmed that the one who 
was tried and condemned is indeed the creator, the organizer, and the director of the 
Revolutionary Party which has troubled Indochina since 1907.  The verdict was greeted 
with significant calm and it seems to have satisfied all those who, with various feelings, 
impatiently awaited the solution of this affair.657 
As far as Bride was concerned, the trial of Phan Bội Châu had been a marvelous 
demonstration of French justice at work.  The Criminal Commission had proven its case against 
the accused by presenting a staggering amount of documentary and testimonial evidence.  It had 
given Phan Bội Châu opportunities to respond to all of it.  Bride and the other Commission 
members had shown remarkable forbearance as Phan Bội Châu spun lie after lie for weeks on 
end.  They had even graciously commuted the old patriot’s sentence in light of his age and 
infirmity.  Finally, there remained the most significant result of the trial: the accused had 
confessed.  For Bride, there could be no denying that justice had been properly served.   
As President of the Protectorate Council of Tonkin, Robin’s job now was to address Phan 
Bội Châu’s appeal, which his attorneys Bona and Larre had indicated would be forthcoming.  
Robin formally initiated this process on December 1 by sending a telegram in his capacity as 
Acting Governor General Monguillot’s delegate to himself in his capacity as President of the 
Protectorate Council.658   
Phan Bội Châu delivered his appeal on December 3 via a handwritten note in Chinese.  
The appeal read:  
The Annamese convict Phan Bội Châu respectfully requests the noble government [貴政] 
in Tonkin to listen to his pleas.  I'm old today; I will soon be 60 years old. In my cell, I 
have reflected a long time. The benevolent manner in which I have been treated deeply 
touched me. Having seen the functioning of the Criminal Commission and listened to the 
pleadings of my two excellent lawyers, I understand that the noble government has 
instituted justice in this country, which [before had employed] barbaric methods of 
criminal investigation using torture, the cangue, and the rattan. If I had been brought 
before an native court in my country, I would have already lost my head. I also 
understand my errors with regard to teaching, because I now know that the noble French 
government has opened throughout the country many schools where my compatriots can 
be educated in the Western sciences.  I also acknowledge all of my past mistakes [愚已醒
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悟昔日一切之所錯誤].  
With all my strength, I implore the kindness and leniency of the noble government for all 
of my crimes. In this letter, I make a solemn commitment to dedicate the rest of my life to 
endeavoring to persuade my compatriots that their happiness, their ease, and their 
security will really be assured if they collaborate, completely, confidently, and loyally 
with the noble government. I have publicly made the same statements before my judges. I 
declare in the same way solemn (that I want) to break all relations with the Vietnamese 
who would enter into struggle against the noble government and to separate myself from 
them forever and ever. I therefore have no complaints against the judges who have 
pronounced their decision on the nature of my faults. Their sentence is fair because they 
only had to judge me for the crimes that were committed before the end of 1913. As the 
Criminal Commission has inflicted a just punishment on me, I can only implore the pity 
and forgiveness of the noble government.  I will respectfully receive its just decision with 
infinite gratitude. Hanoi, December 3, 1925.  The humble supplication of Phan Boi 
Châu.659 
These were surely difficult words for the old patriot to write.  In a textual display of self-
abnegation, Phan Bội Châu outdented each instance of “noble government (貴政),” while he 
referred to himself as “this fool (愚).”  This was likely the lowest point Phan Bội Châu had yet 
experienced in his life.   Nevertheless, Phan Bội Châu’s willingness to work with the French 
Protectorate government, even playing a role as a collaborator, bore strong similarities to the 
proposals he previously made in letters to Néron and Sarraut, and in Pháp Việt đề huề chính kiến 
thư (A Proposal for a Franco-Vietnamese Collaboration Policy).660  It cannot be argued that he 
was any more sincere in writing this appeal than he had been in those earlier writings.   
Phan Bội Châu’s appeal made Varenne’s job slightly easier and Robin’s slightly harder.  
Varenne could use it to justify a pardon as the accused had demonstrated contrition and promised 
to work faithfully with the government.  Robin could use the appeal too, as proof of Phan Bội 
Châu’s guilt. Guilt would only allow Robin to confirm the judicial sentence, but it would not 
help him convince Varenne that Phan Bội Châu still represented a danger to the colony.  Part of 
the problem lay in the nature of Phan Bội Châu’s appeal.  Instead of challenging the verdict 
(guilty) or even the sentence (forced labor for life), Phan Bội Châu simply asked for what 
clemency the government could provide.   
On December 7, Bride sent Varenne his two final notes as president of the Criminal 
Commission.661  Both notes offered Bride’s opinion on Phan Bội Châu’s appeal (which he 
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enclosed) and the possibility or nature of a pardon.  To assist Varenne in making a decision, 
Bride sought to clearly define the roles and responsibilities.  The role of the Criminal 
Commission, Bride stressed, had been to determine if Phan Bội Châu was responsible for the 
crimes committed in 1913.  The Commission members were absolutely certain of Phan Bội 
Châu’s guilt.  The Commission had considered attenuating circumstances not because it had any 
doubt about the guilt of the accused, but rather because of his age.  By considering attenuating 
circumstances, Bride argued, the Criminal Commission had already provided a pardon, if only a 
limited one.  Whether Phan Bội Châu deserved a broader pardon or not, was now entirely a 
political question for the Protectorate government.662   
On the political question of a broader pardon, Bride offered Varenne some legal advice, 
though he stressed it was entirely supplementary to his role as president of the Criminal 
Commission.   If a pardon were politically necessary, according to Bride the best choice would 
be partial pardon commuting the sentence of hard labor to “obligatory transport to a specific 
locality.”  In other words, Bride suggested Varenne exile Phan Bội Châu overseas, in a manner 
similar to the rogue Emperors Hàm Nghi, Thành Thái, and Duy Tân.  Bride suggested Algeria, 
New Caledonia, or the Antilles.  The one thing Varenne should absolutely avoid, according to 
Bride, would be to offer a full pardon.  A conditional pardon would “retain a sanction for the 
[criminal] acts for which PBC recognizes himself as the author because he confesses in his plea 
of December 3 to have committed the crimes that are imputed to him by the verdict of the 
Criminal Commission.”663  Bride’s note was an elegant way of trying to salvage all of his work 
as president of the Criminal Commission.  If Varenne pardoned Phan Bội Châu, it would send a 
message that politics mattered more than justice.   
The Protectorate Council met at 9:00 AM on December 9, 1925 to consider Phan Bội 
Châu’s appeal.664  Robin read Acting Prosecutor General Bourayne’s letter of December 3 
arguing the appeal was without merit and should be rejected.  As Phan Bội Châu had not 
presented any new evidence, the Protectorate Council, in its capacity as a Court of Cassation, 
simply reviewed whether the Criminal Commission had properly observed procedure (it had).  
According to Bourayne, “The accused presented his defense and was defended by his co-
counsellors. He had the last word.”  Bourayne noted that Phan Bội Châu had been given three 
days to prepare his defense, but in the event had enjoyed thirteen days.  Having finished reading 
Bourayne’s letter, Robin reviewed the facts of Phan Bội Châu’s case, noting that all procedures 
had been followed to the letter.   Having therefore taken all circumstance into consideration, the 
Protectorate Council advised Governor General Varenne that the appeal should be rejected, and 
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ended the meeting at 10:00 AM.665   
Whether or not Robin knew of Bride’s advice to Varenne concerning conditional pardons, 
Robin had no interest in allowing any clemency for Phan Bội Châu. He also did not trust Varenne 
to recognize the danger the security officials (and Robin himself) saw in Phan Bội Châu.  As 
such, Robin now attempted to present Varenne with another fait accompli.  On December 11, the 
head of the Legislation and Administration Service of the Government General presented a note 
to Governor General Varenne.666  The note explained that the Protectorate Council had met under 
the leadership of the resident superior of Tonkin (Robin) and advised Phan Bội Châu’s appeal be 
rejected.  The note then laid out the terms of Article 31 of the Decree of September 15, 1896: 
“The Governor General, on the assent of the Protectorate Council, rules on the appeal, by a 
simple decree which, in the event of rejection, may order immediate execution.”667  Pursuant to 
these regulations, the head of the Legislation and Administration Service had prepared for 
Varenne a formal rejection of the appeal ready to be signed.668  The envelope containing both 
documents further demanded the attached documents “be submitted, without delay, for signature 
by the Governor General.”669 
Though he had quite easily steamrolled his way through the deep state’s previous attempt 
to force his hand, Varenne now seemed to lose his nerve.  On December 11, Varenne sent an 
urgent plea to Perrier, the minister of colonies:  
Please urgently propose to President of Republic immediate and complete grace for Phan 
Bội Châu, sentenced to forced labor for life by Criminal Commission Hanoi.  Sentenced 
confirmed yesterday by Protectorate Council of Tonkin which provided advice to reject 
appeal. Cases dating back to 1913, capital conviction by default.  Moral complicity 
presumed in various assassinations with no proof of effective participation.  The 
condemned is an old patriot agitator.  Long time unrepentant enemy now older and claims 
to recognize errors.  Almost entire indigenous population requests pardon on occasion of 
new GGI and French liberal political pledge in Indochina.  Certain precedents authorize 
pardon.670 
Varenne, who had only arrived in Hanoi four days prior, was not in a good position to 
claim a capital conviction was reached “by default.” Nor was he in a good position to claim there 
was “no proof of effective participation.”671  Nevertheless, he made this representation and hoped 
President Gaston Doumergue would carry his water for him.   
 Perrier was content to let Varenne sweat a bit.  On December 15, Varenne cabled Perrier 
again, expressing his surprise at a lack of response and re-emphasizing the urgency of the 
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670 SPCE 352, Télégramme Officiel, Gougal (Varenne, Hanoi) à Colonies Paris, No. 1625, 11 décembre 
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request, which, he claimed, “will lose its useful effect if delayed too long.”672  Despairing of a 
response from Perrier, Varenne then cabled AGINDO to ask Cordonnier to obtain a response 
from President Doumergue.673  Perrier finally responded on December 20 informing Varenne that 
he and the president of the Council of Ministers had no objection to Varenne offering amnesty to 
Phan Bội Châu, as long as there was absolutely no proof of effective participation in the 1913 
attacks.674  Perrier added, “this is a decision that belongs to you.”675  Neither the Ministry of 
Colonies nor President Doumergue were willing to take responsibility for Phan Bội Châu.   
Governor General Varenne signed the order granting clemency on December 23, 1925.676  
The previous day Varenne had signed the form rejecting Phan Bội Châu’s appeal, which meant 
the clemency order now pardoned Phan Bội Châu for all of the crimes he had been found guilty 
of by the 1925 Criminal Commission.677  Notably, however, the pardon did not include the words 
“immediate and complete grace” that  Varenne had included in his cable to Perrier.  Phan Bội 
Châu was allowed to move to Huế, however, “The resident superiors of Tonkin and Annam, and 
the director of the Judicial Administration of Indochina” were charged with the execution of 
Varenne’s order.  The pardon did not mean Phan Bội Châu was free to do as he wished.   
For Robin, Bride, and the civil servants of Indochina, Varenne’s act was a bitter pill to 
swallow, but it did mean the mood in the streets turned from anger to joy.  Members of the 
Vietnamese educated classes could and did claim the amnesty for Phan Bội Châu as a major 
victory.  For a moment, lines of communication had connected up and down the country.  
Vietnamese had a national hero, he had stood up to a French prosecutor in court and defended 
himself.  Newspapers and journals revealed the history and demeanor of a Vietnamese patriot 
who refused to bow to Indochina’s colonizers.678 Vietnamese had entered city streets united in a 
single goal, for what seemed like the first time.  December 1925 marked a watershed for 
Vietnamese nationalism.  Henceforth it would be visible, it would be loud, and it would have a 
hero. 
Varenne’s pardon turned a potential national martyr into a national hero, but in so doing 
Varenne had cleared Phan Bội Châu’s legacy of many complicating features.  Varenne’s pardon 
retroactively turned the Criminal Commission into a colonial show trial. Phan Bội Châu could 
simply walk away from his admissions of guilt.  All of the allegations so painstakingly proven by 
 
672 SPCE 352, Télégramme Officiel, Gougal (Varenne, Hanoi) à Colonies Paris, No. 1640, 15 décembre 
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674 SPCE 352, Télégramme Officiel, Colonies Paris (Perrier) à Gougal (Varenne, Hanoi), No. 1035, 20 
décembre 1925. 
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677 SPCE 352, Le Gouverneur General de l’Indochina, No. 4830, 22 décembre 1925. 
678 A number of pamphlets reflecting on Phan Bội Châu’s place in Vietnamese society and history appeared 
in 1926.  Mai Du Lân of the Thực Nghiệp publishing house in Hanoi published a collection of essays as Mai Du 
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Phụng (aka Tùng Lâm), Phan Bội Châu ngày nay (Phan Bội Châu today) (Saigon: Imprimerie Xưa Nay, 1926), 
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Bride and the Criminal Commission could now be easily written off.   Politics had triumphed 
over justice.   
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Chapter Five 
Time, Morality, and Revolution: Phan Bội Châu and the Book of Changes 
If Phan Bội Châu had been executed in 1925, he would have earned the title of Vietnam’s 
“greatest patriotic martyr.”  Perhaps recognizing the dangers of such a posthumous moniker, on 
December 23, 1925, the governor-general of French Indochina Alexander Varenne acceded to the 
demands of thousands of Vietnamese protesters by commuting Phan’s sentence to house arrest in 
Huế.679  The ardent patriot with a reputation for advocating violent resistance was forced to 
spend the next fifteen years of his life under the watchful eyes of the French colonial 
administration and its secret police, the Sûreté.   
For decades, Phan had sent tracts back to Vietnam from distant Japan and China, solidifying 
his reputation as a nationalist.  In works such as A History of the Loss of Vietnam (1905), New 
Vietnam (1907), and A Letter from Abroad Written in Blood (1907), Phan laid out his 
interpretation of Vietnam’s recent past and offered a vision of its future.  These were political 
works, designed to arouse strong patriotic and anti-French sentiments.  In them, Phan focused on 
the oppressive French colonial state with its taxation and punitive policies, and the corrupt local 
administration it kept alive to ensure its own legitimacy.680  Phan argued that a Vietnam free of 
these illegitimate villains would  be able to rise to the heights of modernity.  The Vietnamese 
people would enjoy trains, airplanes, and skyscrapers - the rewards of living in a civilized 
modern society dedicated to science, patriotism, and virtue.681    
In a later book, A Study of Vietnamese History (1909), Phan abandoned vitriol for a more 
sober presentation of the “objective facts.”  Phan’s conception of Vietnam now took on historical 
depth.  Phan recounted how the nation originated in the near mythical time of the Hung Kings, 
then suffered under almost a millennium of Chinese domination despite the efforts of a long line 
of national heroes.  Phan glossed over a fair portion of Vietnam’s medieval history, only to 
refocus his attentions on Lê Lợi, the fifteenth-century general who led a successful rebellion 
against Chinese Ming Dynasty invaders.  After saving the country of Đại Việt, Lê Lợi founded 
the Lê Dynasty (1428-1788).682  Phan held up Lê Lợi as a quintessential patriot laudable for his 
ability to rally the Vietnamese people and drive off a mighty invader.683  
Educated Vietnamese people who read these texts, which had been printed in Japan and 
 
679 Phan’s “house arrest” actually allowed him to take day trips on the Perfume River in a sampan.  This 
pratice earned him the sobriquet “Old Man of the Imperial Quay (Ông già Bến Ngự).” 
680 French Colonial Indochina was composed of five distinct and separately-administered regions: Tonkin, 
Annam, Cochinchina, Laos, and Cambodia.  In Tonkin and Annam, the French rulers delegated limited authority to 
the Nguyễn dynastic state.  The Nguyễn state was responsible for the systems of justice, taxation, and local 
administration, and carried out these functions by appointing mandarins selected through the examination system.  
Phan had obtained a cử nhân bachelor’s degree in the Nghê An regional examinations of 1900,  but chose not to 
become a mandarin. David Marr argues this was because Phan denounced those who joined the native 
administration as collaborators, and wished only to demonstrate his academic qualifications for revolutionary 
purposes. 
681 Phan Bội Châu,  The New Vietnam,  in Colonialism Experienced: Vietnamese Writings on Colonialism, 
1900-1931,. trans. Truong Buu Lam (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 2000), 105-124. 
682 The state of Đại Việt encompassed the Red River valley and provinces to the south.  This name was 
used from 1054, during the Lý Dynasty (1009-1225) until 1804, when Emperor Gia Long of the Nguyễn Dynasty 
(1802-1954) renamed the country Việt Nam. 
683 Phan Bội Châu, “Việt Nam Quốc Sử Khảo.” The Collected Works of Phan Bội Châu (Phan Bội Châu 
Toàn tập, Tập 3: Văn Thơ Những Năm ở Nước Ngoài).  ed. Chương Thâu. (Hà Nội: Thuận Hóa Publishers, 2000),   
9-146. 
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smuggled back into the country, were impressed by the erudition of Phan’s writings and the 
comprehensiveness of his vision.  Though literati had taken up their brushes in patriotic defense 
of king and country before, Phan wrote in a vibrant and approachable style that conveyed his 
intuitive statesmanship and addressed Vietnamese of all social classes.  His impact became 
evident in 1925, when mass protests against a sentence of hard labor for fifty-eight-year-old Phan 
brought rickshaw pullers and female stall-owners from the market into the streets alongside 
students and scholars.684  The French hand was forced. 
This was a clear and dramatic victory, but what could Phan do while under house arrest?  
Phan had lost his opportunity for martyrdom and was now restrained from engaging in any kind 
of surreptitious revolutionary activities by vigilant guards.  Though this must have rankled the 
elderly partisan, he kept busy by meeting with visitors, making occasional speeches, and writing 
prodigiously.  Just as he had done while in the Cantonese prison eleven years before, Phan began 
to write.  With more comfortable surroundings685 and plenty of free time, Phan’s annual literary 
production skyrocketed.  According to Trần Anh Vinh, Phan wrote nearly four times as much 
during the Huế years as he had in the forty-three years previously.686  Furthermore, he could now 
contemplate and carefully consider exactly what and how to write.  Soon after his arrest Phan, 
composed a considerable number of poems.  He later wrote articles that were published by his 
friend Huỳnh Thúc Kháng in the journal Tiếng Dân (The Voice of the People).   
Perhaps thinking of his legacy, Phan decided to draft his life’s story for the second time.  In 
1929, through a network of friends and supporters, Phan was able to secretly print The 
Autobiography of Phan Bội Châu by using underground presses.687  He had written it at night 
using double-ply reversible paper.  This allowed him to secretly compose a work that otherwise 
would surely have been confiscated by the French authorities.688  This work recounted Phan’s 
public career as a revolutionary and nationalist.  In it, Phan hoped to impart three lessons to the 
youth of Vietnam: (1). Self-conceit leads to disaster; (2) blind trust in people is foolish; (3) lack 
of attention to detail causes all ventures to fail.  These three lessons represented a shift away 
from Phan’s fiery condemnations of colonialism and exuberant glorifications of martyrs.  It was 
a shift toward thoughtful reflection on his life and on history. 
Phan Bội Châu’s later work was that of a man who still held strong patriotic beliefs, but who 
now saw that a more thorough understanding of the world and its underlying principles would be 
needed for Vietnam to achieve its independence.  Feeling he still could offer the next generation 
some valuable insight, Phan worked hard to develop a new vision of personal conduct and 
political action.  The crux of that vision was a technique of personal cultivation that, if used 
effectively, would produce revolutionaries armed with perspicacity, determination, and charisma 
 
684 David Marr, Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920-1945 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1981).  18-19. 
685 Many Vietnamese sent money to support Phan and the group of elderly patriotic scholars who came to 
live with him, ensuring he did not want for his simple material needs. 
686 Trần Anh Vinh, Thơ Văn Phan Bội Châu thời kỳ ở Huế (1926-1940). (Hà Nội: Thuận Hóa Publishers, 
1987), 16. 
687 David Marr, following Chương Thâu, claims the text was written in 1937.  Marr, Vietnamese 
Anticolonialism, 267. After a more thorough review of sources, Vinh Sinh and Nicholas Wickenden, determined that 
Phan wrote the work between 1928 and 1929.  Vinh Sinh and Nicholas Wickenden.  “Introduction.” Overturned 
Chariot: The Autobiography of Phan-Bội-Châu, (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i Press, SHAPS Library of 
Translations, 1999), 24. 
688 Vinh Sinh and Wickenden, 24. 
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sufficient to succeed where Phan had failed.  This vision unfolded most profoundly in Phan’s two 
longest and most philosophically engaged works: The Light of Confucian Studies and his 
unassuming and extensive commentary on The Book of Changes.   
At first glance, Phan’s commentary on The Book of Changes is  a long and rather mundane 
antiquarian musing.  It has been duly dismissed as such by numerous historians, both foreign and 
Vietnamese.  However, upon closer examination, Phan’s commentary on The Book of Changes 
reveals a perceptive and motivated mind at work.  We find Phan offering to Vietnamese 
intellectuals a unique and powerful framework for understanding the very nature of time and 
how to harness change itself.  In this chapter, I will show how Phan employs The Book of 
Changes as a refractive device for ordering the modern world.  It is a tool through which he 
articulates a coherent Confucian revolutionary ideology that patriotic Vietnamese could use to 
overthrow French colonialism and build a modern Vietnamese nation. 
Phan Bội Châu’s Commentary on The Book of Changes 
The Changes of Zhou (Chu Dịch) by Phan Bội Châu is a 760-page commentary on the 
Confucian classic, The Book of Changes.  The commentary is a hefty volume that is prefaced by 
a two-page foreword, a thirteen-page introduction, and a two-page introduction to the 
Hexagrams. All of this is followed by the main body of the work, which consists of 676 pages, 
which constitute sixty-four individual chapters covering the hexagrams.  All of this is then 
followed by an Appendix containing portions of the Great Commentary.  This document 
accounts for the entirety of Volume Nine of Phan Bội Châu Toàn Tập (The Collected Works of 
Phan Bội Châu), edited by Chương Thâu, the preeminent scholar of Phan’s life and work.  In a 
foreword to the volume, Chương Thâu informs us that Phan completed an original manuscript 
exceeding 1,000 pages, which was entitled An Explanation of the Changes of Zhou in Vietnamese 
(Quốc Văn Chu Dịch Diễn Giải).  This text was hand copied three times in romanized 
Vietnamese (quốc ngữ) sometime before the end of 1937, when a publication notice went out in 
Huỳnh Thúc Kháng’s periodical entitled The Voice of the People (Tiếng Dân).  The original 
copies were given to Phan’s close confidantes, including his student Nguyễn Văn Yêm,689 for 
safekeeping.  This was done because the work could not be published immediately due to 
heightened French surveillance of Phan’s house.   
In 1943, a short excerpt from Phan’s commentary on The Book of Changes on the topic of 
“Wang Yangming studies in Japan” appeared in Wang Yangming (Vương Dương Minh) by Phan 
Văn Hùm.  According to Chương Thâu, it is not clear whether Phan Văn Hùm held one of the 
original copies of Phan’s commentary.  After 1945, Nguyễn Văn Yêm provided a number of 
Phan’s writings, including the commentary, to the Cultural Office of Nghệ An province.  Chương 
Thâu claims that he “discovered” these papers in 1967.  Unfortunately, sixteen out of thirty 
sections had been misplaced.   
Serendipitously, the family of Tống Châu Phu (of the Astronomical Service in Huế) sent a 
painstakingly-transcribed copy of one of the originals (now lost), which had been borrowed from 
the family of Phan Nghi Đệ, Phan Bội Châu’s son, to an exhibition of Phan Bội Châu’s 
belongings and works.  This exhibition had been organized at the University of Huế in 1967 for 
Phan’s birthday centennial.  Finally, in 1969, the Khai Trí publishing house in Saigon published 
the Tống Châu Phu version in two volumes, which were together entitled Chu Dịch.  However, 
 
689 Chương Thâu relates that Nguyễn Văn Yêm was Phan Bội Châu’s student in Huế from 1934 to 1938.  
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 10. 
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this version was still missing four chapters.690  Chương Thâu claims that The Collected Works of 
Phan Bội Châu contains the most complete version.691   
It seems Phan wanted the text published in romanized Vietnamese because he felt this would 
more effectively connect with his intended audience - younger Vietnamese who could not read 
Chinese. By doing so, Phan was implicitly recognizing that Chinese had fallen out of favor and 
indeed out of use.692  However, the use of romanized Vietnamese, presents complications for 
anyone reading the text.  Phan transliterated the original text of the Book of Changes, which is 
written in a terse form of ancient Chinese that included many rare characters.  Once transliterated 
into romanized Vietnamese, however, these characters became indistinguishable from one 
another.  A Vietnamese reader with no knowledge of classical Chinese would find the result 
nearly indecipherable.   
To make up for this, Phan provides careful explanations in colloquial Vietnamese for nearly 
every word of the original text, and this exercise comprises the bulk of the commentary.  The 
result is a hybrid text - primarily Chinese in content, but Vietnamese in form and script.  Like 
Phan Bội Châu himself, the commentary straddles two languages and two historical repertoires, 
drawing freely from both to better reveal the secrets of the Book of Changes to the untrained but 
eager Vietnamese reader.  Phan’s explanations are colloquial and easy-to-understand.  They 
demonstrate clearly Phan’s abilities as a communicator, for the Book of Changes is not a simple 
or easily-understood text.   
The Book of Changes was not a frivolous choice.  The Book of Changes is held by many, 
including, (it is said), Confucius himself, to be the preeminent classic.  The Book of Changes has 
enjoyed a level of scholarly and, at times, popular attention, on par with great religious texts such 
as the Bible or Quran.  The Book of Changes (Yijing 易經) is a complex text with multiple layers 
representing separate yet interrelated discourses.  The first layer, the Changes of Zhou (Zhouyi 周
易), is a divinatory text from the early Zhou period.  The language is cryptic, terse, and often 
quite brutal.  Richard Rutt calls it, “a royal book of oracles mainly related to warfare, especially 
warfare as a means of obtaining captives to be killed in sacrifices.”693  Comprised of sixty four 
hexagram sections, which have been variously organized,694 The Changes of Zhou contains 
hexagrams (gua 卦), hexagram names (guaming 卦名), hexagram statements (guaci 卦辭), and 
line statements (yaoci 爻辭).  This primary layer is neither moralizing in content nor does it 
provide an explicit holistic cosmological understanding of the world.  Instead, it offers a series of 
mantic pronouncements on fluid instances or moments in time, alternatively quotidian, historical, 
 
690 It is worth noting that Nghệ An and Huế were on opposite sides of the Vietnam War.  Chương Thâu 
makes no mention of the fact that the text was first published in the southern Republic of Vietnam. 
691 Chương Thâu, “Concerning the Work An Explanation of the Changes of Zhou in Vietnamese” (“Về Văn 
Bản Tác Phẩm Quốc Văn Chu Dịch Diễn Giải”). The Collected Works of Phan Bội Châu (Phan Bội Châu Toàn tập, 
Tập 9: Chu Dịch),  (Hanoi, VN: Nhà Xuất Thuận Hóa, 2000), 9-10. 
692 See Woodside, Community, 75-76. 
693 Richard Rutt,  Zhouyi: The Book of Changes (Surrey, UK: Curzon, 1996).  135. 
694 Phan Bội Châu’s commentary abides, as do most commentaries, by the “received order” or the “King 
Wen” sequence.  Variations include the Mawangdui version and, later, the Shao Yong sequence or the “Fu Xi” 
arrangement.  For more information, see Richard Smith,  Fathoming the Cosmos and Ordering the World: The 
Yijing (I-Ching, or Classic of Changes) and Its Evolution in China  (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia 
Press, 2008), 50-56, 122-124. 
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or archetypal.  The content ranges from the natural changing of the seasons to significant points 
of transition in the cultural or social life of individuals or communities.695   
Philosophers in the later Zhou and Han periods chose The Changes of Zhou as a 
foundational text upon which to build a thoroughgoing cosmological explanation for the universe 
and the development of human society.  These philosophers added a set of conceptual definitions 
and practices that thoroughly changed the meaning of The Changes of Zhou, and provided the 
basis for a wide variety of theoretical, philosophical, and  commentarial discourses from the Han 
dynasty forward.696  This second layer was The Ten Wings (Shiyi 十翼), a heterogenous set of 
texts purportedly compiled by Confucius.  Han dynasty academicians combined the Changes of 
Zhou and The Ten Wings, and thereby created the one of the five Chinese classics: The Book of 
Changes.  
With the addition of the Ten Wings, the text became, as Richard Smith puts it, “a microcosm 
of the universe.”697  For example, The Great Commentary (Dazhuan 大傳, one of the Ten 
Wings), ,  states “In [The Book of Changes] are included the forms and the scope of everything in 
the heavens and on earth, so that nothing escapes it.”698  The text itself thus claims to represent 
all varieties of phenomena and change, offering to the dedicated reader a typology of the 
universe and its permutations -:a prism through which the cosmos might be conceptualized, 
understood, and ordered.   
The typology presented is best explained as an example of “correlative cosmology.”  The Ten 
Wings describes a universe composed of interrelated and mutually productive properties: light 
and dark, the firm and the yielding, motion and rest, the creative and the receptive.  This list is 
theoretically unlimited, but indicates an essential dualism that permeates the cosmology of The 
Book of Changes: that of yin and yang (陰陽).  Yinyang cosmology and an affiliated system 
known as the five agents, or wuxing 五行, are at the heart of an, “elaborate system of 
correspondence and resonance, often described as ‘correlative thinking.’”699  Where Western 
style positivistic logic emphasizes logical subordination and external causality, correlative 
cosmology emphasizes instead complex patterning, relativistic associations, and analogical 
reasoning.  Correlative cosmological principles underlie much of East Asian philosophy and 
aesthetic theory.  A familiarity with this system and how it can be used and repurposed is 
essential for understanding Phan’s commentary and his broader political project.   
In correlative cosmology, time is not as an abstract substance or theoretical category.  Rather, 
time is an immanent and continuous flow punctuated by successive moments of change or 
 
695 For an interesting exploration of the content of the Zhouyi, see Smith,  Fathoming, 18-24. 
696 There are many examples of a Han moral meaning overlaying an earlier connotation.  Benjamin 
Schwartz describes how the graphic for “correct” or zheng 正 originally involved a cluster of ideas including 
“governing,” “punitive action,” and “attacking a settlement with foot-soldiers.”  Benjamin Schwartz,  The World of 
Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 103. 
697 Smith Fathoming,  38. 
698 Richard Wilhelm,  The I Ching or Book of Changes ( New York, NY: Bollingen Foundation, Inc., 1950)  
296 
699 Smith,   Fathoming,32.  Benjamin Schwartz provides a helpful explanation: “The essential 
preoccupation lying behind the correlative cosmology seems to be that of finding in the homologies between human 
and natural phenomena a means of controlling human civilization as well as human individual life by ‘aligning’ 
them with the cycles, rhythms, and patterns of the natural realm.”  Benjamin Schwartz,  The World of Thought in 
Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985).  355. 
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alteration.  This notion of time differs significantly from Western notions of time, as presented in 
Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities.  Correlative cosmological time differs from 
“messianic time” insofar as no divine figure or other external force is understood to be ordering a 
simultaneous, eternal time.  Rather, correlative cosmology holds that time is continuous change 
without beginning or end.  Nothing is eternal except change itself and no thing, divine or 
otherwise, exists outside of change.  Correlative cosmological time is also different from linear 
time or “homogenous, empty time” because it is not an abstract quantity.700   In correlative 
cosmology, time is the fundamental texture in which events take place.  Time is immanent and 
suffused with moral force.  Ethical precepts derived from correlative cosmology place a much 
greater emphasis on when and how to act correctly than it does on what the correct action is - a 
perennial concern of Greek and Christian philosophers. 
This moral force associated with correlative cosmological time is complemented by a notion 
of resonance between things within space.  In contrast to the idea, common to Western 
philosophy, that objects are discrete phenomena upon which outside forces can act (Newtonian 
physics), correlative cosmology contends that “like-things could influence like-things on a 
cosmic as well as microcosmic scale.”701  Thus, the most important task for philosophy is to 
properly categorize things such that an adept could understand how achieve harmony by the 
correct ordering of relationships between objects, people, and social institutions.  Thus, 
correlative cosmology is inherently a political as well as philosophical mode of thought. Because 
The Book of Changes reveals how to bring about cosmological order, it could thus become, in the 
hands of the right individual, a device of great political power.   
Commentaries on The Book of Changes constitute an important part of the text’s legacy.  
From the late Han dynasty onward, additional layers of interpretation accumulated and expanded 
the applicable scope of the text dramatically.  Commentators approached The Book of Changes 
from a wide variety of philosophical, political, and literary points of view.  Richard Smith writes, 
“not surprisingly, Confucians found Confucian meanings in The Book of Changes, Daoists found 
Daoist meanings in it, and Buddhists found Buddhist meanings in it.  And, as indicated above, 
people in different periods of Chinese history - not to mention at different points in their own 
lives - quite naturally used the [Book of Changes] for different purposes and in different ways, in 
accordance with the times.”702  The enigmatic character of the original text, the sociopolitically 
significant moral layer, and a dazzlingly creative variety of commentarial traditions, ensured The 
Book of Changes would have a long-standing and widespread popularity - one that has persisted 
into the modern era.703   
 
700 This raises the question of whether Phan’s interpretation of modern nationalism may fall outside of 
Anderson’s considerations, but this is a question that will have to wait for future examination.  Benedict Anderson, 
Imagined Communities (London, UK: Verso, 1983). 24. 
701 Richard Smith,   The I Ching: A Biography (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012),  54. 
702 Smith, Fathoming, 3. 
703 The Book of Changes gained prominence among Vietnamese scholars during the Lê dynasty (1428-
1789), though it was rarely considered a text worthy of specialized study.  There were two important exceptions.  
The first was Nguyễn Bỉnh Khiêm 阮秉謙 (1491-1585), the “Vietnamese Nostradamus” and an exponent of Shao 
Yong’s numerological approach.  The second was Lê Quý Đôn (黎貴惇, 1726–1784), who propounded in his An 
Explanation of the Classic of Changes for Different Levels on the applications of the Changes to practical statecraft.⁠  
Smith, The I Ching,152-3.  Lê Quý Đôn was the sort of prolific scholar whose encyclopedic writings remained 
influential into the  twentieth century.  He argued that “the universe was ruled by an unchanging, immanent sense of 
moral organization.”  All changes that might take place needed to “affirm and reinforce the greater unchanging 
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The two main schools of interpretation were the “Meanings and Principles School (yili jia 義
理家),” which focused on the moral content of the Book of Changes, and the “Images and 
Numbers School (xiangshu jia 象數家),” which explored mathematical and cosmological 
correspondences between the text and the wider world.  These schools found their most 
significant expressions during the Song dynasty in the work of the Cheng brothers, whose 
approach to The Book of Changes Smith calls “relentlessly moral,” and Shao Yong 紹雍 (1011-
1077), who devised influential numerological correspondences and created the “Fuxi 
Arrangement of the Sixty-four Hexagrams (Fuxi liushisi gu tu 伏羲六十四掛圖).”704  The 
famous Neo-Confucian Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) drew from both schools, contending that “the 
ultimate purpose of the Changes was to contribute to self-cultivation.”705  As we will see that 
Zhu Xi’s viewpoint was to prove significant for Phan Bội Châu’s interpretation of The Book of 
Changes.   
 Phan’s foreword and introduction, presented in a simple and direct manner, lay out his 
reasons for writing the commentary and explain what he considers the most important principles 
of The Book of Changes.  Phan makes three points.  First, The Changes is a text relevant to the 
modern global age.  Second, the notion of change found in The Changes is coherent, all-
inclusive, and undergirds a cosmological system built on immanence and correlation, rather than 
external causality.  Third, the most important concept introduced in The Changes is the human 
capacity to accord with time itself - what we might call punctuality.  These three insights form 
the foundation upon which Phan erects his grand vision of The Book of Changes and its 
instrumental role in Vietnamese politics.  Phan opens in the foreword by separating Eastern 
philosophy into three categories: Buddhism, Daoism, and the study of The Book of Changes.706  
Buddhism, he contends, is highly idealistic, but pushes an adherent toward an eremitic life.  
Meanwhile, Daoism  is overly mystical and impractical.  Buddhism and Daoism will not suit the 
modern world, which demands perception and engagement.  By contrast, the study of The Book 
of Changes is the most refined, realistic, perceptive, and suitable philosophy for grasping and 
contending with modernity, colonialism, and ultimately nation-building.   
Phan then injects his commentary into a global discourse by deploring how Westerners and 
Japanese busy themselves with The Changes while the Vietnamese, “go begging with a jewel in 
[their] pocket.”707  In other words, the “modern” nations of east and west have discovered the 
power of The Changes while the Vietnamese ignore it.  With these opening lines, Phan makes 
 
moral sense, in order to escape disaster.”  Thus it fell upon enlightened individuals to maintain “high standards of 
moral stewardship and self-stewardship” so as to ensure that any changes that did happen occurred within proper 
bounds.⁠2?  As we shall see, Phan took the notion of personal responsibility for change very seriously, while straying 
significantly from Lê Quý Đôn’s overall political conservatism.  Alexander Woodside,  “Conceptions of Change and 
of Human Responsibility for Change in Late Traditional Vietnam.” in Moral Order and the Question of Change: 
Essays on Southeast Asian Thought, ed. by David K. Wyatt and Alexander Woodside,  (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Southeast Asia Studies, 1982), 120-1. 
704 Smith, Fathoming,120-130. 
705 Smith, Fathoming, 134. 
706 Phan’s study presents the three in this order: Buddhism, “yi-ology” (the study of The Book of Changes), 
then Daoism. 
707 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 14. 
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clear who his intended audience is: young Vietnamese intellectuals seeking to understand the 
nature of the world and how they might best take their place in it.  For Phan, the point of writing 
the commentary is to convince the Vietnamese people they have an incredible tool at their 
disposal, one that, if grasped effectively, could change everything. 
Phan grumbles that in Vietnam, The Book of Changes has been taken for a prop by blind 
soothsayers or as simple exam material by careerist scholars-officials.  Phan accuses the 
Vietnamese of simply sitting around in their houses and staring at their diplomas while the 
sophisticated and abstruse insights of Fu Xi, King Wen, the Duke of Zhou, and Confucius lay 
waiting.  This statement fits well with the classical trope of a valuable thing lying unused.  The 
trope usually symbolizes an official ignored or exiled by a thoughtless emperor.  In Phan’s 
analogy, The Book of Changes takes the place of the official while the Vietnamese people play 
the ignorant sovereign.  Phan claims that his own lowly contribution is the equivalent of 
fathoming the depths of the ocean with a clamshell or peeping at the heavens through a pipe.  
Even so, Phan writes, he dare not keep this tasty morsel of food or delicious drink to himself.708  
Phan feels he must do what he can to reveal the wisdom contained within the Book of Changes 
so that the Vietnamese people may benefit from its epistemological power.   
Phan’s introduction provides a basic overview of The Book of Changes, and is broken into 
seven sections.  The first section concerns the history of The Book of Changes.  Here Phan makes 
it clear that he values The Book of Changes for its philosophical profundity and not for its 
original mantic properties.  Phan reaffirms the traditional genealogy of authors (Fu Xi, King 
Wen, the Duke of Zhou, and Confucius), but reserves special emphasis for the role of Confucius 
in compiling The Ten Wings.  Phan writes that before Confucius added this collection,  “the 
words were too abstruse, the meaning was too profound, and scholars rarely understood its 
import.”  Phan thus affirms that the moralizing layer of the Ten Wings is a valid representation of 
the deeper meaning of The Changes of Zhou. There is no mention of divination methods in the 
introduction.  Even more telling, the sections ofthe Great Commentary left out of the Appendix 
are precisely those having to do with mantic practices.709  From the start, Phan’s commentary 
treats The Book of Changes as a text imbued with a moral force derived from its intuitive and 
profound expression of correlative cosmological principles. 
The second section discusses the concept and reality of change.  Phan explains that change 
(dịch) has three meanings: non-change (bất dịch), exchange (giao dịch), and ceaseless change 
(biến dịch).710  Phan says that ceaseless change is most important for understanding the Changes, 
but that all three meanings are mutually constitutive and generative.  Phan explains by way of an 
analogy:  “Take for example the original substance of a male or a female.  For a male this 
[substance] is definitely yang while for a female it is definitely yin.  This [certainty] is the 
meaning of ‘non-change.’  When males and females exchange [fluids] with one another they 
create a male or a female.  This is using ‘exchange’ to create ‘ceaseless change.’  However after 
[entering into] ‘ceaseless change,’ a male is still male and a female is still a female.  Thus 
 
708 Ibid. 
709 In “The Appendix” presenting The Great Commentary, Phan leaves out sections six and nine and 
portions of sections eight, ten, eleven, and twelve from “Part One” and portions of all sections, except section seven, 
from “Part Two.” 
710 This tripartite definition was originally explained in the anonymous work  Zhouyi Qianzuodu 周易乾鑿
度.  Smith, Fathoming, 78-79.  Bent Nielsen notes that the work is attributed to Zheng Xuan 鄭玄 (127-200).  Bent 
Nielsen,  A Companion to Yi Jing Numerology and Cosmology (London, UK: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 304. 
153 
‘ceaseless change’ returns to ‘non-change.’”711  Phan thus presents change as endless yet 
dynamic.712   
According to Phan, the ordering principle of any given thing (that which is “non-changing”) 
does not exist independently; it is always already a constituent part of that which it orders.  Such 
“non-changing” ordering principles are inherent within the nature of everything in the universe, 
but they are not in any way separate from it.  All things can and will interact (or “exchange”) 
with other things endlessly.  This is what Phan calls “ceaseless change.”  Phan provides examples 
to help readers understand .  Iron melts in fire and presumably hardens again afterwards.  The 
nature of iron does not change, despite the fact that the iron itself interacts with fire and changes 
its form.  Likewise, a silkworm transforms into a butterfly, which lays eggs which then become 
silkworms.  The nature of the silkworm/butterfly remains the same despite the fact that its form 
changes over time.  Thus, Phan suggests that change is a part of the nature of all things.  Phan 
says this is still true, even though the exact way things change differs depending on the 
circumstances and the nature of the thing in question.  All processes of change are thus potential 
representations of what Phan calls “invisible principles.”713   
Phan’s epistemology is quite clearly a version of correlative cosmology.  It is predicated on a 
productive dialectic, but not one that assumes the inevitability or even the possibility of 
transcendence to a higher level of being or understanding.714  Rather than assuming a unitary or 
complete cosmos, Phan presents an infinite universe with infinite variety, in which all things are 
potentially related to one another.  Phan715 emphasizes this point: “Within the way of all under 
heaven, there is only relativity, there are no absolutes.  Whenever things have a way to coalesce, 
there will be a way for them to disperse.  When there is a way for things to disperse, there will 
then be a way for them to come together.  The only competition is between those two ways.”716  
This is a cosmos unlimited in scope, but fundamentally guided by principles of change and 
analogical resonance.   
In section four of the introduction, Phan introduces the eight trigrams, their characteristics, 
and their significance.  Phan starts by explaining that The Book of Changes is a mathematical 
text.717  Phan claims that by understanding the mathematics of the text and then carefully 
 
711 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 18. 
712 This description is consonant with what Chenshan Tian calls “a process of becoming,” in which 
continuity is achieved through change.  Chenshan Tian, Chinese Dialectics: From Yijing to Marxism  (Lanham, MA: 
Lexington Books, 2005).  22-23. 
713 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 22. 
714 Contrast this with Hegelian or Marxian dialectical theory, in which dialectical transformations entail a 
movement to a higher level of contradiction. 
715 The logic here is of analogy and correlation.  Unlike Western philosophy, which since Parmenides and 
Zeno, has accepted a split between reason and sense experience and the notion that rest or stasis as the ontological 
basis for all further speculations, correlative thinking, as David Hall and Roger Ames contend, “depends upon the 
acceptance of ‘images’ and ‘metaphors’ as the primary means of expressing the becoming of things.”⁠  David Hall 
and Roger Ames,  Anticipating China: Thinking Through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture (Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 32, 40. In the three capacities Phan describes, change can be found 
in all things. Phan claims that those things with similar qualities will resonate with one another.  He provides as 
examples a baby with its mother, cocks crowing together, the tendency of moist things to attract water, the tendency 
of dry things to attract fire, and the properties of magnets.   Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 62. 
716 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 645. 
717 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 17. 
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reflecting upon the images, “We can understand the fundamental principle of the universe.”718  
The eight trigrams are composed of three broken or unbroken lines.  The broken lines correspond 
to yin, the principle of dispersion and declination, and the unbroken lines correspond to yang, the 
principle of coalescence and coming together.  As an interim step, two lines can be placed 
together to create old yin, which will become young yang, and old yang, which will become 
young yin.  Therefore, by doubling the lines,  we begin to see how change can be represented 
temporally.    
By placing yin and yang lines in their eight possible combinations (23 = 8), the trigrams come 
to represent the eight basic elemental positions of the universe: Heaven (qian 乾, thiên [vt] ☰), 
Lake (dui 兌, đoài [vt], ☱), Fire (li 離, ly [vt], ☲), Thunder (zhen 震, chấn [vt], ☳), Wind (xun 
巽, tốn [vt], ☴), Water (kan 坎, khảm [vt], ☵), Mountain (gen 艮, cấn [vt], ☶), and Earth (kun 坤
, khôn [vt], ☷).  These trigrams are collectively known as the eight symbols (bagua 八卦).  The 
trigrams could be seen as stand-alone ideal types, but Phan quickly identifies them as part of 
ordered sequences.  As Phan explains it, qian through zhen are progressive insofar as they 
constitute a process of rising yang, while xun through kun are regressive insofar as they 
constitute a process of declining yang.719  The fundamental dialectic between yin and yang is 
thus maintained as the lines expand into trigrams to comprise the basic elements and directions.   
To help explain the characteristics and order of the trigrams, Phan provides several well-
known pictorial representations of these eight symbols, including the “Fifty-Five Point Yellow 
River Chart,” the “Chart of Fu Xi’s Positions of the Eight Trigrams [the “Fu Xi Chart”],” and the 
“Diagram of the King Wen Arrangement of the Eight Trigrams [the “King Wen Chart”].”  Each 
figure presents and orders the trigrams in different ways.  The “Fifty-Five Point Yellow River 
Chart,” which Phan presents in section four, associates the trigrams with the four cardinal 
directions and sets of numbers (which add up to fifty-five, hence the name of the Chart).  Phan 
explains why each trigram occupies the direction it does and why it is associated with a 
particular set of numbers, effectively providing a simultaneously spatial and numerological 
conceptualization of the trigrams. 
 
718 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 17. 
719 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 22. 
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Following this in section six, Phan describes two other ways of arranging and understanding 
the trigrams in the Fu Xi and King Wen Charts.  The “Fu Xi Chart” provides an alternative set of 
directional associations, which Phan claims are “ordained by Heaven.”720  Phan explains that the 
“King Wen Chart” arranges the trigrams as a family, with qian the father ruling over his sons 
called zhen, kan, and gen, and the kun being the mother ruling over her daughters called xun, li, 
and dui.  Phan draws upon these classical diagrams and charts to demonstrate the vast 
associational capacity of these basic building blocks of The Changes, and thus reveals for us the 
functional utility of correlative cosmology as a system for organizing knowledge.   
 
By combining two trigrams together, a hexagram (six-line figure) is created.  All the possible 
combinations of trigrams (82) thus comprise the sixty-four hexagrams of The Book of Changes.  
Recapitulating the entire process, Phan explains that thái cực or the Supreme Ultimate produces 
yin and yang, which in turn produce the four images (mature yang, young yin, young yang, 
mature yin), which thereupon produce the eight trigrams.  Each trigram has eight children, 
producing the sixty four hexagrams.  To depict the entire process visually, Phan presents the 
“Diagram of the Fuxi Arrangement of the Sixty Four Hexagrams.”  This diagram makes the 
binary nature of the Book of Changes clear: each level doubles to accommodate more 
associations and ways of more precisely defining the nature of things and the possibilities of 
change.  Finally, as each line of each hexagram can change independently of all the other lines, 
we can see the outer limits of possible types of change in the number 4096 (642).    
 
720 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 22. 
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Phan thus presents the hexagrammatic system as a totalistic representation of all possible 
forms of change, a typology of universal possibility.  Significantly, Phan is implicitly claiming 
that nothing categorically new can take place that The Book of Changes would not apply to or be 
able to explain.  If a new challenge were to arise, for instance the colonization of Vietnam by 
France, Phan is confident that The Book of Changes contains hexagrams and lines through which 
the challenge could be understood and dealt with.  A thorough understanding of all sixty-four 
hexagrams would allow an individual to immediately understand any given situation and, if they 
were perceptive enough, determine the most ethical and timely action to take in response.  As 
any “new” situation can be properly associated with a particular hexagram or set of hexagrams, it 
is more appropriate to think of responses in terms of “creative applications” of hexagrams and 
lines than of “innovation.”  That is, even the most radical of responses can and should still be 
conceived of within the framework of the text.  
Since the hexagrams and their lines can be creatively applied to any situation, there are 
undoubtedly historical and textual precedents for any given situation or instance of change.  It 
should therefore be no surprise that Phan fills his Commentary with historical and textual 
allusions.  For a thoroughgoing examination of the references and citations found in the 
Commentary, refer to the Appendix to this chapter.  I mention here only the highlights.  Phan 
provides 551 citations of works and references to historical persons or events.  A total of 504 of 
these are presented in the hexagram chapters.  This works out to an average of 7.875 per 
hexagram, though Qian 乾 predominates, with forty-nine citations and references.  Most of the 
references are to Chinese texts or historical events, though Phan provides Vietnamese, Western, 
and other examples as well.  Of the citations, the majority are from classical Confucian texts, 
especially from the Analects.  Most of these citations deal with the ethical requirements for 
becoming a virtuous and effective Confucian gentleman, although, as we shall see, Phan uses 
these citations to explain hexagrams in a way specific to the process of creating an ideal 
Confucian knight-errant.     
Phan’s synopsis of The Book of Changes offers a coherent epistemological and ontological 
framework for understanding the world.  For Phan, The Book of Changes is a guide to ethical 
action within a world of ceaseless change, and a prism through which it is possible to understand 
all events and processes.  As the hexagrams and principles described within The Changes are 
“non-changing,” one can apply insights gleamed from a reading of the text to any time period or 
situation, including the modern colonial situation in Vietnam.  Finally, it is through an 
“exchange” or interaction with the book that a reader will gain the perception and ethical 
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intuition necessary to master time and change.  Having mastered time and change, a person could 
rally the people and save the nation.   
Ethical Temporality 
Phan asserts that time is at the core of The Changes - it is the single necessary factor for the 
movements of all of the hexagrams - and thus for all changes, notional or real.  For Phan, time 
takes precedence over all persons, events, and concepts.  It is ontological prior to all other forms 
of ethics or political organization, and thus must serve as the central focus of any individual 
seeking to order the world.  Time is furthermore directly related to the ethical foundations of 
human social organization.  According to Phan, time is the medium through which all change 
must take place, and thus takes ontological precedence over space and all material and 
phenomenon within it.  To realize the knowledge-power afforded by a reading of The Changes, 
an individual must fundamentally grasp the notion of time this book presupposes.   
In section three of his introduction, Phan first quotes and then translates Shao Yong, “There is 
only one word that covers the entirety of The Book of Changes and that word is ‘time.’”721  Phan 
goes on to explain that time has three principal meanings: “First, time means period, as in the 
time one eats and the time one goes to sleep.  Second, time means season, as in the summertime 
when one must wear lighter clothes and wintertime when one must wear heavier clothes.  Third, 
time means moment, as in the time you open the door and the time you turn out the light.”  These 
three definitions of time correspond both to lived reality and to the variable temporal scales 
associated with The Book of Changes.  Changes can occur quickly or slowly, but they always 
occur within time.   
Because all things unfold and change in time, every instance is potentially imbued with 
ethical meaning.  We can see this theme clearly in Phan’s explanation of the Huan 渙 hexagram 
(No. 59, Dispersion): “That which is in accordance with time suits the sentiment of man, it is 
right for the way of man.  When it gathers, it brings prosperity to mankind.  That which 
contravenes time opposes the sentiment of man, it does not accord with the way of man.  When it 
disperses this also brings prosperity to mankind.”722  Herein we find an explicit association 
drawn between “accordance with time” and “rightness for man.”   
Time orients the ethical properties of human existence, making it the necessary focus of 
Phan’s epistemological and ontological theorization.  Here, morality is relative, but it is 
universally relative insofar as nothing stands outside time.  To put it another way, in Phan’s 
metaphysical conceptualization of the universe, there exists no absolute moral principle or force 
outside of time.  If spiritual forces exists, they work through time, but not beyond it.  To 
understand the nature of time is to grasp the central message of The Changes, captured most 
effectively in the phrase: “Change accords with time [隨時變易].”723    
Phan’s explanation is explicitly this-worldly.  He offers no suggestion of a transcendental 
realm from which external forces might influence or affect the process or existence of change.724  
Instead, all phenomenon are ontologically horizontal, or infinitely relatable to all other 
phenomenon.  However, they are not ethically equal.  Herein the vertical nature of time enters to 
 
721 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 17. 
722 Phan Bội Châu. Chu Dịch, 645. 
723 Phan Bội Châu. Chu Dịch, 19. 
724 Chenshan Tian explains, “Instead of being moved by any transcendental Being, the Chinese world is 
ziran or self-so-being, and ziwei or self-so-going or self-so-doing.” Tian, 34. 
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provide the basis for ethics. Since all things could potentially interact with all other things, the 
issue of proper hierarchical ordering arises.  Timing determines that which is “appropriate” or 
ethical and that which is “out of time.”  In the world of cosmological correlation “immoral” is 
not a fixed or permanent category as in one of Plato’s forms.  Rather “unethicalness” is an 
attribute that arises from the misalignment of a thing with time itself.   
The theoretical implications of such a philosophical perspective are immense.  In Phan’s 
correlative cosmology, ethics are a function of time.  Ethics are not abstract categories.  Rather, 
the ethical individual or society perceives the nature of change and takes timely action to ensure 
they do not end up on the wrong side of time.  Clearly, Vietnam,  had fallen behind the times.  
Thus, to explain history  would be to show how the country and its rulers misperceived the 
changes in the world and failed to take proper action when it was required.  Rather than being a 
categorical evil, French colonialism was the inevitable result of a failure to perceive and accord 
with changes in the world.   
The temporal pressures of modernity - the need to “catch up” to Europe - made finding a 
philosophically coherent way to describe and effectively use time a critical part of East Asian 
intellectual discourse in the first half of the 20th century.  Phan, like other Chinese and 
Vietnamese thinkers, developed an acute awareness of the velocity of modernity.725  Phan 
himself describes his amazement at the modern transportation and communications systems of 
Japan when he first arrived there by steamship in late May of 1905.726  Ships, trains, and 
automobiles moved much faster than previous forms of transportation, and the rationalized 
bureaucracies employed by modern states and corporations emphasized efficiency as their 
primary goal.  Vietnamese intellectuals watched these processes unfold and took note.727  Writing 
what could easily have been an epigraph to Phan’s Commentary, Alexander Woodside observes, 
“The command of time, and of the definition of time, [could] be as significant a part of the 
development of power as the command of space or money; in Eastern Asia, historical 
modernization timetables, as manipulated by elite figures, practically [became] the substitutes for 
religious prophecies.”728   
According to Phan, the hexagrams are tools with which to perceive change and ascertain 
one’s “place” within time.  The hexagrams reveal, line by line, the variety of situations possible 
in an infinite world of ceaseless change.  That is to say, the hexagrams show what is “non-
changing” within change, or the archetypal moments in time that recur endlessly, though not in 
any particular order.  Particular hexagrams and particular lines present different alignments or 
misalignments between space and time.  Phan explains, “A nation or a society can become 
‘caught’ in a hexagram or a line - this refers to the timing of that situation.”729  Phan intimates 
that Vietnam is indeed caught in a poor position within time.  Fortunately, hexagrams eventually 
 
725 However, it would be a mistake to assume that an understanding of the importance of time in the 
modern era meant that time itself was understood in the same way as in the West.  Modern temporality, that is, could 
be conceived in many ways, Anderson’s “empty, homogenous time” being just one.  Given the importance of 
temporality to conceptions of modernity, it is clear that alternative notions of time that account for and seek to 
respond to the velocity of the modern could offer a way of perceiving multiple formulations of “modernity” itself.  
That is, in addition to there being multiple characteristics that make up possible “modernities,” the very perceptions 
of those modernities can be multiple as well. 
726 Phan, Overturned, 84-85. 
727 Phan Khoi, for example, agonized over the fact that, as he believed, Vietnamese “lacked flexible variety 
in describing time,” Woodside, Community, 76. 
728 Woodside, “Territorial,” 191. 
729 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 96. 
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change their lines from broken to non-broken or vice-versa, and thus situations can change.  
However, whether it changes from bad to good depends on whether or not the individuals 
involved are perceptive enough to grasp the seeds of change before they sprout.   
A proper reading or use of the hexagrams will allow the perceptive individual to cultivate 
their sense of ethical timing and determine right action.  Phan writes, “If one understands the 
nature of the hexagrams, one will see that the improvement or deterioration of life, the goodness 
or evil of people, the small matter of composing oneself and one’s family, and the great matters 
of uniting a country and unifying the world, [hinge upon] only one principle.”730  A sensitivity to 
the timing of change is what allows an individual choice.  Thus, perception is the locus of all 
power-knowledge.  Phan’s message to his readers is thus: cultivate your perception of time, as it 
alone allows you to foresee change and take effective actions.731   
 By properly perceiving and according with time, one may achieve success.  Success here is 
simply modernization or “keeping up with the times.” However, it is not the achievement of a 
specific goal.  Even the achievement of independence is seen here as a functional product of the 
mastery of time.  This is not ideology so much as it is ideo-praxy - knowing the correct means of 
acting in the world.  Phan is much more interested in tactics than in strategy.  That is to say, he 
sees tactics as strategy.   
 Of course, there is the question of which hexagram is most appropriate to a given situation 
or time.  Rather than counsel the use of divination, Phan advises that readers focus on the 
“complete and perfect numerological system” found in the Changes.732  Phan’s exegesis of the 
Great Commentary, which otherwise presents in longer form the same points he makes in the 
introduction, omits the sections dealing with mantic practices and divination (section nine and 
paragraphs one through four of section ten of part one).  In additio, in my review of the body of 
the text I found no mentions of divination or any mantic formulas.  Although it is possible the 
omission is the result of a misplacement of parts of the text, I believe Phan purposefully excised 
these portions.  This would constitute a decisive break with traditional scholarly and folkloric 
conceptions of The Changes and their significance. Phan’s focus is clearly on the hexagrammatic 
system as a whole and not the results obtained for any specific hexagram by divination or any 
other method.733   
An Example: Qian (乾) 
Phan’s argument concerning the primacy of time is made forcefully in his explanation of the 
Qian 乾 hexagram (No. 1, The Creative).  Phan uses the entire Qian hexagram as an archetype 
for understanding the relationship between man and time.  Unlike many others, the Qian 
 
730 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 25. 
731 Phan’s emphasis is similar to Michael Nylan’s here: “The Changes can teach readers to distinguish 
significant from insignificant change, thereby enabling them to prioritize their concerns and pursuits. (Without the 
Changes, ordinary humans find it difficult to ignore the white noise generated by the ceaseless interaction of 
tendencies.)  By focusing attention on the limited field of significant change, devotees of the Changes can achieve 
mastery over the changes that most affect their quality of life, since, by definition, such mastery is predicated on 
anexquisite sensitivity to the ethical implications of each evolving situation.”⁠  , Michael Nylan,, The Five Confucian 
Classics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001),232. 
732 Phan Bội Châu. Chu Dịch, 19. 
733 Phan discusses some basic ways of reading hexagrams, including analyzing upper and lower trigrams 
and evaluating correspondences whereby certain lines were yang lines (1, 3, 5) and others were yin (2, 4, 6).  These 
are standard methods of evaluating hexagrams developed by the Images and Numbers School. 
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hexagram is thematically cohesive.  It describes, line by line, a dragon rising from a position of 
anonymity to a position of power and influence.   
The first line is the crouching dragon (潛龍).  This represents a man waiting for an 
opportunity.  Phan argues that a man in this position must cultivate his virtue and expand his 
knowledge.  Premature action at this time would fail because the conditions are not yet right.  
Phan compares this situation to that of a seed still within the earth.734 
The second line is the dragon appearing in the field (見龍在田).  This is the time to take 
action and make one’s virtue visible.  Here Phan stresses the importance of “hitting the time” just 
right (chính trung, 正中).  Acting too early or too late both lead to failure.  Phan’s analogy here is 
to cooking rice: “If cooked for thirty minutes the rice will be just right.  If cooked for thirty five 
minutes, however, the rice will be burnt.  If cooked for only twenty minutes, the rice will be 
raw.”735  He also brings up the example of a sharpshooter: only a hit dead-center matters.736  
Phan’s correlative metaphors are telling.  He suggests the import of The Book of Changes applies 
equally to quotidian peasant life, basic military matters, and grand cosmological movements.   
These are not abstractions, but clear and concise elucidations of how we relate to time in 
daily life.  Phan suggests the value of The Book of Changes  is in allowing an individual to see 
how time functions in the same way regardless of circumstance.  In correlative cosmology, scale 
is not important.  One could apply the principle of proper timing to cooking one’s rice or to the 
planning of a revolution.  This then is an example of analogical enlargement, a principal feature 
of correlative cosmology.   
In the third line, the superior man works tirelessly day and night (終日乾乾).  This is an 
unsteady and dangerous position for the superior man.  It is critically important to recognize 
when one is in such a middle position and to stick to the Way (反復道也).  Here, sincerity and 
consistency count for everything.  It is while explaining this line that Phan introduces the curious 
yet perfectly appropriate analogy of planning a train trip from Huế to Hà Nội.  To ensure a man 
reaches his destination, all manner of things need to be taken into account: purchasing tickets, 
handling luggage, checking the schedule, preparing adequate food and water, and having 
someone to pick him up at the right time once he arrives.  Immediately after, Phan explains the 
temporal significance of this analogy: 
  To reiterate, “knowing the goal and thus reaching it [知至至之]” is related to space.  
“Knowing the end and thus completing it 知終終之” is related to time.  “According with the 
sprouts [可與幾]” means taking advantage of things already revealed in order to consider 
those which have not yet been revealed. “According with the preservation of righteousness [
可與存義]” means maintaining secrecy on the outside to preserve that which is on the inside.  
The way of the sages is knowing the journey and planning for the goal with consistency from 
beginning to end.  Because the learning of the sages is this way we must approach things in 
accord with the times and circumstances.  There is no place this does not apply.737 
 
734 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 53. 
735 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 54. 
736 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 54. 
737 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 59. 
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This example demonstrates a willingness, even a need, to understand modern life through the 
lens offered by The Changes.  Phan had lived the life of a revolutionary faced by a modern 
colonial state armed with a vast security apparatus, and thus he knew full well the importance of 
correctly perceiving and acting in time.  Only an individual attentive to dangers and cognizant of 
the nature of time could survive in a period when enemies maintained overwhelming force.  Only 
an individual capable of understanding the ethical principles inherent in time itself could 
eventually hope to succeed in achieving their political goals.   
The fourth line shows the superior man considering whether to leap over an abyss (或躍在淵
).  This is still a dangerous time, like the time of line three, but it offers the possibility of 
advancing.  However, any advance must be made carefully and gradually.  The crux of the line is 
the character huo (或), meaning “perhaps.”  This, then, is a time of decision.  Here Phan 
introduces the examples of Zhuge Liang and Yi Yin, both men who considered situations very 
carefully before deciding to act.738  Phan is particularly concerned with the historical possibilities 
of this line - Phan’s hasty actions while in this type of situation led to disaster in the past.  Phan 
suggests that a revolutionary who deliberates carefully would be able to succeed where Phan 
himself had failed.   
The fifth line is the flying dragon (飛龍).  Here an individual finally has an opportunity to 
rise righteously and achieve great success.  Phan explains that this line embodies the central 
message of the entire Book of Changes.  He thus implores the reader to pay careful attention.  
The sage acting with perfect virtue will draw the support of all of the people.  Provided the sage 
is pure of intent, he becomes an unstoppable force, capable in this moment of achieving 
anything.  To explain, Phan provides the example of Lê Lợi: “Lê Thái Tổ [The imperial title 
taken by Lê Lợi] was farming in Lam Sơn when the rebellion against Ngô739 began.  The entire 
country responded to him.  Truly a sage had appeared and all of the ten thousand things craned 
their necks to look upon him.”740   
Phan’s rhetorical exuberance makes clear that this line represents the culmination of his 
political dreams.  Phan’s greatest ideal, then, is not a state of being or a sociopolitical form of 
any sort.  Rather, it is a moment of dynamic crescendo, a time when the ethical power embodied 
in a great man comes shining forth, radiating goodness and eliciting resonant responses in all 
virtuous people and things.  It is not difficult to imagine Phan identifying Hồ Chí Minh’s 
triumphant proclamation of the independence of Vietnam on September 2, 1945, as the perfect 
realization of this line.741   
The sixth line is the arrogant dragon (亢龍).  Here Phan notes that the time of victory 
 
738 Phan Bội Châu. Chu Dịch, 60. 
739 The character 吳, here referring to the ancestral homeland of Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋 1328-1398, the 
founder of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), which had occupied Đại Việt. 
740 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 62. 
741 Whether Phan would have had ideological differences with Hồ Chí Minh is without consequence in this 
frame of reference.  Regardless of Hồ Chí Minh’s intentions after victory, Phan would have likely considered the act 
of standing up and for a moment representing the dreams of the Vietnamese nation of paramount significance.  
Phan’s doctrine is similar in some ways to that of ‘might makes right’- the strong are respected for their strength - 
but Phan’s argument fundamentally holds that only ethical individuals will truly win the hearts and minds of the 
people.  Ethics and efficiency are not competing concepts in Phan’s worldview. Rather, they are mutually productive 
analogues of one another. 
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inevitably passes.  Should one continue to advance beyond the point of victory, time itself will 
turn against even the most powerful of men.  The key is knowing when to stop.  In addition to 
providing the negative examples of Napoleon and Yuan Shikai, Phan offers exemplars who did 
not attempt to exceed their position: Trần Thái Tôn (1218-1277), who abdicated the throne in 
favor of his son Trần Thánh Tông (1240-1290), and the husband of Queen Victoria of England 
(1819-1901).742  Phan’s choice of a Chinese, a Vietnamese, and two European examples to 
explain this line shows his ability and willingness to see all historical events anywhere on the 
globe as essentially analogous to one another.   
The most important point of the sixth line is that all situations eventually transform into 
different situations.  To underscore this point Phan, when glossing the Dun 遯 hexagram (No. 33, 
Retreat), quotes a Chinese proverb: “There is no never-ending feast.”743  Temporal limits such as 
this ultimately contain Phan’s radicalism.  While the revolutionary wave is inevitable, so is its 
recession.  On the other hand, the knowledge that all situations must come to an end would 
surely have been a source of comfort to Phan as he daily faced the unpleasant reality of French 
colonial power.744  
 
742 Phan here refers to but does not mention the name of Prince Albert of Sax-Coburg and Gotha (1819-
1861) who, without an official power, invested his time in humanitarian ventures such as education and the global 
abolition of slavery.  Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 64. 
743 “下没有不散的宴席” Phan Bội Châu. Chu Dịch, 388. 
744 Phan reiterates and expands upon his conception of time in other hexagrams.  Through the framework of 
The Changes, Phan presents change as inevitable and time itself as irremediably contextual. ⁠  Explaining the nature 
of the Sui 隨 hexagram (No. 17, Following), Phan writes, “Throughout history the world has had ideologues come 
forward touting some ideology or doctrine.  Only when the times fit the situation do heaven and earth follow these 
[men].  Whether under a constitutional monarchy or a republic, whether statism or socialism, there is often a 
promoter.  The multitudes of people only follow, however, when the time is right.  If you didn’t have an autocratic 
monarchy, such as in the time of Lộ Địch, and promoted democracy or if you did not have capitalist war such as 
took place at the end of the 19th century and promoted socialism, who would follow you?  Thus it pays to know the 
phrase “all under heaven follow in accordance with the time 天下隨時.”⁠ Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 237.   
“Lộ Địch” refers to a play written by Ưng Bình Thúc Giạ Thị (1877-1961) based on Chinese history and “Le Cid” 
by Pierre Corneille (1606-1684).  Here time, not political ideology nor the capacity of a particular individual, 
determines whether one will be successful in obtaining followers.  This sense of the relativity of sociopolitical forms 
shows up again his Phan’s discussion of the fifth line of the Heng 恆 hexagram (No. 32, Duration): “In the time of 
monarchy, one should worship the king.  In the time of democracy, one should worship the people.  In the time of 
nationalism, one should worship the nation.  In the time of socialism, one should worship society.”⁠ Phan Bội Châu. 
Chu Dịch, 386.  This clearly indicates that Phan’s ideological employment of the Confucian repertoire is utterly 
divorced from any attachment to institutions, past, present, or future.   
       It is important to note here just how distinctive Phan’s focus on temporality and timeliness is.  To be sure, the 
Analects and the Mencius discuss the importance of time and the importance of according with it.  Nevertheless, 
for Confucius in the Analects it is accordance with li 禮 that takes precedence.⁠ Schwartz, World of Thought, 
81.  For Mencius, the focus is on moral intentionality, by which one can bring out one’s inner goodness.⁠  
Ibid., 262.  For Phan, there is a sense that time itself constantly looms and inevitably rushes ahead.  Here we can 
most clearly see the reason choosing The Book of Changes as an ideological organizing framework.  Facing the 
harsh truths of colonial statehood, social fragmentation, and economic exploitation, Phan felt strongly that time was 
not on his side.  In order to escape the fate augured by Social Darwinists, Phan needed an ideological framework 
that both took temporality seriously and provided some means of bringing time itself back under control.  The Book 
of Changes offered this possibility, but taking advantage of it required that Phan reinterpret and rearticulate elements 
of the Confucian repertoire so that Phan’s modern notion of ethical time could take center stage in his commentary.   
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Personal Cultivation 
According to Phan, although a grasp of time is essential to success, cultivating the right personal 
attributes is necessary as well.745  To perceive time and act appropriately, one must develop moral 
character.  Through his careful explanation of the hexagrams, Phan reveals the individual 
characteristics required of the superior man (quân tử 君子).  In Phan’s presentation, this term, is 
ethical, not social, in quality.  That is, anyone proving themselves capable of embodying virtue 
and righteousness could become a superior man.  Money and power are not prerequisites, but 
determination and education are.  Of course, the foresight of the superior man is directly tied to 
his timeliness.  Phan argues that a superior man also embodies the virtues of selflessness, 
perspicacity, and consistently correct conduct.  He constantly works to refine his knowledge 
through learning and strengthen his will through patience and the exercise of prudent judgment 
in times of struggle.   
Phan has obvious debts to the Confucian classics in his conceptualization of the ideal 
superior man.  To elucidate his points, Phan often cites or refers to Confucian moral aphorisms 
and statements, mostly from the Analects and the Doctrine of the Mean.  However, his 
presentation differs from standard Confucian tropes in three important ways.  First, the context of 
the individual’s actions is entirely different.  Throughout his Commentary, Phan presents the 
superior man as faced with awesome challenges that he can meet only by cultivating within 
himself the ethical properties of fortitude, awareness, and perfect precision under fire.  Phan’s 
superior man is not a widened scholar or deferent bureaucrat.  He is an action hero.    
However, to become a modern day knight errant, one must still rely on aspects of tradition.  
For example, Phan lays a heavy emphasis on the importance of learning.  Phan advises that 
students should ask questions in order to better understand the principles of the Sages.  Studying 
should thus help one “bring everything together 學以聚之.”746  However, the purpose of 
studying is not simply to amass knowledge from books.  It is to cultivate one’s character.  To do 
so requires a new type of learning: experiential and reflective study.  In an indication of how to 
 
        Throughout Phan’s commentary, the necessity of awareness of and proper accordance with time recurs again 
and again.  When the time is not right, Phan routinely counsels restraint and patience.  When factors align and one is 
able to see the opportunity to act, one must take action or face the imminent danger of falling behind time.  For 
Phan, this is best expressed in the “Commentary on the Image” of the Qian 乾 hexagram (No. 1, The Creative): 
“The superior man strengthens himself without rest 君子以自強不息.” Commenting on this phrase, Phan writes, 
“Never rest.  One must strengthen oneself from youth until old age, then from old age until death.  There can never 
be an interruption.  If there is an interruption, one has already lost the ability to strengthen oneself.”⁠  Phan Bội Châu. 
Chu Dịch, 39.  Phan thus seeks to answer Herbert Spencer (1820-1903)’s existential threat through ceaseless self-
reform.  It is clear here that time is of the essence: in the modern world, only the timely will survive. 
745 For example, when discussing the Daguo 大過 hexagram (No. 28, Great Reward), Phan suggests that 
time by itself will not produce victories. He writes:  
        “After the period of village settlements [primitive accumulation], [history] entered the period of autocratic rule, 
represented by Shang and Wu [the Tang and Zhou Dynasties].  After the period of monarchy, [history] entered the 
period of people’s rule [democracy], represented by the French Revolution.  Within the country of Hinduism, 
Buddhism was set up, as represented by Shakyamuni Buddha.  Within imperialist countries, there was nationalism, 
and a socialist state was set up, as represented by Lenin (Vladymir Ilych Ulyanov).  These were great events and 
only through the efforts of great men could they have happened.  But also the time has to be just right.  If there are 
great men, but the time is not right for great rewards, then there will be no success.  Only when the time is right for 
great rewards and there are great men will great events take place.” ⁠  Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 341. 
746 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 55. 
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use history as a pedagogical tool, Phan argues that, “The successes and failures of former 
times…should serve as our teachers for the future.  This is what it means to study.”747  Books are 
useful, but only as tools for accessing and understanding the lessons of the past.   
This line of thinking is similar to that of the eighteenth-century literatus Lê Quý Đôn (1726-
1784), who argued that “one had to first cultivate one’s moral being, for only morally upright 
individuals could actually perceive the natural patterns manifest in the heavens and on earth.”748  
Personal cultivation is the means by which a superior man could develop the perceptive capacity 
to grasp the nature of time and change.  This perceptiveness goes beyond empirical observation.  
Rather, it is defined by the attempt to holistically and intuitively apprehend the nature of time 
and space.  It means grasping of the fundamental unity underlying reality and orienting oneself 
according to the ethical properties of time.749  By do so, one might then be able to apply that 
knowledge to any number of specific contexts.   
 Cultivation requires consistent dedication to honing one’s sense of rectitude.  Learning 
and contemplation are worth nothing if the course of study is not oriented according to 
righteousness (nghĩa [vt], yi 義).  This is a concept that Benjamin Schwartz claims refers to 
“right behavior in the vast sea of unique life situations where more often than not there is no 
simple ‘covering’ rule of li 禮.”750   In explaining the Yi 頤 hexagram (No. 27, Nourishment), 
Phan writes,  
Religious people, scholars, artists all focus on nourishing the spirit, but they cannot forget 
to nourish the body.  Laborers, farmers, and workers all focus on nourishing the body, but 
they must also nourish the spirit.  The use of the term ‘providing nourishment [頤]’ 
encompasses both of these.   
When nourishing the spirit, going the way of superstition and the occult is not correct.  
When nourishing the body, going the way of slavery and servile labor ruins the 
conscience and is thus not correct.   
Thus the sage taught, “perseverance in nourishing brings success.” This means that the 
task of nourishment, no matter in what sense, must be done correctly.  Whenever one 
nourishes correctly, one has character.  When one does not nourish correctly, one does not 
have character.751  
Once the superior man has accumulated a certain degree of character, he can begin to 
influence those around him.  However, this can also be dangerous if selfish thoughts remain or 
begin to creep in.752  To properly cultivate one’s character, one must be determined and 
 
747 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 55. 
748 Kelley, “Vietnam,” 71. 
749 Hall and Ames, reading the Analects, describe “actualizing or realizing the meaningfulness of the 
world” as the prime focus of thinking.  Hall and Ames identify one of the main operative ways of thinking of 
Confucius as the act of realization or zhi 知, which they claim “refers to a propensity for forecasting or predicting 
the outcome of a coherent set of circumstances.” David Hall and Roger Ames,  Thinking Through Confucius.  
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987) 44, 51. 
750 Schwartz, World of Thought,  79. 
751 Phan Bội Châu. Chu Dịch, 327. 
752 This is because virtue radiates outward from one’s person, causing correlative resonances in other 
people. Phan writes: “Not only must we nourish ourselves, when we nourish others we must do it correctly.  If we 
fail to nourish ourselves correctly, we fall into the way of the small man.  If we fail to nourish others correctly, we 
bring them into the ambit of the small man.  Thus the sage said, “We must look at how we nourish others and first 
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sincere.753   
Second, Phan’s conception of personal cultivation is decidedly focused on the individual.  
This is consistent with the Neo-Confucian turn towards the self noted by Peter Bol and William 
De Bary.  As Bol explains, “the subject of learning was learning itself, and the goal of learning 
was transforming oneself into a responsible actor in the world.”754  Like Song and Ming, who 
were Neo-Confucians who “turned inward” after finding it increasingly difficult to influence 
policies at court, Phan created an non-institutional ideology embodying a theory of learning that 
“gave those who internalized it a ready means of making sense out of the everyday human 
experiences of acquiring knowledge, thinking, feeling, and making choices.  It not only told them 
how to divide up and organize into a coherent whole the various aspects of human experience, 
but also justified respect for historical models.”755   
 
decide for ourselves if it is good or bad, successful or disastrous.”⁠  Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 327.  Phan suggests 
the cultivation of character begins with one’s person and radiates outwards. 
753 For example, Phan explains the Xian 咸 hexagram (No. 31, Influence) thusly, “In matters of the heart, 
one must follow the essence earnestly.  Earnestness means to amass sincerity within one’s heart.  In order to meet 
the time, one must have an empty heart. An empty heart means there is nothing within one’s heart.  There are no 
selfish or sexual desires occupying a portion of one’s heart.  If a selfish or sexual desire should enter our heart then 
we will have a full heart.  Once a man’s heart is full, he cannot receive the timeless way of heaven and must thus 
empty his heart.  If we study psychology we must consider both of these aspects.  Thus studying the Changes, we 
must look at the Daxu 大畜 hexagram (No. 26, The Taming Power of the Great), which contains the word “Sincerity 
誠” and at Xian hexagram, Influence, which contains the word “Empty 虛” as the meanings help to explain one 
another.”⁠ Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 371. 
754 Bol, Neo-Confucianism, 192. 
755 Bol, Neo-Confucianism, 158.  However, unlike the Song and Ming Neo-Confucians,, Phan’s vision was 
oriented around the necessity of creating heroes capable of acting with alacrity and complete dedication of purpose.  
Phan took exception to Vietnamese scholars willing to serve in the Nguyễn civil administration, which, because it 
was dominated by the French colonial state, he considered an “empty” institution.⁠  Alexander Woodside, for 
instance, notes how Phan, “was obsessed by the need to launch a war against the fatally distracting upper-class 
appetite for the ‘honors of office’ (cong danh), which he called ‘empty names’ (hu danh).”  Woodside, Community, 
42.  Simply put, there were no legitimate institutions in Vietnam.  As such, Phan’s formulation of Confucianism 
concentrated wholly on the individual and what he might be able to accomplish.  There is also little consideration of 
the individual’s familial role or social class.  Given that Phan was not one to speak candidly about his own family, it 
might be assumed that the lack of attention to kinship or social relations simply reflects modesty on his part.  
However, the effect is to focus considerable attention on the virtuous individual to the exclusion of that individual’s 
social context.⁠.” 
This line of ‘individual-centric’ thinking can be found in the Analects, although there is profound disagreement over 
exactly what constitutes an individual.  Herbert Fingarette, on one side, claims that “the entire notion [of an inner 
psyche] never entered [Confucius’s] head.” ⁠  Herbert Fingarette, Confucius - The Secular as Sacred (New York, NY: 
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972).  45.  Thus, any emotional or ethical emphases could only be found within the 
context of specific performances of ritual or proper behavior, but never as a part of the inner world of the individual.  
This would mean Phan was making a considerable leap by constructing an ideology around the individual that 
stressed the psychological aspects of “amassing sincerity within one’s heart.”  It would also mean that Phan was 
developing through his reading of The Book of Changes a modern form of Confucian psychology, a supposition 
supported by the fact that Phan was one of the first Vietnamese intellectuals to write an autobiography (indeed, 
two!).   
       On the other side, Benjamin Schwartz counters by writing, “Confucius is, in fact, enormously interested in the 
inner state of the person even when he is not operating in the public space and regards these sustained inner states as 
of the utmost relevance to public behavior.”⁠  Benjamin Schwartz,  The World of Thought in Ancient China 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985)., 75.  If Schwartz is correct, then Phan’s 
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Third, there a radical emotional quality to Phan’s prescriptions that sets it apart from standard 
Confucian interpretations. In a gloss to the Kun 困 hexagram (No. 47, Oppression), Phan offers a 
glimpse of how far he expected his adherents to go in their dedication to righteousness: “There is 
a line in the Analects: ‘The scholar, seeing threatening danger, is prepared to sacrifice his life.’  
To give one’s life in tribute to the nation and society is what it means to ‘sacrifice one’s life 致命
.’”756  Phan’s interpretation of this line (Analects 19:1) is rather extraordinary.  In contrast, 
Edward Slingerland provides the following translation and comment: “19.1 Zizhang said, ‘To 
submit to fate when confronted with danger…’”  Most commentators understand this to be a 
summary of the minimum qualities that are necessary to make one an acceptable scholar-
official.”757  Phan’s version thus converts “submitting to fate” as a scholar official into 
“sacrificing one’s life in tribute to the nation and society,” indicating that the stakes of personal 
cultivation had increased dramatically in the context of modern colonialism.758   
Leadership and Grouping  
Once an individual attains an appropriate level of personal cultivation, they will begin 
attracting followers.  Here we encounter Phan’s theory of the formation of groups (qun 群).   
Entirely irrespective of what political or religious ideology they profess, Phan contends that 
people will gravitate toward leaders based on the principles of correlative resonance.  However, 
for the nascent leaders several problems then emerge.  First, one must consider how to select and 
foster good, loyal subordinates.  Second, one must decide how to conceive of and create larger 
sociopolitical units.   
Phan subscribed to a Confucian version of Carlyle’s “Great Man Theory of History,” wherein 
the decisions of “heroes” are held responsible for the progression of history.759  Phan’s version 
differed significantly from Carlyle, for Phan’s heroes do not determine the path of history, rather 
they perceive the opportunities afforded by the changing of time and, by virtue of their 
cultivation, are able to guide their followers in accordance with the times. Significantly, heroic or 
virtuous qualities ensured precisely nothing if their timing was not right.   
Leaders were necessary for revolutions to take place.760  When explaining the Cui 萃 
 
notion of a self-aware individual who cultivates sincerity and virtue does have meaningful roots in the Analects, 
though the goal to which Phan directs this cultivation may indeed be novel. 
756 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 531. 
757 Confucius: Analects.  With Selections from Traditional Commentaries,  trans. by Edward Slingerland, 
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.), 221. 
758 In contrast, Alexander Woodside describes how “Pham Quynh unhesitatingly identified the ideal 
Vietnamese national character, in 1925, as that of the ‘wind-and-stream’ man, the imperturbable intellectual who 
tranquilly offered wine to his friends.”  Woodside, Community, 91. 
759 See Thomas Carlyle,  On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History (New York, NY: Frederick 
A. Stokes & Brother, 1888). 
760 Explaining the second line of the Jing 井 hexagram (No. 48, The Well), Phan makes the claim “There 
needed to be a King Tang in the time of Yi Yin to cut down Jie and save the populace.  There was [Kaiser] Wilhelm 
in the time of Bismarck who was able to make strong the country of Germany.  Without intelligent kings such as 
those two men, who would be able to draw from the well?” Phan did not apparently see any categorical differences 
between ancient Shang and modern German rulers, though the ability of each to accord with their particular time 
periods ensured their success.  No matter the time period, Phan maintains that an elite vanguard of ethically trained 
and knowledgeable individuals must be available and willing to guide a polity to success.  Phan Bội Châu,Chu Dịch, 
547. 
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hexagram (No. 45, Gathering Together), Phan makes it clear that “When men collect as a group, 
there must be a great man to serve as leader.  When men collect as a nation, there must be a great 
man to serve as president.”761  Accordingly, a time with all small men and no great men (the 
situation of line four of the Kun 坤 hexagram, No. 2, the Receptive) is a great disaster for a 
nation or a society.762  Leadership and the formation of groups are thus presented as mutually 
productive phenomenon.  Having one without the other is an indication of a misalignment within 
time.   
To become a leader, one needed a following.  Phan raises this issue many times over the 
course of his commentary.  He offers little idea of how exactly a leader is to attract followers.  
The implicit suggestion is that a virtuous individual will inevitably draw people to him by the 
power of his charismatic moral persona.  Should this fail to take place, the virtuous individual 
would simply bide his time, waiting patiently for recognition.  Phan seems to suggest that 
personal cultivation will simply guide the superior man toward taking whatever steps will be 
necessary to attract a following. In his Autobiography, Phan spends little time reflecting on 
exactly why people chose to follow him.  Charisma is not something to be explained in a 
Machiavellian fashion, it is simply something the virtuous leader will have as a result of his 
personal moral cultivation.    
Conversely, Phan’s emphasis is on the proper selection of followers.   Discussing the Zhun 屯 
hexagram (No. 3, A Difficult Beginning), Phan writes, “When national or social affairs are at 
stake, one should find and rely upon talented subjects.”763  That those followers be suitable 
individuals is, of course, crucial, as Phan points out in an explanation of the third line of the Bi 
比 hexagram (No. 8, Union):  
In a village there are neighbors, when studying there are friends, when getting along there 
are colleagues, when working there are parties, wives choose husbands, husbands choose 
wives, servants choose masters, masters choose servants, all of this is [part of finding] 
Union.  No matter what group, anytime you employ a crook things will be ruined.  Thus 
you should choose a person who balances you well.  This is really worth paying attention 
to.”764 
Here we see the principles of resonance and good judgment at work.  A superior man is one 
who can discern which people will in time prove suitable for particular tasks.  Phan himself was 
forced to rely on many individuals and, as such, points out the necessity of compromise in 
choosing subordinates.  However, as he admits in his Autobiography, he was often too gullible 
when trusting people.765  Thus, in an explanation of the top line of the Shi 師 hexagram (No. 7, 
The Army), he claims: “Stupid, corrupt, and deceitful people are useful, but only for military 
purposes.  Once you turn to running a country you need to get rid of these people!”766   
Phan’s prescription for the creation and expansion of sociopolitical units is an interesting 
blend of Mencian populism and socialist democracy.  Phan’s Commentary includes a rather 
 
761 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 512. 
762 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 84. 
763 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 87. 
764 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 149. 
765 Phan Bội Châu, Overturned, 45. 
766 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 142. 
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vague conception of politics based on analogous amplification of the same principles that apply 
to personal cultivation.  When discussing the concept of self-strengthening 自強, for example, 
Phan claims that the same methods of making oneself self-reliant would work equally well for “a 
family, a nation, a society, or the world.”767  Similarly, when explaining the fifth line of the 
Jiaren 家人 hexagram (No. 37, The Family), Phan considers the following question:  
Why does [the hexagram] not state “extends to the country” and only states “extends to 
the family”? Is not a king who extends only to his family particularistic? We must 
understand that a nation is only a root, a country is really a large family.  A family is 
really a small country.  “Extends to the family” is stated because it is part of the Jiaren 
hexagram, so the word “Country” could not be stated. The intention of the sage is, 
however, that “country” means “family” and “family” means “country.”  
This is an excellent example of correlative cosmological thinking.  Though it would be easy to 
point to a regression in the sophistication of Phan’s political philosophy here to an almost absurd 
reductionism, it is equally important to recognize the analytical utility of this sort of analogical 
explication.  Discourses that describe nations as “fatherlands” and “motherlands” abound in the 
West, as do leaders calling themselves “fathers of the nation.”  By shifting “family” to 
“country,”Phan is acknowledging the reorientation of political affiliation around national 
groupings, but without claiming the nation to be a fundamentally new category.  Rather, 
“country” and “nation” have taken the analogical place, not the formal place, of “family.”  As 
such, “family” can still exist within “country” without a formal contradiction.  Thus, what seems 
at first glance to be a simplistic reversion to tradition is in fact a subtle reorientation of 
archetypal categories to account for changes in the modern world.   
 Another of Phan’s analogies for leadership deserves similar attention.  Explaining the Zhun 
屯 hexagram (No. 3, A Difficult Beginning), Phan writes, “Weave the threads together to create 
fiber lengths.  Constructing an organization and building a nation or society, large or small, 
requires this act.”768  The Image line reads: “Clouds and Thunder.  A Difficult Beginning.  The 
superior man weaves thread 經綸.”  The characters in question also mean “statecraft.”  Here we 
can see again the power of analogical reasoning.  Forming a strong sociopolitical unit is akin to 
weaving together threads that by themselves are weak.  Phan and other Vietnamese intellectuals 
long deplored the “sandlike” nature of the Vietnamese people.  An effective leader would be one 
who could not just attract people to him by the power of his charisma, but one who could bind 
them together by careful and consistent interweaving of individuals and families.  
 With regard to political policy, Phan had a few suggestions of a Mencian bent.  Phan 
considered the people’s livelihood important.  This is made evident in a long passage taken from 
Phan’s discussion of the Yi 益 hexagram (No. 42, Increase), concerning Lord Mengchang of Qi 
(See Appendix D).  This story contains many themes we have previously reviewed .  First, we 
see the importance of having a trustworthy servant, even one who may at first seem disobedient.  
Second, we see how the accrual of personal virtue, here in the form of “righteousness,” garners 
the support of the people.  Third, we can see a political philosophy in which the elite are 
expected to provide for the people’s material needs.  Finally, there is an embryonic impulse 
 
767 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 39. 
768 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 90. 
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towards economic though not social equalization.   
  The message is essentially one of Mencian populism - rulers need to take the people’s 
interests into account before their own.  The unstated corollary is the practical consideration that 
by doing so, rulers would be ultimately benefitting themselves.  Phan himself suggests as much 
in a gloss to the Tai 泰 hexagram (No. 11, Peace):  
Heaven increases the number of people and earth provides this with advantages.  If there 
is not a method of dividing and developing or [a method of] assisting and regulating so 
that the common people can be satisfied, there will be excesses and shortages.  This will 
produce innumerable inequities in society.  The rich will become richer, the hungry will 
become hungrier, the happy will become happier, and the destitute will become more 
destitute.  The people above will oppress the people below and the people below will 
grow to hate the people above.  All this will occur because of the lack of a means of 
dividing, developing, assisting and regulating on behalf of the people.769 
It might be said that before there is policy, there must be principle.  Phan’s observations of the 
French colonial state led him to believe that policy came first and principle failed to come at all.  
The veiled threat of the “people below growing to hate the people above” is thus significant.   
 Phan’s populism only went as far as economic equality and did not include political 
equality along the lines of socialism.770  Phan argues that hierarchy  should be meritocratic.  It is 
precisely those who have cultivated their perception of time and sense of discernment who 
should be in charge of political affairs.  In essence, Phan argues here for a meritocratic ideal 
independent of the institution of the examination system.  There is a strong appeal to common 
sense here.  Phan feels that if those on top can rectify the national or global situation, then it will 
be possible for everyone to find their proper place.  Though this may seem like the most 
undeveloped aspect of Phan’s modern Confucian worldview, it is worth noting how similar it is 
to the pragmatism of John Dewey or the meritocratic ethos of global capitalism.   
An Example: Ge 革 Revolution 
 I will now focus on a single hexagram: Ge 革 (No. 49, Revolution).  This is the hexagram 
Phan considers to be the most important for Vietnamese intellectuals to grasp and put into action.  
Phan’s exegesis of Revolution is impassioned, forceful, and innovative.  Phan argues for an 
overdue overturning of the French colonial state and the Vietnamese monarchal administration as 
part of a global wave of modern revolution.  This revolution would be ethical, for it would fit the 
time and the needs of the people.  It would also represent the culmination of all of Phan’s other 
themes: individuals would cultivate their personal virtue, become charismatic leaders, rally the 
people and effectively organize them into a powerful collective political force and, when the time 
was just right, drive out everything that failed to resonate with the ethical power of the 
 
769 Phan Bội Châu,Chu Dịch, 176. 
770 Phan makes this clear in a frank discussion of the matter found his explanation of the Lü 履 hexagram 
(No. 10, Treading): Distinguishing between above and below does not mean distinguishing between social classes.  
Long ago everyone was quite equal, but this only meant equal in social class.  Sometimes you have to distinguish 
between talent and position.  Observe a village.  Could anyone be village leader and could anyone be the village 
herald?  If anybody was leader and anybody was herald, could village matters be properly handled?  If roles are 
properly doled out, then people don’t bicker and things get done.  Not only does everyone have a duty, everyone 
also has some authority.  This is really equality.  Up and down are only sorted according to talent while equality is 
achieved through balanced authority and responsibility.  These two methods seem contradictory but are really 
complementary.”⁠  Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 163. 
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revolutionary moment.   
Phan foreshadows his discussion in a short passage appearing under the fifth line of the 
Tongren 同仁 hexagram (No. 13, Fellowship with Men): 
If you consider all of the options, going back and forth over it, you will come to 
revolution.  The racial revolution isn’t over, the national revolution isn’t over. We must 
bring up the social revolution and the world revolution.  Though there will be crying and 
shouting all over the world, we will be smiling.  To summarize, there is only the great 
master sculptor.  What is the great master sculptor?  It is Revolution, Revolution!   
Phan here sounds like a student on the streets of Beijing on May 4, 1919 (or perhaps August 18, 
1966?).771  There is an exuberance in this passage, as there is in the following passages, not 
found elsewhere in the commentary.  This is one of the most unique aspects of Phan’s 
formulation of Confucianism: it is a Confucianism that features moral revolution as its primary 
purpose, the goal toward which all other descriptions of value and utility are directed.   
Phan’s sense of excitement in his essay on Revolution is palpable (See Appendix E).  Phan’s 
initial two-part justification for revolution reveals that revolution is a sort of cosmological 
“cleansing device.”  If humans fail to keep up with time for long enough, Phan seems to argue 
that revolution is an inevitable result.  On the other hand, Phan makes a strong case for 
individuals to “absorb the spirit of revolution,” indicating that he was not confident revolution 
would take place on its own.  For example, at the end of his explication of the “Commentary on 
the Appended Statements,” Phan emphasizes that the Way relies on people to carry it out.772  The 
essay is thus both a justification and a prescription.     
The second part of the justification indicates that Phan anticipates that Revolution will bring 
Vietnam into the modern era.  There is a whisper of total revolution here, but it is conditioned by 
Phan’s choice of metaphors.  A modern revolution is akin to buying new clothing or building a 
new house.  It does not necessarily involve a thoroughgoing change to one’s identity or way of 
thinking.  The line, “revolution has been happening for a long time” indicates that Phan 
understands revolution to have both gradual and sudden aspects.  He also notes that revolutions 
can be dangerous, though this fact does little to dampens his enthusiasm.   
Phan identifies several paradoxes of revolution.  First, it is both what people desire and 
something that bewilders and terrifies them.  There is the suggestion here that the ethical 
properties of time are intimately linked to the sentiment of the majority of the people.  Phan’s 
advice for the would-be-revolutionary is ambivalent on this issue - he can only wait patiently and 
accumulate virtue and followers until the time of revolution comes.  This pessimism is perhaps a 
result of Phan’s failure to arouse sufficient popular sentiment for revolution despite years of 
writing harsh tracts denouncing French colonialism.   
A second paradox concerns the ubiquity and proper use of the word “revolution.”  Despite 
the lack of willingness on the part of the people to undertake or at least condone revolution, Phan 
notes that they bandy the word about with annoying frequency.  Phan feels obliged in light of the 
discursive spread of “revolution” to distinguish between “real” revolutions and simply instances 
of “change.”  Where there is an actual change of “mandate,” Phan argues, then it is suitable to 
refer to a revolution.  The notion of a “Mandate of Heaven” figures prominently in Mencian 
populism, and here seems to represent the will of the majority of the people.  That is to say, if a 
 
771 Phan actually was in Beijing by August 1919, according to his Autobiography.  It is likely that he would 
have observed some portion of the New Culture Movement there or in Hangzhou.  Phan Bội Châu, Overturned, 244. 
772 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 743-744. 
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change is not a reflection ofthe will of the people, then it should not be considered a revolution.   
The final paragraphs present instances of revolution drawn from around the world.  These 
modern examples of revolution are specifically linked to nationalist causes.  Phan points out that 
Washington, Kemal, and Lenin were considered “fathers of the nation” after completing 
revolutions, suggesting that Phan implicitly associates revolution with nation-building.   
Phan’s Coherent Vision of a Modern Confucian Revolutionary Ideology   
Having demonstrated how Phan conceives of and utilizes the Book of Changes, I consider 
now the overall significance of his commentary.  The key questions are: what does the text reveal 
about Phan’s ideological ambitions and how do these ambitions complicate historical and 
theoretical narratives in which Phan is implicated?  It reveals Phan’s coherent vision of a modern 
Confucian revolutionary ideology. 
First, Phan’s vision is coherent and totalistic.  This is made evident in the introduction and 
again in Phan’s explanation of the Great Commentary.  The Changes includes all things under 
heaven and upon the earth and nothing escapes it.773  Such a perspective is on par with other 
contemporary totalizing visions such as those of French colonialism, Marxist historical 
materialism, Weberian rationalism, or biological science.  All of these ideologies claim to 
represent the entire world, even the entire universe, and to have a special knowledge of what 
causes change.  Phan’s vision is distinct from these other ideologies insofar as it locates the 
cause of change in change itself.  That is, no single substance or quality animates the totality - 
not civilisatrice, the economic base, transcendental ethics, or biodynamic energy.   
In Phan’s correlative cosmology, neither is the totality a unitary self-generative whole.  
Rather, all things have their own particular orienting principles, which are ultimately analogous 
to the orienting principle of the whole or dao 道, but not reducible to it.  Phan’s ideological 
articulation is based fundamentally on ideas derived from what is known as correlative 
cosmology: an epistemological system that organizes and classifies phenomenon through 
analogies and the ascertaining of essences.  Chenshan Tian contends the system also underlies 
Chinese dialectics, including those articulated by the Chinese Communist Party.   
Second, Phan’s vision is modern.774  Despite apparent similarities, Phan’s totalistic vision is 
different from those of earlier exponents of The Book of Changes.  Specifically, Phan 
demonstrates throughout his commentary that The Book of Changes is applicable to the modern 
era by refracting modern events through hexagrams and hexagram lines to reveal the clarifying 
utility of the text.  The text, if used properly, could be a tool for understanding and responding to 
the modern world.775   
 
773 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 724. 
774 It is important distinguish between modernity and the process of modernization.  According to Frederic 
Jameson, modernity is a feeling, specifically a feeling of newness.  He writes, “Modernity would describe the way 
‘modern’ people feel about themselves…the modern feeling seems to consist in the conviction that we ourselves are 
somehow new, that a new age is beginning, that everything is possible and nothing can ever be the same again; nor 
do we want anything to be the same again, we want to ‘make it new,’ get rid of those old objects, values, mentalities, 
and ways of doing things, and somehow be transfigured.”⁠  Alternatively, modernization, “has something to do with 
industrial progress, rationalization, reorganization or production and administration along more efficient lines, 
electricity, the assembly line, parliamentary democracy, and cheap newspapers.”⁠  Frederic Jameson,   
Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991).  304, 310. 
775 Joseph Levenson rightly points out, maintaining an idea after that idea’s time has passed changes the 
idea.⁠  Levenson writes, “An idea is always grasped in relative association, never in absolute isolation, and no idea, in 
history, keeps a changeless self-identity.”  Leveson, Confucian,  xxviii. 
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An important aspect of Phan’s commentary is his continual emphasis on time, timeliness, and 
calculation.  In a creative explanation of time and space in the Zhun 屯 hexagram (No. 3), Phan 
notes how when it is nighttime in America, it is daytime in Asia.  Not only does Phan here 
demonstrate his awareness of international time zones, he shows how The Book of Changes can 
function in a global modality.  In explaining the importance of thorough consideration in the 
context of the third line of the Qian 乾 hexagram (No. 1), Phan uses the metaphor of taking a 
train : 
When going from Huế to Hà Nội, do we not need to know beforehand which train to 
take?  Knowing the final train is fundamental, [but  must we] not also know how many 
trains must be taken in between, how many hours this will take, how much it will cost, 
what luggage we will take with us, how many people we will need to help us, what 
precautions to take to ensure a successful trip and where we will stay when we get off in 
Hanoi? 
       Moreover, between leaving and arriving, what dangers might there be?   
       Such matters as listed above must be calculated thoroughly and only then can we 
decide to leave and [actually] get to the place we want to go.  If these fundamentals are 
followed, our design of getting to Hanoi will not fail.   
Phan had taken many trains and ships earlier in life and understood quite well the importance 
of being on-time and attending closely to many details at once.  A diligent reader of The Book of 
Changes, then, would be able to make better use of modern transportation.  Beyond this, they 
would be able to master any modern technological system which differed from the situations 
presented in The Book of Changes only in terms of speed and complexity, not in terms of kind or 
type.   
In addition to timeliness, Phan claims another aspect of modernity: being civilized.  Having 
criticized the French claim to “civilization” in earlier works, Phan repeats the argument in line 
five of the Bi 比 hexagram.  First he explains how when hunting, sage kings would leave one of 
four sides open to allow animals to escape.  In contrast to this practice, Phan writes, “Look at the 
policies of the colonizers from the civilized nations - they simply throw down the net but do not 
open it again.  On the outside they appear civilized but within they are extremely boorish!”776  
Phan’s discursive claim stabs right at the heart of the French colonial paradox - the country of 
Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité was denying all of these to the Vietnamese.  A necessary element of 
modernity for Phan was a sophisticated ethics - a set of values to serve as a personal and social 
standard.    
Third, Phan’s vision is Confucian, but Confucian only insofar as it draws from the Confucian 
repertoire to articulate an argument centered upon the capacity of the superior man to 
successfully cultivate his personal moral force, gather the people to him through virtuous 
conduct, and carry out a national revolution.777  Phan’s Confucianism is a distinctly hero-based 
 
776 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 150. 
777 There is considerable debate over exactly how to conceptualize and discuss ‘Confucianism.”  A large 
part of this problem stems from attempts to conceive of Confucianism as a coherent ideology.  Rather than an 
ideology, Benjamin Elman, John Duncan, and Herman Ooms call Confucianism alternatively “a repertoire of world-
ordering devices” or a “repertoire of common techniques or tactics.” ⁠  Seen as a repertoire, Confucianism could take 
many forms and retain both intellectual and emotional value in a variety of different geographical and historical 
contexts.⁠  Furthermore,,a repertoire  does not face the same definitional problems as an ideology.  However, I would 
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ideology emphasizing virtues such as courage, determination, and perspicacity.778  Phan 
elsewhere wrote prodigiously about Vietnamese heroes, so it comes as no surprise to find such 
examples in his Commentary.779   
 While Phan consistently references heroes displaying Confucian values, he dispensed with 
what Alexander Woodside calls the “defensive corporatism” engendered by state exams and Neo-
Confucian state orthodoxy.780  That is, Phan’s Confucian ideology is non-institutional, similar in 
many ways to the non-institutional Confucian inspired ontologies of Xiong Shili and Liang 
Shuming.  Phan makes this clear in a gloss to the Pi 否 hexagram (No. 12): “Monarchy 
flourishes, but one day it will fall.  As monarchy falls, the common man will rise.”  The ease 
with which Phan dismisses the dynastic state indicates that his version of Confucianism is really 
quite distinct from the articulations of Confucianism identified and discussed by Shawn McHale 
and Nola Cooke.  Like his Chinese counterparts, Phan developed an ideology that incorporated 
portions of the Confucian repertoire with aspects of Western political theory and philosophy.  
Phan’s Confucianism is distinctive for his articulation of personal ethical values within an 
ontological framework informed by correlative cosmology.   
Fourth, Phan’s vision is political and revolutionary.  Throughout the commentary Phan 
describes a process whereby a perceptive individual who gauges the time correctly could 
overcome adversity to achieve political success.  The politics described in the commentary is 
based on a principle of analogical expansion.  That is, Phan contends that the proper cultivation 
of virtue and ordering of what is near will inevitably extend and apply to larger sociopolitical 
units and more significant situations.  Politics, then, falls primarily under the Confucian concepts 
of “grouping 群.”  Nevertheless, Phan conceives of groups only as instances in which people 
coalesce around leaders.  The groupings here are not social so much as they are charismatic.   
For Phan, the purpose of politics in the modern global context is to constitute a national unit 
 
make a further correction.  It seems to me most appropriate to think of a Confucian repertoire containing a vast array 
of potentially mutually conflicting texts, concepts, principles, narratives, and practices upon which individuals can 
and have drawn for the purpose of articulating ideological visions.  See Benjamin Elmanwith John B. Duncan and 
Herman Ooms.  “Introduction.” Rethinking Confucianism: Past and Present in China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, in  
eds. Benjamin Elman, et al.  (Los Angeles, CA: UCLA Asian Pacific Monograph Series, 2002),. 4-5. 
       Such a definition also accords with Hao Chang’s term, a “storehouse of moral wisdom.”  Hao Chang,  “New 
Confucianism and Contemporary China,” In  The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservative Alternatives in 
Republican China,  ed. Charlotte Furth.  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 300. 
778 104. Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 185. 
779 Phan dedicates some fifteen pages in Phan Bội Châu Niên Biệu to the students who took part in the 
Đong Du movement, describing how many were killed on the battlefield, the gallows, or took their own lives.  
Phan’s grand monument to such men was written in 1920 with the Việt Nam Nghĩa Liệt Sử (The History of the 
Martyrs of Vietnam).  Prior to this, he also wrote Hà Thành Nhị Liệt Sĩ [The History of the Two Martyrs of Hanoi] 
following a failed attempt in 1908 to poison French soldiers and attack Hanoi, Trần Đông Phong Truyện [The Story 
of Tran Dong Phong] about a young student who committed suicide, Tái Sinh Truyện [The Story of a Resurrection] 
about Bùi Chính Lộ, who took his own life in a Siamese prison after killing two French operatives, Kỷ Niệm Lục [A 
Record of Memories] concerning the lives of Tăng Bạt Hổ and Vương Thúc Quý, and Sùng Bái Giai Nhân [A 
Tribute to Shining Lives], a collection of biographies of recent heroic figures.  The greatest single individual to 
receive confirmation and praise from Phan was Phạm Hồng Thái.  In Phạm Hồng Thái Liệt Sĩ Truyện [A Biography 
of the Martyr Pham Hong Thai] and several other writings, Phan recounted the life of the young man and his 
explosive assassination attempt on Governor-General Merlin in 1924. 
780 Alexander Woodside, “Territorial Order and Collective-Identity Tensions in Confucian Asia: China, 
Vietnam, Korea.”  Daedalus 127, no. 3, 1998), 210. 
174 
out of resonant groups of bioculturally similar people (one’s countrymen), and to overcome any 
political force exercising sovereignty over that grouping.  Phan does not spend much time in the 
commentary discussing the particular situation of Vietnam.  This points to the global nature of 
Phan’s political ambitions.  Beyond the national unit, Phan, like Kang Youwei, seems to have 
envisioned some sort of world unity.  This global unit is mentioned only in passing, and seems to 
be a largely unarticulated utopian goal to be considered once the national unit has been 
successfully made sovereign and defended against international enemies.   
  Finally, Phan’s vision is ideological.  The Book of Changes offers the most comprehensive, 
rich, and cosmologically sound means of interpreting the world, history, and nature of political 
and charismatic power.  It thus serves as an ordering framework for a political theory of 
revolution.  Phan presents The Book of Changes as a system for categorizing moral examples.  It 
is a device, a theoretical framework for understanding all events, all times, all pathways and 
instances of change.  It is also a toolbox, full of images that allow access into the very nature of 
change and time.  Used properly, it offers the reader who would intuit its meaning an escape 
route, a source of emotional and psychological succor, and a means of conceptualizing a way 
forward.781 
Phan’s ideology draws from correlative cosmology, but does so in a coherent fashion that 
establishes clear prescriptions for individual and group political action.  Phan is able to interpret 
world events, both past and present,through the prismatic framework of The Book of Changes.  
He is further able to propound clear instructions for personal moral cultivation, the gathering of 
followers, and the carrying out of revolution.  All actions are to be taken only after careful and 
conscious observation of the situation to determine an appropriate ethical course in accordance 
with the nature of change and time itself.  This could thus be described as a political-ethical 
temporal ideology of drawing on the Confucian repertoire.  Phan employs The Book of Changes 
as a refractive ordering device through which he articulates a coherent vision of a modern 
Confucian nation.  
Conclusion: Effectiveness and Comparisons 
 In this evaluation of Phan’s commentary, I have sought to demonstrate that 
“Confucianism,” “Modernism,” and indeed “nationalism” are best understood not as fixed 
categories by which to classify intellectual production, but rather terms that indicate frames of 
reference and repertoires of cultural and philosophical content from which individuals can draw 
to form more or less cohesive ideologies that describe their perspective of the world and offer 
visions of change within it.  This commentary presents a conceptual device, the use of which, 
Phan argues, would allow perceptive and well-cultivated patriotic leaders to first cultivate their 
own virtue and capacity, then carry out a revolution producing a modern nation founded on 
principles of personal and collective virtue, politico-moral heroism, and social harmony.  Phan’s 
commentary lays out a coherent vision of the cosmos and suggests the most appropriate means of 
acting within it.   
 How effective was Phan’s ideology?  On the face of it, not very.  Phan’s commentary was 
not published until 1969 -twenty-nine years after he passed away.  It has not had a significant 
influence on Vietnamese philosophers, politicians, or for that matter, scholars.  Phan did not 
 
781 Hall and Ames say The Book of Songs serves a similar function to the function the Book of Changes 
serves for Phan.  They write, “People of different ages with different concerns could use the text creatively to 
arrange and express their experiences, to structure their priorities and to argue for a specific point of view.” David 
Hall and Roger Ames,  Thinking Through Confucius ( Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987), 64. 
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achieve the ideological influence he intended with this text.   
 If we consider the text on its own merits, that is, as a presentation of a systematic 
framework for understanding the modern world, a rather different evaluation is possible.  Phan 
interprets and explains The Book of Changes in such a way that time itself becomes the primary 
ontological unit.  This allows for a modern understanding of temporality, albeit one distinct from 
the Western notion of temporality as empty, homogenous, and linear.  By focusing on the 
superior man’s overriding need to accord with time, Phan reorients the text and fundamentally 
alters its interpretive possibilities.  By focusing his reader’s attention on time, in effect, Phan can 
“keep up” with the velocity of the modern.782   
 Phan’s focus on the development of proper ethical attributes for a hero draws upon 
traditional sources, but presents them within modern contexts and facing modern problematics, 
such as colonialism.  In this sense, Phan is demonstrating the utility of traditional values, 
provided they are oriented around a modern conception of time.  Phan’s modern heroes, such as 
Cai E and Camillo Cavour, display the same characteristics of courage, charisma, determination, 
and perspicacity as do traditional heroes.  Phan’s point is that virtues do not change.  For Phan, 
what made a man a strong leader in the past will make him a strong leader in the future as well.  
Phan’s employment of values found in traditional texts underscores his belief in the fundamental 
validity of certain portions of Confucian doctrine, but they are precisely the portions he is most 
able to accommodate to a modern global conception of revolution.   
 Though it is easy to criticize Phan’s validation of traditional virtues, it is worth 
comparing them to the virtues upheld by the organization typically praised for its modern and 
effective approach to politics and nation-building: The Vietnamese Communist Party.  There are 
many homologies.  Both ideological perspectives include an ontological of dialectical time, place 
a strong emphasis on personal moral cultivation, and posit revolution as their goal.   However, 
there is a critical difference.  Whereas The Book of Changes is systematic, it uses analogical 
reasoning, which is primarily descriptive of the totality and prescriptive for the 
individual.   Communist ideology is primarily prescriptive for the totality and descriptive of the 
individual (assignment of class status). 
    Thus, at its heart, Phan’s ideology is most effective for an individual navigating the 
modern world.  It is a road map for young Vietnamese revolutionaries who are determined to 
learn, develop morals, and do whatever might be required to succeed.  On a societal scale, Phan’s 
framework and vision would quickly prove inadequate.  However, on a personal level, Phan’s 
way of interpreting and explaining the world, and an individual hero’s place in it, are remarkably 
coherent, morally sophisticated, and psychologically satisfying.   
Appendix - Data Analysis of the Content of the Commentary 
 As indicated in the corresponding chart (See Appendix A1), the most important finding is 
that 80% (441/551) of the references were to Chinese texts or historical figures.  This exceeds the 
number of references to Vietnamese texts and historical figures, 10% (55/551), by a factor of 
eight.  We can draw three conclusions from this.  First, Phan Bội Châu’s knowledge of Chinese 
history and literature was considerable.  Second, Phan had no compunction about employing 
Chinese references, which suggests that he saw China less as a foreign nation to compete with 
 
782 For an excellent discussion of this and other velocity-related theoretical concerns, see Paul Virilio, 
Speed and Politics (Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2007).  Virilio points out that in the modern era, that which is 
more rapid will inevitably overcome that which is more wealthy.  He locates the geographical source of velocity: 
“speed is the hope of the West [italics in original],” 70. 
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and more as a reservoir of meaningful cultural content.  Third, Phan seems to have assumed that 
his readers would at the very least recognize and comprehend his references, for he makes little 
effort to explain them. 
Of the Chinese references (See Appendix A2), 246 are citations from identifiable texts.  
Approximately 64% (158/246) of these citations are from works traditionally understood as 
classical Confucian texts.  These include The Book of Documents or shujing 書經 (16), The Book 
of Songs or shijing 詩經 (8), and the Zuo Commentary or zuozhuan 左傳 (9).  The Daoist 
citations are primarily from the Dao De Jing  道德經 (14).  The portion described as Later 
Commentaries come from a vast range of sources.  Of these,there is considerable representation 
from late Tang and Song dynasty scholars including Han Yu 韓愈 (768-824),783 Shao Yong, 
Cheng Yi, and Sima Guang 司馬光 (1019-1086).  The “foreword” is particularly interesting 
because of the individuals Phan references in it.  In rapid succession, Phan mentions the 
polymath Shao Yong, the strategist Zhang Liang 張良 (262-189 BCE), the philosopher Mencius 
孟子 (372-289 BCE?), and Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵 (1139-1192) and Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472-
1529), the founders of the Lu Wang School.784  He does this only to elucidate his distinction 
between Buddhism, Daoism, and the study of The Book of Changes.  
     However, the bulk of citations (109) come from a group of classical Confucian texts 
known at the Four Books (See Appendix A3).785  This set of texts, selected by the Neo-Confucian 
educator Zhu Xi, comprise the core of the Neo-Confucian curriculum in China. These include the 
Analects or lunyu 論語 (39), the Mencius or mengzi 孟子 (39), the Great Learning or daxue 大
 
783 Phan offers a particularly interesting story about Han Yu as a gloss to the second line of the Xun 巽 
hexagram (No. 57, Penetration): “Han of Changli [Han Yu] was banished to Chaozhou.  He went to Hang Mountain.  
The clouds and snow blocked the mountain pass and he couldn’t see the path.  He prayed to himself sincerely and 
suddenly the clouds dissipated and the snow hardened.  Chaozhou often had people injured by crocodiles.  The 
people of Chaozhou at that time were savages.  They said crocodiles were spirits and they did not dare touch them.  
He had men go purchase bows and arrows to shoot them with.  When planning to attack a crocodile, first a 
proclamation was thrown into the river informing the crocodiles that if they truly were spirits then they needed to 
leave within three days or they would all be wiped out.  In two days, thunder and lightning suddenly and violently 
struck the river.  A great many crocodiles followed the wind away.  From that point forward the people of Chaozhou 
had no more crocodile problems.”  The line in question reads: “Nine in the second line.  There is penetration 
underneath the bed. If one employ many priests and sorcerors there will be good fortune and no error.”   Phan Bội 
Châu, Chu Dịch, 630. 
784 The Lu-Wang school refers one of the two major Neo-Confucian schools, the other being the Cheng-
Zhu school associated with the Cheng brothers, Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033-1107), Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032-1085), and 
Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200). 
785 Citations from the Four Books can be found throughout the text, in comments on judgments, line 
statements, or in Phan’s “extra notes” provided to gloss his exegetical remarks.  Nevertheless, Phan is somewhat 
selective; for 16 out of 64 hexagrams (exactly one quarter), there are no citations from the Four Books at all.  
Phan’s use of the Four Books ranges from the definitional to the pedagogical, butthroughout he displays a tendency 
to emphasize the importance of the virtuous individual and of learning.  A majority of citations concern the actions, 
behaviors, and states of mind necessary for an individual to become or be considered a superior man 君子.  A 
number of others underscore the importance of timeliness and of patience under duress.  Of those citations that relate 
to social groupings, most concentrate on the effect the superior man has on those around him. 
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學 (10), and the Doctrine of the Mean or zhongyong 中庸 (21).  The Four Books were imported 
into Vietnam at the time of the Ming occupation (1407-1427), and served as the basis for 
Vietnamese Confucian education in village schools such as the ones Phan attended in Nghệ An 
province.  In his Autobiography, Phan recalls memorizing portions of The Book of Songs and the 
Analects, even going as far as to compose his own Analects of Mr. Phan, for which he was 
reprimanded.786 
   Of course, the Analects is a foundational text for the Confucian repertoire.  It provides 
many anecdotes, aphorisms, and pragmatic principles an individual can use to determine their 
own way to walk a moral path.  The text demonstrates a concern for ritual corruption and a 
decline in ethical conduct associated with the moral chaos of the Spring and Autumn period 
(771-476 BCE).787  The sense of moral concern for the political state of the Central Country only 
increased as the “Way of the Zhou” deteriorated in the violent atmosphere of the Warring States 
period (475-221 BCE).  In addition to serving as Phan’s childhood primer and his textbook for 
the civil service exams, The Analects can be best understood as a resource Phan drew upon for 
guidance when faced with political and social trouble.788   
Phan’s liberal use of Mencius is striking, although not surprising. Of the Four Books, the 
Mencius held a privileged reputation for Vietnamese Confucian scholars.  Alexander Woodside 
points out, “There is no doubt that Mencianism had become broadly internalized in the 
consciousness of Vietnamese village scholars by the 1700s.”  Furthermore, Woodside suggests 
that the influence of Mencius may have been stronger in Vietnam than in China due to the 
“narrower, more controlled range of Confucian scholarship.”789   
 
786 Phan, Overturned, 48. 
787 Edward Slingerland writes, “Such a situation of moral chaos is what Confucius saw around him in a 
society that had lost the true Way because of its obsession with externalities.”  Edward Slingerland,   “Introduction.”  
Confucius: Analects, trans. Edward Slingerland. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2003),  xxiii. 
788 Phan draws primarily on four chapters of the Analects (See Appendix A4): Chapter One 學而, Chapter 
Four 里仁, Chapter Seven 述而, and Chapter Fifteen 衛靈公.  Chapter One focuses on the importance of learning 
and virtuous public behavior.  Phan cites the opening line three times: “The Master said, ‘To learn and then have 
occasion to practice what you have learned - is this not satisfying?  To be patient even when others do not 
understand - is this not the mark of a gentleman?’” ⁠ Confucius, Trans. by Slingerland, 1.  Learning here does not 
mean simple academic learning, but rather the moral progression of the individual.  Phan thus reinforces his 
contention that the ability to properly utilize The Book of Changes requires constant attention to one’s conduct, 
thinking, and sense of determination.  Chapter Four concentrates on the goodness embodied by the superior man and 
the latitude this virtue allows him in influencing the perceptions and opinions of others.  Meanwhile, Chapter Seven, 
concerns, “the importance of a properly directed and sufficiently intense will or intention.”⁠  Confucius, Trans. by 
Slingerland, 64.  Chapter Fifteen has no central unifying theme, but the passages Phan cites generally highlight the 
forbearance and probity exercised by the superior man in the face of adversity.  From this collection of citations, we 
can see Phan emphasizing the qualities of a resolute, virtuous leader, a man that could draw on his inner will no 
matter the array of forces against him. 
789 Alexander Woodside,  “History, Structure, and Revolution in Vietnam.” International Political Science 
Review 10, no. 2 (1989): 149.  Phan’s use of the Mencius is distinctive and bears some scrutiny.  Written after a 
conceivable “Confucian” doctrine had taken form, the Mencius is a text concerned with defending the faith against 
other hostile doctrines such as those of Yang Chu and Mozi. ⁠  Schwartz, World of Thought, 259.  Mencius contends 
that human nature is good, but that it can be corrupted if the people are not afforded a “stable livelihood.” Ibid., 278.  
As such, it is important for a ruler to ensure the people’s material needs are met. Providing for the people’s 
economic livelihood is, according to Mencius, one of the most important duties of a sovereign and necessary for any 
attempt to improve the people’s moral condition. A ruler failing to do so is not a proper ruler, and can be 
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Phan’s textual allusions thus give the impression that he seeks to use The Book of Changes to 
foster and guide virtuous heroes capable of maintaining their inner will amidst the turmoil of the 
modern age.  Phan’s emphasis on developing one’s perception so that one can take action in a 
timely manner suggests that he sees the Book of Changes as a calibrating device, a catalyzing 
prism through which change can be ascertained and harnessed, no matter its velocity.  Those able 
to understand the message will become heroes of the modern age.   
The historical references in Phan’s commentary are primarily individuals - mostly heroes, but 
occasionally villains (See Appendix A5).  Phan uses the exploits of these individuals to gloss 
particular hexagrams and explain their significance.790  Many of the references are to the four 
 
legitimately dethroned.⁠   H.G. Creel, Chinese Thought: From Confucius to Mao Tse-tung (New York, NY: 1953),  
71.  While this suggests an analogue of the Western notion of popular sovereignty, Benjamin Schwartz takes pains 
to point out that, “one is struck by the extraordinary passivity of the people.  Without the sages, they are completely 
at the mercy of nature and totally unable to cope with their most rudimentary needs.”⁠  Schwartz, World of Thought, 
287. 
        It is particularly interesting, then, that Phan does not cite Mencius in this capacity, although his discussion 
admits of a certain Mencian populism.  Most of the 39 citations of the Mencius pertain to the refinement of personal 
virtue in the face of difficulty, in line with Phan’s citations from the Analects.  Mencius, like Confucius, stresses the 
importance of proper moral cultivation.  However, he emphasizes that this be accomplished by means of a “constant 
accumulation of righteousness.” Creel, Chinese Thought, 79.  Phan’s citations focus on a potent kind of moral force 
described by Mencius. ⁠  Phan cites the following line twice: “Be skillful at nourishing one’s vast flow of energy.”⁠  
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 221, 328.  Following this line in the Mencius is an explanation of the term “vast flow of 
energy 浩然之氣.” Mencius states, “It is difficult to explain.  It is vital energy.  If raised continuously and not 
harmed, it will fill up all between heaven and earth.  It is vital energy.  It accords with righteousness and the Way.  
Without it, one goes hungry.  It is brought into being by an accumulation of righteousness.  It is not obtained by 
sporadic righteous acts.”⁠  Mencius,  ed. by Li Weihui (Xinhua Publishing Company, 2003),66. [My translation].  
The passage goes on to compare the proper accumulation of righteousness with planting seeds and allowing them 
time and space to grow.  The cultivator of virtue is thus analogous to the cultivator of grain.  If one is able to 
emulate the diligence and patience of the farmer, one may obtain access to a vast store of moral energy - a source of 
the willpower, perspicacity, and personal charisma that are the makings of a great leader.  Phan’s citations from The 
Great Learning and Doctrine of the Mean are also mostly along these same lines.⁠  Towards the latter half of the 
commentary, Phan shifts from citing the Four Books precisely using Sino-Vietnamese, and begins paraphrasing in 
colloquial Vietnamese.  It is unclear why he does so. 
790 Two figures receive a significant amount of attention: Yi Yin 伊尹 (c. 1600-1549 BCE) and Zhuge 
Liang 諸葛亮 (181-234).  Yi Yin, as described in the Mencius, was a minister in the early Shang dynasty who 
helped Emperor Tang of Shang 商湯 (r. 1675-1646 BCE) defeat the last Xia ruler Jie 夏桀 (1728-1675).  Phan 
mentions Yi Yin ten times, usually in his capacity as a sagely advisor.  In 1905, Phan took the young Cường Để, a 
member of the Nguyễn dynasty, to Japan, hoping to eventually help him take the throne and establish a 
constitutional monarchy.  This plan failed, but the narrative is noticeably similar to the Yi Yin story Phan repeats 
throughout the commentary. ⁠  Phan was not alone in his appreciation of Yi Yin.  Alexander Woodside notes that Ngo 
Thi Nham, a prominent advisor to Emperor Quang Trung of the Tay Son, “publically represented himself as a 
Vietnamese version of the famous reformer in Mencius (Yi Yin), who had believed that he could make any ruler 
into a sage emperor; Ngo Thi Nham even took Yi Yin’s name as his own.” Woodside, “History,” 150.  Interestingly 
enough, Phan uses the example of Ngo Thi Nham fleeing after the fall of the Tay Son to explain the Bo 剝 hexagram 
(No. 23, Splitting Apart).  Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 296.  Zhuge Liang was a famous strategist and advisor to Liu 
Bei 劉備 (161-223), a warlord who made himself Emperor of the Shu-Han 蜀漢 state (221-263) during the Three 
Kingdoms period (220-280).  Phan mentions Zhuge Liang nine times, also in his capacity as a sagacious advisor and 
brilliant tactician (Phan also references Liu Bei twice).  Though Zhuge Liang was not as successful as Yi Yin, his 
reputation as a crafty and perceptive man capable of pulling off victories such as at the famous battle of Red Cliff 赤
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putative authors of the Book of Changes: Fu Xi (6), King Wen (17), the Duke of Zhou (10), and 
Confucius (36).  The perseverance and struggles of King Wen and Confucius during difficult 
times are a common theme.791  Mentions of legendary and historical figures range from the sage 
kings Yao 堯 and Shun 舜 to Liu Xiucheng 李秀成 (1823-1864), a Taiping military commander 
who died along with 3,000 martyrs rather than submit to the Qing dynasty.792   
While they are few (7), Phan’s references to modern Chinese figures are some of the most 
interesting in his commentary.  Sun Yatsen appears twice as a positive figure and national leader.  
The remaining five references are to Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 (1859-1916) (4 mentions), a Qing 
general who assumed the Presidency of the nascent Republic of China in 1912 and then declared 
himself Emperor in1915 in a short-lived attempt to revive the monarchy, and his one-time 
commander-in-chief Cai E 蔡鍔 (1882-1916), who raised a rebellion from Yunnan province 
which extinguished Yuan Shikai’s ambitions.  In a witty explication of the third line of the Dun 
遯 hexagram (No. 33, Retreat), Phan demonstrates the importance of knowing when to be patient 
and when to take action (See Appendix A). 
It is not entirely clear why Phan included such a long section on Cai E.  It seems more an 
example of authorial exuberance than a morally appropriate gloss for the line in question, which 
reads: “Nine in the third line, shows one retreating but hassled, this is dangerous and distressing.  
Fostering a retainer or concubine would bring good fortune.”793  Rather than breeze over a line 
that counsels a hero to find succor in “drink and pleasure,” Phan here seems to revel in the sheer 
appropriateness of the example.  Nevertheless, it is a fascinating example of how the modern 
events can be viewed through the lens of particular hexagrams in The Book of Changes.   
Vietnamese Historical References 
 Though Chinese references far outnumber Vietnamese ones, the latter offer a unique 
example of a national history refracted through the prism of correlative cosmology.  These 
examples effectively demonstrate that Confucian virtues and ethical conduct can be found in 
Vietnam just as they can in China.  Interestingly, Vietnamese historical references usually follow 
 
壁 ensured a long legacy within (though not central to) the Confucian repertoire.  In his Autobiography, Phan 
mentions learning The Essentials of Zhuge Liang (Vũ-hầu tâm-thư) by heart.⁠  Phan, Overturned, 52.  Guy Alitto 
notes that Liang Shuming had a similar interest in Zhuge Liang. ⁠  Alitto, “Conservative as Sage,” 236.  Thus, both of 
Phan’s most referenced individuals were advisors who embodied traits Phan found important: tactical insight and the 
ability to achieve some measure of political success.⁠  Most importantly, these two men understood the nature of time 
and the importance of timely action.    
Another individual Phan pays particular attention to is Jizi 箕子 (5), a semi-legendary figure purported to have been 
a virtuous relative of the last king of Shang, the evil tyrant Zhou Xin 紂辛 (1075-1046 BCE).  Jizi supposedly 
feigned madness to avoid being killed after remonstrating against Zhou Xin’s conduct.  After Zhou Xin was 
defeated, Jizi then assisted King Wen of Zhou in administering the state. 
791 Phan mentions both to explain line five of the Wuwang 無妄 hexagram (no. 25, Innocence): “King Wen 
was imprisoned at You Li and Confucius went hungry between Chen and Cai.  Since they were innocent of these 
maladies, what need had they for medicine?”  The implication is that only those guilty of having put themselves in 
jeopardy need be anxious about the result.  As King Wen and Confucius held true to their virtue, they could 
persevere without external assistance.  Phan Bội Châu. Chu Dịch, 221, 315. 
792 Li Xiucheng’s story is used to explain the top line of the Sui 隨 hexagram (No. 17).  Phan Bội Châu, 
Chu Dịch, 245. 
793 James Legge’s translation. 
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directly after Chinese ones, setting up analogical parallels between historical events in both 
countries.794   
Heroes and emperors comprise the bulk of the 55 historical references.  Trần Hưng Đạo 
(4),795  Lê Lợi (4), and Gia Long (1762-1820) (3) exemplify, respectively, loyalty, wherewithal, 
and good judgment.796  In addition to rulers, Phan also introduces Vietnamese sagely advisors.  
 
794 As an illustration of Phan’s use of Vietnamese history to explain The Book of the Changes, I present an 
example of failure that shows Phan’s technique of establishing parallels between Chinese and Vietnamese historical 
situations.  To explain the third line of the Kun 困 hexagram (No. 48, Oppression), Phan writes,    
“During the Han Dynasty, Cai Yong 蔡邕 [132-192] was killed for crying over the corpse of Dong Zhuo 董卓 [?-
192].  Because Yang Xiong sang the praises of Wang Mang 王莽 [45 BCE-23 CE] and jumped from a building 
trying to commit suicide, he ended up wasting his life and was scorned on his tombstone. 
Nguyễn [Hữu] Chỉnh [?-1787] abandoned Lê and Trịnh and went to the Tây Sơn.  In the end the Tây Sơn destroyed 
the Trịnh, whereupon Chỉnh came under suspicion and was killed by the Tây Sơn. 
Lê Văn Chất [1769-1826], a famous Tây Sơn general, followed Gia Long after turning against the Tây Sơn.  In the 
end, he and his descendants were executed by the Nguyễn Dynasty.”⁠ Phan Bội Châu. Chu Dịch, 535.  
        The line, a yin line trapped between two yang lines and located on a yang position, reads: “Imprisoned in stone 
and rests upon brambles.  Upon entering the hall, one does not see one’s wife.  There will be misfortune.” This line 
would apply to any individual trapped between two forces.  Clearly for Phan, the fact that at least fifteen centuries 
intervene between the examples does not affect their analogous relationship.  It is interesting that the Vietnamese 
examples both involve “traitors” whereas the Chinese examples involve men who simply chose the wrong patron.  
This may indicate a subtle critique of Vietnamese who collaborate with French colonialism, and a warning that 
when Vietnam achieves independence a last minute conversion to the nationalist cause may not save them. 
795 To explain line four of the Sui 隨 hexagram (No. 17), a strong line in a weak position, Phan writes,  
“Trần Hưng Đạo takes responsibility for this line.  When the Mongols invaded our country three times the king 
moved the capitol and the Retired Emperor fled to Thanh Hoa.  The many forces of the national army were entrusted 
to a Great Prince, but the people doubted whether he could exercise authority and save the country.  However, his 
lordship, being patriotic and hating the enemy, was able to drive off the Mongols.  When he greeted the king and the 
Retired Emperor, the country was still in a dangerous state and owed its safety to the Great Prince.  The king had 
abandoned the throne and relied on the Great Prince to get it back.  When he had risen to high position, above the 
entire world, but still refused to take the country.”  Phan Bội Châu,Chu Dịch, 242.  
       The corresponding line in The Changes reads: “Nine in the fourth line, one who follows reaps success, but to 
persevere [on one’s own accord] will bring disaster.  If one is sincere in abiding by the Way and makes that evident, 
how could he be blamed?”⁠  Here, Phan both provides an appropriate explication of the line and commends Trần 
Hưng Đạo for his military capability and loyalty.  This line is an excellent example of how distinct the mantic 
and moral readings of the text can be. Richard Rutt provides a reconstructed version of the line without a moral 
interpretation: “Pursuit ends in finding. Augury: Disastrous.  Sacrificing captives on the way; in a covenant, could 
there be misfortune?”  Rutt, Zhouyi, 240. 
796 Emperor Gia Long of the Nguyễn dynasty (1802-1885) and his rival Quang Trung of the Tây Sơn 
(1778-1802) appear in two contrasting vignettes.  The first is used to explain the first or bottom line of the Guai 
夬 hexagram (No. 43, Breakthrough), in which one “forcefully moves forward ahead of one’s toes (one gets ahead 
of oneself), thus failing to achieve victory:” 
“In the Tây Sơn period, when Emperor Quang Trung heard that the Manchu enemy had entered Hanoi, he 
first came up with a plan.  He ordered men to convey [his desire to] surrender to the Manchus to make the enemy 
arrogant.  He then ordered five columns to secretly attack Long Thành, cleanly driving out 150,000 Manchu troops.  
This was victory by achieving victory before acting. 
In Siam, at the same time, Gia Long gathered reinforcements and hastily extended his forces, 150,000 
strong, into Cambodia, intending to take the south.  He did not expect Quang Trung to extend his forces from the 
north down to the south to attack Cambodia [which he did].  In one battle the Siamese troops fell like leaves.  This 
was defeat by acting before achieving victory.”⁠ Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 494.   
          Clearly Quang Trung is shown to be the better general because he recognized the timing of the 
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Glossing the second line of the Song 訟 hexagram (No. 6, Conflict), Phan writes:  
During the Lê dynasty, the Nguyễn and the Trịnh fought each other for the throne.  The 
Lê Emperor was weak and, although he wanted to side with the Nguyễn, he was unable 
to.  The Nguyễn wanted to contend with the Trịnh, but the Trịnh were too powerful and 
still enjoyed the support of the people of the north.  The Nguyễn Lord sent an emmisary 
to plot with Nguyễn Bỉnh Khiêm [1491-1585], who advised the Nguyễn to leave the 
north to the Trịnh.  However, he explained further, “You can take refuge beyond the 
mountains.”  This meant taking refuge beyond the Ngang pass.  Thus the Nguyễn Lord 
requested the land of Ô Châu, known today as Thuận Hóa.  This is exactly the meaning of 
the line “When you are unable to contend, retreat to a safe refuge 不克訟，歸而逋.”797  
Here we see Nguyễn Bỉnh Khiêm, a famous scholar of The Book of Changes in his own 
right,798 serving a similar role as Yi Yin and Zhuge Liang.  In several examples, Phan clearly 
references intra-Vietnamese warfare - an interesting choice for a nationalist ostensibly interested 
emphasizing Vietnamese unity vis-a-vis the French colonial state.  Phan’s sole concern is the 
 
situation.  Gia Long in this instance did not and over-extended.  The phrase “moving ahead of one’s toes 壯于前趾” 
offers a sense of acting before the time is right to act. 
The second narrative is used to explain the second line of the Lü 旅 hexagram (No. 56, Wandering), in 
which one wanders up to an inn carrying one’s property and thereby obtains the service of a young servant, allowing 
one to go on: 
 “At this point in the Yijing, the story of Gia Long being forced by the Tây Sơn to flee to Siam comes to 
mind.  Nguyễn Huỳnh Đức was captured by Quang Trung.  Quang Trung wanted Huỳnh Đức to work for him so he 
tried his best to persuade him, even sleeping in the same bed with him, but Huỳnh Đức wasn’t satisfied.  Outwardly, 
he paid obeisance to Quang Trung, but he remained every day dedicated to his old lord.   
One day, while sleeping in Quang Trung’s bed, [Huỳnh Đức] murmured in his sleep, “Kill the enemy in 
Huế…Kill the enemy in Huế.”  Quang Trung understood and the next morning he asked Huỳnh Đức, “I’ll ask you 
straight, I’ve been very kind to you, what are your true thoughts?” 
Huỳnh Đức complained, “I thank you my lord, but you cannot order me to forget my lord.  If I should know 
where he is, I would go to him immediately.  Quang Trung was satisfied and told him, “Your lord is in Bangkok, I 
will send someone to take you there.”  The next morning Quang Trung gathered his officers and held a feast to see 
off Nguyễn Huỳnh Đức and send a man to show him the way to Siam.  Huỳnh Đức went to Bangkok and visited Gia 
Long.  As soon as they saw each other, he embraced Gia Long’s knee and cried for a long while, he couldn’t say a 
word.  The King of Siam saw and exclaimed, “If Vietnam has servants such as this, how could you not go back?” 
The King of Siam thereupon sent reinforcements to convey the Emperor [Gia Long] to Gia Dinh [Sai Gon].  
From this we know that having a ‘good and trusty servant’ is wonderful during the time of wandering.” ⁠ Phan Bội 
Châu, Chu Dịch, 622.   
At first glance it is odd to see an Emperor discussed in reference to the peripatetic Lü hexagram, yet here it 
is entirely appropriate. ⁠3  Gia Long was the heir to the Nguyễn Lords, who had dominated the state of Đàng Trong in 
what is now Southern Vietnam from 1588 until they were deposed by the Tây Sơn rebels in 1777.  Gia Long, 
followed by Nguyễn Phúc Ánh, then traveled back and forth through Siam [Thailand] and the southern islands off 
the coast of the Mekong Delta for many years.  We can see here the value Phan places on finding and retaining 
talented and loyal assistants.  Phan himself wandered throughout China from 1912 until 1924, often relying on the 
same young men he had brought to Japan during the Eastern Travel Movement.  For an insightful explanation of the 
Lü hexagram, see Hellmut Wilhelm, Heaven, Earth, and Man in the Book of Changes (Seattle, WA: University of 
Washington Press, 1977), 164-189. 
797 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 127. 
798 Richard Smith notes, “Nguyen [Binh Khiem] used the Yijing to unite Neo-Confucian metaphysics with 
Daoism and Buddhism. He also gained fame as an able and insightful exponent of Shao Yong’s numerological 
approach to divination.” Smith, The I Ching, 152. 
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degree to which an action corresponds to the timing of the situation.  He evinces no interest in 
which side is the “right” one.  This suggests strongly that Phan’s worldview is amoral, although 
it is clearly normative.  As I will discuss in greater detail later, Phan’s vision of reality combines 
the sociopolitical concerns of Social Darwinism with notions of strategic ethical temporality 
drawn from The Book of Changes. 
Other Citations and References: Buddhism, Japan, and the West 
This category includes fifty-four heterogenous examples ranging from references to the 
Śūraṅgama Sūtra (Kinh Lăng Nghiêm 楞嚴經)799 to an explication of the phrase “wind comes 
from fire  風自火出” by reference to “the Western scientific axiom that mechanical movement 
relies on fire and electricity to produce wind, thus [indicating] electricity is a product of fire and 
wind.”800  These citations and references are a mixed bag, but show Phan’s willingness to 
perceive nearly any phenomena as perfectly relatable to the hexagrams and lines of The 
Changes.  The very catholicism of Phan’s approach indicates an ordering method at odds with 
Western rational classification systems.  Nevertheless, there is an effort on Phan’s part to 
demonstrate a totalistic epistemology - one that can and does find useful analogues for any 
phenomenon.   
 The foreword is particularly interesting because of the individuals Phan integrates into it.  
In rapid succession, Phan mentions the polymath Shao Yong, the strategist Zhang Liang 張良 
(262-189 BCE), the philosopher Mencius 孟子 (372-289 BCE?), and the Lu-Wang School 
founders Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵 (1139-1192) and Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472-1529), to elucidate 
his distinction between Buddhism, Daoism, and the study of The Changes. 
 Most of Phan’s references to Buddhism note how Buddhists or Buddhist texts interpret 
particular words or lines of The Changes.  While explaining the Guan 觀 hexagram (No. 20, 
Contemplation), Phan cites the Diamond Sutra: “Those who see me in form or  seek me through 
sound are on a mistaken path; They do not see the Tathagata.”801  Phan states that this is exactly like 
the line from the Commentary on the Judgment: “Contemplation.  One washes one’s hands but 
does not sacrifice.” Though a Buddhist might disagree, Phan at least makes an effort here to 
draw parallels between the two philosophical perspectives.  At other points, Phan makes 
distinctions between the doctrines.  For example, when explaining the Wuwang 無妄 hexagram 
(No. 25, Innocence),  Phan writes: “In Buddhism, rashness 妄 is a hated word, while in the study 
of The Changes innocence 無妄 is treasured.”802   
 
799 Phan Bội Châu. Chu Dịch, 299. 
800 Phan Bội Châu. Chu Dịch, 428. 
801 “若以色见我 以音声求我 是人行邪道 不能见如来.”  Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 266. 
802 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 310.  Phan’s use of Buddhism thus indicates an attempt to incorporate other 
epistemological systems into his own.  By presenting the refractive facets through which Buddhists observe 
phenomenon, Phan suggests that not only are all things relatable, methods of knowing themselves are akin to 
looking into the prism of reality from a different side.  This attempt to seek holistic knowledge both of things and 
ways of perceiving them reflects what is truly radical about Phan Bội Châu: he saw no fundamental disagreement 
between types or modes of reality.  Taking Kang Youwei’s syncretism one step farther, Phan sought to discursively 
establish the unity of the entire universe - an extreme reaction to the fragmentation of the Vietnamese socio-polity 
akin in revealing ways the projects of Hegel and Marx. 
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Phan offers only a few references to Japan.  This is rather odd given that he spent five years 
(1905-1909) there, and was initially quite impressed with Japanese technology and social 
customs.  However, by the 1920s, Phan had begun to describe Japan as a threat.803  Whether 
related to these concerns or not, Phan only includes eight references to Japan in his commentary.  
In one interesting example, Phan references Zhu Shunsui (1600-1682), a famous Ming loyalist 
who fled to Japan and worked for Tokugawa Mitsukuni, and Mạc Ngọc Luyến, who left Vietnam 
for Longzhou.  Phan cites these two men as examples for a phrase from line four of the Mingyi 
明夷 (No. 36, Brightness Wounded), which Phan explains as “finding comfort when the 
brightness is wounded.”804  Phan here reads the line as a validation of self-selected exile as a 
response to the foreign occupation of one’s homeland.  Certainly this line thus read could apply 
to Phan himself during his long exile (1905-1924).   
 Phan’s references to Western historical figures and events are few, but particularly 
interesting.  In the introduction, Phan notes how Richard Wilhelm spent twenty years in Qingdao 
studying The Book of Changes and received a doctorate from Kaiser Wilhelm II.   Phan’s 
references here testify to his broad learning and, in effect, claim that his work participates in a 
modern global discourse on the Book of Changes.  Phan demonstrates his enthusiasm for Camillo 
Cavour805 and George Washington, but counts Napoleon as a dictator who took things too far.  
Explaining the top line of the Qian 乾 hexagram (No. 1, The Creative) entitled “the arrogant 
dragon,” Phan notes that George Washington refused to declare himself king or President for life 
and turned down a second term while Napoleon, like Yuan Shikai, declared himself emperor, 
thus inviting his own downfall.806  “Socialism” is mentioned five times in various contexts.  As 
an offside gloss for the Xu 需 hexagram (No. 5, Waiting for Nourishment), Phan cites Marx’s 
Critique of the Gotha Program.807 
 By far the most curious reference to a Western situation appears in Phan’s explanation of 
the Song 訟 hexagram (No. 6, Conflict, See Appendix B).  Here Phan attempts a materialist 
explanation of international conflict through a reading of the “Sequence of the Hexagrams,” one 
of the Ten Wings that offers usually not-altogether-convincing explanations for why one 
hexagram follows another.  It is not clear from where Phan derived his information, but since he 
was held in jail in Guangzhou from 1914 to 1917, it is entirely possible it was through prison 
hearsay.  It is also possible Phan read about WWI in a Chinese newspaper.  Given the endemic 
food shortages associated with Vietnam’s subsistence economy,808 it is not ultimately surprising 
that Phan would focus on food as a principle cause of warfare.  Regardless of the provenance of 
the “bread problem”explanation, we see here a clear attempt to interpret modern events as 
representations of hexagrams shifting in time.   
 
803 Duiker, “Phan Bội Châu,” 84. 
804 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 418. 
805 Glossing the Daguo 大過 hexagram (No. 28, Great Achievement), Phan points out how Camillo 
Cavour, like Yi Yin, farmed and read books, secretly researching the past for over ten years before unifying Italy.   
Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 339. 
806 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 47. 
807 Phan refers to his source as “the book entitled Socialism.” However, the citation is “From each 
according to his ability, to each according to his need.” Phan Bội Châu.,Chu Dịch, 109. 
808 James Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia.  (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976). 
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Appendix B - Yuan Shikai and Cai E 
“When the Republic of China was founded, Cai E was the Military Governor of Yunnan Province.  Because 
Yuan Shikai wanted to oppose democracy by declaring himself Emperor and he knew that Cai E supported 
democracy, Yuan ordered Cai E to come to Beijing.  If he did not come to Beijing, Yuan would send his army to 
attack.  At the time, Cai E was not strong enough to fight against Yuan, so he contained himself and went to 
Beijing.  
Yuan kept him in Beijing and made him Commander in Chief, but did not allow him to attend to military 
matters.  Instead, Yuan sent a dozen agents to spy on Cai E every day.  Cai E had no opportunity to hide from 
Yuan, so he waited two years in complete secrecy.  Every day, aside from the time he spent in Yuan’s hall, he 
was only with the actress [Xiao] Fengxian 小鳳仙.  An agent was sent to spy at Fengxian’s house for a long 
time, but seeing Cai E doing absolutely nothing, finally grew disheartened and bored and began to take his 
guard duties less seriously.  Cai E knew that Yuan still did not trust him, and since a revolt [against Yuan] was 
not forthcoming, Cai E continued to suffer patiently and secretly married Fengxian.  Every day after leaving 
Yuan’s hall he went immediately to stay at Fengxian’s house and did not return to the mansion.  Yuan sent 
another operative to spy on the mansion to see if there was a plot.  Cai E understood Yuan’s intent.  One day 
when Cai E took Fengxian to the mansion Cai E’s wife grew jealous and came to blows with him, scratching 
and tearing his face. Cai E immediately asked Yuan for a divorce.  Legally, for the Commander in Chief to 
divorce his wife, he needed the permission of the President.  Yuan saw this and declared Cai E highly improper.  
At that point Cai E’s wife took a portion of his money and left for his hometown in Hunan with the divorce 
papers.  From this point forward Cai E ate and slept religiously at Fengxian house, did not bother to go to the 
mansion and spent his days and nights lost in drink and pleasure.  Two years later, in the fourth year of the 
Republic, Yuan officially pronounced himself Emperor Hongxian and exchanged nationalism for imperialism.   
 The next morning at seven o’clock sharp, gallantly dressed up in his military attire with his sword and 
helmet, his carriage gleaming, [Cai E] went from Fengxian’s house straight to the Tian’an Gate (Tian’anmen) to 
report to the eunuch guarding the gate and asked to be let into the Imperial Hall.  The guarding eunuch replied, 
“The Emperor has not yet come forth, wait for a bit and you can come in at nine o’clock.”  Cai E immediately 
changed his whole uniform and placed his entire carriage smack in front of the Tian’an Gate and announced to 
everyone “Wait for me here.  It’s early and I haven’t eaten breakfast.  I am going to the Oten restaurant for a 
little bit and I will be back at nine o’clock.”   
 Cai E then grasped his Commander in Chief’s sword and beckoned for a rickshaw to run him straight 
to Fengxian’s house.  He tossed his sword and threw off his uniform and everything else, including his general’s 
quill, and donned some light clothes. Cai E took Fengxian under his arm onto a train headed to Tianjin, then 
immediately boarded a Japanese ship for Hong Kong where he met his teacher Liang Qichao and friend Ân 
Thừa Hiến who were waiting for him.  Beijing was suddenly missing a Commander in Chief.  Yuan was 
enraged and killed twelve policemen and twelve agents.  The next month Yunnan was the first to rise up against 
Yuan.  Everywhere else responded and within three months Emperor Hongxian had fallen and Yuan died soon 
after.  Cai’s wife went to Sichuan to help him with affairs.  From this we know the hero’s way of Retreat 遯 and 
furthermore that the power of servants is not negligible.  When Cai E died, the entire country met to 
commemorate him.  Fengxian also wrote a couplet for him: 
Unhappy fate! Zhou Lang’s life cut short 
It was known early on that Li Jing was a hero.”809  
 
Appendix C - Germany in The Great War 
“The Song hexagram [Conflict] comprises all of the conflicts, large or small, from within a family up to the 
international stage.   
In 1914 Europe began a war that lasted four years.  The number of casualties in the combatant countries 
reached 10 million.  After the war was over, scholars sought to find out what had caused it.  There was a simple 
and very correct answer: ‘the bread problem.’  This meant that the fighting had simply started over food.  How 
correct!” 
  At the start of the 20th century, before the war began, Europe was completely fixated on economic 
problems and the problem of securing a food supply. 
 
809 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 392-294. 
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At that time, the population of Germany had risen to over 70 million and it seemed as if there would not be 
enough food to eat.  [Germany] needed colonies to expand business around the globe.  Because of difficulties, 
Germany was a late developing [nation], most of the valuable and wealthy land around the world had already 
been seized by Britain, France, and America.  Although [Germans] wanted to get food from the sea, [they could 
not] because of the Red Hairs’ [Britain] maritime monopoly.  After twenty years of heartbreak, the Germany 
Kaiser initiated a Great War on land against the French and Italians and by sea against the Red Hairs.  Even if 
[Germany] should lose, it would be preferable to die with honor than to die of starvation.  Britain and France, 
fearing German hegemony and that their own food supplies might be captured, banded together to contend with 
Germany. 
To summarize, the European imperialist war shattered the earth and shook the heavens, but if we seek out 
its causes, we find two: 
One is the issue of capturing food and the other is that of maintaining enough food.  These were the causes 
of the European war and it was because of food that [the combatants] clashed, that blood flowed into rivers and 
bones piled up into hills.  This was caused by ‘the bread problem’ alone.   
This shows the subtle import of The Book of Changes [which states that] if there is Waiting for 
Nourishment ［需］, there will certainly be Conflict.  Truly this strikes right through to the heart of world 
affairs! 
Oh!  Looking at the world’s present and future, [we can see] ‘the bread problem’ has yet no solution.  If 
things continue badly, like in the beginning of the 20th century, the Second Great War will likely affect the entire 
world; it is unavoidable.  Any peace or disarmament without a solution to the food shortage problem will be 
nothing but idle talk.   
Waiting for Nourishment leads to Conflict; Conflict leads to the Army [師].  Reading the Book of Changes 
brings immeasurable grief!”810   
Appendix D - Lord Mengchang of Qi 
“During a time of peace the result of ‘increasing what is below’ is quite small.  However, during a time of 
great obstacles and troubles, that ‘increase’ will be seen as very great!  In the past Lord Mengchang, the 
Chancellor of Qi, lent a sum to the people of Xue in the amount of several tens of thousands.  When interest 
came due, he sent Feng Huan to collect on the contracts.  He asked Lord Mengchang, “After I collect the debt, 
should I buy anything to bring back?” Lord Mengchang replied, “If you see anything missing from my house, 
then buy that.”  Feng Huan went, taking the contracts with him in a carriage.  As soon as he reached Xue, he 
saw that the people had met several years of poor harvests and that life was bleak.  Feng Huan immediately 
gathered the people and announced, “The Lord Chancellor told me to come here principally to pay attention to 
the people’s sentiment and not to demand a debt.  Right now the people feel miserable, on behalf of the 
Chancellor, your debts are hereby exempted.” Whereupon he lit many contracts on fire before the people.  Feng 
Huan returned with empty hands and reported to Lord Mengchang.  Lord Mengchang asked, “Why are your 
hands empty?”  Feng Huan pleaded, “I saw the people were starving and miserable, so I burned the contracts.  
Seeing that your home is already full of expensive and strange things, [I felt] there was only one thing still 
missing: ‘Righteousness.’  So I bought ‘Righteousness’ and brought it back for your good lordship.”  Lord 
Mengchang was unhappy, but he allowed Feng Huan to stay.   
Not long afterward the King of Qi died and his son became King.  Many courtiers who detested Lord 
Mengchang’s power and influence impeached him before the King, accusing him of many evils.  The King was 
furious.  He dismissed Lord Mengchang from the Chancellorship and banished him from the capital.   
Lord Mengchang was frightened that his entire life would become difficult.  Feng Huan came to his table 
and urged him to go to Xue.  Lord Mengchang listened to his advice and left in the middle of the night, 
speeding his carriage to Xue.  He arrived at the border at mid-day.  The people had heard he was coming and 
young and old, men and women all turned out to greet the carriage of Lord Mengchang.  They gathered before 
his carriage and yelled in unison: “The father of our district has returned!”  There were tens of thousands on 
either side of his carriage. 
Lord Mengchang looked back and said to Feng Huan, “Today I understand what gain the ‘righteousness’  
you bought has brought us!” 
The King of Qi heard about this and feared that Lord Mengchang had won too much of the people’s 
 
810 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 121-122. 
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adoration and feared that [Lord Mengchang] would soon be able to overthrow him.  He immediately invited 
Lord Mengchang back to Qi, appointed him Chancellor as before, and sternly reproached the group that had 
impeached him.   
From reviewing this case, we can understand the words “decreasing what is above and increasing what is 
below 損上益下” and that “advantageous for crossing the great river利涉大川” are not idle words.”811 
 Appendix E - Exegesis on Revolution 
Revolution means to change what is old.  Whenever a matter grows old or something becomes old, there 
must be revolution.  This is for two reasons. 
First, according to history anything that has been around for a long time accumulates evil.  If evil is 
accumulated for a long time and cannot be changed, there comes a time when medicine cannot clear it out.  At 
this point there must be revolution. 
Second, the circumstances are different today than they were in the past.  We must attune to present day 
society.  We have to welcome with high regard new and strange trends.  After we have welcomed with high 
regard new and strange trends, there will certainly be outdated things to get rid of.  Because of the two reasons 
stated here, in the course of life it is impossible to escape revolution.   
Because of this there must be a hexagram for revolution in the Book of Changes.  Revolution is quite a 
commonplace phenomenon.  For example, when clothing is torn one must purchase new clothing.  If a house 
becomes old one must erect a new house.  To talk of these things is not at all strange, but then there are issues of 
a more difficult nature, such as personal or familial revolution, which cannot be undertaken carelessly, or 
national and social revolutions, which are so much more severe and dangerous.   
To explain, with so many old things and set habits, a sudden change can bewilder people.  Moreover, 
suddenly smashing the old foundations before a new foundation is erected can terrify people.  Not to mention 
one cannot carry out revolution alone!  One must rely upon the majority of the people. How difficult!.  Human 
nature prefers what is familiar and sticks to the old.  Few people understand.  Most people are only happy once 
things are going, but do not have faith at the beginning.  So heavy, Revolution! So hard, Revolution! What 
should we think in regard to timing?  One can only wait upon the situation and reflect on the principle of 
righteousness.  This way the time for revolution will come naturally.  When things have gotten to the point of 
revolution, one must carry out revolution.  A long time has passed and the principle of righteousness is now 
clear.  The situation still tends toward this direction and now the people’s hearts must follow.  This means that 
revolution has been happening for a long time but only now are people ready to believe.   
A nation or a society, having suffered a great defeat that brought it to the point of termination, will fall 
silent.  For example, Xia was not willing to become Shang, Shang was not willing to become Zhou, though at 
those times the common people feared death at the hands of the tyrants Jie and Zhou.  It was Tang who had to 
drive out Jie to carry out a revolution over the Xia, it was Wu who had to strike Zhou to carry out a revolution 
over the Shang. Tang and Wu’s revolutions were in accordance with the way of Heaven and fulfilled the desires 
of the people.   
The word ‘Revolution’ is on the tongues of people nowadays.  But what does it mean to them?  Up until 
now no one has provided a suitable explanation.  Please follow this explanation of the meaning drawn from the 
Book of Changes: ‘cách’ means change, ‘mệnh’ means a correct mandate.  Changing a nation, a court, or a 
government all mean replacing an old mandate with a new mandate.’ 
For example, in a family replacing an old habit with a new habit is called ‘family revolution.’  
For an ethnicity, to replace that race with this race is called ‘ethnic revolution.’  To replace an old corrupt 
administration with a new administration is called ‘national revolution.’  To replace an old class with a new 
class is called ‘social revolution.’  For some matters one cannot say ‘revolution.’  In these cases it is enough to 
say ‘change,’ whereas adding the word ‘mandate’ would be excessive. 
For example: moral revolution, career revolution, craft revolution, economic revolution, artistic revolution.  
Compared with national revolution and political revolution, [we might say] for one group it is correct to say 
‘mandate,’ whereas for the other group it does no good to say ‘mandate.’  
At the end of the hexagram for Revolution there must be a warning: ‘resting in correctness brings success.’  
For example, Yuan Shikai overthrew the Manchus and established the Republic of China. This was the 
 
811 Phan Bội Châu, Chu Dịch, 479-480.  This story seems to be a Vietnamese paraphrasing of “The 
Biography of Lord Mengchang” from the The Records of the Grand Historian or the Shiji 史記.  Sima, Qian (1995). 
The Grand Scribe's Records, vol. VII. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press). 189. 
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conclusion of the revolution, but he continued to alter the body politic and set up the Hongxian Dynasty.  In the 
end he lost both his dignity and his life.   
Napoleon toppled the monarchy, opened the National Assembly, and established the constitution.  Was this 
not the end of the revolution?  Yet he turned around and declared himself emperor to flatter himself.  In the end 
he also lost both his dignity and his life.  Both of these men ‘kept going, thus inviting disaster.’   
When we read the words, ‘resting in correctness brings success,’ we must admire Washington.  After eight 
years of bloody war he drove out the British government and founded the United States, he let another person 
take over as President and was content to be an average citizen.  Today the people of America still call him the 
father of the nation - is this not an example of ‘resting in correctness brings success?’ 
Never mind the far, [let us consider] what is closer.  How great were the causes of Mustapha Kemal in 
Turkey and Lenin in Russia and how much their people believed in them!  Before they had carried out 
revolutions they were seen as saints by the people, after they completed the revolutions they were seen as 
parents.   
Whoever is born in the time of revolution or who wants to carry out revolution, must absorb the entire spirit 
of the hexagram Revolution.”   
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